OCHA Evaluation of Duty of Care | Final Report - June 2018

1. Executive Summary

1.1. Introduction

  1. OCHA is currently in the implementation phase of a change process, with several important components, which were initially outlined in the 2016 OCHA Functional Review. In January 2018,
    OCHA launched a People Strategy, which encompasses a mandate related to, but much broader than, duty of care. The People Strategy is intended to foster an improved work culture and, in line with the Secretary-General’s vision, to create “a working environment that embraces equality, eradicates bias and is inclusive of all staff.”

  2. Within this milieu, OCHA commissioned an evaluation to clarify and strengthen the provision of duty of care towards its personnel and their eligible family members, particularly those in high-risk environments. Recommendations from the evaluation are intended to support the recommendations emerging from the High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM) Duty of Care Task Force, as well as the operationalization of the OCHA People Strategy.

1.2. Methodology

  1. The evaluation focused on three dimensions within duty of care: security risk management in high-risk environments, staff welfare (health, benefits and entitlements), and an empowering and respectful working environment, free from harassment.

  2. The evaluation drew on both qualitative and quantitative measures. The quantitative measures were obtained from a wide range of pre-existing internal and external sources complemented by an online survey to all OCHA personnel to assess current perceptions related to duty of care themes prioritized in the inception report. Qualitative data was collected through virtual interviews with selected OCHA personnel based around the world and in-person interviews during six site visits – one to each headquarter location (New York and Geneva); three country offices (Somalia, Iraq and Mali) and one regional office (The Regional Office for Southern and Eastern Africa in Nairobi). In total, 318 persons (41 per cent female) were interviewed and 510 OCHA personnel responded to the online survey (25 per cent response rate).

1.3. Summary of the Findings

1.3.1. Cross-cutting themes

  1. There is currently no UN system-wide duty of care definition or legal framework. This is in the process of being developed as a consequence of the High-Level Committee of Management (HLCM) Duty of Care Task Force but is not yet operationalized. This has three important implications for OCHA. First, the policy and process environment for delivering duty of care is widely dispersed across separate entities, organizations, departments and functions. Second, duty of care as a concept is subject to multiple interpretations by stakeholders. Third, this has led to a lack of a systematic articulation of senior-level OCHA manager responsibilities for the delivery of duty of care in their posts.

  2. Multiple assessments or reforms with implications for duty of care have been developed or are being developed. Since 2014, this includes the current OCHA duty of care evaluation exercise, the OCHA Functional Review of 2016, the OCHA People Strategy of 2018, the HLCM Duty of Care Working Group of 2014, the HLCM Duty of Care Task Force of 2016, as well as proposed SecretaryGeneral reforms.

  3. OCHA has grown rapidly as an organization and has evolved with more similarities – in size and function – to agencies yet the duty of care systems supporting OCHA have not evolved commensurately.

  4. OCHA’s position within the Secretariat affects its capacity for duty of care considerations.
    OCHA’s reliance on procurement and Human Resources (HR) processes via the Secretariat impacts its provision of duty of care. There are alternative mechanisms available including the special measures exemption. OCHA also has the ability to utilise other service providers (especially UN sister agencies) to support duty of care and these service providers may be better equipped to deliver on duty of care.

  5. OCHA’s role in humanitarian coordination may limit its willingness to access the resources or structures of UN peacekeeping missions related to duty of care. The principle of neutrality in humanitarian coordination is important in OCHA’s coordination role, but also creates a reluctance to make use of generic management, counselling resources, and mission legal support for managing contracts and leases.

  6. OCHA guidance, systems and standards of accountability are minimal for allowing managers to deliver duty of care. The lack of a guidance, system, standards, and described roles and responsibilities subsequently limits the capacity of the support systems (HR, procurement and finance) to provide the targeted support to field managers for implementing duty of care leading to a field culture which under-delivers on duty of care to its personnel. This is exacerbated by a lack of staff awareness of policy frameworks that do exist.

1.3.2. Security

  1. A security policy framework outlines minimum standards. In comparison to the other dimensions, a security risk management policy document exists and is more centralized for coherent access. Minimum standards are defined for security.

  2. The perceptions regarding the quality of security risk management is highly variable among countries. Personnel based in non-family duty stations and personnel on surge deployment were less satisfied with the degree of security support.

  3. The most significant security gaps cited in interviews related to the practices applied to highrisk environments on three elements:

a. Risks to national staff: National staff often experience greater security risks while having fewer opportunities and resources for mitigation.

b. Gender considerations: Gender-specific considerations related to security for women in highrisk environments are perceived as insufficient with respect to accountability measures to mitigate personal security risks.

c. UNDSS capabilities for support: Security advisors in OCHA at HQ level can play a helpful role, but this is not adequate given the scale of complex contexts that OCHA is operating in. Further,
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) resources are often perceived as not sufficient to meet OCHA’s security needs leading to multiple requests for dedicated security officers in certain contexts.

  1. Procurement issues for security were frequently cited in interviews. Primary concerns cited included the observation of the reliance on Secretariat procurement structures that were not seen as fit for purpose for OCHA needs, lack of sufficient management orientation to procurement processes, different standards for security equipment between the United Nations Office at Gevena/ Department of Field Support procurement processes and those used by agencies, and delays in procurement processes.