OCHA

Libya

Philippines OCHA swiftly responded to the humanitarian needs resulting from the civil unrest and armed conflict which began in Libya in February 2011. Through offices in Egypt and Tunisia, OCHA worked to establish effective humanitarian leadership, secure access to affected populations and facilitate principled and needs-based actions. As security conditions improved, OCHA moved into Benghazi, Tripoli and Misrata at key stages of the crisis until hostilities ceased in October.

The new Libyan authorities are expected to be able to address most humanitarian needs with existing national resources and the international community is working to phase out substantive humanitarian programming by the end of the year. Plans for longer-term recovery are being handled through the Libya Coordinated Needs Assessment process, with support from the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

CONTEXT ANALYSIS

The Socio-political Situation

Libya’s interim authority, the National Transitional Council (NTC), announced the country’s liberation on 23 October. This came after seven months of intense fighting, which culminated in the death of Muammar Qaddafi and the fall of his stronghold in Sirte. This ushered in a period of political transition with three immediate priorities: (i) the formation of a new interim Government; (ii) the restoration of law and order, integration of disparate armed groups into the official security forces, and collection of weapons; (iii) the preparation for national elections in mid-2012.

Transitional justice and national reconciliation processes, the establishment of the rule of law and the revival of the economy are crucial for a return to stability. In September 2011, a political mission was established to support the country's new transitional authorities in their post-conflict efforts. The mandated tasks of UNSMIL include assisting the Libyan authorities in restoring public security and the rule of law, and promoting inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation. It will also assist the NTC with elections and the drafting of a new constitution. UNSMIL is further mandated by the Security Council (S/2011/580) to help the Libyan Government extend State authority by strengthening emerging accountable institutions, restoring public services, promoting and protecting human rights and supporting transitional justice. The mission will also assist economic-recovery efforts and coordinate support that may be requested from other multilateral and bilateral actors.

The Humanitarian Situation

Humanitarian concerns in Libya have been primarily related to the protection of civilians in war during the conflict. While accurate numbers are not available, it is estimated that 30,000 to 50,000 civilians and combatants may have died or been injured in the conflict.

At the peak of the crisis, medical facilities lacked staff and ran out of life-saving supplies; water networks broke down, affecting millions of people in Tripoli, Bani Walid and Sirte for prolonged periods; and migrants and minority groups were reportedly assaulted. The contamination of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) has been extensive throughout the country.

Over 200,000 IDPs were recorded during the height of the conflict. Most have since voluntarily returned to their areas of origin, without the need for international humanitarian assistance, particularly to eastern Libya, Tripoli and the Nafusa Mountains. Approximately 50,000 IDPs from minority groups remain. They were displaced as a result of their association with the former regime, and have been unable or unwilling to return to their areas of origin due to protection threats and fear of arrest.

The most concerning issue has been the conflict’s impact on migrants and third-country nationals (TCNs). Between February and September 2011, more than 700,000 million people crossed Libyan borders. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) it was “one of the largest migration crisis in modern history”. ^[1]TCNs, including citizens of neighbouring countries, represented almost half of the flows. Migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, accused by many in Libyan society as belonging to the previous Government’s militia, continue to be faced with complex protection and socio-economic challenges. Coping mechanisms and the absorption capacity of neighbouring countries, already struggling to provide for their own populations, have been strained.

Throughout the conflict, Libyan local councils and volunteer groups proved to be well mobilized and resourced. They were the primary delivery mechanism for international assistance, with effective NTC support. In some areas where fighting ended in the earlier months of the conflict, including in Tripoli, Misrata and the Nafusa Mountains, the situation stabilized quickly and life returned to relative normality. Shops reopened, banks resumed operations, and primary and middle schools began the new school year. Basic services, such as water and power supplies, were also largely resumed. Fighting continued in other areas, mainly Sirte and Bani Walid, until mid-October, causing extensive destruction to civil infrastructure and devastation to communities. In these localities, the pace of recovery is expected to be slower.

The Humanitarian Strategy and Response

Following the cessation of hostilities, the humanitarian and relief operations that are outlined in a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) for October through December 2011 are expected to wind down. Since February 2011 humanitarian relief efforts in Libya have focused on the following four priorities:

Procurement of essential drugs and equipment using €100 million in unfrozen Libyan assets; provision of INGO-managed field hospitals near front lines, providing direct surgical care to the wounded; WHO/WFP provisions of supplemental fuel supplies to ensure the functioning of hospitals.

Relief assistance to IDPs through food and non-food distributions throughout the country, including bulk water supplies and the management of temporary transit facilities.

Assistance to TCNs and migrants; over 200,000 assisted to leave the country by air, land and sea; food, non-food provisions; transit camps at borders, including for 3,000 people near the border with Chad.

Emergency water and sanitation support, in particular during Tripoli’s water crisis when nearly 4 million people were without tap water during several weeks of fighting in August. Water supplies for 500,000 people were delivered.

Projections

The emergence of humanitarian needs in Libya this year has been a direct result of the fighting. In 2012 they are not expected to surpass the ability of national authorities or any one international agency to respond. This eliminates the need for a CHAP or appeal. In addition to Libyan assets being unfrozen for use by the new Libyan authorities, national councils and civil society groups have shown their own resource mobilization capacity. Much of the relief they provided has been sourced from their own revenues.

Assuming hostilities do not resume, most IDPs are expected to have returned to their homes by the end of 2012, or be otherwise effectively assisted by sustainable Libyan Government programming. All basic social services are expected to start returning to full capacity in early 2012.

Humanitarian needs that are likely to continue into next year, but that would not require a CHAP, include refugee response, support for TCNs and minorities, and mine action. In 2012, these programmes will be coordinated through UNSMIL and the Office of the RC/HC.

Transition periods are often fragile. The following risks need to be considered for contingency planning purposes:

Sporadic conflict and political tension result in delayed elections or in results that are not seen as credible.

The security situation deteriorates with inter-tribal or inter-factional fighting.

New internal displacement within Libya and into neighbouring countries occurs.

The interim Government is unable to meet the high expectations of the population, especially young people, causing discontent and unrest.

_{[1]IOM, Humanitarian Emergency Response to the Libyan Crisis, 28 February – 27 September 2011 (October 2011).}

STRATEGY

Background

OCHA established a Country Office to coordinate the international humanitarian response following the start of the conflict in February 2011. The office was initially located in Egypt and Tunisia. As security conditions improved, a sub-office was established in Benghazi in March. The office then moved to Tripoli in September.

Throughout the crisis, OCHA’s main objectives were to establish effective humanitarian leadership, secure access to affected populations, and facilitate principled and needs-based actions to meet the most critical humanitarian needs.

Following Tripoli’s liberation by NTC forces in August 2011, the establishment of UNSMIL and the beginning of early recovery plans by Libya’s transitional authorities initiated, OCHA started transition planning to wind down its operations as soon as conditions on the ground allowed.

Current Focus

Under the HC’s leadership, OCHA is supporting the strategic and coordinated provision of humanitarian aid through the cluster approach, as per the needs highlighted in three planning documents. These are the Flash Appeal (February to August), the September 30-day plan and the CHAP for residual humanitarian needs (October to December 2011).

OCHA organizes needs assessments and joint mission planning, liaises with national authorities to ensure staff safety, advocates humanitarian space and provides meeting management services. It has also led resource mobilization efforts and continues to produce regular information products. Humanitarian coordination leadership and architecture have been established at the regional and national levels. Achievements have included the establishment of common humanitarian programme cycles to identify and prioritize needs, and inter-agency planning and resource allocation. The consolidation and analysis of information improved decision-making and led to a more focused humanitarian response.

Forward Strategy

Provided there is no return to conflict, with law and order re-established and fundamental human rights guaranteed, the OCHA office will be downsized in 2012 to focus on providing the following support to the Office of the RC/HC:

Coordination: OCHA will work with UNSMIL and the Office of the RC/HC to harmonize development, humanitarian and political coordination architectures. Libya has resources to address its humanitarian and recovery needs. The NTC’s capacity to coordinate and manage the links between local needs assessments and higher-level decision-making processes is still developing. An immediate need is to ensure temporary support in the humanitarian domain.

Reporting and Advocacy: The office will reorient its reporting and advocacy efforts to cover residual humanitarian needs; the rights of the most vulnerable; the protection of TCNs and at-risk minority groups; the needs of people living in areas contaminated with Explosive Remnants of War; and early recovery requirements. The office will also produce a comprehensive report on the humanitarian response in 2011.

Information Management: In addition to core information management services and products, the office will work with the Government Information Authority to ensure a handover of data collected during the humanitarian phase to support Libya’s recovery efforts (except for protection concerns). Where possible, the office will try to provide disaggregated data on men, women, boys and girls.

Financial Coordination & Resource Mobilization: The office will work with all appealing organizations from the 2011 Flash Appeal and subsequent plans to ensure timely and accurate reporting.

PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK

Result 1: AN EFFECTIVE HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION SYSTEM ESTABLISHED IN-COUNTRY
Indicator 1. Decisions taken by Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) led to improved delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people.
BASELINE 2011	HCT was established in February 2011. It functions as the senior-level humanitarian decision-making body. HCT decisions include CERF applications; Flash Appeal review and clearance; prioritization of humanitarian action; and advocacy priorities.
TARGET 2012-13	HCT decision-making is fully integrated into other coordination structures and mechanisms within Government (NTC) and UN (RC/UNSMIL).
Indicator 2. Level of satisfaction expressed by key stakeholders (government, donors, humanitarian actors) with coordination leadership.
BASELINE 2011	The HC enjoys a high level of in-country support from UN, INGOs, donors and the NTC. Although the HCT fulfils its functions, it drew criticisms on the frequency of meetings and the HCT’s inclusiveness to accommodate Cairo, Benghazi and Zarzis members.
TARGET 2012-13	The HCT is more inclusive and representative of humanitarian partners.
Indicator 3. Effective inter-cluster coordination in place, documenting decisions and tracking adherence.
BASELINE 2011	Inter-cluster coordination has been difficult as cluster coordinators are often based in different locations (Tripoli, Benghazi, Cairo and Zarzis). This has been compounded by a high turnover of cluster coordinators.
TARGET 2012-13	Transition of the cluster system into sector coordination as part of the Libyan Coordinated Needs Assessment process.

Result 2: A SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS GUIDES A COMMON RESPONSE
Indicator 4. Joint assessment and analysis of needs guide response planning.
BASELINE 2011	Inter-agency joint needs assessments mainstreamed into humanitarian response. However, the reports are primarily narrative without reporting against standard indicators. Missions inform the response planning.
TARGET 2012-13	Not applicable. No joint assessments are envisioned beyond 2011.
Indicator 5. Common response plan endorsed by the HCT fully reflecting priority needs in line with IASC-approved appeal policy and guidelines.
BASELINE 2011	A CHAP was finalized covering residual humanitarian needs from October to December 2011.
TARGET 2012-13	No common response plan envisaged for 2012. Remaining humanitarian response will be integrated under UN agencies’ technical cooperation programmes and UNDAF.
Indicator 6. Percentage of an appeal’s requirements prioritised in the highest category.
BASELINE 2011	N/A
TARGET 2012-13	N/A
Indicator 7. Percentage of projects in each Gender Marker code (0, 1, 2a, 2b).
BASELINE 2011	N/A
TARGET 2012-13	N/A
Indicator 8. Level of satisfaction expressed by stakeholders with the IM products supporting the analysis and monitoring of the programme cycle.
BASELINE 2011	Medium level of satisfaction with IM products.
TARGET 2012-13	High level of satisfaction with IM products.

Result 3: A WELL-RESOURCED COMMON RESPONSE PLAN REGULARLY MONITORED
Indicator 9. Percentage of CERF and CHF allocations that are made towards highest priority projects. Percentage of ERF project allocations that are made in accordance with agreed criteria.
BASELINE 2011	Not applicable. No CERF application envisaged.
TARGET 2012-13	Not applicable. No CERF application envisaged.
Indicator 10. All clusters publish information on collective outputs vs. targets as expressed in their cluster response plans.
BASELINE 2011	Clusters’ reporting against outputs and targets is satisfactory.
TARGET 2012-13	Comprehensive report on Flash Appeal and CHAP produced by March 2012.
Indicator 11. Percentage of country-based pooled-fund projects monitored according to agreed monitoring plan.
BASELINE 2011	Not applicable. No ERF or CHF.
TARGET 2012-13	Not applicable. No ERF or CHF.
Indicator 12. Level of stakeholders’ satisfaction of OCHA resource mobilization and management of pooled fund processes.
BASELINE 2011	High level of satisfaction.
TARGET 2012-13	Not applicable. No ERF or CHF.

Result 4: IMPROVED ACCESS BY ALL VULNERABLE POPULATIONS TO SERVICES AND ASSISTANCE
Indicator 13. Increased access to previously inaccessible regions and populations.
BASELINE 2011	Access has incrementally improved in line with enhanced security conditions.
TARGET 2012-13	Full access to displaced persons.
Indicator 14. Number of arrangements to facilitate access developed and implemented through engagement with the relevant actors.
BASELINE 2011	Partnership with ACTED for coordination and information management support in Misrata.
TARGET 2012-13	Handover of partnership agreements with Libyan civil society groups for monitoring humanitarian early warning indicators.
Indicator 15. Percentage of key stakeholders (Humanitarian Coordinator, Cluster Coordinators, Agency Heads, donors, etc.) report being more informed on access.
BASELINE 2011	Common understanding of access issues through the SMT and HCT.
TARGET 2012-13	N/A

Result 5: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION INFLUENCES A BROADER AGENDA
Indicator 16. Humanitarian principles and priorities are reflected in the strategies/plans of non-humanitarian actors.
BASELINE 2011	OCHA has produced ERC Key Messages, which have been reflected in key partners’ strategies.
TARGET 2012-13	Field key messages produced, disseminated and used to support advocacy on humanitarian issues as required.
Indicator 17. Percentage of humanitarian partners viewing OCHA as effective in influencing the broader agenda.
BASELINE 2011	Partners see the role of the HC and OCHA as a critical and constructive interface with the NTC and new transition authorities.
TARGET 2012-13	Partners see the role of the HC and HSU as critical and constructive on humanitarian issues with new transition authorities and UNSMIL.

Result 6: GOVERNMENTS AND HCT BETTER PREPARED TO COORDINATE AND RESPOND TO FUTURE EMERGENCIES
Indicator 18. Integration of international tools and services in national contingency plans and other government plans.
BASELINE 2011	No integration of international tools and services in national contingency plans and other Government plans.
TARGET 2012-13	OCHA to work with Libyan authorities so that national preparedness plans reference international emergency response tools and services.
Indicator 19. Inter-agency contingency plan in place to address new or resurgent emergencies.
BASELINE 2011	Contingency Plan updated and released mid-August. A revised contingency plan to be developed by end of 2011.
TARGET 2012-13	Updated 2011 Contingency Plan by March 2012.

Result 7: RECURRENT HUMANITARIAN CONCERN ADDRESSED THROUGH LONGER-TERM DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
Indicator 20. Humanitarian issues reflecting analysis of vulnerability are integrated into development strategies (UNDAF, PRSP, etc.).
BASELINE 2011	The CO is working with the RC’s Office to integrate early-recovery and recovery plans into the 90-day plan.
TARGET 2012-13	Humanitarian issues integrated into Agency Technical Cooperation Programmes.

PLANNED STAFFING AND TOTAL COSTS

Total Staff	Professional		National		General Service		GTA		UNV	Total
Total Staff	XBPB	XBAB	XBPB	XBAB	XBPB	XBAB	XBPB	XBAB	UNV	Total
Total Staff 2012	3	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	7
Total Staff 2013	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

XBPB: Extrabudgetary Programme Budget | XBAB: Extrabudgetary Administrative Budget | GTA = General Temporary Assistance | UNV: United Nations Volunteers

Total Costs (US$)	Programme Costs	Administrative Costs	Total

Total Costs 2012	275,092	44,649	319,741
Total Funds Requested 2012			275,092
Total Costs 2013	0	0	0
Total Funds Requested 2013			0

As the sun sets, hundreds of migrant workers line up for food at a transit camp near the Tunisia-Libya border. © OCHA/David Ohana