Aim and objective of the document
With the aim to foster a constructive and effective dialogue between the humanitarian community and EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (hereunder referred to as EUFOR), coordination mechanisms and liaison arrangements were put in place immediately with the arrival of the first EUFOR elements in November 2007.

EUFOR was a bridging operation for MINURCAT and the arrival of its blue berets. During its operation, EUFOR therefore tested courses of action and explored possibilities of cooperation with the humanitarian community, preparing the way for MINURCAT. Coordination mechanisms, information sharing products and inter-institutional meetings were created in order to ensure a regular dialogue with the humanitarian community.

This document shall serve as a reference guide – for the follow-on force as well as for the humanitarian community – describing what has been put in place in the domain of humanitarian-military coordination during EUFOR's mandate from January 2008 to March 2009. Secondly, it shall serve as institutional memory, capturing established coordination mechanisms and liaison arrangements for reference beyond the Transfer of Authority on 15 March 2009. Lastly, this document may provide the basis for country-specific guidelines on humanitarian-military coordination in Chad for MINURCAT and the humanitarian community.

I – Context
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1778 of 25 September 2007 established EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, with the objectives to:

1/ contribute to the protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;
2/ facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations;
3/ contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel.

This resolution was succeeded by Security Council resolution 1834 of 24 September 2008 and resolution 1861 of 14 January 2009.

Considering the operation's mandate and the objectives outlined above, an effective coordination and dialogue between the humanitarian community and EUFOR were critical in order to ensure respect for humanitarian space and for EUFOR to be able to fulfill its mission. This dialogue was all the more important since MINURCAT was in the course of deploying when EUFOR had to respond to threats that sometimes required a police rather than a military response.

II – Definition of key terms
Some principles outlined in the IASC Reference Paper on Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies of 28 June 2004 have proven to be of particular relevance for the relations between the humanitarian community and EUFOR in eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic (CAR):

1/ Civil-Military Coordination from a humanitarian point of view
The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation.

Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.
Humanitarian Principles – Humanity, Neutrality and Impartiality

Humanity, neutrality and impartiality are three fundamental humanitarian principles. Any humanitarian civil-military coordination must serve the prime humanitarian principle of humanity – i.e. human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found.

In determining whether and to what extent humanitarian agencies should coordinate with military forces, one must be mindful of the potential consequences of too close an affiliation with the military or even the perception of such affiliation, especially as these could jeopardize the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. The concept of non-allegiance is central to the principle of neutrality in humanitarian action; likewise, the idea of non-discrimination is crucial to the principle of impartiality.

However, the key humanitarian objective of providing protection and assistance to populations in need may at times necessitate a pragmatic approach, which might include civil-military coordination. Ample consideration must be given to finding the right balance between a pragmatic and a principled response, so that coordination with the military would not compromise humanitarian imperatives.

Impartial with regard to internal conflicts in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR, EUFOR went to great lengths to demonstrate this in its relations with humanitarian organizations.

Do No Harm

Considerations on civil-military coordination must be guided by a commitment to ‘do no harm’. Humanitarian agencies must ensure at the policy and operational levels that any potential civil-military coordination will not contribute to further the conflict, nor harm or endanger the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance. With EUFOR, this concept was in particular applied to the implementation of micro-projects that were financed and carried out by some of the troop contributing countries to the force.

Option of last resort – unique capability

Use of military assets, armed escorts, joint humanitarian-military operations and any other actions involving visible interaction with the military are the option of last resort. This choice is made when all comparable civilian alternatives have been exhausted and only the use of military support, by offering a unique capability which humanitarian organizations do not dispose of, can meet critical needs (heavy logistics, medical assistance etc.)

Avoid reliance on the military

Humanitarian agencies must avoid becoming dependent on resources or support provided by the military. Any resources or support provided by the military should be, at its onset, clearly limited in time and scale and present an exit strategy element that defines clearly how the function it undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel/means. Resources provided by the military are often only temporarily available. When higher priority missions emerge, such support may be recalled at short notice and without any substitute support. In eastern Chad and northeastern CAR, this applied in particular to the use of armed escorts.

Civil-Military Distinction in Humanitarian Action

In order to maintain a clear distinction between humanitarian workers and the military, it is important that each actor wears the outfit that applies to their institutions.

Humanitarian workers should not present themselves or their work as part of a military operation, and military personnel should, at all times, wear their uniforms. In eastern Chad and northeastern CAR, it was the norm that EUFOR soldiers would wear their uniforms at all times in all places. Also, the locations to which the military could go were clearly designated: i.e. from the military side, solely EUFOR CIMIC personnel were authorized to enter IDP sites or refugee camps. They went there in military uniform without weapons, in coordination with humanitarian organizations working in the respective sites and camps, accompanied by a representative of a humanitarian organization. Every armed force or force protection unit had orders to stay outside of sites and camps. This concept applied even during official visits of statesmen and VIPs who wished to visit a site or a camp.
III – Coordination mechanisms, liaison structures and information exchange

In order to enable an effective dialogue and coordination, the following mechanisms have been created:

1/ Interlocuteur from the humanitarian side and direct contact

Since the arrival of EUFOR and MINURCAT in late 2007, the United Nations employ a Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Officer (UN Humanitarian CMCoord Officer), principal advisor to the Humanitarian Coordinator and his Deputy in the east, in order to serve as liaison and point of contact between military actors (including uniformed actors such as police and gendarmerie) and the humanitarian community at large.

This function included the establishing of coordination mechanisms (regular civil-military coordination meetings) and information exchange, daily coordination and liaison, sensitization and awareness training with the military on humanitarian principles and vice versa, common training and providing advice to respond to requests of various humanitarian actors. All this was done in close cooperation with EUFOR, the Humanitarian Coordinator and his Deputy in the east.

A central aspect of the role of the UN Humanitarian CMCoord Officer consisted of establishing and facilitating direct relations of trust between humanitarians and the military. This included explaining respective mandates and establishing contact between different actors. The direct contact and communication between humanitarian organizations and EUFOR was essential, both for humanitarians to have a military appreciation of the situation, as for EUFOR, to have an insight into humanitarian operations and the overall situation, thus being able to better tailor its contribution to security for humanitarians.

When direct contact between the military and humanitarians was not wished for or not possible, both actors asked the UN Humanitarian CMCoord Officer to serve as interlocuteur and channel to exchange information regarding humanitarian operations.

The UN Humanitarian CMCoord Officer had a direct information exchange and working relations at all levels of the force, from warrant officers to the Force Commander. This allowed for a coherent coordination between humanitarian actors and EUFOR, by moderating, facilitating and reconciling different points of view and modus operandi of the variety of actors present in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR.

Frequent contact with EUFOR Force Headquarters in Abeche as well as with the battalions in the field allowed for smooth information exchange and regular dialogue between the humanitarian actors and EUFOR. This did not only apply to civil-military coordination but contributed equally to military-military coordination, since the UN-CMCoord Officer could take stock of the situation with EUFOR contingents and humanitarian actors in each sector and sometimes help reinforce links between the different zones in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR by moving within the area of operations to meet with the different EUFOR entities.

The NGO Coordination Committee in Abeche employs a policy advisor on civil-military relationships who above all helped the member NGOs of the CCO to be informed and to position themselves on questions regarding the military and humanitarian space. He could equally be mandated by the member NGOs to represent specified positions or to fulfill a liaison function.

2/ Interlocuteurs from the military side

At Force Headquarters level of EUFOR in Abeche, the J-9 CIMIC cell is the entry point for the IOs/INGOs. All communication should go through the liaison officers to the chief of the branch.

Coordination takes place on all levels, thus a regular information exchange with the Force Commander and/or his Deputy was also established.

In N’Djamena, the EUFOR point of contact for the humanitarian community was the EUFOR liaison officer, in his capacity as liaison with humanitarian actors. At the same time he served as HUMAD (Humanitarian Advisor) to the Force Commander.

In the EUFOR camps (Iriba, Farchana, Goz Beida, Birao) this contact took place directly via the battalion commander, his CIMIC teams and the Operations Officer, or, in locations where no CIMIC Team was deployed, a liaison officer as was the case in Birao.
The CIMIC Officers maintained a direct liaison by visiting humanitarian organizations at their locations and operational bases. Humanitarians did not always welcome this direct liaison for reasons of perception and distinction of roles, in order to preserve their neutrality and impartiality. In this case, a neutral space outside of their respective compounds was found, as for instance the OCHA Office.

When CIMIC Officers went to the operational bases of humanitarian organizations they went there with the order to wear their military uniform and no weapons. Generally, their cars would be parked outside of the compounds of humanitarian organizations. Should they have a weapon, they would leave it in the car and enter the compound without it.

3/ Regular weekly meetings
Created by OCHA, in each location of EUFOR deployment and humanitarian presence, weekly meetings were put in place, with the participation of all humanitarian organizations that wished to attend (NGOs, Red Cross Movement, United Nations agencies), the EUFOR Force Commander at Abeche level, and at tactical level the battalion commanders/Operations officers/CIMIC officers or, in the case of Birao where no CIMIC Team was present, the detachment's liaison officer. This meeting attracted a wide participation of the humanitarian community, as it was the only forum where humanitarian actors and the military force could exchange information directly, which allowed for a common understanding of the situation. These meetings took place under the chairmanship of OCHA or another UN agency where no OCHA Offices are present.

4/ Information sharing products
Several regular information sharing products were created: a weekly EUFOR CIMIC bulletin, destined at the whole humanitarian community in Chad; a weekly EUFOR security bulletin, addressed at the security officers of the humanitarian community; a weekly email with the schedules of EUFOR logistics convoys which humanitarian actors could join, also destined at the whole humanitarian community. All these documents and any other useful information EUFOR wished to pass to the humanitarian community was disseminated widely via the UN Humanitarian CMCoord Officer.

IV – Coordination in security matters
During its mandate, communication procedures between EUFOR and humanitarian actors were put in place. They were designed based on the need expressed by humanitarian actors. EUFOR offered several possibilities in order to contribute to an improved security for humanitarian organizations.

1/ Security evaluations
Any humanitarian organization could ask for a security evaluation of the different regions, available through the EUFOR CIMIC Teams. The weekly EUFOR security bulletin provided a military analysis of the situation for humanitarian actors.

2/ Logistic convoys
Humanitarian actors could join EUFOR logistic convoys between respective operational zones in eastern Chad. This was not an armed escort, but provided a security umbrella through deterrence. Two options were possible:
1/ Humanitarian vehicles could follow or precede EUFOR convoys from A to B. Concerns with regard to perception and neutrality were thus reduced, by avoiding armed escorts as such, while moving within the radius of a military convoy. 
2/ Humanitarian vehicles could be integrated into the logistic convoy if wished. In this case they had to adhere to the rules and regulations of the military convoy.

3/ Coordination of humanitarian movements and patrols
EUFOR regularly conducted long range and short range patrols within their area of responsibility. During periods of increased insecurity (Dogdore, Koukou etc.), and during peak times of break-ins into humanitarian compounds, EUFOR increased its patrols accordingly, or declared an area a ‘zone of particular interest’. Patrols took place above all around the main axes utilized by humanitarian actors.

In addition, humanitarian organizations could, if they wished, communicate their movements and ask for a EUFOR patrol in the area on specific dates. Humanitarian organizations who did not wish to have a military presence in their area of movement could equally communicate this to
EUFOR, thereby asking for the possibility for EUFOR not to be in the same zone or, if so, ask EUFOR not to stop when crossing the path of their organization.

4/ Armed escorts
Humanitarian actors used armed escorts as a last resort only. EUFOR offered armed escorts only on specific request and solely in exceptional cases. Armed escorts, if utilized and agreed upon in designated areas only, were provided by the CNAR (Commission Nationale de l’Accueil et de Réinsertion des Réfugiés), and later by the DIS (Détachement Intégré de Sécurité), once they replaced the CNAR.

In addition to armed escorts on specific request, EUFOR provided security for transports of humanitarian goods and distributions of funds (e.g. during the payment of salaries of employees of humanitarian organizations), and during food distributions.

5/ EUFOR emergency contacts for humanitarian organizations
The list of telephone numbers of the EUFOR CIMIC Teams as well as the EUFOR Joint Operations Centres (JOC) was sent out regularly to the humanitarian community, via the UN Humanitarian CMCoord Officer. The EUFOR JOC was operational on a 24 hour basis. It was thus possible to ask for an intervention in case of extreme emergency at any time.

6/ Evacuation/relocation
Since EUFOR was mandated to contribute to the security umbrella (for any humanitarian organization who wished to be covered by this umbrella), EUFOR participated in the elaboration of the evacuation plans for the humanitarian community in cooperation with UNDSS (UN Department of Safety and Security). EUFOR’s role was to maintain liaison with the crisis management cell; to protect the humanitarian assembly points when under threat; to relocate humanitarians from the assembly points to Camp Croci and the Camp des Etoiles; to host humanitarians until they could go back to their bases or until they would be evacuated out of the country, organized by UNDSS. This only applied to eastern Chad.

It is to be noted that EUFOR had also accepted to host the national staff of humanitarian organizations, as well as their dependants, in agreed upon locations, even after international staff would have been evacuated.

V – Training and awareness-raising in the field
The initiatives taken by the UN Humanitarian CMCoord Officer were:

1/ Awareness sessions on humanitarian work and principles
Awareness sessions on humanitarian work, humanitarian actors, humanitarian principles and humanitarian civil-military coordination in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR were implemented throughout the area of operations of EUFOR and MINURCAT. EUFOR asked that these sessions be provided to each new battalion, to the battalion commanders, key officers and the CIMIC teams.

2/ Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Workshops
Seven UN Humanitarian CMCoord Workshops in all locations of deployment of EUFOR and humanitarian presence took place (N’Djamena, Abeche, Iriba, Goz Beida, Farchana, Birao (in Bangui)). They comprised of a group of 25 to 30 persons each, composed of humanitarians, the military, UNPol, as well as MINURCAT and BONUCA civilian staff. Duration: one and a half days. Content: policy, guidelines and reference documents on civil-military relations applied to the field in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR, complementarities and divisions of labour, principles and modalities of civil-military cooperation and coordination, structure of humanitarian coordination and of DPKO missions etc. The workshops were prepared, organized and carried out by OCHA.

3/ Information sessions on civil-military relations
Matinees with information and awareness sessions for humanitarian organizations, on civil-military reference documents, civil-military coordination in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR, military culture and institutions etc. were implemented by the UN Humanitarian CMCoord Officer, throughout the area of operations, to humanitarians of all functions at all levels, from drivers to heads of offices and country representatives.
In all these initiatives, EUFOR participated not only with CIMIC Officers but also with Operations Officers and Officers of all other branches and all ranks (for instance soldiers leading patrols in the field), so that those who would give the orders would equally be impregnated as those who would receive them. The Force Commander joined each workshop and contributed with a presentation each time.

From the humanitarian side, all organizations, whether UN agencies, NGOs, the Red Cross Movement, donors or diplomatic representations of all levels and functions were present.

Both military and humanitarians judged these initiatives as very useful and positive, contributing to a better understanding of respective mandates, and an enhanced common understanding of the possibilities and limits of cooperation.

VI – Projects
EUFOR as such did not have a budget to implement projects. Yet, certain contingents received national funding in order to carry out micro-projects. Eight micro-projects had initially been planned. Those ranged from the domain of reconstruction (painting of walls, reparations of roofs etc.) to the construction of a sports ground and a bridge over a wadi. Next to the micro-projects, school kits for pupils had also been distributed.

Certain humanitarian and development actors would have appreciated that EUFOR had consulted them further before deciding on the projects they were to implement. EUFOR had participated in a meeting organized by OCHA where the Force Commander himself was present and explained the nature of the projects to humanitarian actors in Abeche. The report of this meeting was largely disseminated within Chad.

The humanitarian community had pointed out very clearly from the beginning that projects should be done in line with the Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (March 2003, Revision I, January 2006), thus respecting the categories of direct, indirect and infrastructure support. The projects that had been put in place by the military should solely focus on infrastructure support, and, possibly, indirect assistance, direct assistance being strongly discouraged.

The projects were implemented in coordination and communication with humanitarian organizations on-site. In Abeche, relevant cluster leads, for education for instance UNICEF, was put in touch with EUFOR at a meeting organized by OCHA on this particular subject.

In order not to double up on humanitarian programmes, EUFOR had decided to focus their projects on the local population, and not the displaced or refugees.

As certain humanitarian organizations expressed their criticism against the micro-projects which EUFOR battalions were implementing, EUFOR took care to restrict them to a minimum, while dealing with the pressure of governmental donors, and while respecting the categories of indirect assistance and infrastructure support.

VII – Conclusion
The direct relation of trust which EUFOR deemed essential to forge with humanitarian actors constituted a critical element in the establishment of the security umbrella for the humanitarian community. EUFOR adapted its means to the realities of insecurity in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR and contributed, at all levels of command, to the necessary information exchange networks. EUFOR relied on the United Nations system of civil-military coordination via the UN Humanitarian CMCoord Officer throughout its mandate, which was accomplished in respect of humanitarian principles.

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