OCHA

Somalia

Philippines The humanitarian situation in Somalia has deteriorated. The number of people in need of assistance increased from an estimated 2 million at the start of 2011 to 4 million by September. With famine expected to spread across all regions of the south in 2012, the humanitarian challenge is immense. Al Shabaab’s ban in 2010 on humanitarian organizations, including WFP, working in southern and parts of central Somalia has partially prevented the UN from reaching the very hungry, especially children. It also contributed to the current crisis. Such access constraints and prevailing insecurity have severely limited OCHA’s field presence and current operations in South Somalia. Despite these challenges, OCHA is stepping up its response in 2012 and 2013, and will begin to move its entire Country Office into Somalia. The first step is to strengthen its Mogadishu presence, then extend to other parts of southern Somalia as the security situation permits. OCHA will also set up a Humanitarian Liaison Unit to deal with access and work to ensure effective information flow between UN entities.

CONTEXT ANALYSIS

The Socio-political Situation

For almost two decades, Somalia has endured conflict, recurrent droughts and floods, and lack of an effective central Government. The 2010 ban imposed by Al Shabaab, preventing some humanitarian organizations from operating in territory under its control, has affected the humanitarian community’s ability to deliver life-saving humanitarian assistance. By November 2011, the violent struggle for control over territory between rival factions across Somalia showed no sign of abating. South and Central Somalia remain at the epicentre of conflict between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Al Shabaab, making these areas extremely difficult for humanitarians to access. In late October 2011, the Government of Kenya commenced a military incursion into Somalia, the duration and scope of which was unclear.

The Humanitarian Situation

The Somalia Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit declared a state of famine in six areas in southern Somalia in 2011. These included the agro-pastoral livelihood zone of southern Bakool, Lower Shabelle region, the Balcad and Cadale districts of Middle Shabelle region, Bay region, the IDP settlements of the Afgooye Corridor, and the Mogadishu IDP community. The famine could spread further if affected populations do not receive assistance on time.

Malnutrition rates are critically high, particularly in the famine-stricken areas of southern Somalia. There were 450,000 acutely malnourished children in August 2011, of whom 190,000 were severely malnourished. The Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates are highest in the Bay region at 58 per cent (nearly four times the WHO emergency threshold of 15 per cent). Mortality rates have reached an estimated high of 15 per 10,000 daily in children under age 5 among IDP populations in Mogadishu. Despite increased international resources in recent months, the humanitarian response in Somalia remains challenged. Famine is expected to spread across all regions of the south in the remainder of 2011, and is likely to persist well into 2012. Efforts to implement immediate large-scale and comprehensive responses continue.

The Humanitarian Strategy and Response

Despite significant operational and security constraints, the humanitarian community has adopted several strategies to mitigate the famine in Somalia. These include partnering with local NGOs to provide assistance to drought- and famine-affected people in areas inaccessible to the UN; delivering assistance to those in transit to minimize the loss of life en route to refuge; and providing life-saving assistance to affected populations in their places of origin.

An emergency revision of the Consolidated Appeal for 2011 was issued in August, requesting $983 million. About $705 million in humanitarian funding has been received since July (both CAP and non-CAP), compared with $402 million received during the first half of 2011. Non-traditional donors, such as Gulf Member States, have emerged as important actors, accounting for 29 per cent of the funding received for humanitarian activities. Concerted efforts are required from all actors to sustain the current operations, since the current crisis is expected to continue far into 2012.The CAP 2012 is requsting a total of $1.5 billion of humanitarian funding.

Projections

It is anticipated that the humanitarian situation in Somalia will deteriorate further. Without significant increases in humanitarian response levels and average or poor deyr (October to December short rains), further deterioration in food security is expected across Somalia over the next four months. Little or no gu rains (April-June 2012) will bring low crop production, increasing the cost of basic commodities and potentially prolonging the humanitarian crisis into 2013. It is critical that humanitarian actors continue to deliver life-saving assistance in 2012 and build the resilience of communities to withstand future shocks.

STRATEGY

Background

A fully operational OCHA office was established in Somalia in 2003. However, OCHA’s presence in the country dates back to 1999. Since then, its coordination role has grown in relevance and size as the humanitarian situation has developed in Somalia. OCHA has responded to drought, floods, famine, chronic food insecurity and environmental degradation, all of which have been adversely affected by a 20-year civil war that displaced millions of people and destroyed governance in most parts of the country. OCHA Somalia’s key focus has been to mobilize and coordinate an effective and principled inter-agency humanitarian response. Security concerns over the last three years have challenged internal and national staff who have been unable to travel to south and central regions, and in some cases have had to leave their areas of responsibility. Under these circumstances, coordination was carried out remotely, either through Nairobi or other towns in Somalia.

Current focus

By mid-2011, access had improved in central and south Somalia. This made permanent national and international presence possible in regions that previously were off limits. The OCHA office has since expanded its in-country presence beyond the previous sub-offices of Hargeisa, Garowe, Bossaso and Galkayo, to include an internationally staffed Mogadishu office. Efforts are also underway to establish national staff outreach offices in Dhobley, El Waq, Dollow, Abudwaq and Belet Hawa. Recruitment for national staff focuses on individuals familiar with regional humanitarian issues.

Key OCHA functions in these newly established areas are to:
(i) Support the establishment of clusters.
(ii) Manage the inter-cluster working group.
(iii) Provide overall coordination.
(iv) Develop information management products in support of response efforts.

The RC/HC represents humanitarian interests and concerns in the Senior Policy Group, comprised of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the RC/HC and the Chief of the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). As a member of the Joint Planning Unit, OCHA represents humanitarian interests and concerns. OCHA is also a member of the relevant ISF working groups.

Forward strategy

The limitations of current operations are linked to physical restrictions in Somalia. OCHA and its humanitarian partners must increase their presence in Somalia. Immediate steps toward this result should follow the twin tracks of:

Establishing and strengthening presence in all locations where conditions allow.

Undertaking analytical research to identify individuals who can enable and facilitate access negotiations with those movements unwilling to engage in discussion with the humanitarian community.

From 2012-2013, OCHA intends to move the entire Country Office into Somalia. This will include reinforcing the Mogadishu sub-office to accommodate its shift from Nairobi. OCHA will also establish a presence in newly accessible areas of southern Somalia, and will set up a new sub-office in Dollo to serve the Gedo region and neighbouring Bakool and Bay regions. OCHA will also strengthen coordination for the Jubas. If the security situation remains unstable in Dhobley, the staff member may need to rotate between Nairobi, Dadaab and Liboi. The Mogadishu office will initially serve Banadir and the Shabelles. Galkayo will serve southern Mudug, Galmudug and Hiraan. OCHA’s presence in Puntland and Somaliland will be strengthened to provide a full suite of services and to work with regional authorities on disaster risk management and risk reduction. OCHA will establish a Humanitarian Diplomacy Support Unit to map stakeholders who influence access and to identify individuals with whom they have leverage.

OCHA will continue to participate in the integrated coordination mechanisms to ensure effective information flow between the various UN entities and to ensure appropriate attention to humanitarian concerns. Particular attention will be devoted to security issues in Mogadishu for appropriate engagement with AMISOM and TFG.

Coordination: The shift of the OCHA office to Mogadishu will enable greater efficacy of coordination with TFG and the actors present there. Increased field presence and delegation of authority to capable heads of sub-offices will enable leadership and decision-making to take place at the field level through regional Inter-Cluster Working Groups. The Access Support Unit will create enhanced opportunities for new areas of negotiation and increased access.

Reporting and Advocacy: The accuracy of field reporting will improve as OCHA will be closer to events as they unfold. The accuracy of information provided will enhance the ability to advocate issues with authority, confidence and credibility, both through field presence and the analysis of the Access Support Unit.

Information Management: The increase in field presence, along with the stationing of an IMO in each hub, will enhance OCHA’s ability to capture and analyse information, and to generate information products at the regional level to facilitate better response.

Financial Coordination and Resource Mobilization: The Funding Coordination/CHF Unit will be one of the last units to move to Mogadishu in its entirety. In the interim, additional field visits and training conducted by unit members will improve the understanding and engagement of LNGOs in the CAP and CHF systems. In Nairobi, the Head of Unit will engage with donors to encourage their contributions during this time of transition and increased expenditure.

PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK

Result 1: AN EFFECTIVE HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION SYSTEM ESTABLISHED IN-COUNTRY
Indicator 1. Decisions taken by Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) led to improved delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people.
BASELINE 2011	HCT common positions endorsed and decisions taken on policy issues of inter-agency concern as they emerge, with clear actions and recommendations. While the HCT is able to reach common positions, it is a lengthy process and occasionally not timely, due to multiple revisions of draft documents.
TARGET 2012-13	Decision making process is streamlined and timelier. Members to ensure they express all concerns with first draft of all documents to enable approval of second draft.
Indicator 2. Level of satisfaction expressed by key stakeholders (government, donors, humanitarian actors) with coordination leadership.
BASELINE 2011	Overall satisfaction with OCHA Somalia leadership 60per cent Partners reported as satisfied by location: • Nairobi –92 per cent (excellent 28.6 per cent, good 39 per cent and fair 24.8 per cent) • Somaliland – -68.9 per cent (excellent 10 per cent, good 30 per cent and fair 28.9 per cent) • Puntland – 69.3 per cent ((excellent 9.9 per cent, good 25.3 per cent and fair 34.1 per cent) • South Central Somalia – 51.4 per cent (excellent 7.6per cent, good 19per cent and fair 24.8 per cent) (Galkayo, Dollow, Juba / Dadaab / Liboi, Mogadishu) This information from surveys highlights the geographical areas where satisfaction is lowest, corresponding to areas of greatest need and lowest international presence. Currently OCHA presence is being increased in all locations that security conditions permit, and coordination mechanisms put in place.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: Overall satisfaction with OCHA Somalia leadership increased to 70 per cent Increased OCHA presence and functioning coordination mechanisms will lead to greater client satisfaction in all locations. 2013: Overall satisfaction with OCHA Somalia leadership 80 per cent.
Indicator 3. Effective inter-cluster coordination in place, documenting decisions and tracking adherence.
BASELINE 2011	Inter-cluster coordination is strong at Nairobi level. An Inter-Cluster Working Group (ICWG) coordinates cluster analysis and response activities in Somalia, meeting monthly, and more frequently during a crisis (for instance, the ICWG has met twice a week since the declaration of famine in Southern Somalia). OCHA chairs the ICWG meetings, sets the agenda after consultations with clusters, and ensures action points are documented, tracked and implemented. Eight out of nine clusters have dedicated cluster chairs and are supported by cluster support officers deployed by OCHA. More recently, several cluster lead agencies are providing information management officers to cluster chairs, improving analytical and information management capacity. The ICWG meets once per month with the HCT to ensure that synergies exist between the strategic and operational issues. OCHA shares decisions/guidance from the HCT to the ICWG and through it to clusters in Nairobi and the field. Field Clusters have improved in 2011, but are not yet as strong as they could be. All the field clusters have designated field cluster focal points from the main agencies or key NGOs operating in the relevant areas. In Mogadishu and Gedo, in particular, almost all the clusters are now operational, while in areas with limited access field cluster focal points have been appointed, though they are weak. Field ICWGs have been established and are active in Hargeisa, Garowe, Galkacyo, Mogadishu, and Gedo in Somalia and in Mandera, in Kenya. In the south, and Mogadishu in particular, non-traditional actors have entered the operational environment and activities are being conducted to explain the humanitarian coordination system, and welcome them into existing coordination mechanisms
TARGET 2012-13	2012: OCHA will focus on supporting and strengthening, and where possible increase field ICWGs. OCHA plans to gradually increase its presence on the ground (through increased staffing in Somalia, increased field visits and deployment of staff with coordination skills from Nairobi to the field) to provide technical guidance and support to the existing structures. In Puntland and Somaliland, cohesive and comprehensive linkages between cluster and sectoral coordination will be established. Disaster Risk Reduction programs will be established with these regional authorities. Continued and increased outreach to non-traditional donors and implementers will encourage their entry to established coordination mechanisms. 3 more ICWGs will be established in Hiraan, Jubbas, and Bay and Bakool, security permitting. 2013: OCHA will aim to establish ICWGs in all regions of South and central Somalia, and to enhance the capacity of the existing zonal ICWGs in Puntland and Somaliland. Clear linkages and methods of working will exist between clusters and sectors in Puntland and Somaliland.

Result 2: A SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS GUIDES A COMMON RESPONSE
Indicator 4. Joint assessment and analysis of needs guide response planning.
BASELINE 2011	Bi-annual country-wide food security and nutritional assessments, and continuous rainfall monitoring provide the basis for the formulation of the humanitarian strategy in the CAP, as well as for CHF standard allocations. The initiated Survey-of-surveys, accumulating volunteered assessments, conducting gap analysis of assessments provide improved overview of needs by region. The generic multi-cluster Assessment Tool recently developed and currently under review, will allow for joint assessments to gap regions identified and minimize duplication and assessment fatigue.
TARGET 2012-13	Humanitarian strategy in the CAP, as well as for CHF standard allocations based on the assessments and ICP reports. Improved overview of needs by district through the Survey-of-surveys of existing assessments and gap analysis of assessments. The generic multi-cluster Assessment Tool will allow for selected regions and partial district gaps analysis for further needs understanding and intervention.
Indicator 5. Common response plan endorsed by the HCT fully reflecting priority needs in line with IASC-approved appeal policy and guidelines.
BASELINE 2011	Somalia common situation analysis, clear objectives, strategic priorities and plans for implementation are reflected in Consolidated Appeal Plan (CAP), CAP MYR, CAP EYR.
TARGET 2012-13	Somalia will maintain high quality appeal, CAP MYR, CAP EYR.
Indicator 6. Percentage of an appeal’s requirements prioritised in the highest category.
BASELINE 2011	75 per cent of projects rated as high priority in CAP 2011.
TARGET 2012-13	Reduction by 10 per cent of projects (representing a minimum of 10 per cent of funding requirements) in the highest category in 2012. Reduction by another 10 per cent of projects in 2013.
Indicator 7. Percentage of projects in each Gender Marker code (0, 1, 2a, 2b).
BASELINE 2011	The IASC Gender Marker Coding scores out of 229 projects submitted in the CAP 2011 were as follows: Code 0 – 18 per cent; Code 1 – 52 per cent; Code 2A – 26 per cent; and 2B – 4 per cent.
TARGET 2012-13	Code 0 - 0; Code 1- less than 35 per cent; Code 2A - more than 45 per cent and Code 2B - approximately 20 per cent.
Indicator 8. Level of satisfaction expressed by stakeholders with the IM products supporting the analysis and monitoring of the programme cycle.
BASELINE 2011	No baseline (not included in existing client satisfaction surveys).
TARGET 2012-13	2012: At least 30 per cent of partners satisfied with OCHAs support in the following: Needs assessment that are multi – sectorial and that adequately address the needs of the different clusters; needs analysis that guides humanitarian programming; monitoring of humanitarian situation in a way that effectively influences programming; monitoring of response activities through cluster reports, 3Ws, CAP documents and humanitarian dashboard. 2013: At least 50 per cent report satisfaction with above processes.

Result 3: A WELL-RESOURCED COMMON RESPONSE PLAN REGULARLY MONITORED
Indicator 9. Percentage of CERF and CHF allocations that are made towards highest priority projects. Percentage of ERF project allocations that are made in accordance with agreed criteria.
BASELINE 2011	100 per cent of all CERF and 90 per cent of CHF funding (including Emergency Reserve) are made towards highest priority projects.
TARGET 2012-13	CERF per cent at 100 per cent, CHF at 90 per cent
Indicator 10. All clusters publish information on collective outputs vs. targets as expressed in their cluster response plans.
BASELINE 2011	Clusters provide information on achievements (outputs) against and indicators twice a year (at the MYR review and End-year review). As a result of the famine, Clusters provide figures on number of people assisted/reached on a weekly basis, in so far as data availability allows. Data is cross-checked monthly and final data for a given month is published.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: There should be a move to monthly reporting in 2012: monthly output vs. indicator updates should be provided. 2013: Monthly output vs. indicator updates will be provided by all clusters.
Indicator 11. Percentage of country-based pooled-fund projects monitored according to agreed monitoring plan.
BASELINE 2011	CHF monitoring framework in place. A monitoring plan will be developed and operationalized by a dedicated Monitoring and Evaluation Officer once on board. CHF funded a pilot capacity building project under FAO to strengthen the Agriculture and Livelihoods cluster coordination and monitoring of cluster activities. Project will put in place structures at both field and Nairobi level to foster monitoring. In 2011, verification visits made to 40 per cent of CHF funded projects.
TARGET 2012-13	50 per cent of CHF funded projects will be monitored. This will be achieved using available field mechanisms both by clusters and OCHA field and increased field missions by Funding Coordination Unit.
Indicator 12. Level of stakeholders’ satisfaction of OCHA resource mobilization and management of pooled fund processes.
BASELINE 2011	Donors are regularly informed of funding requirements to cover the most urgent humanitarian needs in Somalia. Donor meetings are held at a minimum every two months and more often as required. This year for example they were held every 2-3 weeks due to the resource requirements for the drought. The CAP is funded at 78.4 per cent. Per cent of stakeholder reporting satisfaction on the following: 50 per cent: Funding priorities for the CHF in line with the most urgent humanitarian priorities for Somalia 42 per cent: Decision making process is transparent 42 per cent: The application process is efficient
TARGET 2012-13	2012: Donor satisfaction on each of the above increases to 60 per cent. 2013: Donor satisfaction on each of the above increases to 70 per cent.

Result 4: IMPROVED ACCESS BY ALL VULNERABLE POPULATIONS TO SERVICES AND ASSISTANCE
Indicator 13. Increased access to previously inaccessible regions and populations.
BASELINE 2011	Overall access improved in all regions except those controlled by Al Shabaab where only slight or no improvements occurred. Administrations in control of areas previously in the hands of Al Shabaab encourage humanitarian interventions and access. In areas where famine recently was declared there has been a slight increase in access for a limited number of INGOs rather than broad access to territory and people needed. Access in the north and north west has remained the same with temporary access constraints due to localized conflict.
TARGET 2012-13	An Access Support Unit will be established within the CO: a comprehensive mapping of actors in Somalia that are currently hindering or obstructing access will be undertaken. OCHA will research individuals and/or entities with leverage over these actors, to enable access negotiation and facilitate increased coverage, particularly in the south.
Indicator 14. Number of arrangements to facilitate access developed and implemented through engagement with the relevant actors.
BASELINE 2011	As agreed among humanitarian actors, all operational access negotiations remain the prerogative of the NGOs on the ground. Informally, it is agreed that OCHA assists where it can provide added value. HC confirmed that he will engage at a strategic level the HC, with OCHA’s assistance. In 2011, OCHA engaged traditional elders in Galgaduud and parts of Hiraan regions in central Somalia to negotiate access, easing movement of humanitarian personnel. OCHA also initiated access discussions with Al Shabaab in southern regions through the HC, but this has yet to open up access.
TARGET 2012-13	Access Support Unit established and generating analysis that assists in managing humanitarian negotiations on access. OCHA will review the current access negotiation strategy moving it to a senior level engagement with Al Shaabab to achieve better results.
Indicator 15. Percentage of key stakeholders (Humanitarian Coordinator, Cluster Coordinators, Agency Heads, donors, etc.) report being more informed on access.
BASELINE 2011	The monthly access report for Somalia is being revised, and the access map indicators reviewed.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: Improvements undertaken on the access analysis reports and map, which stakeholders are expected to find more useful. 2013: Wider stakeholder group reached with regular reports with more analysis.

Result 5: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION INFLUENCES A BROADER AGENDA
Indicator 16. Humanitarian principles and priorities are reflected in the strategies/plans of non-humanitarian actors.
BASELINE 2011	In 2011, OCHA has focused advocacy on following concerns: against forced evictions targeting IDPs in some of the settlements in Bossaso, Garowe, and Galkayo, Puntland; against deportation from Puntland of IDPs; against indiscriminate shelling of civilian neighborhoods by all parties to the conflict. OCHA also worked closely with the AMISOM’s communication team to influence its outreach efforts to safeguard humanitarian interests. OCHA engages with AMISOM’s civil military component to prevent the blurring of military civilian and humanitarian responses. Engagement with the mission side of the UN and the AU has been particularly successful, given that Somalia is not an integrated mission. Through continued engagement and dialogue, OCHA has been able to ensure that humanitarian and protection issues, particularly in relation to IDPs are on the agenda of mission organizations.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: Strengthen relations and engagement with the local Somali media for the purpose of better humanitarian advocacy. Adoption of a new strategy (through OCHA national staff) that will involve non-traditional communication channels that will engage traditional elders and religious leaders for the purpose of strengthening OCHA advocacy at the field levels. In addition to continued engagement with the UN Mission and AU, the increasing number of NGOs entering Somalia will be targeted for awareness raising sessions on humanitarian principles, as will the AU on humanitarian coordination 2013: Mainstream humanitarian principles and priorities in UN mission and AU planning and activities. Regular communication channels established between OCHA and traditional elders and religious leaders.
Indicator 17. Percentage of humanitarian partners viewing OCHA as effective in influencing the broader agenda.
BASELINE 2011	Anecdotal evidence suggests partner satisfaction with OCHA messaging, however we have not as yet systematically measured this. This will be included in future surveys.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: 60 per cent 2013: 80 per cent

Result 6: GOVERNMENTS AND HCT BETTER PREPARED TO COORDINATE AND RESPOND TO FUTURE EMERGENCIES
Indicator 18. Integration of international tools and services in national contingency plans and other government plans.
BASELINE 2011	Many national institutions are weak in most parts of Somalia and do not have plans that reflect or incorporate elements of international experience. In Somaliland (north west Somalia) the government launched a National Development Plan (NDP) in 2011, which has some degree of alignment with zonal cluster plans.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: Create linkages between cluster response plans, sector strategies and the National Development Plan in Somaliland. DRM strategy in initial phases of implementation in Somaliland. For the rest of Somalia, progress is unlikely in 2012. 2013: Humanitarian plans consider national development plans of the zonal authorities and the Government in Somalia, security and political stability permitting. DRM strategy beginning to yield results in terms of preparedness.
Indicator 19. Inter-agency contingency plan in place to address new or resurgent emergencies.
BASELINE 2011	There is no annual multi-hazard inter-agency contingency plan which is regularly updated. Contingency plans are developed for droughts, floods, and conflicts, where this is deemed relevant. These contingency plans are developed by clusters, and therefore, reflect the consensus of humanitarian actors. A process is underway to produce a drought contingency plan for Somaliland.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: An Inter-Agency contingency plan will be put in place for Somalia. 2013: Standard multi-hazard HCT contingency plan is in place and updated each year.

Result 7: RECURRENT HUMANITARIAN CONCERN ADDRESSED THROUGH LONGER-TERM DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
Indicator 20. Humanitarian issues reflecting analysis of vulnerability are integrated into development strategies (UNDAF, PRSP, etc.).
BASELINE 2011	Somalia currently is not an integrated mission and does not have an UNDAF. OCHA engages in processes such as the UNSAS and ISF in which humanitarian concerns are addressed.
TARGET 2012-13	Humanitarian outputs and indicators linked to UNSAS and ISF, primarily in the areas of basic services, livelihoods, protection and DRM.

PLANNED STAFFING AND TOTAL COSTS

Total Staff	Professional		National		General Service		GTA		UNV	Total
Total Staff	XBPB	XBAB	XBPB	XBAB	XBPB	XBAB	XBPB	XBAB	UNV	Total
Total Staff 2012	28	1	44	2	10	4	17	6	1	113
Total Staff 2013	26	1	32	1	14	4	8	7	1	92

XBPB: Extrabudgetary Programme Budget | XBAB: Extrabudgetary Administrative Budget | GTA = General Temporary Assistance | UNV: United Nations Volunteers

Total Costs (US$)	Programme Costs	Administrative Costs	Total

Total Costs 2012	11,017,856	466,036	11,483,892
Total Funds Requested 2012			11,017,856
Total Costs 2013	9,804,446	535,044	10,339,490
Total Funds Requested 2013			9,804,446

Women and children wait to receive a cooked meal at a food distribution organized by the WFP near the port in Mogadishu, Somalia. © Kate Holt/IRIN