OCHA

Eritrea

Philippines Eritrea became independent in 1993, after a 30-year liberation war, only to be involved in military conflicts again, first with Yemen and then with Ethiopia. OCHA deployed to Eritrea in 1998 when the border dispute with Ethiopia erupted into major conflict, displacing 100,000 people and disrupting the livelihoods of 160,000 people. Escalating violence and a devastating drought caused a deepening crisis. A decade later, Eritrea still faces recurrent droughts and chronic food insecurity, while the unresolved border dispute with Ethiopia remains an obstacle to economic progress. With a cooperation framework about to expire, the future role of the UN and international organizations in Eritrea remains unclear. In 2012, OCHA will work closely with the UN Country Team to develop a new assistance strategy based on government priorities, leverage international support and help coordinate aid to vulnerable communities.

CONTEXT ANALYSIS

The Socio-political Situation

Eritrea experiences annual food-production shortages due to recurrent drought and exclusive dependence on unpredictable rainfall. Nearly two thirds of the population relies on rain-fed agriculture and pastoralism. The harsh climate and rudimentary farming methods mean Eritrea can only produce about 60 per cent of its total annual cereal requirements (estimated at 650,000 MT) in a good year. This may drop to about 30 per cent in a poor season. In 2006, Eritrea stopped receiving food aid and began to rely on food imports to bridge its annual cereal production gap.

A 2003 survey found that 66 per cent of the population of nearly 5 million were unable to secure sufficient food or essential goods and services. An estimated 37 per cent live in extreme poverty.^[1]While accurate information is scarce, conditions appear to have deteriorated since then. The country is ranked 165 out of 182 on the Human Development Index (HDI).^[2]A HDI report estimated that over 50 per cent of Eritreans were living below the national poverty line between 2000 and 2006.^[3]In 2008, a drop in agricultural output due to drought coincided with a spike in global food and fuel prices, underlining the country’s economic fragility.

Eritrea’s past conflicts with Ethiopia have had a profound effect on the family unit. A high number of households in rural areas are headed by females.^[4]Tense relations with Ethiopia over the last decade have seen manpower and other resources prioritized for national defence at the expense of other sectors. The critical shortage of a skilled civilian workforce and funds for the public sector has slowed economic progress.

The legacy of conflict continues to stall agriculture as large fertile areas remain contaminated with landmines, especially in the former Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). According to the Landmine Impact Survey of Eritrea (2002 - 2004), approximately 655,000 people live in communities affected by landmines and unexploded ordnances (UXOs).^[5]

National security concerns have contributed to severe macroeconomic imbalances, high inflation, foreign-exchange shortages and unsustainable public debt. This situation is expected to persist in 2011-12, despite the onset of industrial-scale mining (EIU: Country Report, September 2011).

Eritrea’s relationship with the international community deteriorated following the latter’s apparent failure to protect Eritrean autonomy in 1962. This position has been entrenched with international inaction in the face of Ethiopia’s non-compliance with the Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) ruling and certain peace terms agreed in Algiers in December 2000. This poor relationship with international counterparts, coupled with an aggressive national self-reliance policy, has restricted the scope for humanitarian and development assistance in the country.

The Humanitarian Strategy and Response

Eritrea is expected to remain vulnerable to natural hazards, especially recurrent drought, given its unpredictable rainfall patterns and food-deficit status. The unresolved border dispute with Ethiopia remains an additional barrier to economic progress.

Since 2005, the Eritrean Government policy on humanitarian assistance has shifted to one that emphasizes self-reliance, cash for work, and investment in long-term food security programmes rather than food for work or free food distribution. Measures taken since include:

Introducing an NGO proclamation in 2005 requiring that an NGO must have at least $2 million in its account to operate in the country, and prohibiting NGOs from acting as implementing partners for UN agencies.

Dissolving the Eritrea Refugee and Rehabilitation Commission, the Government entity responsible for coordinating humanitarian assistance and its absorption into the Ministry of Labour and Human Welfare.

Opting out of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) in 2006.

Investing in long-term food-security programmes and the fisheries and mining sectors as a long-term strategy for weaning the country off short-term emergency/humanitarian aid.

The main vulnerable groups identified include small-scale rural farmers, pastoralists, recently resettled internally displaced people, refugees and asylum-seekers, the urban poor, the disabled and people living with HIV/AIDS. Women and children are typically the most disadvantaged.

UNICEF reports significant deterioration of the nutritional status of children under age 5 in recent years. A rapid middle-upper-arm circumference (MUAC) screening conducted in April-May 2010 found an acute malnutrition rate of 8.3 per cent. Monthly admissions to therapeutic feeding centres have increased by 40 per cent between January and May 2011, compared with 2009. UNICEF and WHO continue to support over 200 therapeutic feeding centres in the country. This level of malnutrition suggests persistent food insecurity at the household level. Flexible approaches to assisting are required if agencies are to meet these critical needs without contradicting official policy.

Eritrea hosts 4,000 Somali refugees who have fled the crisis in their home country and are prevented from integrating locally. According to UNHCR, the global acute malnutrition rate among Somali refugee children under age 5 in Emkulu camp was 23 per cent (November 2009). There is a need for continued provision of food aid and other social services to these refugees.

The goal of the 2012-2013 Humanitarian Strategy is to assist the Government to meet the critical humanitarian needs of women, men, boys and girls at risk, and to enhance its response capacity. Particular focus is on priority areas identified by the Government, namely emergency health and nutrition, water supply and sanitation.

The objectives of the strategy are as follows:

Health and Nutrition
Supporting the Ministry of Health in its efforts to reduce the avoidable morbidity and mortality due to acute malnutrition and schistosomiasis control interventions. Beneficiaries include 118,033 children under age 5 in the Southern Red Sea and Gash Barka regions targeted for nutrition interventions; and 113,000 children under age 16 in Mandefera and Debub targeted for schistosomiasis control interventions (WHO). The large number of under-nourished children clearly points to acute food insecurity at the household level. This would normally be addressed through free food distribution. However, WFP has not been operational in Eritrea since 2006 following the Government’s integration of 64,500 MT of WFP food aid into its cash-for-work programme.

Priorities include nationwide vitamin A distribution, rapid nutrition assessment using mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC), provision of water and sanitation in locations where IDPs/expellees have returned or have been resettled; and supporting therapeutic and community-based supplementary feeding centres in Southern Red Sea and Garsh Barka regions. The target beneficiaries are more than 340,000 children under age 5 (UNICEF).

Provision of Food Aid to Refugees
According to the Office of Refugee Affairs (UNHCR’s implementing partner), the global acute malnutrition rate among Somali refugees in Emkulu camp is 13.4 per cent. Given that WFP has no operations in Eritrea, UNHCR has a responsibility to provide life-saving basic and complementary food commodities to these refugees.

Food Security
Support the national food security strategy (through supporting the Ministry of Agriculture) in the following areas: strengthening early warning systems and risk analysis; developing water harvesting and conservation farming methods; developing diversified farm-production models including integrated livestock and fisheries; and strengthening the extension services and seed systems (FAO).

Coordination and Support Services

Despite the constraints related to access, OCHA will support the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) through strategy development, contingency planning, advocacy, information management and prioritization of/reporting on CERF resources. All projects in Eritrea are nationally executed. Apart from occasional gaps, these partners have well-established achievement and accountability records. The UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA, FAO, UNAIDS, UNHCR) and their Government counterparts periodically conduct monitoring and evaluation missions to project sites. Rather than promote inter-agency coordination, the Government prefers to deal with partners on a bilateral basis. The UNCT has set up thematic/sector working groups to ensure that assistance to various parts of the country is coordinated.

Projections

Eritrea is expected to face ongoing humanitarian challenges due to its vulnerability to adverse weather conditions and recurrent droughts. The situation has been exacerbated by a lack of information on the overall humanitarian situation and an official Government policy that favours development over humanitarian action. No international NGOs are expected to remain in the country by the end of 2011. The reduced number of humanitarian partners coupled with the absence of a credible resource mobilization plan will leave a significantly reduced response capacity in-country in 2012.

The possible scenarios include:

The unresolved border dispute with Ethiopia will continue to divert resources to national defence, negatively affecting the country’s socio-economic development.

The 2011-2012 agricultural season harvest is expected to remain below average due to erratic Azmera rains (March - May) in the highlands and a late start of the Krimiti rain season (June - September) at the beginning of August, instead of mid-June. The Bahry (coastal) rains (October - February) have been erratic in recent years. The current prediction is for persistent water scarcity, poor pastures especially in the arid areas of the country and a major food gap in 2012.

Local food and fuel prices are likely to remain high, putting severe pressure on vulnerable groups’ coping mechanisms.

An overall decline in funding opportunities for Eritrea.

UNDP estimates that more than 11,000 displaced/expellee households (64 per cent of whom are female headed) and 2,500 households of war- and drought-affected families returned or were resettled in 2008. Due to the unpredictable weather conditions, these households remain among the most vulnerable in Eritrea and will require sustained support.

The risks revolve around unpredictable Government policies, including:

Uncertainty surrounding UN and NGO programming beyond 2011/2012.

Official denial of the existence of any humanitarian needs in the country.

Difficulty in determining needs in the country due to access constraints.

The Government’s policy of self-reliance is at odds with international aid modalities. Hence, the level of funding for humanitarian and development activities is expected to remain low.

_{[1]Household Living Standards Measurement Survey, National Statistics and Evaluation Office, 2003}

_{[2]Human Development Report 2009, UNDP}

_{[3]Human Development Index 2009 – Annex I}

_{[4]2008 State of the Worlds children UNICEF}

_{[5]Landmine Impact Survey – Eritrea 2002 –2004 – most of the Landmine Impacted Communities are located in Debub, Gash Barka, Anseba and Seminawi Keih Bahri (Northern Red Sea)}

STRATEGY

Background

OCHA first deployed staff to Eritrea as part of a UN inter-agency team in August 1998, following the Government’s request for humanitarian assistance. By 2002, the OCHA presence had expanded, with two field offices set up to support emergency relief activities for the benefit of those displaced or expelled by conflict. Since then, conditions for people in the rest of the country have deteriorated due to the effects of prolonged droughts. UN agencies have focused on providing basic services and livelihood support (such as goat restocking) to vulnerable families, particularly female-headed households. The recovery of these communities has been slow due to unpredictable weather patterns.

Current focus

OCHA’s intervention in Eritrea aims to alleviate human suffering and strengthen the livelihoods of vulnerable populations. The HCT’s main coordination challenges include restrictions on international staff access; the lack of inter-agency needs assessments and credible information; an absence of strategic dialogue and coordination between Government and humanitarian partners; the lack of a common humanitarian response and assistance strategy; the reduced number of international NGO partners (there will be none left by the end of 2011), and capacity constraints with Government partners.

OCHA is creatively addressing these challenges by working with UN agencies to ensure that humanitarian concerns are incorporated into development programs. OCHA has supported the UNCT in prioritizing $20 million in CERF contributions over the last six years. The cluster approach has not been rolled out due to the lack of partners and a requirement to implement humanitarian activities through Government structures.

It has not been possible to implement the full OCHA mandate. However, activities have included:

Advocacy: OCHA develops key messages and briefing notes for the RC/HC and senior UN officials for on-going advocacy/dialogue with senior Government officials.

Prioritization of CERF: OCHA uses available monitoring information (from operational agencies) as proxy indicators for prioritization of CERF funds. In particular, OCHA works to ensure that CERF proposals are gender sensitive, given that 64 per cent of resettled IDPs/expellees households are female headed.

Contingency Planning: OCHA coordinates the development and review of inter-agency contingency plans, and ensures that standby human resources and emergency stocks are identified in regional hubs in case of sudden emergencies.

Coordination: Supports HCT and IASC meetings.

Information Management: with agencies and donor partners, supports mapping of humanitarian and development activities, produces 3W (who does what where) reports. Regular humanitarian updates have not been possible due to access constraints.

Forward strategy

The future of UN and international partner operations in Eritrea beyond 2012 will need to be resolved when the current interim cooperation framework expires. At present, UN operations have been restricted to health, water supply and sanitation. Over the next two years, OCHA’s aim is to help to alleviate the suffering of the vulnerable population through advocacy, strategy development and mobilization of resources.

Specific activities include

Government-led Coordination: advocate the importance of Government involvement with humanitarian and development partners in the development of a common assistance strategy for resource mobilization and programme monitoring.

Reporting and Advocacy: In collaboration with aid partners, OCHA will continue to promote unhindered access for conducting inter-agency assessments and monitoring.

Information Management: OCHA will work with operational UN agencies and NGOs to provide a minimum number of information products, such as maps, 3Ws and contact lists.

Financial Coordination and Resource Mobilization: Without a resource mobilization tool and financial coordination with key donors, responding to the needs of vulnerable populations will remain a challenge. Given that Eritrea does not have a consolidated appeals process (CAP), OCHA will support the RC/HC through developing alternative resource mobilization mechanisms in support of UN agency programs.

Gender: Promote the use of sex- and age-segregated data among humanitarian agencies in order to better address the different needs of boys, men, girls and women.

PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK

Result 1: AN EFFECTIVE HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION SYSTEM ESTABLISHED IN-COUNTRY
Indicator 1. Decisions taken by Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) led to improved delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people.
BASELINE 2011	Since 2006, the HCT’s effectiveness as a humanitarian decision-making body has been undermined by Government’s official position of not recognizing the existence of humanitarian concerns in Eritrea, and more recently (end of 2011), the absence of NGO partners in the country. Consequently, the UNCT now doubles up as HCT, and humanitarian concerns are being addressed within the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), thus eliminating the need for a parallel humanitarian strategy. The drawback is that the HCT/UNCT has missed an opportunity for a common resource mobilization mechanism because Government objects to official appeals.
TARGET 2012-13	OCHA will continue to support advocacy and high-level dialogue between the UN and the Government on the need for an enabling environment for delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to vulnerable populations. The advocacy messages should demystify “humanitarian”, while reinforcing the complementarity between humanitarian and development assistance. OCHA will increase its efforts to seek opportunities for humanitarian funding outside the traditional appeals processes, mobilize resources for potential interventions, and monitor their effectiveness through the operational UN agencies.
Indicator 2. Level of satisfaction expressed by key stakeholders (government, donors, humanitarian actors) with coordination leadership.
BASELINE 2011	Key stakeholders are reasonably satisfied with the level of coordination within the international community. However, Government’s dis-inclination towards working within an “inter-agency coordination mechanism” remains a constraint on affective coordination, a missed opportunity for realization of the synergies that come with coordination.
TARGET 2012-13	OCHA will continue to support high-level diplomacy and advocacy with Government to improve Government’s perception of humanitarian assistance; advocate with the Government on the need for improved access to affected populations, as well as the importance of Government leadership in strategic dialogue and coordination with international partners on both humanitarian and development assistance.
Indicator 3. Effective inter-cluster coordination in place, documenting decisions and tracking adherence.
BASELINE 2011	Inter-cluster coordination effectiveness is very limited due to Government policies that discourage coordination, and restrict both access to population and the operating environment. Furthermore, the few international NGOs operational in Eritrea (Oxfam, Norwegian Church Aid, Lutheran World Federation, etc.) ceased operations at the end of 2011 at the request of Government; and, more importantly, all humanitarian and development projects are implemented through government structures. Nevertheless limited inter-sector coordination and information sharing is taking place at the UNCT level and through some thematic group meetings.
TARGET 2012-13	OCHA will continue to support inter-sector coordination and situation analysis at the UNCT level. UN agencies will be encouraged to share information obtained through their bilateral work with counterpart government departments.

Result 2: A SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS GUIDES A COMMON RESPONSE
Indicator 4. Joint assessment and analysis of needs guide response planning.
BASELINE 2011	Since 2006, the Government has not authorized inter-agency assessments. However, there is solid evidence (based on nutrition and health information) that indicates dire humanitarian situations in some parts of the country.
TARGET 2012-13	Despite existing limitations, OCHA will facilitate discussions and analysis and desk reviews of available information to identify critical humanitarian needs/priorities. OCHA will also work with IASC partners and UNCT colleagues to develop joint advocacy messages.
Indicator 5. Common response plan endorsed by the HCT fully reflecting priority needs in line with IASC-approved appeal policy and guidelines.
BASELINE 2011	There are no official appeal documents. However, internal to the UN, a Common Humanitarian brief for donors that reflects key humanitarian concerns in 2012has been developed. OCHA ensures that the prioritization process is also part of the screening process for CERF proposals.
TARGET 2012-13	OCHA will advocate exceptional prioritization and funding modalities for programmes in Eritrea (outside the traditional appeal processes). This is due to a lack of common baseline data for planning, and due to the Government’s opposition to common humanitarian appeals.
Indicator 6. Percentage of an appeal’s requirements prioritised in the highest category.
BASELINE 2011	Not applicable.
Indicator 7. Percentage of projects in each Gender Marker code (0, 1, 2a, 2b).
BASELINE 2011	Not applicable (because there are restrictions on comprehensive needs assessments).
Indicator 8. Level of satisfaction expressed by stakeholders with the IM products supporting the analysis and monitoring of the programme cycle.
BASELINE 2011	Moderately satisfied. Since 2006, the data collection and its quality have been negatively affected due to the Government’s restrictions on access and absence of up-to-date information for planning.
TARGET 2012-13	OCHA and other UN agencies will continue to seek opportunities for supporting government in the area of data collection and analysis.

Result 3: A WELL-RESOURCED COMMON RESPONSE PLAN REGULARLY MONITORED
Indicator 9. Percentage of CERF and CHF allocations that are made towards highest priority projects. Percentage of ERF project allocations that are made in accordance with agreed criteria.
BASELINE 2011	56.6 per cent was allocated to health and nutrition; 37.5 per cent to food security/agriculture/food aid; 3.9 per cent to mine action (protection); and 1.6 per cent to water and sanitation.
TARGET 2012-13	OCHA will work with other UN agencies to periodically review prioritization criteria based on new information/needs assessments, if any.
Indicator 10. All clusters publish information on collective outputs vs. targets as expressed in their cluster response plans.
BASELINE 2011	Not applicable due to access restrictions and implementation of activities through one partner – Government agencies.
Indicator 11. Percentage of country-based pooled-fund projects monitored according to agreed monitoring plan.
BASELINE 2011	Not applicable. Eritrea has opted out of these resource mobilization mechanisms.
Indicator 12. Level of stakeholders’ satisfaction of OCHA resource mobilization and management of pooled fund processes.
BASELINE 2011	Stakeholders are very satisfied with OCHA's management of CERF resources, including the speedy disbursement of funds after the signing of the memorandum of understanding.
TARGET 2012-13	Stakeholders will continue to appreciate the roles of CERF and OCHA in defining priorities. OCHA will seek opportunities for funding humanitarian activities outside the traditional appeal processes.

Result 4: IMPROVED ACCESS BY ALL VULNERABLE POPULATIONS TO SERVICES AND ASSISTANCE
Indicator 13. Increased access to previously inaccessible regions and populations.
BASELINE 2011	Access to the field by international personnel remains controlled. It remains a major constraint to monitoring and needs assessments. Some limited access allowed for monitoring visits by international and national staff, but not for assessments.
TARGET 2012-13	OCHA will support the Humanitarian Coordinator’s advocacy agenda for increased/ improved access through dialogue with high-level Government officials.
Indicator 14. Number of arrangements to facilitate access developed and implemented through engagement with the relevant actors.
BASELINE 2011	No dialogue on access is exists. All depend on unilateral Government decisions – access considered a national security issue.
TARGET 2012-13	OCHA will support high-level advocacy on access issues and advise the HC on available opportunities. The recent restoration of UN – Government cooperation framework provides an opportunity for reviewing impediments to delivery of assistance to vulnerable populations.
Indicator 15. Percentage of key stakeholders (Humanitarian Coordinator, Cluster Coordinators, Agency Heads, donors, etc.) report being more informed on access.
BASELINE 2011	Humanitarian partners are regularly updated on the access situation.
TARGET 2012-13	OCHA will inform partners of all efforts/initiatives to improve access, in addition to seeking common approaches to the issue.

Result 5: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION INFLUENCES A BROADER AGENDA
Indicator 16. Humanitarian principles and priorities are reflected in the strategies/plans of non-humanitarian actors.
BASELINE 2011	The United Nations Development Framework 2007-2011 reflects humanitarian needs alongside development priorities.
TARGET 2012-13	OCHA will continue to participate actively in the development and review of the Strategic Partnership Cooperation Framework (SPCF) 2013 – 2016 to ensure integration of humanitarian concerns within agency development plans.
Indicator 17. Percentage of humanitarian partners viewing OCHA as effective in influencing the broader agenda.
BASELINE 2011	OCHA’s role has been undermined by the official Government policy of not acknowledging the existence of humanitarian needs in the country. Nevertheless, the UNCT considers OCHA’s continued presence as important in view of the chronic humanitarian concerns in the country.
TARGET 2012-13	OCHA will continue to seek opportunities for mainstreaming the humanitarian agenda into development programmes.

Result 6: GOVERNMENTS AND HCT BETTER PREPARED TO COORDINATE AND RESPOND TO FUTURE EMERGENCIES
Indicator 18. Integration of international tools and services in national contingency plans and other government plans.
BASELINE 2011	Not applicable at the moment. However, in the new UN-Government “Strategic Partnership Cooperation Framework (SPCF)”, OCHA and UNDP have proposed, for Government’s consideration, the need for a “National Platform” for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) to coordinate and strengthen on-going, but disparate, DRR activities in various Government Ministries and Departments.
Indicator 19. Inter-agency contingency plan in place to address new or resurgent emergencies.
BASELINE 2011	The inter-agency contingency plan (CP) was last updated in 2009. OCHA plans to work with the UN agencies to have it updated before the end of 2012. However, CP2009 only reflects UN agencies’ contributions due to Government sensitivities to such plans. Major constraints include the lack of participation of other international partners, absence of up-to-date baseline information, and official disavowal of the existence of humanitarian concerns in Eritrea.
TARGET 2012-13	CP2009 will be updated before the end of 2012. Plan is not expected to change much because the issues are chronic, e.g. regional tensions, cyclical droughts/crop failure, and possibility of cross-border disease outbreaks.

Result 7: RECURRENT HUMANITARIAN CONCERN ADDRESSED THROUGH LONGER-TERM DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
Indicator 20. Humanitarian issues reflecting analysis of vulnerability are integrated into development strategies (UNDAF, PRSP, etc.).
BASELINE 2011	No vulnerability assessments and analysis have been conducted due to access challenges. However, since 2006, development agencies have continued to address emergency needs within their country programmes.
TARGET 2012-13	OCHA will work with the operational UN agencies to ensure incorporation of available vulnerability data analysis within their broader development programmes.

PLANNED STAFFING AND TOTAL COSTS

Total Staff	Professional		National		General Service		GTA		UNV	Total
Total Staff	XBPB	XBAB	XBPB	XBAB	XBPB	XBAB	XBPB	XBAB	UNV	Total
Total Staff 2012	2	0	1	1	0	0	2	1	0	7
Total Staff 2013	2	0	1	1	0	0	2	1	0	7

XBPB: Extrabudgetary Programme Budget | XBAB: Extrabudgetary Administrative Budget | GTA = General Temporary Assistance | UNV: United Nations Volunteers

Total Costs (US$)	Programme Costs	Administrative Costs	Total

Total Costs 2012	716,067	29,708	745,775
Total Funds Requested 2012			716,067
Total Costs 2013	799,308	43,260	842,568
Total Funds Requested 2013			799,308