ReliefWeb Latest Reports for Country Office

South Sudan: Famine in Africa: Switzerland pledges CHF 15 million to support emergency relief

Yemen - ReliefWeb News - 4 hours 2 min ago
Source: Government of Switzerland Country: Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Switzerland, Yemen

Switzerland has pledged to take direct action to help populations facing starvation, especially in South Sudan. The decision follows a call issued by the United Nations Secretary-General on 22 February 2017. Swiss Humanitarian Aid, a department of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), is to release CHF 15 million from its fund for humanitarian emergencies for countries hit by famine in the beginning of this year.

“Switzerland is calling for the rapid mobilisation of aid. Some 100,000 people are already facing starvation in South Sudan, and famine looms in other countries in the region,” declared Didier Burkhalter, head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The funds released by Switzerland are earmarked for humanitarian efforts in South Sudan, where the situation is most critical, and in Somalia, Nigeria and Yemen, which are also on the brink of famine. The funds will be divided among a range of programmes and humanitarian organisations working on the ground in these regions, where the lack of food security could affect more than 20 million people by summer 2017 if nothing is done.

South Sudan not only suffered a drought in 2016 but it also has also been in the grip of civil war for the last three years, which has driven 3.5 million people from their homes. The country is now facing a food crisis on an unprecedented scale. Switzerland has been working in this region for several years. “The threat of famine has been looming over this country for quite some time now. Swiss Humanitarian Aid has regularly stepped up its efforts in response to growing needs on the ground,” explains André Huber, head of the Africa Division of Swiss Humanitarian Aid. Work on the ground, which is coordinated by the Swiss Humanitarian Aid office in the capital Juba, aims to offer long-term support and assistance to communities affected by conflict and adverse climate conditions.

The CHF 15 million released from the emergency aid fund is on top of the CHF 50 million in humanitarian aid which the SDC already provides in these four countries. The 2017 budget for South Sudan, which totals CHF 20 million, will fund efforts in the water and civilian protection sectors, as well as projects to improve food security and livelihoods. A share will also be allocated to the ICRC and to UN agencies, such as the World Food Programme and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to support their operations on the ground. Swiss Humanitarian Aid itself runs a programme in Aweil, a city in the north of the country, which aims to provide the local population with access to drinking water and sanitation. Switzerland’s contribution will also support NGOs distributing food and providing medical care.

The Secretary-General warned that urgent action is needed to prevent more people dying of hunger, adding that the timely delivery of sustained and adequate assistance could improve the situation within a few months and mitigate further suffering.

Address for enquiries:

Information FDFA Bundeshaus West CH-3003 Bern Tel.: +41 58 462 31 53 Fax: +41 58 464 90 47 E-Mail: info@eda.admin.ch

South Sudan: Famine in Africa: Switzerland pledges CHF 15 million to support emergency relief

Somalia - ReliefWeb News - 4 hours 2 min ago
Source: Government of Switzerland Country: Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Switzerland, Yemen

Switzerland has pledged to take direct action to help populations facing starvation, especially in South Sudan. The decision follows a call issued by the United Nations Secretary-General on 22 February 2017. Swiss Humanitarian Aid, a department of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), is to release CHF 15 million from its fund for humanitarian emergencies for countries hit by famine in the beginning of this year.

“Switzerland is calling for the rapid mobilisation of aid. Some 100,000 people are already facing starvation in South Sudan, and famine looms in other countries in the region,” declared Didier Burkhalter, head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The funds released by Switzerland are earmarked for humanitarian efforts in South Sudan, where the situation is most critical, and in Somalia, Nigeria and Yemen, which are also on the brink of famine. The funds will be divided among a range of programmes and humanitarian organisations working on the ground in these regions, where the lack of food security could affect more than 20 million people by summer 2017 if nothing is done.

South Sudan not only suffered a drought in 2016 but it also has also been in the grip of civil war for the last three years, which has driven 3.5 million people from their homes. The country is now facing a food crisis on an unprecedented scale. Switzerland has been working in this region for several years. “The threat of famine has been looming over this country for quite some time now. Swiss Humanitarian Aid has regularly stepped up its efforts in response to growing needs on the ground,” explains André Huber, head of the Africa Division of Swiss Humanitarian Aid. Work on the ground, which is coordinated by the Swiss Humanitarian Aid office in the capital Juba, aims to offer long-term support and assistance to communities affected by conflict and adverse climate conditions.

The CHF 15 million released from the emergency aid fund is on top of the CHF 50 million in humanitarian aid which the SDC already provides in these four countries. The 2017 budget for South Sudan, which totals CHF 20 million, will fund efforts in the water and civilian protection sectors, as well as projects to improve food security and livelihoods. A share will also be allocated to the ICRC and to UN agencies, such as the World Food Programme and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to support their operations on the ground. Swiss Humanitarian Aid itself runs a programme in Aweil, a city in the north of the country, which aims to provide the local population with access to drinking water and sanitation. Switzerland’s contribution will also support NGOs distributing food and providing medical care.

The Secretary-General warned that urgent action is needed to prevent more people dying of hunger, adding that the timely delivery of sustained and adequate assistance could improve the situation within a few months and mitigate further suffering.

Address for enquiries:

Information FDFA Bundeshaus West CH-3003 Bern Tel.: +41 58 462 31 53 Fax: +41 58 464 90 47 E-Mail: info@eda.admin.ch

Nigeria: Lake Chad Basin Emergency Response Plan 2017

Niger - ReliefWeb News - 4 hours 12 min ago
Source: World Health Organization Country: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria

Funding requirements

Health sector funding requirements for 2017

(health partners including WHO)
• Cameroon: US$ 11 646 815
• Chad: US$ 10 669 960
• Niger: US$ 9 000 243
• Nigeria US$ 93 827 598

Total: US$ 125 144 616

Beneficiaries targeted by health partners in 2017

In the Lake Chad Basin, health partners will target more than 8.2 million people in 2017. These include:
• Cameroon 767 000
• Chad 233 000
• Niger 325 000
• Nigeria 6 900 000

Background

The Lake Chad Basin emergency affects some 17 million people across north-eastern Nigeria, northern Cameroon, western Chad and south-east Niger. The effects of conflict, climate change, environmental degradation, poverty and underinvestment in social services have combined to bring about deepening insecurity, rapid population growth and severe vulnerability. This has translated into 11 million people needing humanitarian assistance. More than 2.3 million people have fled their homes. Vital infrastructure such as health centres, schools, water pipelines, bridges and roads have been destroyed and millions of people have limited or no access to basic services.

Health sector situation

Across the Lake Chad Basin, almost one third of the population is struck by food insecurity. Malnutrition and related mortality are critically high. In most conflict-affected areas, malnutrition rates have surpassed the emergency threshold. More than 500 000 children are severely acutely malnourished, of whom 75 000 could die without urgent assistance.

Cameroon

Cross-border raids, suicide bombings and heightened insecurity have caused massive displacements and deprivation of communities in the Far North region. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) reached around 200,000 by October 2016. This has resulted in a sharp increase of humanitarian needs for IDPs and host communities, who were already vulnerable before the crisis. Food insecurity remains alarmingly high. Access to basic services in the conflict-affected areas has been severed or severely diminished. Health centers, whose access and quality of services were already limited, are overwhelmed. Some 21 health centres have closed due to insecurity.

Health sector objectives

Objective 1: Ensure access to essential health care for 1.2 million people by supporting 70 health facilities with 140 additional staff, delivering 100 Interagency Emergency Health Kits and providing comprehensive immunization for 240 000 children under 5 and 6 000 pregnant women.

Objective 2: Procure essential commodities for safe delivery and distribute 5000 dignity kits for 60 000 pregnant women.

Objective 3: Implement a comprehensive package for HIV/AIDS services for 60 000 pregnant women and their children and 30 000 IDPs and host communities.

Chad

Insecurity persists along Chad’s western Lac region. The resulting population displacement has accentuated the vulnerability of both those forced to flee the violence and the communities hosting them, many of who already needed assistance. The influx of displaced people is exerting pressure on resources.

Lac region has only 10 doctors. Global Acute Malnutrition in this region now stands at 12.2%, while severe acute malnutrition is 2.1%, which is above the emergency threshold.

Health sector objectives

To reduce the risk of disease, particularly cholera, measles and polio it is critical to:

Objective 1: Strengthen epidemiological surveillance and outreach to 125 000 displaced persons.

Objective 2: Improve access to primary health care for 187 000 people from both displaced and host communities through access to medicines (for malaria, yellow fever), mobile clinics and support to health centres.

Niger

Recurrent attacks by Boko Haram have resulted in the displacement of more than 300 000 people (IDPs, refugees and returnees) in south-east Niger. Some have been forced to flee multiple times. Already limited basic services and resources are overstretched in a region where communities have long grappled with food insecurity, malnutrition and cyclic droughts and floods.

Insecurity and recurrent attacks regularly disrupt health, water and other essential services. In 2017, some 340 000 people face food insecurity, around 12 000 children will be severely malnourished and almost 45 000 will suffer from moderate malnutrition.

Health sector objectives

Objective 1: Increase access to health services through mobile clinics, free medical consultations and prepositioning of contingency medical supplies.

Objective 2: Establish an early warning system to respond to potential disease outbreaks.

Objective 3: Ensure vaccinations of at least 10 500 children not covered under routine immunization campaigns.

Objective 4: Set up emergency response mechanisms to ensure response to sexual and gender-based violence as well as sexually transmitted diseases, and reinforce mental health services and psychological support to people affected by trauma.

Nigeria

The long-running Boko Haram-linked conflict has devastated communities of north-eastern Nigeria, compounding the poverty and underdevelopment in the area. More than 8 million people across Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States require humanitarian assistance. Food insecurity in the three states has almost doubled and almost 2 million people have been displaced.

Health sector objectives

Objective 1: Provide assistance to 5.9 million people, including 1.7 million IDPs and 4.2 million people in host communities, through services for reproductive health, maternal and child health, gender-based violence and the management of malnutrition and non-communicable diseases.

Objective 2: Establish, expand and strengthen communicable disease surveillance and outbreak prevention, control and response.

Objective 3: Strengthen coordination and health system restoration to improve life-saving response for people in need.

Nigeria: Lake Chad Basin Emergency Response Plan 2017

Chad - ReliefWeb News - 4 hours 12 min ago
Source: World Health Organization Country: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria

Funding requirements

Health sector funding requirements for 2017

(health partners including WHO)
• Cameroon: US$ 11 646 815
• Chad: US$ 10 669 960
• Niger: US$ 9 000 243
• Nigeria US$ 93 827 598

Total: US$ 125 144 616

Beneficiaries targeted by health partners in 2017

In the Lake Chad Basin, health partners will target more than 8.2 million people in 2017. These include:
• Cameroon 767 000
• Chad 233 000
• Niger 325 000
• Nigeria 6 900 000

Background

The Lake Chad Basin emergency affects some 17 million people across north-eastern Nigeria, northern Cameroon, western Chad and south-east Niger. The effects of conflict, climate change, environmental degradation, poverty and underinvestment in social services have combined to bring about deepening insecurity, rapid population growth and severe vulnerability. This has translated into 11 million people needing humanitarian assistance. More than 2.3 million people have fled their homes. Vital infrastructure such as health centres, schools, water pipelines, bridges and roads have been destroyed and millions of people have limited or no access to basic services.

Health sector situation

Across the Lake Chad Basin, almost one third of the population is struck by food insecurity. Malnutrition and related mortality are critically high. In most conflict-affected areas, malnutrition rates have surpassed the emergency threshold. More than 500 000 children are severely acutely malnourished, of whom 75 000 could die without urgent assistance.

Cameroon

Cross-border raids, suicide bombings and heightened insecurity have caused massive displacements and deprivation of communities in the Far North region. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) reached around 200,000 by October 2016. This has resulted in a sharp increase of humanitarian needs for IDPs and host communities, who were already vulnerable before the crisis. Food insecurity remains alarmingly high. Access to basic services in the conflict-affected areas has been severed or severely diminished. Health centers, whose access and quality of services were already limited, are overwhelmed. Some 21 health centres have closed due to insecurity.

Health sector objectives

Objective 1: Ensure access to essential health care for 1.2 million people by supporting 70 health facilities with 140 additional staff, delivering 100 Interagency Emergency Health Kits and providing comprehensive immunization for 240 000 children under 5 and 6 000 pregnant women.

Objective 2: Procure essential commodities for safe delivery and distribute 5000 dignity kits for 60 000 pregnant women.

Objective 3: Implement a comprehensive package for HIV/AIDS services for 60 000 pregnant women and their children and 30 000 IDPs and host communities.

Chad

Insecurity persists along Chad’s western Lac region. The resulting population displacement has accentuated the vulnerability of both those forced to flee the violence and the communities hosting them, many of who already needed assistance. The influx of displaced people is exerting pressure on resources.

Lac region has only 10 doctors. Global Acute Malnutrition in this region now stands at 12.2%, while severe acute malnutrition is 2.1%, which is above the emergency threshold.

Health sector objectives

To reduce the risk of disease, particularly cholera, measles and polio it is critical to:

Objective 1: Strengthen epidemiological surveillance and outreach to 125 000 displaced persons.

Objective 2: Improve access to primary health care for 187 000 people from both displaced and host communities through access to medicines (for malaria, yellow fever), mobile clinics and support to health centres.

Niger

Recurrent attacks by Boko Haram have resulted in the displacement of more than 300 000 people (IDPs, refugees and returnees) in south-east Niger. Some have been forced to flee multiple times. Already limited basic services and resources are overstretched in a region where communities have long grappled with food insecurity, malnutrition and cyclic droughts and floods.

Insecurity and recurrent attacks regularly disrupt health, water and other essential services. In 2017, some 340 000 people face food insecurity, around 12 000 children will be severely malnourished and almost 45 000 will suffer from moderate malnutrition.

Health sector objectives

Objective 1: Increase access to health services through mobile clinics, free medical consultations and prepositioning of contingency medical supplies.

Objective 2: Establish an early warning system to respond to potential disease outbreaks.

Objective 3: Ensure vaccinations of at least 10 500 children not covered under routine immunization campaigns.

Objective 4: Set up emergency response mechanisms to ensure response to sexual and gender-based violence as well as sexually transmitted diseases, and reinforce mental health services and psychological support to people affected by trauma.

Nigeria

The long-running Boko Haram-linked conflict has devastated communities of north-eastern Nigeria, compounding the poverty and underdevelopment in the area. More than 8 million people across Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States require humanitarian assistance. Food insecurity in the three states has almost doubled and almost 2 million people have been displaced.

Health sector objectives

Objective 1: Provide assistance to 5.9 million people, including 1.7 million IDPs and 4.2 million people in host communities, through services for reproductive health, maternal and child health, gender-based violence and the management of malnutrition and non-communicable diseases.

Objective 2: Establish, expand and strengthen communicable disease surveillance and outbreak prevention, control and response.

Objective 3: Strengthen coordination and health system restoration to improve life-saving response for people in need.

Iraq: Iraq: Emergency Dashboard, February 2017

Iraq - ReliefWeb News - 4 hours 42 min ago
Source: World Food Programme Country: Iraq, Syrian Arab Republic

South Sudan: South Sudan: Emergency Dashboard, February 2017

Uganda - ReliefWeb News - 4 hours 49 min ago
Source: World Food Programme Country: Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda

South Sudan: South Sudan: Emergency Dashboard, February 2017

Sudan - ReliefWeb News - 4 hours 49 min ago
Source: World Food Programme Country: Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda

South Sudan: South Sudan: Emergency Dashboard, February 2017

Kenya - ReliefWeb News - 4 hours 49 min ago
Source: World Food Programme Country: Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda

South Sudan: South Sudan: Emergency Dashboard, February 2017

Ethiopia - ReliefWeb News - 4 hours 49 min ago
Source: World Food Programme Country: Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda

South Sudan: South Sudan: Emergency Dashboard, February 2017

DRC - ReliefWeb News - 4 hours 49 min ago
Source: World Food Programme Country: Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda

South Sudan: South Sudan: Emergency Dashboard, February 2017

CAR - ReliefWeb News - 4 hours 49 min ago
Source: World Food Programme Country: Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda

Nigeria: Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen O’Brien Remarks to the press at the Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region Oslo, 24 February 2017

Niger - ReliefWeb News - 5 hours 3 min ago
Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Country: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria

We have a humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Region which is truly massive: a staggering 10.7 million people need immediate humanitarian assistance – that is twice the population of Norway as a whole – and who urgently need life-saving relief and protection tonight. And 8.5 million of that 10.7 million are in north-eastern Nigeria around the epicenter of Maiduguri.

With our international community’s increased support, beginning today, affected families and communities - and that includes these very important first responders and host communities who often have very little for themselves but are the ones who step up first and support people who have had to flee through no fault of their own - if we don’t step up, they will all face a life of hunger, even famine in some areas of north-east Nigeria, as announced on Tuesday at the United Nations – so disease, gender-based violence and continued displacement accompany all that. Children will face a bleak future of illiteracy, malnutrition, risk of forced recruitment into armed groups and premature death.

Today, I have launched the Nigeria Humanitarian Fund to support life-saving operations in the North-East. This fund will enable donors to pool their contributions to deliver a more effective, collective and immediate response and I have encouraged all donors to support this initiative. I am deeply grateful to those who have already so committed. What lies behind this is that catastrophes such as a famine can be averted now if we step up in a timely, sufficiently advanced manner.

We are sending a very clear message today: as the international community is stepping up, and is supporting a scale-up, supporting the governments of the region, we can stop and reverse a further descent into an ever-deepening crisis with unimaginable consequences for millions of people and an entire generation of children and youth.

With [the affected] governments, in concert with those governments, and the leadership in-country – and local governments – we, the international community representing all the people behind the governments of those who donate, the UN agencies, the ICRC, the local and international NGOs, we can bring hope.

The UN and our partners in Nigeria have already been reaching 2.1 million people with food assistance, over four million with emergency care and over 1.7 million with water and sanitation, despite the high-risk environment of reaching people with access. We already have a track record of success behind which the donors can generously get behind and back us as we now see the compound factors leading to the need for scale-up.

Particular for this region, the humanitarian appeal is for US$1.5 billion for the Lake Chad Basin region in 2017. And in one morning, we have raised a third of that. That is genuine success for 2017. We have other [donors] who will be able to come in in the course of the coming months as their transition of budgetary cycles allow, and that will help us aim for our target which will help the neighbours meet all the needs as we have seen them. So I am deeply grateful for the support. We have the ability therefore to deliver on a plan, and to step up. We are ready, we need the finance, and I am delighted that as finances are coming in, we can save lives.

Nigeria: Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen O’Brien Remarks to the press at the Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region Oslo, 24 February 2017

Chad - ReliefWeb News - 5 hours 3 min ago
Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Country: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria

We have a humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Region which is truly massive: a staggering 10.7 million people need immediate humanitarian assistance – that is twice the population of Norway as a whole – and who urgently need life-saving relief and protection tonight. And 8.5 million of that 10.7 million are in north-eastern Nigeria around the epicenter of Maiduguri.

With our international community’s increased support, beginning today, affected families and communities - and that includes these very important first responders and host communities who often have very little for themselves but are the ones who step up first and support people who have had to flee through no fault of their own - if we don’t step up, they will all face a life of hunger, even famine in some areas of north-east Nigeria, as announced on Tuesday at the United Nations – so disease, gender-based violence and continued displacement accompany all that. Children will face a bleak future of illiteracy, malnutrition, risk of forced recruitment into armed groups and premature death.

Today, I have launched the Nigeria Humanitarian Fund to support life-saving operations in the North-East. This fund will enable donors to pool their contributions to deliver a more effective, collective and immediate response and I have encouraged all donors to support this initiative. I am deeply grateful to those who have already so committed. What lies behind this is that catastrophes such as a famine can be averted now if we step up in a timely, sufficiently advanced manner.

We are sending a very clear message today: as the international community is stepping up, and is supporting a scale-up, supporting the governments of the region, we can stop and reverse a further descent into an ever-deepening crisis with unimaginable consequences for millions of people and an entire generation of children and youth.

With [the affected] governments, in concert with those governments, and the leadership in-country – and local governments – we, the international community representing all the people behind the governments of those who donate, the UN agencies, the ICRC, the local and international NGOs, we can bring hope.

The UN and our partners in Nigeria have already been reaching 2.1 million people with food assistance, over four million with emergency care and over 1.7 million with water and sanitation, despite the high-risk environment of reaching people with access. We already have a track record of success behind which the donors can generously get behind and back us as we now see the compound factors leading to the need for scale-up.

Particular for this region, the humanitarian appeal is for US$1.5 billion for the Lake Chad Basin region in 2017. And in one morning, we have raised a third of that. That is genuine success for 2017. We have other [donors] who will be able to come in in the course of the coming months as their transition of budgetary cycles allow, and that will help us aim for our target which will help the neighbours meet all the needs as we have seen them. So I am deeply grateful for the support. We have the ability therefore to deliver on a plan, and to step up. We are ready, we need the finance, and I am delighted that as finances are coming in, we can save lives.

Pakistan: Emergency Grant Aid to Afghan refugee and host communities in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Pakistan - ReliefWeb News - 5 hours 15 min ago
Source: Government of Japan Country: Afghanistan, Japan, Pakistan
  1. On February 24, the Government of Japan decided to extend Emergency Grant Aid of 7 million US dollars through the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in order to support Afghan refugees and their host communities in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through assistance such as the provision of food and educational and vocational training.

  2. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan has hosted an enormous number of Afghan refugees for over thirty years in the past. The number of refugees who return to Afghanistan has been drastically increased since July 2016. After the winter pause of repatriation process, it is expected that very large scale of refugee will start to return again in March this year. The Government of Afghanistan is concerned about the worsening of humanitarian and security situations in the country. Considering this situation, UNHCR has called the international community for immediate support to Afghan refugees and their host communities in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Pakistan: Emergency Grant Aid to Afghan refugee and host communities in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Afghanistan - ReliefWeb News - 5 hours 15 min ago
Source: Government of Japan Country: Afghanistan, Japan, Pakistan
  1. On February 24, the Government of Japan decided to extend Emergency Grant Aid of 7 million US dollars through the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in order to support Afghan refugees and their host communities in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through assistance such as the provision of food and educational and vocational training.

  2. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan has hosted an enormous number of Afghan refugees for over thirty years in the past. The number of refugees who return to Afghanistan has been drastically increased since July 2016. After the winter pause of repatriation process, it is expected that very large scale of refugee will start to return again in March this year. The Government of Afghanistan is concerned about the worsening of humanitarian and security situations in the country. Considering this situation, UNHCR has called the international community for immediate support to Afghan refugees and their host communities in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Myanmar: Emergency Grant Aid to residents and displaced persons in Rakhine State, Republic of the Union of Myanmar

Myanmar - ReliefWeb News - 5 hours 19 min ago
Source: Government of Japan Country: Japan, Myanmar
  1. On February 24, the Government of Japan decided to extend Emergency Grant Aid of 10 million US dollars to residents and displaced persons affected by the destabilized situation in northern Rakhine State, Republic of the Union of Myanmar.

  2. This Emergency Grant Aid is to provide humanitarian assistance, such as provision of food, non-food items and shelters as well as cooperation which will contribute to the development such as nutrition program to residents and displaced persons in both communities of Muslims and Buddhists still in strained relations in Rakhine State through World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Besides, it is also expected to contribute to the peace-building through education and vocational training aimed at building trust between the two communities in the area.

World: Watch List 2017, Special Report N°3 | 24 February 2017

Yemen - ReliefWeb News - 5 hours 26 min ago
Source: International Crisis Group Country: Bangladesh, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), World, Yemen

Global Overview

Whether unprecedented or not, the challenges currently facing our global security are immense and cause for considerable alarm. It is difficult to think of a time in recent history when there has been such a confluence of destabilising factors – local, regional and global – hindering collective capacity to better manage violence. These overlapping risks, unchecked, could coalesce into a major crisis – indeed we are currently experiencing a spike in global conflict violence – without the safety net of solid structures to deal with it.

When Crisis Group was founded, its premise was that bringing field-based expert analysis to the attention of (principally) Western policymakers could effect positive change in both preventing and ending situations of deadly conflict. Much of that premise still holds, but for us, as for others, it is no longer sufficient: the West can no longer be viewed either as homogenous or an oasis of tranquility. Increasingly, too, its self-projected image as an unalloyed force for good is becoming exposed. Greater efforts are needed, and urgently, both to understand better the growing dangers of conflict seeping from one arena to another; and to engage a broader array of actors with the capacity to effect positive change.

This document seeks to do two things. First, it aims to highlight those conflicts which Crisis Group believes threaten to worsen significantly unless remedial action is taken. Inevitably perhaps, the countries selected represent a partial snapshot. For that reason we place them explicitly in their regional contexts. But even so, strong arguments can be made for the inclusion of others: examples include Afghanistan, Ukraine, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the South China Sea and Democratic Republic of Congo. A case could be made, too, for the Western Balkans, perhaps, or Central Asian states. That we could provide a rival, equally valid list is itself cause for concern. For each conflict, we seek to indicate the contours of possible policy responses based on ground-up analysis. In putting forward tentative prescriptions, our principal target is the European Union (EU), its institutions and member states, whether working directly or in conjunction with others. An underlying premise of this report is our belief that the EU has the potential – indeed faces an imperative – to bring to bear all the tools at its disposal fully to do its bit, in concert with others, to preserve the threatened field of conflict prevention.

Second, the list can be read as one document. Percolating through it are the range of interlinked dangers and stresses that makes this era so perilous. Essentially, these can be distilled down to three. First, an increasing fusion of the domestic with the international. Second, a sense of crisis overload. And third, growing uncertainty about hitherto assumed structures and institutions to collectively manage danger.

All ten conflicts possess international dimensions, in many instances overwhelmingly so. In such crowded landscapes – with a multitude of actors and equally broad range of motivations – navigating a route to peace becomes immeasurably more difficult. The growing prevalence of non-state armed groups and in some instances their propensity to fracture, together with the blending of licit and illicit economies, churns yet more this complex terrain. This increasing fusion of local and global is reflected further in heightened nationalism and ideological dogmatism, with – as things stand – the triumph of policies designed to cater to short-term tactical imperatives as much if not more than preserving or ensuring long-term stability. This can be seen in burgeoning intolerance to the mass movement of people, as actions are taken to stem or push back the flow without trying adequately to address the reasons why such movement is underway on such an unprecedented scale.

It can be witnessed in the resort to muscular security responses that can neither fully contain the threat nor address its underlying causes. And it is manifested in some actors resorting too readily to the rallying cry of counter- terrorism, with its playbook of repressive measures and eschewing the very inclusivity invariably essential to sustained peace. In the balance between soft and hard power, the latter currently is dominant.

All this, of course, is playing out against – and in part driven by – a growing diffusion of power globally. This in and of itself is not a bad thing, but the uncertainties such a shift throws up are cause for concern. Further, the stresses to which Europe is currently exposed; the revival of geopolitics; and uncertainty about the future direction of the trans-Atlantic alliance and the underlying commitment to the UN of its traditional power-brokers, represent significant challenges to hitherto durable assumptions about the role of international institutions and law, and the web of alliances built up in the past 70 years. So far so gloomy (and without touching on climate change or demographic trends). But this report also, we believe, contains within it ideas which might contribute to a needed course correction. In essence, it constitutes a call to learn old lessons amid these new dynamics.

What, in particular, might this mean for the EU? We posit two broad observations, outlined in more detail in the following pages. They sit on top of an underlying imperative to ensure that through their actions the EU and its member states do not contribute to generating further harm. In many instances where room for positive change is currently heavily circumscribed, avoiding worse constitutes progress.

First, we seek to identify what Europe’s leverage is with regards to specific conflicts and regions. Often it is indirect, but no less important for that. Frequently, too, we suggest it will involve maximising opportunities presented of shared interests and a division of responsibilities in their pursuit. In this regard, as in all others, speaking with as unified a voice as possible is imperative: dissonance can be exploited. Providing maximum support to the new UN Secretary-General in his efforts to revive that organisation’s work in conflict prevention must also be a priority.

Second, in virtually every crisis we cite, a better balance is required between the desire for quick impact and the need to put in place sustainable solutions. The two need not be at odds with each other – we should reject the notion that it is a binary choice. But it will require Europe to speak out more clearly in defence of core values – in deed, not simply rhetoric; to make clear that its humanitarian and development assistance is for those most in need, not solely for the pursuit of political ends; to nudge conflict parties toward pursuing peace through inclusive dialogue, not simply force; and to prioritise the pursuit of better models of governance, the absence of which is at the root of so many of today’s conflicts.

To some these may appear as thin reeds on which to float notions of charting a more positive course. But in the current atmosphere of uncertainty, through articulating clear, principled and strategic goals and how, tactically, it will seek to work toward them in conjunction with others, Europe has the opportunity to make a significant contribution toward a more stable and peaceful future. by dialogues with other regional organisations to develop an understanding

World: Watch List 2017, Special Report N°3 | 24 February 2017

Somalia - ReliefWeb News - 5 hours 26 min ago
Source: International Crisis Group Country: Bangladesh, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), World, Yemen

Global Overview

Whether unprecedented or not, the challenges currently facing our global security are immense and cause for considerable alarm. It is difficult to think of a time in recent history when there has been such a confluence of destabilising factors – local, regional and global – hindering collective capacity to better manage violence. These overlapping risks, unchecked, could coalesce into a major crisis – indeed we are currently experiencing a spike in global conflict violence – without the safety net of solid structures to deal with it.

When Crisis Group was founded, its premise was that bringing field-based expert analysis to the attention of (principally) Western policymakers could effect positive change in both preventing and ending situations of deadly conflict. Much of that premise still holds, but for us, as for others, it is no longer sufficient: the West can no longer be viewed either as homogenous or an oasis of tranquility. Increasingly, too, its self-projected image as an unalloyed force for good is becoming exposed. Greater efforts are needed, and urgently, both to understand better the growing dangers of conflict seeping from one arena to another; and to engage a broader array of actors with the capacity to effect positive change.

This document seeks to do two things. First, it aims to highlight those conflicts which Crisis Group believes threaten to worsen significantly unless remedial action is taken. Inevitably perhaps, the countries selected represent a partial snapshot. For that reason we place them explicitly in their regional contexts. But even so, strong arguments can be made for the inclusion of others: examples include Afghanistan, Ukraine, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the South China Sea and Democratic Republic of Congo. A case could be made, too, for the Western Balkans, perhaps, or Central Asian states. That we could provide a rival, equally valid list is itself cause for concern. For each conflict, we seek to indicate the contours of possible policy responses based on ground-up analysis. In putting forward tentative prescriptions, our principal target is the European Union (EU), its institutions and member states, whether working directly or in conjunction with others. An underlying premise of this report is our belief that the EU has the potential – indeed faces an imperative – to bring to bear all the tools at its disposal fully to do its bit, in concert with others, to preserve the threatened field of conflict prevention.

Second, the list can be read as one document. Percolating through it are the range of interlinked dangers and stresses that makes this era so perilous. Essentially, these can be distilled down to three. First, an increasing fusion of the domestic with the international. Second, a sense of crisis overload. And third, growing uncertainty about hitherto assumed structures and institutions to collectively manage danger.

All ten conflicts possess international dimensions, in many instances overwhelmingly so. In such crowded landscapes – with a multitude of actors and equally broad range of motivations – navigating a route to peace becomes immeasurably more difficult. The growing prevalence of non-state armed groups and in some instances their propensity to fracture, together with the blending of licit and illicit economies, churns yet more this complex terrain. This increasing fusion of local and global is reflected further in heightened nationalism and ideological dogmatism, with – as things stand – the triumph of policies designed to cater to short-term tactical imperatives as much if not more than preserving or ensuring long-term stability. This can be seen in burgeoning intolerance to the mass movement of people, as actions are taken to stem or push back the flow without trying adequately to address the reasons why such movement is underway on such an unprecedented scale.

It can be witnessed in the resort to muscular security responses that can neither fully contain the threat nor address its underlying causes. And it is manifested in some actors resorting too readily to the rallying cry of counter- terrorism, with its playbook of repressive measures and eschewing the very inclusivity invariably essential to sustained peace. In the balance between soft and hard power, the latter currently is dominant.

All this, of course, is playing out against – and in part driven by – a growing diffusion of power globally. This in and of itself is not a bad thing, but the uncertainties such a shift throws up are cause for concern. Further, the stresses to which Europe is currently exposed; the revival of geopolitics; and uncertainty about the future direction of the trans-Atlantic alliance and the underlying commitment to the UN of its traditional power-brokers, represent significant challenges to hitherto durable assumptions about the role of international institutions and law, and the web of alliances built up in the past 70 years. So far so gloomy (and without touching on climate change or demographic trends). But this report also, we believe, contains within it ideas which might contribute to a needed course correction. In essence, it constitutes a call to learn old lessons amid these new dynamics.

What, in particular, might this mean for the EU? We posit two broad observations, outlined in more detail in the following pages. They sit on top of an underlying imperative to ensure that through their actions the EU and its member states do not contribute to generating further harm. In many instances where room for positive change is currently heavily circumscribed, avoiding worse constitutes progress.

First, we seek to identify what Europe’s leverage is with regards to specific conflicts and regions. Often it is indirect, but no less important for that. Frequently, too, we suggest it will involve maximising opportunities presented of shared interests and a division of responsibilities in their pursuit. In this regard, as in all others, speaking with as unified a voice as possible is imperative: dissonance can be exploited. Providing maximum support to the new UN Secretary-General in his efforts to revive that organisation’s work in conflict prevention must also be a priority.

Second, in virtually every crisis we cite, a better balance is required between the desire for quick impact and the need to put in place sustainable solutions. The two need not be at odds with each other – we should reject the notion that it is a binary choice. But it will require Europe to speak out more clearly in defence of core values – in deed, not simply rhetoric; to make clear that its humanitarian and development assistance is for those most in need, not solely for the pursuit of political ends; to nudge conflict parties toward pursuing peace through inclusive dialogue, not simply force; and to prioritise the pursuit of better models of governance, the absence of which is at the root of so many of today’s conflicts.

To some these may appear as thin reeds on which to float notions of charting a more positive course. But in the current atmosphere of uncertainty, through articulating clear, principled and strategic goals and how, tactically, it will seek to work toward them in conjunction with others, Europe has the opportunity to make a significant contribution toward a more stable and peaceful future. by dialogues with other regional organisations to develop an understanding

World: Watch List 2017, Special Report N°3 | 24 February 2017

Niger - ReliefWeb News - 5 hours 26 min ago
Source: International Crisis Group Country: Bangladesh, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), World, Yemen

Global Overview

Whether unprecedented or not, the challenges currently facing our global security are immense and cause for considerable alarm. It is difficult to think of a time in recent history when there has been such a confluence of destabilising factors – local, regional and global – hindering collective capacity to better manage violence. These overlapping risks, unchecked, could coalesce into a major crisis – indeed we are currently experiencing a spike in global conflict violence – without the safety net of solid structures to deal with it.

When Crisis Group was founded, its premise was that bringing field-based expert analysis to the attention of (principally) Western policymakers could effect positive change in both preventing and ending situations of deadly conflict. Much of that premise still holds, but for us, as for others, it is no longer sufficient: the West can no longer be viewed either as homogenous or an oasis of tranquility. Increasingly, too, its self-projected image as an unalloyed force for good is becoming exposed. Greater efforts are needed, and urgently, both to understand better the growing dangers of conflict seeping from one arena to another; and to engage a broader array of actors with the capacity to effect positive change.

This document seeks to do two things. First, it aims to highlight those conflicts which Crisis Group believes threaten to worsen significantly unless remedial action is taken. Inevitably perhaps, the countries selected represent a partial snapshot. For that reason we place them explicitly in their regional contexts. But even so, strong arguments can be made for the inclusion of others: examples include Afghanistan, Ukraine, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the South China Sea and Democratic Republic of Congo. A case could be made, too, for the Western Balkans, perhaps, or Central Asian states. That we could provide a rival, equally valid list is itself cause for concern. For each conflict, we seek to indicate the contours of possible policy responses based on ground-up analysis. In putting forward tentative prescriptions, our principal target is the European Union (EU), its institutions and member states, whether working directly or in conjunction with others. An underlying premise of this report is our belief that the EU has the potential – indeed faces an imperative – to bring to bear all the tools at its disposal fully to do its bit, in concert with others, to preserve the threatened field of conflict prevention.

Second, the list can be read as one document. Percolating through it are the range of interlinked dangers and stresses that makes this era so perilous. Essentially, these can be distilled down to three. First, an increasing fusion of the domestic with the international. Second, a sense of crisis overload. And third, growing uncertainty about hitherto assumed structures and institutions to collectively manage danger.

All ten conflicts possess international dimensions, in many instances overwhelmingly so. In such crowded landscapes – with a multitude of actors and equally broad range of motivations – navigating a route to peace becomes immeasurably more difficult. The growing prevalence of non-state armed groups and in some instances their propensity to fracture, together with the blending of licit and illicit economies, churns yet more this complex terrain. This increasing fusion of local and global is reflected further in heightened nationalism and ideological dogmatism, with – as things stand – the triumph of policies designed to cater to short-term tactical imperatives as much if not more than preserving or ensuring long-term stability. This can be seen in burgeoning intolerance to the mass movement of people, as actions are taken to stem or push back the flow without trying adequately to address the reasons why such movement is underway on such an unprecedented scale.

It can be witnessed in the resort to muscular security responses that can neither fully contain the threat nor address its underlying causes. And it is manifested in some actors resorting too readily to the rallying cry of counter- terrorism, with its playbook of repressive measures and eschewing the very inclusivity invariably essential to sustained peace. In the balance between soft and hard power, the latter currently is dominant.

All this, of course, is playing out against – and in part driven by – a growing diffusion of power globally. This in and of itself is not a bad thing, but the uncertainties such a shift throws up are cause for concern. Further, the stresses to which Europe is currently exposed; the revival of geopolitics; and uncertainty about the future direction of the trans-Atlantic alliance and the underlying commitment to the UN of its traditional power-brokers, represent significant challenges to hitherto durable assumptions about the role of international institutions and law, and the web of alliances built up in the past 70 years. So far so gloomy (and without touching on climate change or demographic trends). But this report also, we believe, contains within it ideas which might contribute to a needed course correction. In essence, it constitutes a call to learn old lessons amid these new dynamics.

What, in particular, might this mean for the EU? We posit two broad observations, outlined in more detail in the following pages. They sit on top of an underlying imperative to ensure that through their actions the EU and its member states do not contribute to generating further harm. In many instances where room for positive change is currently heavily circumscribed, avoiding worse constitutes progress.

First, we seek to identify what Europe’s leverage is with regards to specific conflicts and regions. Often it is indirect, but no less important for that. Frequently, too, we suggest it will involve maximising opportunities presented of shared interests and a division of responsibilities in their pursuit. In this regard, as in all others, speaking with as unified a voice as possible is imperative: dissonance can be exploited. Providing maximum support to the new UN Secretary-General in his efforts to revive that organisation’s work in conflict prevention must also be a priority.

Second, in virtually every crisis we cite, a better balance is required between the desire for quick impact and the need to put in place sustainable solutions. The two need not be at odds with each other – we should reject the notion that it is a binary choice. But it will require Europe to speak out more clearly in defence of core values – in deed, not simply rhetoric; to make clear that its humanitarian and development assistance is for those most in need, not solely for the pursuit of political ends; to nudge conflict parties toward pursuing peace through inclusive dialogue, not simply force; and to prioritise the pursuit of better models of governance, the absence of which is at the root of so many of today’s conflicts.

To some these may appear as thin reeds on which to float notions of charting a more positive course. But in the current atmosphere of uncertainty, through articulating clear, principled and strategic goals and how, tactically, it will seek to work toward them in conjunction with others, Europe has the opportunity to make a significant contribution toward a more stable and peaceful future. by dialogues with other regional organisations to develop an understanding

World: Watch List 2017, Special Report N°3 | 24 February 2017

Myanmar - ReliefWeb News - 5 hours 26 min ago
Source: International Crisis Group Country: Bangladesh, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), World, Yemen

Global Overview

Whether unprecedented or not, the challenges currently facing our global security are immense and cause for considerable alarm. It is difficult to think of a time in recent history when there has been such a confluence of destabilising factors – local, regional and global – hindering collective capacity to better manage violence. These overlapping risks, unchecked, could coalesce into a major crisis – indeed we are currently experiencing a spike in global conflict violence – without the safety net of solid structures to deal with it.

When Crisis Group was founded, its premise was that bringing field-based expert analysis to the attention of (principally) Western policymakers could effect positive change in both preventing and ending situations of deadly conflict. Much of that premise still holds, but for us, as for others, it is no longer sufficient: the West can no longer be viewed either as homogenous or an oasis of tranquility. Increasingly, too, its self-projected image as an unalloyed force for good is becoming exposed. Greater efforts are needed, and urgently, both to understand better the growing dangers of conflict seeping from one arena to another; and to engage a broader array of actors with the capacity to effect positive change.

This document seeks to do two things. First, it aims to highlight those conflicts which Crisis Group believes threaten to worsen significantly unless remedial action is taken. Inevitably perhaps, the countries selected represent a partial snapshot. For that reason we place them explicitly in their regional contexts. But even so, strong arguments can be made for the inclusion of others: examples include Afghanistan, Ukraine, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the South China Sea and Democratic Republic of Congo. A case could be made, too, for the Western Balkans, perhaps, or Central Asian states. That we could provide a rival, equally valid list is itself cause for concern. For each conflict, we seek to indicate the contours of possible policy responses based on ground-up analysis. In putting forward tentative prescriptions, our principal target is the European Union (EU), its institutions and member states, whether working directly or in conjunction with others. An underlying premise of this report is our belief that the EU has the potential – indeed faces an imperative – to bring to bear all the tools at its disposal fully to do its bit, in concert with others, to preserve the threatened field of conflict prevention.

Second, the list can be read as one document. Percolating through it are the range of interlinked dangers and stresses that makes this era so perilous. Essentially, these can be distilled down to three. First, an increasing fusion of the domestic with the international. Second, a sense of crisis overload. And third, growing uncertainty about hitherto assumed structures and institutions to collectively manage danger.

All ten conflicts possess international dimensions, in many instances overwhelmingly so. In such crowded landscapes – with a multitude of actors and equally broad range of motivations – navigating a route to peace becomes immeasurably more difficult. The growing prevalence of non-state armed groups and in some instances their propensity to fracture, together with the blending of licit and illicit economies, churns yet more this complex terrain. This increasing fusion of local and global is reflected further in heightened nationalism and ideological dogmatism, with – as things stand – the triumph of policies designed to cater to short-term tactical imperatives as much if not more than preserving or ensuring long-term stability. This can be seen in burgeoning intolerance to the mass movement of people, as actions are taken to stem or push back the flow without trying adequately to address the reasons why such movement is underway on such an unprecedented scale.

It can be witnessed in the resort to muscular security responses that can neither fully contain the threat nor address its underlying causes. And it is manifested in some actors resorting too readily to the rallying cry of counter- terrorism, with its playbook of repressive measures and eschewing the very inclusivity invariably essential to sustained peace. In the balance between soft and hard power, the latter currently is dominant.

All this, of course, is playing out against – and in part driven by – a growing diffusion of power globally. This in and of itself is not a bad thing, but the uncertainties such a shift throws up are cause for concern. Further, the stresses to which Europe is currently exposed; the revival of geopolitics; and uncertainty about the future direction of the trans-Atlantic alliance and the underlying commitment to the UN of its traditional power-brokers, represent significant challenges to hitherto durable assumptions about the role of international institutions and law, and the web of alliances built up in the past 70 years. So far so gloomy (and without touching on climate change or demographic trends). But this report also, we believe, contains within it ideas which might contribute to a needed course correction. In essence, it constitutes a call to learn old lessons amid these new dynamics.

What, in particular, might this mean for the EU? We posit two broad observations, outlined in more detail in the following pages. They sit on top of an underlying imperative to ensure that through their actions the EU and its member states do not contribute to generating further harm. In many instances where room for positive change is currently heavily circumscribed, avoiding worse constitutes progress.

First, we seek to identify what Europe’s leverage is with regards to specific conflicts and regions. Often it is indirect, but no less important for that. Frequently, too, we suggest it will involve maximising opportunities presented of shared interests and a division of responsibilities in their pursuit. In this regard, as in all others, speaking with as unified a voice as possible is imperative: dissonance can be exploited. Providing maximum support to the new UN Secretary-General in his efforts to revive that organisation’s work in conflict prevention must also be a priority.

Second, in virtually every crisis we cite, a better balance is required between the desire for quick impact and the need to put in place sustainable solutions. The two need not be at odds with each other – we should reject the notion that it is a binary choice. But it will require Europe to speak out more clearly in defence of core values – in deed, not simply rhetoric; to make clear that its humanitarian and development assistance is for those most in need, not solely for the pursuit of political ends; to nudge conflict parties toward pursuing peace through inclusive dialogue, not simply force; and to prioritise the pursuit of better models of governance, the absence of which is at the root of so many of today’s conflicts.

To some these may appear as thin reeds on which to float notions of charting a more positive course. But in the current atmosphere of uncertainty, through articulating clear, principled and strategic goals and how, tactically, it will seek to work toward them in conjunction with others, Europe has the opportunity to make a significant contribution toward a more stable and peaceful future. by dialogues with other regional organisations to develop an understanding

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