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CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION
OFFICER FIELD HANDBOOK
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Presented to the Consultative Group on the Use of MCDA
in Geneva on 29 November 2007

Jointly launched by the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Humanitarian Aid
Department of the European Commission (DG ECHO) in
Brussels on 10 March 2008

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Preface

The United Nations Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Officer Field Handbook has been elaborated around the core chapters of Transportation and Logistics; Security, Safety and Medical Services; as well as Communications and Information Management, developed through a series of technical workshops, made possible through the generous financial contribution by the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (DG ECHO).

Some 30 international UN-CMCoord trained experts with extensive field experience attended the workshops, ensuring a realistic and hands-on approach to civil-military coordination in major humanitarian emergency operations, while adhering to humanitarian principles and concepts. Additional chapters on major developments in the humanitarian community and practical deployment aspects and mechanisms were added, and the draft Handbook was subsequently circulated among field personnel and partners for further scrutiny. The final product was presented to the Consultative Group on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) at its annual meeting in Geneva on 29 November 2007 and jointly launched by OCHA and DG ECHO in Brussels on 10 March 2008.

This Field Handbook is designed to assist the Humanitarian UN-CMCoord Officer in the performance of the key tasks identified in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) endorsed UN Humanitarian CMCoord Concept. It assumes a solid working knowledge of the United Nations structure and the roles of the various funds, agencies and programmes in humanitarian response.

All principles and concepts referred to in the Handbook are taken directly from existing and endorsed documents on civil-military coordination, with relevant reference to these. This follows the request in particular by the practitioners in the field for a practical, easy-to-read handbook. Our thanks go to all those who contributed with their time, experience, drafting and comments, to make this possible.

Civil-Military Coordination Section, Emergency Services Branch - OCHA
UN Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination
(UN-CMCoord)

The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In most humanitarian emergencies (complex and natural) the UN agencies and the members of the international humanitarian community responding to the disaster will encounter armed actors. Now, more than ever before, there are likely to be multiple types of forces, including foreign, international or multinational forces. When such actors are present there are significant coordination challenges in the realms of security, medical evacuation, logistics, transport, communications, information management, and others. The challenges include such issues as ensuring that humanitarians have the access they require, but at the same time do not become a target. Other challenges include minimizing the competition for scarce resources such as ports, supply routes, airfields and other logistics infrastructure.

In addition, most of these armed actors are likely to seek to establish relationships with the civilian population and in many cases attempt to provide them assistance. In some cases, the military forces can provide useful resources and support to the affected country or region, population or humanitarian actors. In other cases, the perceived association with the armed actors can compromise the humanitarian efforts and may pose an additional security threat. Dealing with these challenges requires training, appropriate experience and in some cases dedicated staff.

Recognizing the need for effective UN Civil Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) in these situations, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) endorsed various guidance and reference material on this subject. Implementation of this guidance normally requires the deployment of dedicated personnel. Throughout this document UN-CMCoord is to be understood as civil-military coordination for humanitarian action undertaken by UN-CMCoord trained officers on behalf of the international humanitarian community under the direction
of the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator (HC/RC). The persons performing this task are referred to as UN-CMCoord Officers which is different to that of a Military Liaison Officer (MLO) deployed by UN Agencies and other coordination and liaison actors as defined in the IASC reference paper “Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies” dated 28 June 2004.

**General Approach**

UN-CMCoord Officers, deployed in support of the HC/RC, are advisors and facilitators. They advise the leadership of the humanitarian community on civil-military issues and facilitate the establishment, maintenance and review of appropriate relations between the humanitarian and armed actors present. Depending on the situation, they may also serve as liaisons from the humanitarian community to military forces. Experience has shown that in almost all emergencies some level of CMCoord is required and that failure to establish effective and appropriate civil-military relations can have severe consequences both in current operations and in the later stages of the emergency. When required UN-CMCoord officers will be deployed as early as possible. When possible they should be deployed in advance of any international military force.

The immediate response will come from UN-CMCoord trained officers in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). These personnel are referred to as “UN-CMCoord Officers” throughout this document. UN-CMCoord Officers and/or MLOs may be deployed at different levels. While the UN-CMCoord Officer assigned to the HC/RC is responsible for the civil-military relationship at the policy level, other CMCoord Officers and/or MLOs may be assigned to coordinate humanitarian effort at the operational level by their respective organizations.

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1 Reference is made to the IASC Reference Paper on Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies and the Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines). The UN-CMCoord Concept is limited to the essential dialogue and interaction between humanitarian actors and military actors. In these documents the term military actors refers to the official military forces of states.
One of the primary responsibilities of the UN-CMCoord Officer(s) during the initial phase of the operation is to assist the HC/RC and the Country Team (CT) in developing guidelines on the civil–military relationships, based on established guidance (see www.Reliefweb.int for the most recent versions of these documents). The UN-CMCoord Officer will also recommend to the HC/RC an appropriate coordination strategy and structure that could be applied in the emergency. This initial assessment in the first phase of the deployment will help to determine if and how many UN-CMCoord Officers are needed in the near and mid-term and at which levels and locations.

**Mechanism for Triggering Deployment of UN-CMCoord Officers**

UN-CMCoord Officers will be deployed either at the request of the HC/RC or at the direction of the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), after appropriate consultation with the Country Team. As noted above, this capability should be deployed as a matter of course whenever an armed actor is operating in the same geographic space as humanitarian actors.

Factors that may trigger the deployment of UN-CMCoord Officers include but are not limited to situations where:

1. Military action is ongoing or anticipated and is likely to have humanitarian consequences;
2. UN-CMCoord expertise is required for contingency planning;
3. Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) may be required by the humanitarian actors;
4. Military forces may be engaged in relief activities;
5. Humanitarian actors lack the necessary CMCoord capacity.
Reporting Lines and Authority of UN-CMCoord Officers

UN-CMCoord Officers will normally report to the HC/RC as a member of their staff. In some instances the HC/RC may also be the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG). If an OCHA office is present this person may report through the OCHA office in the field, especially during the early stages of an emergency when UN-CMCoord Officers are deployed and involved in their assessment. UN-CMCoord Officers assigned to coordinate operational logistic planning will report to the Chief UNJLC, MLOs will report to their respective organizations.

UN-CMCoord Officers have no authority over persons coordinating the activity of UN agencies, implementing partners or other humanitarian actors with military forces.

Irrespective of reporting lines all personnel involved in CMCoord must keep each other informed

Role of UN-CMCoord Officers and Scope of Activities

Under the direction of the HC/RC, and in consultation with the Country Team, the UN-CMCoord Officer's role will normally include the following five critical functions. These functions focus on the UN-CMCoord Officers' responsibilities as a member of the HC/RC's staff. The relative importance of these functions, as well as how they are accomplished, will vary depending on the situation.

In addition, the HC/RC may make the services of the UN-CMCoord Officer available to organizations that lack a CMCoord capacity or prefer indirect liaison.

1. Support the establishment and sustainment of dialogue with military forces. This dialogue should be opened as early as possible. In addition to the exchange of critical information, the UN-CMCoord Officer is expected to be an advocate for the humanitarian community.
2. **Assist in the development and dissemination of guidelines for the humanitarian community’s interaction with military forces and armed actors.** Country or emergency specific guidelines provide a framework for the interaction with military forces and other armed actors. These guidelines must be reviewed and updated as the situation changes.

3. **Establish a mechanism for the coordination of the UN humanitarian interaction with military forces and other armed actors.** This mechanism should ensure that the necessary information is exchanged and that the relevant actors are kept informed regarding activities and issues.

4. **Monitor assistance activities undertaken by the military forces.** Relief and reconstruction activities of military forces can have significant implications for humanitarian activities. UN-CMCoord Officers should encourage the appropriate focus of these activities, their coordination, and adherence to accepted standards, including the concept of “do no harm” (see IASC reference paper on “Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies” dated 28 June 2004).

5. **Assist in the negotiation of issues in critical areas of coordination.** On frequent occasions the UN-CMCoord Officer will be required to negotiate solutions to issues on either the military or civilian side of the CMCoord interface. These issues will normally involve the policy dimensions of areas such as security, transport, communication, medical evacuation, etc.

**Training and Preparedness**

All personnel to be employed as UN-CMCoord Officers must have the necessary experience and skills, and complete both levels of the UN-CMCoord Training Programme. The experience necessary for these positions is reflected in the terms of reference for each position and has to be tailored for the particular emergencies. The training ensures that they have the basic knowledge of the guidelines and policies and have had the opportunity to benefit from the lessons learned by other UN-CMCoord personnel in past emergencies.
Chapter 2: Key Concepts and Principles

Humanitarian Concepts and Principles

Humanitarian Assistance: Humanitarian assistance is aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality.

Core Humanitarian Principles: As per UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.

**Humanity:** Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.

**Neutrality:** Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.

**Impartiality:** Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.

Any civil-military coordination must serve the prime humanitarian principle of humanity – i.e. human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. In determining whether and to what extent humanitarian agencies should coordinate with military forces, one must be mindful of the potential consequences of too close an affiliation with the military or even the perception of such affiliation, especially as these
could jeopardize the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. The concept of non-allegiance is central to the principle of neutrality in humanitarian action; likewise, the idea of non-discrimination is crucial to the principle of impartiality. However, the key humanitarian objective of providing protection and assistance to populations in need may at times necessitate a pragmatic approach, which might include civil-military coordination. Even so, ample consideration must be given to finding the right balance between a pragmatic and a principled response, so that coordination with the military would not compromise humanitarian imperatives.

**Needs-Based Assistance Free of Discrimination²:** Humanitarian assistance must be provided on the basis of needs of those affected by the particular complex emergency, taking into account the local capacity already in place to meet those needs. The assessment of such needs must be independent and humanitarian assistance must be given without adverse discrimination of any kind, regardless of race, ethnicity, sex/gender, religion, social status, nationality or political affiliation of the recipients. It must be provided in an equitable manner to all populations in need.

**Humanitarian Access to Vulnerable Populations:** Humanitarian agencies must maintain their ability to obtain access to all vulnerable populations in all areas of the complex emergency in question and to negotiate such access with all parties to the conflict. Particular care must also be taken to ensure the sustainability of access. Coordination with the military should be considered to the extent that it facilitates, secures and sustains, not hinders, humanitarian access.

**Perception of Humanitarian Action:** The delivery of humanitarian assistance to all populations in need must be neutral and impartial – it must come without political or military conditions and humanitarian staff

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² A similar provision on needs-based assistance is articulated as Principle 2 in “The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief”. The principle of non-discrimination is expressed in a multitude of human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, etc.
must not take sides in disputes or political positions. This will have a bearing on the credibility and independence of humanitarian efforts in general. Any civil-military coordination must also be mindful not to jeopardize the longstanding local network and trust that humanitarian agencies have created and maintained.

**Operational Independence of Humanitarian Action:** In any civil-military coordination humanitarian actors must retain the lead role in undertaking and directing humanitarian activities. The independence of humanitarian action and decision-making must be preserved both at the operational and policy levels at all times. Humanitarian organisations must not implement tasks on behalf of the military nor represent or implement their policies. Basic requisites such as freedom of movement for humanitarian staff, freedom to conduct independent assessments, freedom of selection of staff, freedom to identify beneficiaries of assistance based on their needs, or free flow of communications between humanitarian agencies as well as with the media, must not be impeded.

**Security of Humanitarian Personnel:** Any perception that humanitarian actors may have become affiliated with the military forces within a specific situation could impact negatively on the security of humanitarian staff and their ability to access vulnerable populations. However, humanitarian actors operating within an emergency situation must identify the most expeditious, effective and secure approach to ensure the delivery of vital assistance to vulnerable target populations. This approach must be balanced against the primary concern for ensuring staff safety, and therein a consideration of any real or perceived affiliation with the military. The decision to seek military-based security for humanitarian workers should be viewed as a last resort option when other staff security mechanisms are unavailable, inadequate or inappropriate.

**Civilian-Military Distinction in Humanitarian Action:** At all times, a clear distinction must be maintained between combatants and non-combatants – i.e., between those actively engaged in hostilities, and civilians and others who do not or no longer directly participate in the armed conflict (including the sick, wounded, prisoners of war and ex-combatants who are demobilised). International humanitarian law protects non-combatants by providing immunity from attack. Thus,
humanitarian workers must never present themselves or their work as part of a military operation, and military personnel must refrain from presenting themselves as civilian humanitarian workers.

The Humanitarian Operating Environment (Humanitarian Space): A key element for humanitarian agencies and organizations when they deploy, consists of establishing and maintaining a conducive humanitarian operating environment (this is sometimes referred to as "humanitarian space"). The perception of adherence to the key operating principles of neutrality and impartiality in humanitarian operations represents the critical means by which the prime objective of ensuring that suffering must be met wherever it is found, can be achieved. Consequently, maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors from that of the military is the determining factor in creating an operating environment in which humanitarian organisations can discharge their responsibilities both effectively and safely. Sustained humanitarian access to the affected population is ensured when the receipt of humanitarian assistance is not conditional upon the allegiance to or support to parties involved in a conflict but is a right independent of military and political action.

Emergency Relief Coordinator and Inter-Agency Standing Committee: The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) is the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and coordinates the international response to humanitarian emergencies and disasters. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is chaired by the ERC and has the membership of all UN operational humanitarian agencies, with standing invitation to ICRC, IFRC, IOM, UNHCHR, the Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs, the World Bank and the three NGO consortia (ICVA, InterAction and SCHR). It is important to note that the decision whether to and who to appoint as Humanitarian Coordinator is made by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator: The Resident Coordinator (RC) is the head of the UN Country Team. In a complex emergency, the Resident Coordinator or another competent UN official may be designated as the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). In large-scale complex emergencies, a separate Humanitarian Coordinator is
often appointed. If the emergency affects more than one country, a Regional Humanitarian Coordinator may be appointed. In countries where large multi-disciplinary UN field operations are in place the Secretary-General might appoint a Special Representative (SRSG). The relationship between the SRSG and the RC/HC is defined in a note issued by the Secretary-General on 11 December 2000 (Note of Guidance on Relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators, dated 30 October 2000).

**Complex Emergency**: A complex emergency, as defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), is “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme.”

**UN-CMCoord Concepts and Principles**

**UN Civil Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord)**: The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

**Military and Civil Defence Assets**: MCDA, as defined in the 1994 “Oslo Guidelines”, “comprises relief personnel, equipment, supplies and services provided by foreign military and civil defence organizations for international humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, civil defence organization means any organization that, under the control of a Government, performs the functions enumerated in Article 61, paragraph (1), of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949”.

**UN MCDA**: When these assets are under UN control they are referred to as UN MCDA.
As reflected in the above diagram, the United Nations considers international MCDA to be a last resort in responding to humanitarian emergencies. UN humanitarian agencies should only request these assets when there are no others available. However, this does not preclude member states from using these assets as they see fit.

The basis for coordination in relief operations is information sharing. In sudden onset emergencies there is seldom a shared international response plan. Therefore the information sharing takes precedence over planning in coordinating the initial relief response. If information is properly shared and tasks are appropriately divided, a foundation can be laid for collaborative planning, if appropriate.

If the basis for respect and understanding between military and civilian actors has been established through information sharing and appropriate task division in the relief phase, the planning process then provides the bridge from relief to recovery. The basis for information sharing in the relief phase is training prior to the emergency. Training provides the mutual understanding and common vocabulary necessary for information sharing and proper task division in the relief phase and is thus the foundation of the process.
Other Deployed Forces: These are all military and civil defence forces deployed in the region other than UN MCDA. For the purposes of these guidelines these forces are divided into four categories based on their missions. These missions are peacetime, UN commanded peacekeeping operations, other peace operation/peace support, and combat. The mission of a force is the primary factor that determines a military unit’s availability and appropriateness to humanitarian tasks, as it impacts on whether or not it will be perceived by others as neutral and impartial.

**Peacetime missions** include training and exercises in the region with no hostile intent.

**UN commanded peacekeeping operations** include missions under the auspices of Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter.

**Other peace operation / peace support missions** include a range of tasks undertaken by military forces that are not under UN command, including peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building and other so-called peace support operations where forces are deployed under operational parameters that dictate a minimum necessary use of force.

**Combat missions** are those where the primary purpose of the operation is the defeat of a designated enemy.

**Hierarchy of Assistance Tasks:** Assistance can be divided into three categories based on the degree of contact with the affected population. These categories are important because they help define which types of humanitarian activities might be appropriate to support with international military resources under different conditions, given that ample consultation has been conducted with all concerned parties to explain the nature and necessity of the assistance.

**Direct Assistance** is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services.
Indirect Assistance is at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel.

Infrastructure Support involves providing general services, such as road repair, airspace management and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population.

Appropriate Relief Tasks Based on Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanitarian Tasks</th>
<th>Mission of Military</th>
<th>Peace Support or Peace Operation</th>
<th>Combat</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Peaceful</td>
<td>Peace-keeping</td>
<td>Peace Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td></td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure Support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This slide depicts the appropriate use of MCDA drawn from other deployed forces to support UN humanitarian activities under most conditions. UN-MCDA which has been brought under UN control and is properly marked may be used more freely, in most situations.

Considerations for Use of MCDA in Complex Emergencies: The decision of whether or not to use military and civil defence resources in a complex emergency is one that must be taken with extreme care. The expedient and inappropriate use of military and civil defence resources can compromise neutrality, impartiality and other humanitarian principles of all humanitarian actors responding to the
emergency. This loss of neutrality can result in relief workers becoming direct targets of the belligerents and being denied access to the affected population, not only in the current emergency, but also in future humanitarian crises. In addition, the loss of neutrality can result in the affected population becoming direct targets of the belligerents. Ultimately, decision-makers must weigh the risk to relief workers and their ability to operate effectively at the moment, and in the future, against the immediacy of the needs of the affected population and the need for the use of military and civil defence assets.

- Are they the option of last resort, indispensable and appropriate?
- Are the countries offering MCDA also parties to the conflict?
- Based on the need, is a military or civil defence unit capable of the task?
- How long will they be needed?
- Can they be deployed without weapons or additional security forces?
- How will this association impact the security of UN personnel and other humanitarian workers?
- How will this impact the perceptions of UN neutrality and/or impartiality?
- What control and coordination arrangements are necessary?
- How and when will transition back to civilian responsibility be achieved?
- What are the consequences for the beneficiaries, other humanitarian actors, and humanitarian operations in the mid to long term?
Civilian Control: A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. While military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organization. This does not infer any civilian command and control status over military assets.

Last Resort: Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in capability and availability.

Affected State: The affected State has primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to persons within its borders. Even though UN humanitarian agencies have been requested by the affected State or the UN Secretary General to provide additional assistance, the affected State has the right to decline the use of UN MCDA or the use of other military and civil defence resources by UN humanitarian agencies on a case-by-case basis.

Transit States: Transit States are those States whose national borders, territorial waters, and airspace are crossed by UN MCDA moving to and from and conducting operations in the affected State. Transit States, especially those bordering the affected State, will facilitate the movement of requested UN MCDA in the same manner that they facilitate the movement of UN relief goods and personnel.
Chapter 3: Key Policies and Selected Guidelines

This chapter provides an overview of key policy references. It is not a substitute for reading these documents, but should allow the UN-CMCoord Officer to more easily find the appropriate portion of these documents.


The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, it attempts to highlight, in a generic manner, the nature and character of civil-military relations in complex emergencies. Secondly, it reviews some fundamental humanitarian principles and concepts that must be upheld when coordinating with the military. Thirdly, attention is given to practical key considerations for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination.

The paper will serve as a general reference for humanitarian practitioners: a tool to which they can refer when formulating operational guidelines that are tailored specifically for civil-military relations in a particular complex emergency.

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• Separate Military Operations for Relief Purposes
• General Conduct of Humanitarian Staff


This document provides guidelines for the use of international military and civil defence personnel, equipment, supplies and services in support of the United Nations (UN) in pursuit of humanitarian objectives
in complex emergencies. It provides guidance on when these resources can be used, how they should be employed, and how UN agencies should interface, organize, and coordinate with international military forces with regard to the use of military and civil defence assets. The document may also be of value in other large-scale emergencies.

**Scope:**

These guidelines cover the use of United Nations Military and Civil Defence Assets (UN MCDA) -- military and civil defence resources requested by the UN humanitarian agencies and deployed under UN control specifically to support humanitarian activities -- and military and civil defence resources that might be available. These other forces on other missions are referred to as other deployed forces.

Principles, concepts, and procedures are provided for requesting and coordinating military and civil defence resources when these resources are deemed necessary and appropriate, and for interfacing with international military forces who are conducting activities which impact on UN humanitarian activities.

These guidelines are primarily intended for use by UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing and operational partners, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators, UN MCDA commanders and commanders of other deployed forces performing missions in support of the UN humanitarian agencies and liaison officers coordinating UN humanitarian activities with international military forces. All humanitarian actors should also be familiar with the principles, concepts and procedures set out herein and encouraged to adhere to them, as appropriate.

They could also be used by decision-makers in Member States and regional organizations when considering the use of military and civil defence resources to provide assistance to civilian populations. They may also be of value to international military or civil defence commanders, including peacekeeping forces, in the pursuit of their missions.
This document focuses on the use of military and civil defence assets in complex emergencies. The foundation for effective coordination of military and civilian assistance during reconstruction and rehabilitation of a disaster or post-conflict society is often established during relief operations, however reconstruction and rehabilitation activities are beyond the scope of this document.

Guidelines for the use of international military resources in natural disasters and peacetime technological or environmental emergencies are provided in a separate document entitled: “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief” (May 1994), also known as the “Oslo Guidelines”.

**Contents:**

**Principles and Concepts**

- Core Principles
- Key Concepts For Use Of Military / Civil Defence Resources
- Avoiding Reliance on Military Resources
- When to Use Military and Civil Defence Resources to Support Humanitarian Activities
- Operational Standards for the Use of UN MCDA
- Operational Standards for the Use of Other Deployed Forces
- United Nations Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) in Complex Emergencies

**Tasks and Responsibilities**

- Affected State and Transit States
• Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator

• UN Humanitarian Agencies

• Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

• Assisting State and International Military or Civil Defence Commanders

Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, Updated November 2006; Revision 1.1 November 2007.

This document is intended for natural, technological or environmental disasters, in peacetime, with a functioning government and stable political conditions.

UN-CMCoord engagement strategy will normally be “cooperation” with the military. Foreign MCDA used by UN relief providers will normally be restricted to indirect assistance and infrastructure support.

The guidelines are not intended to restrict in any manner how the affected state makes use of its domestic military and civil defence resources.

Decision to use MCDA to support UN humanitarian activities must be made in consultation with the affected state.

In setting UN policy in these situations, the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator is encouraged to take into consideration the issues of:

• Complementarity
• Dependency
• Cost and Funding
Contents:

Principles and Concepts

- Core Principles
- Key Concepts For Use Of Military / Civil Defence Resources
- Operational Standards for the Use of UN MCDA
- Operational Standards for the Use of Other Deployed Forces
- United Nations Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) in Natural Disaster

Tasks and Responsibilities

- Affected State and Transit States
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Annexes

- Model Agreement Covering the Status of MCDA
- CMCS Sample Request for MCDA
- Abbreviations
The legal framework provided in this document allows states that have decided to accept international MCDA to establish an interim Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for the emergency. This document can be used if no bilateral or regional agreement exists for these purposes.

*Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys, 14 September 2001.*

As a general rule, humanitarian convoys will not use armed or military escorts. Exceptions to the general rule will be considered, as a last resort, and only when all of the following criteria have been met:

- Sovereignty
- Need
- Safety
- Sustainability

Determination will normally be made by the UN Designated Official (DO) with the advice of UN Department of Safety and Security (DSS).

**Contents:**

- Preliminary questions
- Growing threat to humanitarian workers
- The increasingly irregular nature of warfare
- Erosion of perception of impartiality of humanitarians
- Impartiality and the use of force including armed escorts
- Utility of armed or military escorts
- Consequence of non-use of military or armed escorts
• Policies and practices already in place
• Guidelines on when to use military or armed escorts
• Guidelines on how to use military or armed escorts
Chapter 4: Transportation and Logistics

Logistics is the life's blood of a humanitarian operation. The critical tasks of acquiring, transporting and distributing the right items to the right people at the right place and time may not be all there is to relief operations, but it is absolutely certain that without effective logistics there is no relief.

The same is true of military operations. Modern military forces are equally as dependent on logistics for their success. Every soldier and item in the field has to be equipped, fed, maintained, repaired, and moved to the critical and decisive point to accomplish the mission. Indeed, it is the ability to project and sustain power over distance and time, under adverse and austere conditions, that is the defining quality of a military power.

The challenges of logistics in austere and remote environments, or situations where the infrastructure of the society has been severely disrupted, are shared challenges for both military and humanitarian logisticians and transporters. The focus of this chapter is the coordination necessary to ensure that the humanitarian logistics system can function along side a military logistics system in these difficult environments where infrastructure and resources are in short supply.

In major emergencies the UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC) will normally deploy logistics officers and specialist in the operational coordination of civilian and military logistics. The lead in the operational realm of civil military logistical coordination, to include transport, will normally be left to these individuals. However in operations where UNJLC is not present and in situations where UNJLC may need support, the UN-CMCCoord Officer needs to be able to advise and facilitate solutions to common logistical civil military logistical problems.

1. The Military Perspective on Transport and Logistics

Transport and Logistics are absolutely critical functions in a military force. While the operations section of a military staff determines how to employ the military force to the best tactical advantage, the transport
and logistics capabilities of the force largely determine which options are available to the commander and which operations can be sustained.

These are highly specialized functions within modern military forces. Logisticians and transporters are organized into separate corps and organizations. There are sub-specialties such as medical, aviation, communication, petroleum and heavy equipment logistics. There are also dedicated areas of expertise in transport. Large military forces will have a wide range of transport options including everything from rail to high-speed shipping and will often contract for civilian transportation capacity to supplement the military capabilities.

Aside from specialization there are at least three other characteristics of military logistics and transport that distinguish them from the typical civilian or humanitarian effort and that have implications for humanitarian operations and civil military logistics.

*First*, the military systems are based on standardization. The equipment and supplies are manufactured to or must meet military specifications (MILSPEC). Vehicles use a common grade and type of fuel. Ammunition for a range of weapons is interchangeable. The standardization of supplies, equipment and repair parts, all the way down to pallet configurations for aircraft, allow the military transporters and logisticians to achieve efficiencies in their operations, but the vastness of these supply and logistics systems pose their own challenges and require extremely skilled people.

*Second*, the system includes preposition stocks, depots, and bases. Most militaries keep major stockpiles of goods either at their home stations or at forward bases. These “war reserves” normally include a full range of expendable items to include medical supplies and kits. These resources are considered strategic resources and may be required for other military missions. Normally, the authority to use these supplies does not rest with the operational commander.

*Third*, the military system is, for the most part, a “push” system. Military units have a clearly identified set of needs. They know exactly how many personnel and exactly what items of equipment are deployed on an operation. They have historical data on the type of mission and the
operational conditions such as weather, availability of water, etc. Therefore when an operation is launched, supplies are “pushed” forward based on the plan. Supplies may be shifted from one unit to another based on need (this is of course facilitated by standardization), but the aggregate amount needed in theater is carefully calculated and anticipated in advance. If the right mission, conditions, and force size have been anticipated, the system works well.

- Do the logistic plans of the military force take into account the possible need to divert resources to the humanitarian activities?
- If additional humanitarian supplies are in the region and are under military control, who has the authority to release these supplies?
- What priority has been given to the movement of relief goods and supplies by the military forces and who in the government of these forces sets these policies and priorities?
- Are military forces using, or planning to use, civilian facilities and resources in their operations?
- Who in the military organization is responsible for determining which facilities and resources can be used?

2. The Humanitarian Perspective on Transport and Logistics:

Humanitarian Logistics are highly decentralized. Each humanitarian organization has its own logistics system and focuses on the resources and transport necessary to sustain their particular operations within their mandate. While there are a few shared transport and logistics services, such as the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC), there is no centralized logistics structure for UN humanitarian agencies, and participation in UNJLC coordination procedures is not mandatory, even for UN agencies. The situation is even more individualized in the NGO community where there are a wide range of approaches to logistics, including prayer.
If UNJLC is not present, the logistics and transport considerations will either be dealt with in each sector, or some type of logistics and transport coordination meeting will be initiated by one of the larger relief agencies. This is normally done by the World Food Programme (WFP).

Humanitarians generally lack both standardization and extensive stockpiles. Each organization makes its own decision on what type of equipment they will buy and how it will be serviced and repaired. Within the automated systems that do exist in the larger organizations the data-bases for tracking procurements, inventories and stocks are not compatible, even if the items used are the same. Major agencies maintain emergency stockpiles of basic goods, however, these are not stocked at anywhere near the level of military depots. Sufficient resources are on hand for moderate emergencies. Large scale or longer duration emergencies will require procurement, and even if stand-by arrangements have been made, most agencies are not going to initiate orders without secure pledges from donors.

In addition, humanitarian operations are based on demand. The number, type, and specific needs of the victims are never immediately clear. Most agencies respond with a release of emergency kits, but the logistics planning in the humanitarian community is based on the demand levels established by an effective assessment. Agencies are conscious of the fact that in most emergencies there are greater needs than there are resources, and that priorities must be set and the real demand quickly determined.

Another aspect characteristic of humanitarian logistics is local purchase. This is done to minimize transport costs and stimulate the local economy. However, this does make the humanitarian system vulnerable to local monopolies and at risk of rapid inflation when a new major buyer, such as the military, enters the market.

In short, the humanitarian approach is often seen as chaotic and ineffective by military. It lacks most of the qualities they consider necessary for a good system. For the most part, coordination between the two systems, in the realms of transport and logistics, focuses on minimizing conflict and avoiding competition over facilities and resources.
• If a UNJLC has not been established, who is coordinating logistics and transportation matters with the military forces on behalf of the humanitarian community?

• What are the key facilities that are needed by the humanitarians for logistics and transportation that may also be needed for military operations?

• What are the main supply routes of the military and are they going to be used by the humanitarian community for purposes such as refugee repatriation?

3. Key Military Actors in Transport and Logistics:

Responsibility for logistics extends from the highest headquarters down to the lowest subordinate unit. The following staff sections or personnel will normally be involved in logistics and transport operations when an independent military force or “task force” is deployed. Logistics functions are not limited to ground forces. Air and naval forces have comparable logistic and transportation structures, however the duties presented here are for a generic ground force staff with possible air and sea transport support.

• **Logistics (G4):** The logistics includes a planning section. The logistics planners will always be looking at the next phase of the operation and they are the individuals that estimate the logistics and transport needs for the force. They will be in constant dialogue with Plans (G5) and Operations (G3) and will make recommendations to the commander on which routes, ports, and airfields are necessary to deploy and sustain the force. The remainder of Logistics will focus on current operations and may be organized around classes of supply and functions such as ground and air transport.

• **Transportation Officer:** This function is normally located within the logistics section. This person is responsible for ground transportation assets under control of the command. He does not “own” the trucks, but has tasking authority. This means he
determines which missions will be given to the ground transport units.

- **Movement Control Center:** The deployment, redeployment or any major movement of the force will be carefully controlled, especially when infrastructure is limited and routes can easily become congested. This center is effectively a specialized operations center that assigns convoys, routes, and departure times and does all of the necessary coordination with other actors, such as local authorities and police, to ensure the smooth flow of transport. If there is a dedicated main supply route (MSR) they will control traffic on this route and determine which vehicles have priority. They will make recommendations to the commander on when to close a given route to civilian traffic to ensure an effective military movement.

- **Air Movement Control Center:** Comparable to the ground movement control center the air movement control center will normally manage the flow of aircraft into and out of the area of operations. They normally will not manage tactical airlift by helicopters, but this depends on the size of the operations. If the military controls an airfield or the airspace in a particular emergency, they will manage access to the airspace and allocate slot times for humanitarian aircraft.

- **Beach Master or Naval Shore Party:** If logistics support is being provided from ships at sea, there will be a naval liaison assigned to the logistics section and there will be some type of control element at the beach landing sites or harbors. Unless there is a significant naval operation, such as the landing of naval infantry or marines, the naval logistics and the remainder of the naval staff will normally be aboard ship.

- **Airfield and Port Commanders:** When the military takes control of an airfield or port, they will assign a single individual as the airfield or port commander. This person does not own or control the aircraft or ships, but is responsible for the security of the field or port, maintenance of the infrastructure and has control of most of the supporting facilities. This organization
will be responsible for issuing passes for access to the base. Normally separate passes are required for access to the airfield or piers. This individual may or may not control the fuel, cargo handling, warehouses or maintenance facilities.

- **Medical Logistics:** In most military forces medical supplies are managed separately from other classes of supplies. The Surgeon or Medical Officer controls these resources and has specially trained personnel to handle sensitive supplies such as drugs and medicines. Like other classes of supplies the basic components of the medical package deployed with a force are designed for use by that force. The medical supplies will seldom have the specialized kits for pediatric, obstetric, or geriatric care, which are often needed in the treatment of the more vulnerable elements of a stricken population.

- **Support Unit Commander:** Military units are divided into combat and support units. Basic combat units such as infantry or tank companies and battalions have limited internal logistics capability with only enough transport to carry their own personnel and supplies. Specialized units such as trucking, petroleum supply, and warehouse management are normally under the command of a support unit commander. In larger operations this commander will command depots, operate rail networks, and control the "rear area" where combat troops are not directly involved in operations. This person probably controls any major contractors engaged in support operations such as trucking.

- **Aviation Unit Commander:** Aviation assets are normally managed separately from other means of transportation due to their complexity and the range of possible missions. The aviation unit commander owns the aircraft and crews in helicopter units. The logistical and transport missions assigned to these units are determined by the logistics and transport sections. The aviation unit commander normally can not make a decision on his own to fly a particular mission. The mission has to be approved by the "tasking authority". In most
cases, this will be the logistics or operations sections of the staff.

- **Procurement and Contracting Officers**: The logistics section may or may not have the authority to contract for local services or to purchase local supplies. Often they have discretionary authority to buy certain types of supplies in small quantities on the local market. Large procurements are normally handled by a procurement or contracting section. This may be a time-consuming process, especially if the organization has limited experience in this type of activity and has no established suppliers in the area. If there is competition for scarce resources and the risk of inflating prices, these individuals will have to be involved in the discussions to resolve these issues.

- **Property Disposal Officer**: Most military forces are accountable for every item of equipment they deploy with or acquire during the course of an operation. They are expected to recover and bring home unused supplies. This means that items of equipment, such as generators, will be removed when the military force leaves. Depending on the nature of the operation, commanders may have some authority to declare “combat loss” of equipment, but most losses must be investigated and a report filed before the commander is cleared of liability for this equipment. If there is equipment that is excess to the mission, will be more costly to transport than it is worth, has been locally procured and may not meet military specifications, or is no longer serviceable for military purposes, the determination on how to dispose of this equipment is made by the officer responsible for property disposal.

- **Legal Officer (Staff Judge Advocate – SJA)**: Military Forces have rules and regulations on what can be done with their equipment and supplies. While some commanders may interpret their missions broadly, they still have to operate within the regulations and laws of their forces. Even if a commander’s mission includes providing humanitarian support, this does not give him or her authority to do anything he or she chooses in this area. For example, a commander may have
authority to provide air transport for victims, but probably does not have authority to transport them over an international boundary. The person that advises the commander on the legal boundaries and implications of the mission is the legal officer. He or she will interpret the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the affected state and the military force. This document may restrict what the force can do in terms of assisting the population or taking independent action in a humanitarian emergency. They will review any contracts the command enters into and will often be the principal negotiator for memorandums of understanding or agreements between a military force and a humanitarian organization.

4. Minimum Transport and Logistics Information:

The nature of transportation and logistics operations requires certain basic information to be exchanged between organizations that are operating in the same geographic area and that may share or be in competition for the same facilities and resources. Some of this information is already covered in the Chapter on “Security, Safety and Medical Services.” Both lists should used in coordinating the minimum information flow between military and humanitarian transporters and logisticians.

- Policies and procedures for requesting the use of military or civil defense assets (MCDA) from forces deployed in the area. (“Other Deployed Forces” as defined in the Guidelines for the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.”)

- A list of facilities that are under the control of, or currently in use by, either organization to support humanitarian activities, the government, or affected population.

- Any plans for changes in logistics operations that will impact the access to key facilities or infrastructure.

- Arrangements with the government and local authorities regarding use of public transportation and logistics facilities.
• Current and future estimated use of any shared facilities and resources such as routes, ports, airfields, warehousing, etc. that may affect humanitarian operations.

• The presence and planned use of any UN-MCDA or any MCDA from other forces to support humanitarian activities.

5. Possible Transportation and Logistics Tasks and Activities:

If conditions permit, the areas of transportation and logistics are two areas in which a reasonable amount of tasks and activities can be shared or coordinated without major risk to the perceived neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian actors. Under most conditions any military resources or services should be limited to direct support and infrastructure tasks. The following types of activities might be considered:

• **Negotiation of Contracts**: Operations in austere and hostile environments are often characterized by a limited number of providers or even monopolies. Joint or coordinated negotiations for scarce resources will help prevent unnecessary inflation, which has an adverse affect on the military, humanitarians, other civilian actors and the population.

• **Exchange of Supplier Performance Data**: If local suppliers are being used by both military and civilian procurement officials, the exchange of information on performance and capacities is advisable. Again, this will avoid pricing issues and help ensure that contractors do not bid beyond their capabilities to deliver.

• **Slot-time Coordination**: If a third party controls slot-times for aircraft, it may be advisable to meet with other slot-time requestors, such as the military, prior to negotiating or requesting slots, in order to avoid arbitrary allocations by third parties.
• Repair Parts Exchange and Maintenance Support: Depending on the intensity of operations military forces may have ample spare parts and maintenance personnel to provide temporary loans of components or to undertake emergency repairs. It is probably not advisable to take humanitarian vehicles to military locations for such services or to have military personnel come to a humanitarian location, but components may be able to be discretely exchanged and repaired.

• Prioritization of Infrastructure Repairs: Military forces and humanitarians normally rely on the same roads and bridges. While the military commander may not have authority to build a bridge for the local community, he normally has the authority to reinforce and maintain infrastructure along his main supply routes or other infrastructure critical to his mission or the safety of his soldiers. If the military can repair key infrastructure on a shared route, humanitarian resources can be used elsewhere.

• Prioritization of Demining: The same logic applies to demining operations. Therefore, keep in mind that there is a difference between military demining standards and humanitarian demining. However, in key facilities, such as airfields, the military will normally clear areas to humanitarian standards and will mark mines in other areas.

6. Logistics and Transport Planning Considerations:

Planning is the cornerstone of good logistics for both the military and civilians. If shared logistics plans are prepared in advance, conflicts and competition can be avoided and the opportunities for appropriate cooperation identified. Unfortunately, in conflict situations the military is unlikely to share its logistics plans in advance of the operation. It then falls to the UN-CMCoord Officer to anticipate the humanitarian implications of likely military courses of action, especially for humanitarian transport and logistics.

• Role of the Population in the Conflict: Are there “legitimate” military targets located in close proximity to the population and critical civilian infrastructure? Is the military going to attack
these targets, the population, or civilian infrastructure? If they are attacked, how many new potential beneficiaries will this create?

- **Current Beneficiaries:** What is the current number and condition of the beneficiaries? Will military operations be conducted in the vicinity of these people and are they prepared for this possibility? How will they react? How will aid providers react and will these reactions impact the level of need or the flow of assistance?

- **Movement:** Will the population or current beneficiaries be displaced by the military operation? If so, where and how will they move? Will transport be required? Will assistance be required while the population is moving? Will existing humanitarian support be able to move with the population?

- **Access:** Will the military operations impede access to the population at its current location, on the move, or at the new location? If access is interrupted, how long will the interruption last? Are there alternative means of access?

- **Routes:** What routes are the military forces likely to use for movement of combat forces and for logistics support and supplies? Will the infrastructure on these routes be damaged or weakened by these movements? Will infrastructure on other routes be targeted? Will civilian movement be restricted?

- **Airfields and Ports:** Will the military target or seize airfields or ports? If airfields and ports are attacked, how severe is the damage likely to be? Will support facilities and cargo handling capabilities be targeted? Will they restrict access at shared airfields or ports during operations?

- **Stockpiles and Providers:** Will stockpiles or providers be at risk during the operation? Will there be labor issues as a result of the military operations? Will the flow of resources needed
by the suppliers or providers be interrupted? Will contract transport continue to operate?

- **Prices and Additional Costs:** How will the military operation impact the prices of critical goods and supplies such as fuel? Will the military buy or seize local stocks? Will suppliers demand additional payment or will the military buy selected goods and services at a premium price? Will additional insurance be required for facilities and transport?

### 7. Lessons Observed and Best Practices:

The following are lessons observed and best practices related to transportation and logistics. Since it is often difficult to distinguish between the two, a single list is provided. They may or may not be appropriate for a particular emergency or situation.

- **Convoy Clearances and Coordination:** In conflict situations, military forces will often want to know the composition, routes and schedules for humanitarian convoys. This information may be required by local authorities as well. However, care must be taken to ensure this information is not used in the wrong manner. If the military force assumes other traffic on a route is a legitimate target, civilian and humanitarian activities are placed at risk. If this information is shared, the military is not absolved of its responsibility to discern between civilian and military targets and to avoid collateral damage.

- **Presentation of Logistics Plans and Data:** The military has a very deliberate planning process, which includes highly structured inputs. When information is shared with the military, it may be necessary to “re-package” the information. In the case of logistics, one way to present this information is in a “Humanitarian Logistics Estimate” using a familiar military logistics estimate format.

- **Influencing Priorities:** Military organizations may or may not be responsive to the logistical needs and priorities of international or foreign aid organizations. The best means to influence...
these priorities may be through the national or governmental aid organizations of the state providing the military forces.
Chapter 5: Security, Safety and Medical Services

This chapter highlights key aspects of security, safety, and medical services that are relevant to civil military coordination in the relief and immediate recovery phase of a humanitarian emergency. This chapter is not a substitute for the basic references on Security, Safety, or Medical procedures provided by the UN Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) or UN humanitarian agencies. All UN-CMCoord Officers are expected to be fully aware of the policies and procedures established for UN civilian staff in these areas and the directions issued by the Designated Official (DO) in their particular mission.

UN-CMCoord Officers are not responsible for the security, safety, or medical care of UN personnel. They are, however, responsible for facilitating the minimum essential dialogue between military forces and humanitarian organizations, and advising the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator on appropriate and effective coordination. This includes facilitating the dialogue in critical areas of civil and military interaction such as security, safety, and medical services and advising the individuals responsible for those functional tasks on appropriate methods and techniques for this interaction. Therefore, the UN-CMCoord Officer must take care not to become an additional intermediary between functional experts and thereby assume an inappropriate responsibility for operational communications.

The humanitarian mission unfolds within an operational reality which in turn defines a policy environment and informs options for civil military coordination. The UN-CMCoord officer should seek to investigate these basic realities (for example, with the Regional Field Security Coordination Officer (FSCO)) before entering the operational zone:

- What forces are in the area, how are diverse forces related to one another, and how does this distribution of forces align with the humanitarian area of operations?

- Do these forces have a de facto legitimacy recognized by humanitarian authorities? Do the various forces have a Status of Forces Agreement governing their presence and activities?
What are the policy goals and interests of these forces and the political authorities that sponsor them?

What is the relationship between the various military forces in the area of operations and the civilian population with its constituent components?

Are the forces present in the area well-regulated?

1. Security from the Military Perspective:

There are a minimum of two dimensions to security for military forces. The first dimension encompasses the security aspects of the mission. Every deployed military force has a written mission. This mission has stated and implied tasks. Stated tasks are those directed by the higher headquarters. These tasks may include orders to “secure village X” or to “establish a secure environment that will allow for the delivery of relief assistance.” Implied tasks may include such things as securing an evacuation airfield or road. While not specifically stated in the commander’s orders it is clear to the commander that he can not accomplish his primary mission without accomplishing this implied task. In most military forces the commander has latitude in how he accomplishes his mission, therefore he has some discretion in how he secures village X and it is left to his judgment to determine which other security tasks are implied in his orders. However, there are generally accepted methods for accomplishing most missions and the commander is expected to adhere to this doctrine unless there are overriding circumstances that he is prepared to justify.

The second dimension is security of the force. As a basic principle of war and military operations, all commanders regardless of their mission must protect their personnel, equipment, and the integrity of their units. This includes active and passive measures for “force protection.” Such activities include but are not limited to perimeter guards for military installations, limiting the access to headquarters and other installations, and patrolling in areas adjacent to bases and along routes used by military convoys. These activities often involve efforts to develop supportive relationships with the population and to cultivate sources of
information in the population that might alert the force to any threats that may emerge. Procedures for ensuring the security of the force are often governed by regulations and may even be enacted in national laws governing the military. Commanders have little discretion regarding these mandated procedures.

These two dimensions of security for the military forces have major implications for humanitarian activities in general and civil military coordination in particular. If the commander’s orders state unequivocally that his primary mission is to provide a secure environment for humanitarian activities, the military commander has at least an implicit task to conduct his operations in a manner that facilitates humanitarian action. If on the other hand, the commander has another primary mission and providing a secure environment or support to humanitarian activities is not specifically stated, it is left to the commander to determine whether or not this task is essential to the accomplishment of his mission, or an ancillary task that he could undertake if he has sufficient resources and it will not jeopardize his primary mission. Most commanders are reluctant to accept such “mission creep.”

Furthermore, regardless of the mission of the military force, the commander must ensure the security and integrity of the force. While there is some discretion in how this is done, a military commander who fails to secure his main supply route or protect the only airfield that allows for the evacuation or supply of his force will not remain in command long. These obligatory security tasks, and how they are undertaken by the command, have a major impact on how the force is perceived by the population and other political/military actors, and can have significant impact on access to the population and humanitarian space.

Therefore, among the first and most critical questions a UN-CMCoord Officer must answer about each military force involved in or planning for operations in the area of a humanitarian emergency are:

- What is the primary mission of the force? Does it include an explicit humanitarian purpose?
• Has the commander been tasked or ordered, in any way, to provide a secure environment for humanitarian activities or to provide support to humanitarian organizations? How does the commander describe those humanitarian support tasks?

• Does the commander or his staff consider the success of humanitarian activities as important to the accomplishment of his mission?

• Is the population considered a potential threat to the security of the force?

• How will the commander's plans for securing his personnel, facilities, and area of responsibility impact on the population and humanitarian activities?

• From the commander's perspective, what are the best channels and methods for the UN-CMCoord officer to communicate routinely with the force leadership and staff? What are the possibilities and limitations for sharing planning information?

2. Security from the Humanitarian Perspective:

Humanitarians rely upon adherence to the humanitarian principles and the consent or acceptance of their humanitarian activities by all actors, especially those who could do them harm, as the basis for their security. The accepted practices for establishing and maintaining this consent are well-documented in the references and should be understood by all UN-CMCoord Officers prior to deployment.

UN-CMCoord officers are responsible for advising the Humanitarian Resident Coordinator on the establishment of an appropriate relationship with military forces. Security is one of the primary considerations in determining the degree of coexistence or cooperation that should be established between the humanitarian community and the military force.
The use of armed guards and escorts is a recurring issue. Related civil-military concerns include, but are not limited to, the perceived neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian organizations and the question of whether or not the use of armed escorts will increase or decrease access to victims. The decision to use armed guards or escorts will normally be made by the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator in consultation with the UN Country Team. The advice of UN-CMCoord Officers may be sought in making this decision. See appendix for IASC guidance on this issue. His/her advice should be framed by “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to Support Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” and in consultation with relevant UN and other humanitarian security officers, and should weigh the following questions:

- Who has the mandate for protection of beneficiaries?
- What humanitarian security mechanisms are being used? How will the UN-CMCoord Officer coordinate with them?
- What are the anticipated security risks to the conduct of humanitarian operations?
- How severely will the use of armed guards or escorts, either private or governmental forces, impact the perceived neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian actors?
- Will the use of military assets place the civilian population at risk?
- Will any expected short term increase in access to one portion of the population be off set by loss of access to other portions of the population?
- Can the same level of security be achieved and maintained with a less visible presence of military forces or armed guards?
- How will the use of armed guards or escorts, either private or governmental, be perceived by other armed forces and military actors? By other humanitarian actors?
• What is the risk that the humanitarian community will become dependent on other services provided by this force?

• Under what conditions will the security arrangements be reconsidered and what will be the implications of reducing or eliminating the guard or escort services?

• What training or preparatory measures need to be completed to access military services?

3. **Key Actors in Security, Safety and Medical Services**

Many actors populate the operational environment in which humanitarian situations arise. A basic understanding of military terms and organization will help the UN-CMCoord Officer build effective relationships and understanding. Similarly, the UN-CMCoord Officer should be prepared to explain the humanitarian actors to military counterparts.

**Key Actors in a Military Force:**

Military forces are led by a commander supported by a staff with functional responsibilities to administer, plan, direct, and support operations of the force. Operating units within the force execute instructions within specified geographic or functional areas. An appreciation of the size, composition, and organization of the force will help the UN-CMCoord officer in establishing effective relationships. It is useful for the UN-CMCoord Officer to first understand a military counterpart’s scope of responsibility to ensure the dialogue is framed in a manner consistent with the counterpart’s geographic and functional scope of interest and responsibility. If the force has security as its primary mission, the entire staff and most of the subordinate units will focus primarily on ensuring security for a specific geographic area or set of activities.

Naming conventions for staff elements may vary by nationality and language. In most western forces, the following conventions are common:
• **Cx** – Combined staff with representation from more than nation

• **Jx** – Multi-Service, single nation staff (i.e., Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine)

• **Gx** – Staff of General Officer-led headquarters of a single military Service

• **Nx** – General staff of a Naval force

• **Sx** – Single service staff with a commander lower than General Officer grade, such as Army Regiment, Brigade, Battalion

Forces may differ significantly in organization, but even less well-regulated forces will perform many of these same functions. The following list highlights the roles of primary and special staff in providing security for the force:

- **Personnel and Administration (G1):** The personnel section is often responsible for safety and safety programs. If a full-time safety officer exists in the force he or she will probably be assigned to this section. They may also monitor and report the accidents and injuries sustained by the personnel in the force. They may be responsible for issuing identification and passes for access to military facilities.

- **Intelligence (G2):** The intelligence section is responsible for identifying and evaluating the possible threats to the force. Most of their effort will be focused on organizations that have the capability to attack the force or disrupt its operations. They will also monitor the population and the political and military environment.

- **Operations (G3) and Plans (G5):** Plans for reacting to changes in the security environment of the force are normally formulated by the plans section and supervised by the operations section. This will include contingency plans to
increase the security of the force, assist or evacuate civilians, and conduct operations like searches and roadblocks.

- **Provost Marshal and Military Police:** The Provost Marshal is the senior military police officer and normally commands the military police units. These units will provide security for key installations, provide escorts for senior officers, and enforce traffic and other laws and regulations. They may operate check points at gates and main entrances to military compounds. Any crimes committed by military personnel, to include traffic accidents, thefts, etc, will normally be investigated by this section. The Provost Marshal may have responsibility for coordination with civil police, gendarmerie, and civil security forces.

- **Judge Advocate General (JAG):** As the judicial arm of a military headquarters, the JAG is responsible for defense and prosecution of military law. In deployed missions, the JAG officer advises the commander on the law of armed conflict and application of the rules of engagement.

- **Engineers:** Determining the safety of structures and the traffic ability of roads is the responsibility of engineers. If mine clearance operations are conducted by the force the engineer will normally be responsible for these operations. In some forces engineers are responsible for providing safe drinking water. Either the surgeon or the veterinarian is responsible for checking the purity of the water.

- **Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD):** The disarming of unexploded ordnance (UXO) is the normal responsibility of the specialists. They will also supervise the destruction of large quantities of munitions. For more on current terminology, see the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 Convention), 28 November 2003.

- **Surgeon or Senior/Chief Medical Officer:** The senior medical officer in the force plays a major role in monitoring the health of the soldiers assigned to the organization. They will also
oversee the stocks of medical supplies and may control the medical evacuation capability of the force.

- **Veterinarian (Official responsible for food safety, water quality, and environmental health):** In some military organizations the safety of the food supply is the domain of the veterinarian. This includes the inspection of kitchens and dining facilities. Any animal born disease will also be monitored by this section.

- **Meteorologists:** Modern military forces, especially those that have aviation assets will have a weather section. They forecast and analyze the effect of the weather on the mission and planned operations. They are also capable of forecasting conditions that will threaten exposed personnel and the safe operation of equipment.

- **CIMIC/CA (G9):** The CIMIC (British and Canadian, Civil Military Cooperation) and CA (United States, Civil Affairs) coordinate the application of military capabilities to civilian concerns. The military and affected civilian population work together to support stabilization and reconstruction. Primarily, the CIMIC/CA focus is to support the military component in meeting its mission, conduct civil-military liaison and relations, and provide support to the civil environment. The military headquarters may assume that all liaisons with the humanitarian community should be through this staff element.

- **Special Forces Elements:** Special Forces elements may be employed in remote areas in small detachments or they may be attached to larger force elements for specialized mission support. They may be trained with language and regional expertise in order to make direct contact with the civilian population to obtain operational information and gain cooperation.

- **Public Affairs Officer (PAO):** Larger headquarters have a public affairs officer responsible for all communication with media sources and release of operational information through public channels. This information release will be filtered by the
PAO to ensure operationally relevant information related to security and force protection is protected.

**Humanitarian Actors:**

The UN-CMCoord Officer needs to be prepared to describe the humanitarian actors present in the area of operations to help military counterparts understand their roles, objectives, and resources. The UN-CMCoord Officer can help military counterparts understand the rank and protocol of humanitarian counterparts to minimize potential distractions when two entirely different cultures touch. Military counterparts are likely to prefer a single point of contact to simplify the challenge of cooperating with diverse agencies. The UN-CMCoord Officer may help the military force leadership understand the actors within the humanitarian space, but should avoid becoming a conduit and intermediary for diverse agencies. The military counterpart may be confused and frustrated by the lack of central, coordinating authority over all agencies in the humanitarian space.

**4. Critical Security, Safety and Medical Information:**

The sharing of operationally relevant information can be sensitive for both the humanitarian actor and the military force. The humanitarian principle of neutrality requires that information shared with one military must be shared with all. The military counterpart must understand this implication of neutrality. Options and guidelines for information sharing depend on many factors, including the status and calibre of the military force, the severity and nature of the humanitarian mission, and the political and security dynamics of the environment.

Assuming that the military force is not conducting operations against the population and, at a minimum, supports humanitarian assistance to the population, the following information regarding the safety, security, and medical evacuation for the civilian population and humanitarian actors should normally be shared between military and humanitarian organizations. Appropriate methods for sharing this information under different conditions are discussed in “Chapter 6: Coordination Methods, Techniques and Tools”.

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Humanitarian Information to be provided to Military Forces

The primary purpose for sharing information with military forces is to ensure that in the planning and conduct of their operations they take into account the security and safety of humanitarian actors and their beneficiaries. This includes making sure that these personnel and facilities are not inadvertently harmed or vital humanitarian operations disrupted.

- The mandate for humanitarian action, sources of information on legal obligations of humanitarian actors and military forces, list of humanitarian agencies operating in the area, and identification of MCDA in use by humanitarian missions

- Location, physical well-being and state of security of vulnerable elements of the population to include refugees, internally displaced persons, other institutionalized persons information when and where appropriate, and identification of populations where military action can save lives

- Established or anticipated routes and schedules for movement of vulnerable elements of the population and other institutionalized persons information when and where appropriate, to include processing points, rest areas, and other points where temporary concentrations of beneficiaries may be expected

- Air space control procedures for humanitarian air missions

- If the military force is responsible for evacuation, the locations, staff, and security arrangements for the offices, warehouses, and lodging of humanitarian organizations and other institutionalized persons information when and where appropriate

- Approved marking for humanitarian vehicles and facilities and examples of official identification for local and international staff, with suitable procedures to prevent abuse such as
defacing samples to make it impossible for wrong-doers to pick them up

- Incidents of attacks or threats directed at beneficiaries or humanitarian staff
- Approved medical treatment facilities for humanitarian staff and procedures for the medical evacuation of personnel, especially during period of restricted movement, and contact details for medical officers
- Name and contact info for appropriate humanitarian security officials
- Time and location of civil-military coordination meetings

**Military Information to be provided to Humanitarian Organizations:**

The information provided below is considered the minimum essential information that a military force has an obligation to share with the civilian population and humanitarian actors in order to ensure that humanitarian actors have freedom of movement and/or safe access to the beneficiaries, know whom to contact in the event of problems, and avoid situations known to the military that may pose a risk to the civilian population or humanitarian operations.

- Boundaries, headquarters locations, and daytime and evening contact details for headquarters and subordinate units with responsibilities for security or providing support or assistance to the civilian population or humanitarian actors
- Time and location of civil-military coordination meetings
- Identification of non-uniformed, contracted security elements and their supervisory structure
• Status of roads, bridges, and other infrastructure that may impact access to beneficiaries or the conduct of humanitarian infrastructure

• Locations of recent operations where explosive remnants of war (ERW) (aka unexploded ordnance (UXO)) may be encountered

• The status of demining operations and any mine incidents, and information on the types of support the population and humanitarian actors can receive for mine clearance and evacuation

• Procedures to be followed by humanitarian personnel when approaching military checkpoints or when stopped by military patrols, notification of approved vehicle markings, information on curfews, and potential movement restrictions

• Notification of areas where military operations or security conditions may pose a threat to the civilian population or humanitarian actors, information on insecure conditions and changes in threat levels/status, and information on special events or holidays that may impact the security of the humanitarian community

• Weapons policy and procedures for armed personnel

• Warning and notification of any accidents, incidents or hazards, to include severe weather, industrial or environmental accidents or natural disasters that may imperil the civilian population or humanitarian actors

• Map and GIS information

• Air movements and air space control procedures, measures for deconfliction of air space usage
• Information on the military’s plans for and conduct of civil-military operations

5. Possible Security, Safety, and Medical Tasks and Activities:

When conditions are appropriate, interaction between the military and humanitarian actors can move beyond the minimal exchange of information to an appropriate division of tasks and some collaborative activities. The following activities might be considered. Before recommending or undertaking any of these or similar activities, consider how these actions will be perceived by outside observers. Also take care not to become dependent on military actors for their services.

• Specialized military resources, such as engineers, health specialist, etc. may be used to assess the safety and condition of buildings, compounds and facilities that are not accessible by humanitarian actors.

• Military forces conducting patrols and convoys along routes used by humanitarian actors may be a viable source of assistance in the case of vehicles breaking down, accidents, or overdue/missing vehicles.

• Military specialists may be available to conduct safety training for humanitarian staff on a range of topics to include protection from chemical, biological, or radiological hazards, aircraft safety when embarking and disembarking helicopters, radio procedures for use on military radio nets in emergencies, etc.

• Military and civilian health professionals often can and should collaborate on the interdiction and prevention of infectious diseases, especially those that threaten vulnerable segments of the population and are easily transmitted. Special attention should be given to HIV/AIDS.

• Specialized medical supplies and services are normally in short supply and sometimes can be shared discretely and with
minimum risks. Examples include medical laboratory facilities, cold-chain storage capacity, and imaging/x-ray services.

6. Security Safety and Medical Plans and Planning Activities

Collaborative civil-military planning may be possible and advisable under certain operational conditions and with appropriate policy guidance. When conditions are appropriate, interaction between the military and humanitarian actors can move beyond the minimal exchange of information to an appropriate division of tasks and some collaborative activities. The following activities might be considered to enhance security, safety, and medical well-being in the humanitarian sector in two dimensions: first, for humanitarian actors/staff and second, for beneficiaries. There may be distinct policy and legal guidelines for each. Before recommending or undertaking any of these or similar activities, consider how these actions will be perceived by outside observers. Also take care not to become dependent on military actors for their services.

As noted in Chapter 2: “Key Concepts and Principles,” planning is a special dimension of civil military coordination. Security, Safety and Medical crises are common in humanitarian emergencies. There are at least four sets of plans which should be maintained by both military forces and humanitarian organizations which require careful coordination:

- Plans for Natural, Environmental, and Technological Event Preparedness
- Plans for Response to Anthropogenic (Mass) Casualties or Incidents
- Evacuation Plans for Security Emergencies
- Evacuation Plans for Medical Emergencies

The manner in which these plans are coordinated and the degree of collaboration that can be undertaken in both the planning and response to these crises will vary depending on the CMCoord strategy adopted by
the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator and the conditions surrounding the particular crisis. Continuous consultation should be maintained with the appropriate security official (Designated Official). This challenge is made larger by the fact that there is no standard format for plans in the UN system. One should also consider procedures and actions on the leaving or massive failure of a major player, both military and civilian.

Inherent in each planning activity is the development of an understanding how information will be exchanged and activities coordinated. This requires specifying mechanisms and structures for information access and sharing. The following civil military coordination issues should be considered in the development or review of these plans:

- **Authority to Request MCDA (through OCHA) or Local Military Assistance**: There may be a difference between MCDA assets available through the UN system and military assets available locally on an emergency basis. What is the approval process in the UN mission and humanitarian organizations to request MCDA or other local military assistance in a crisis or emergency? Has this authority been delegated if the responsible official can not be reached? Can this decision be made on the local or regional level; if so, under what circumstances? Need to share contact details for request/release of military assistance.

- **Authority to Release MCDA**: Does the military or force commander have resources to apply and the authority to use his resources to respond to a crisis situation that endangers the civilian population or humanitarian actors? These resources might include security assets, demining, safety, occupational health & safety, and CBRNE capabilities. If permission has to be requested from higher headquarters, what is the approval process and estimated time required for a decision? Is this authority different between national contingents? Does it make a difference if civilian nationals from the same country as the military force are involved?
• **Nonemergent as well as Emergent Needs:** Security and medical planning is needed for non-emergency medical treatment and emergency response not requiring evacuation, such as car accidents and sudden illness. A point of contact is needed for local medical/security issues.

• **Transport of Personnel:** What are the existing policies on the transport of humanitarian personnel in military aircraft or vehicles and what are the legal implications? What are the policies on military personnel in humanitarian aircraft or vehicles? Do these policies take into account life saving emergencies? Who sets these policies and who has the authority to grant waivers to them?

• **Who Can Be Assisted:** Are there any restrictions on who can be assisted? Are there any issues regarding the nationality of the personnel to be assisted? If locals or national staff can be assisted, is there sufficient capacity? Which humanitarian staff members can be assisted (national staff, national NGO staff etc.)? Can dependents be assisted? Recognized dependents? If locals or national staff can not be assisted, what are the implications?

• **Tracking, Tracing, and Accountability of Casualties and Vulnerable Populations:** Do the military organizations have the ability to identify and track casualties and other vulnerable populations (elderly, sick, children, etc.) evacuated by military means and/or treated in military facilities? Who has information on non-uniformed/non-military capacity to respond? What are arrangements at reception point? Are they prepared for evacuation of next of kin or guardians for casualties that are minor children or who are incapacitated? Do the plans include measures to limit the trafficking in children in the wake of an emergency? What is the plan for repatriation? Are they familiar with local customs, beliefs, and rituals regarding imminent death and the handling of remains? Who needs to be contacted?
• National Government, Military Forces, Local Government, and other Local Leaders: Should local/national governmental and military officials be involved in the decision to use military resources? How are local authorities to be notified of the use of these assets?

• Use of Military Resources based in Other Countries: Do military forces based in the country have supporting forces in the region? Can these resources be used, and if so, what coordination is required with authorities in the countries where they are based or which they must transit? Are their special requirements for the arrival of military forces from other countries?

• Legal Status of the Military Forces/Status of Mission: Are there agreements in place governing the “Status of Forces (SOFA)” and the “Status of Mission (SOMA)” concerning both military and UN mission presence and activities? Are humanitarian situations covered by these agreements? Are the respective parties aware of the model SOFA in the Oslo Guidelines? Are there existing bilateral or regional agreements for mutual assistance that may be used in these situations? Are there specified port of entry, immigration, customs, and exit procedures?

• Injured Belligerents and Combatants: If injured belligerents or combatants are evacuated by humanitarian means to humanitarian facilities in areas controlled by their adversaries, what will their status be? Will they be released or repatriated? What will be the status of these individuals if they are treated in military facilities?

• Communications and Coordination Arrangements: What procedures will be used to manage Requests for Information (RFI) and Requests for Assistance (RFA)? What communications networks will be used to coordinate the responses? Will it be feasible to co-locate all or portions of the coordination activities? If liaison personnel are to be exchanged, are they trained, do they have the necessary
clearances and passes, and what authority have they been granted by their respective headquarters? Is there a requirement and process for de-classifying or releasing information?

- **Logistics and Procurement Management:** Are there provisions for the emergency transfer or purchase of critical relief supplies? Under what conditions can military and humanitarian aircraft refuel from each other’s stocks? Does the humanitarian have access to military PX and supplies?

- **Funding and Procurement:** Are there any funding issues? Are there any expectations of reimbursement for resources or supplies expended in support of humanitarian actors or civilian victims? What are the mechanisms for cost sharing? In the case of evacuation, is there a service fee? What documentation is required by expending agencies to account for disbursements? Do humanitarian actors have access to military PX and supplies?

- **Media Coverage of any Collaborative Efforts:** Will media coverage of any joint or collaborative efforts by the humanitarian actors and military forces affect the perceived neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian actors? Can military forces and humanitarian actors agree not to exploit this cooperation for propaganda or psychological purposes? Can draft press guidance for both organizations be prepared in advance? Can media coverage be coordinated? Has attention been paid to security implications of media coverage?

- **Review and Exercise of Plans and Training:** When will these contingency plans be reviewed and what will be the method for review? Can these plans be rehearsed or exercised without creating the wrong impression with the population or other actors? When there are changes in senior leadership of any of the organizations, how will the new leaders be briefed on these plans and how will any changes in guidance be incorporated into the plans? How and when will plans be disseminated?
• **Training:** How can the knowledge and skills of key individuals be confirmed in training and evaluation? For example, to increase safety, individuals need training on mine awareness and mine incident response and accident procedures. How will training needs be identified, evaluated, and addressed?

7. **Lessons Observed and Best Practices:**

The following are lessons observed and best practices related to information sharing, task division and planning in the areas of security safety and medical support. Since it is often difficult to divide the two, a single list is provided. They may or may not be appropriate for a particular emergency or situation.

• Most organizations have internal distribution problems and bureaucratic barriers to the flow of information within organizations. Follow-up on information that has been given to military and civilian organizations and check to see if it is getting to the people that you expected to receive it.

• The more difficult and dangerous the security environment becomes the more important it is to have well-defined responsibilities and clear lines of communication between the responsible security personnel in both military and civilian organizations. UN-CMCoord officers should not insert themselves unnecessarily into this dialogue or create confusion regarding the responsibility of the UNDSS Field Security Coordination Officer (FSCO) or agency security personnel.

• The staffs of military organizations pay attention to the issues that are important to their commander. It can be extremely useful to have the CIMIC Officer or Chief of Staff or the military organization encourage the commander to ask at least one question in the daily situation briefings related to civil military coordination. If possible, the UN-CMCoord Officer should provide suggestions for these questions.
• Specialists in the areas of security, safety and medical services often have common educational and professional backgrounds. These shared experiences or values can be used to build or repair relationships between organizations. Personal relations and respect for counterparts significantly enhance planning, dialogue, and actions. This is crucial especially in case of security/safety matters.

• Based on the humanitarian principles, transparency may aid the security of humanitarian organizations and build confidence. Humanitarian organizations should advocate a transparent approach vis-à-vis military forces.

• CIMIC/CA activities by military forces do not truly meet the humanitarian imperative. They are not recipient needs based, rather they prioritize focus based on force protection needs. They tend to favor individuals and communities that promise the greatest value to the military force. And, military forces are classically not neutral in a complex emergency. However, military leaders will generally refer to CIMIC/CA initiatives as “humanitarian.” The lack of common vocabulary between humanitarians and military CIMIC/CA actors can lead to tensions and misunderstanding. There is little gained in an operational setting from dwelling on disputes of terminology. The UN-CMCoord Officer can play a critical role in translating and building understanding on both sides of this relationship.
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Chapter 6: Communications and Information Management

Communications and information management are prerequisites for effective coordination. In broad terms, communications refers to the means of sharing information, and may include meeting face-to-face as well as a variety of electronic means. Information management refers to the guidelines for the distribution and control of the content of communications. Establishing communications means agreeing to meeting schedules, radio frequencies, digital computer links, etc. Information management means having an intentional and regular practice for the control of information content communicated.

Without reliable and effective means of communication between military and humanitarian actors, the minimum essential interaction and dialogue can not take place. In the absence of effective information management within both humanitarian and military organizations, critical information may not reach the right people and information sharing will not have the desired affect of building mutual trust, confidence, respect, and basic coordination. Both communications and information management require mission-specific guidance.

The UN-CMCoord Officer does not have primary responsibility for either communications or information management in a UN humanitarian operation. However, the UN-CMCoord Officer must be prepared to facilitate effective and appropriate information sharing and offer advice and support on the civil-military aspects of communications and information management to those who have this responsibility. Specifically, the UN-CMCoord Officer may inform military leaders of the information needs of humanitarians, and may advise humanitarian leadership concerning information sharing with military leaders.

1. Communications and Information Management from The Military Perspective:

To be effective, the UN-CMCoord Officer must have a basic understanding of the military view of communications and information management. In modern military forces communications and
information management are components of a broader concept referred to by some forces as Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I). Military communications and information technology systems are designed to ensure that the chain of command, essential control functions, and the intelligence process extend throughout the military force. These are dedicated internal systems and are among the most vital systems in a military force. If an adversary can disrupt, damage, or destroy these systems the ability of the force to function and survive is at risk. One way to envision this system is as the nerve system of the human body. If the system is severely impaired the remainder of the body is paralyzed or can not operate in a coordinated fashion.

Communications within a multinational military effort present a variety of challenges. Military forces of different nations, and even different military forces from a single nation, may have limited means to communicate directly with one another. They may vary in technical sophistication and employ differing procedures and standards. Even where the communications means exist, information sharing between militaries of different nations may be limited due to force protection concerns or other policy reasons. On the other hand, traditions of information cooperation may exist between allied forces of the same service, for example NATO naval forces, and military forces of the same specialty, such as air forces, tend to "talk the same language" and recognize certain common international conventions. Differences in mission and functional requirements means that different types and levels of detail of information will be found in various military organizations and service elements.

In order to protect their integrity, access to the communications and the information management systems of the military are carefully controlled. Levels of access to both communications channels and the information in the system are used to protect the system itself and the information and data that flow through the system. Access to information is managed through a system of classification. All military personnel have security clearances which determine the level of information to which they have access. Within a level their access is further restricted by their "need to know." In other words, they are only given the access to
the sensitive information that they need to know in order to perform their jobs.

Force protection is a fundamental responsibility of all military commanders in all mission environments. Even in seemingly benign environments, military personnel are consistently reminded to maintain “information security” and “operational security”. The later refers to the protection of the intentions, plans and capabilities of the forces. Thus, information is linked to the security of the force and denying potential adversaries knowledge about the force. As a result, military personnel, as a matter of policy and training, are hesitant to share and may be prohibited from sharing certain information. Access to facilities where this information is collated, shared, or disseminated is strictly controlled. Even where information sharing lies within the discretion of local military commanders, their willingness to do so is based on trust.

Military commanders, even at the highest level, have limited authority to share classified information with personnel who have not been vetted. Information received from intelligence agencies is often classified and controlled by the intelligence agencies. Commanders in the field normally have no authority to share this information beyond the approved addressees, even within their own organizations. Also, the more likely a situation may require the use of force, the less military commanders will share information.

Among the most important of controlled facilities is the “operations center” in a headquarters or the “command post” at the lower tactical level. These locations are critical nodes in the C4I system. Access to these locations is always restricted and in combat operations the military forces will attempt to keep these locations secret. Unescorted access to these areas is rare, even for personnel with the appropriate level of security clearance.

Different military branches will have different information needs. The UN-CMCoord Officer has to find out which information he can get where and be aware of the fact that humanitarian information can be abused by the military. The UN-CMCoord Officer has to be aware that all information will be screened for military value.
In situations where the military recognizes the need to share information with humanitarian actors, this information will normally be shared via a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) house, the dispatch of a liaison officer, or via an electronic bulletin board and exchange of e-mails. Among the first things a UN-CMCoord Officer must determine about the military communications and information management are:

- What are the commander’s orders or policies regarding the sharing of information with civilian humanitarian organizations?

- What are the existing channels for communication between humanitarians and military forces at various levels and how do they work in emergencies?

- What military elements are present and what are their communications relationships? Is there an interagency channel within the military structure for sharing information, such as military to foreign ministry to aid agency?

- Does anyone in the humanitarian community have access to the operations centers or command posts? Is there a specific intermediary the military would prefer to facilitate information sharing with the humanitarian community?

- What role does the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Officer and the Civil Military Operations Center play in sharing information with humanitarian actors?

- Is the communication and exchange of information dependent on linguistic or technical translation?

- Are military officers reluctant to share information in the presence of or with local humanitarian staff? Are there specific national issues in the military’s willingness to share information?
• What are the informal and technical channels for the exchange of information between the humanitarians and the military force?

• Is the military willing to keep humanitarian information unclassified? Can information be declassified if it appears in open-source publication?

• What mechanisms are used by the military force to provide information to the population and are these sources trusted by the population?

• Is the military headquarters aware of the various humanitarian open sources available to them; for example VOSOCC, HIC, IRIN, reliefweb etc.?

• Will the military agree to an exchange of radios and/or frequencies? Would the military be willing to establish secure communications using commercial encryption?

2. Communications and Information Management from The Humanitarian Perspective:

The effective UN-CMCoord Officer must understand humanitarian communications and information management practices and needs and be prepared to explain them to military counterparts. In theory, all humanitarian organizations subscribe to a policy of transparency regarding their actions. Transparency is vital to establishing trust and confidence with the local population and reducing suspicion. This transparency is the opposite of the military concept of “operational security.” However, the principle of transparency of actions does not necessarily mean that information flows freely between humanitarian organizations. Many humanitarian organizations have programmatic transparency, but do not have information transparency. To some organizations, the appearance of transparency may be more important than actual transparency.
Most agencies have closed information technology systems. They may limit access by other humanitarian actors, even within the UN system. For example, organizations have requirements to safeguard personal information. The challenge of exchanging information electronically between humanitarian actors is further complicated by different levels of technology, incompatible hardware and software, and the absence of standardized procedures and protocols.

The communications and information technology systems fielded by most agencies are designed to meet Minimum Operational Security Standards (MOSS) and to support internal reporting and data flow requirements. They are not designed to exchange information between agencies or to facilitate coordination. As a result, a tremendous burden is placed on e-mail, exchange of information in meetings and informal networks. The UN-CMCoord Officer should attempt to determine the following:

- Has a Humanitarian Information Center (HIC) or similar facility been established and does the military force receive or provide information from or to this facility? Would the HIC accept a military officer as part of their staff?

- Are there donor/humanitarian donor agency MLO deployed, and if so, where?

- Have any of the agencies or the Humanitarian Coordinator placed restrictions on the information that can be shared with military organizations or on the venues and methods for sharing?

- Are there collaborative environments where civilian and military representatives can be included? How are they accessed and who has control of them?

- What is the primary means of sharing information among agencies and other humanitarian that has been received from a military force?
• From a hierarchical perspective, what are the optimal levels for sharing of information between humanitarian and military organizations?

• How does the geographical scope of humanitarian and military activities relate to sharing of relevant information?

• Are there established procedures for safeguarding sensitive information such as “UN Restricted” communications or documents?

• Has a formal process been established for requesting information from military forces and is there effective follow-up on requests?

• Is it desirable and feasible to include military liaison officers in humanitarian meetings or include them in the humanitarian team?

• Are the respective functions of the UN-CMCoord Officer and of the UN peace operation military advisor clearly defined in order to avoid overlap?

• Do any of the major actors in the humanitarian community feel they have been unnecessarily denied information or deceived by the military force?

3. Key Military Actors in Communications and Information Management:

By knowing the key military actors related to communications and information management, the UN-CMCoord Officer can more skillfully engage humanitarian issues with military counterparts. The following military actors play important roles in this area. Most are directly involved in the formal communications and information management functions. However, informal networks exist within military forces as well, and actors assigned no formal duties in these areas can
dramatically impact the flow of information or how it is received or perceived by others. The UN-CMCoord Officer may have differing levels of access to these military actors depending on the specific mission environment.

- **Intelligence (G2):** Intelligence officers have the primary responsibility for collecting and analyzing the information for the commander. Their efforts will be focused on the mission, the operational environment and the major threats the command faces. They play a major role in shaping the commander's view of the situation and in setting the stage for plans and operations. They conduct liaison with intelligence officers from their national agencies and normally control the flow of information within the headquarters that is gained from intelligence agencies and sensitive sources. They may or may not develop or control local intelligence sources or informants. Their communications systems typically have the most restrictive access within the headquarters. In different mission environment, specialized intelligence sections may exist with a variety of names, such as Joint Mission Analysis Cell, Intelligence Support Team, etc.

- **Operations (G3):** The Operations Section of the staff is responsible for overseeing the operations center. It is in this center that the key elements of the staff are brought together to track current operations. These facilities are normally manned 24 hours per day. This is also where the commander will receive most of his or her briefings. The commander or a senior officer will always be present at this location in emergencies, times of crisis, or when critical operations are underway. Depending on the force composition and size, the Operations Section may be joint (multi-service, called J3), or combined (multi-nation, called C3). Additionally, operations sections may exist for specific functions such as a Joint Logistics Operations Center or an Air Operations Center.

- **Communications (G6):** Responsibility for maintaining the communications and information technology architecture rests with the communications officers. They manage the
equipment and the networks and determine which networks can be used for sensitive information. These personnel manage the frequency spectrum, determine who has which communication equipment, and assigns call signs. They publish the signal or communications and electronics operating instructions and control ciphers and codes. They also set priorities for the repair of communications equipment. If a frequency is to be shared with humanitarians, or radios are exchanged, this office has the responsibility.

- **Civil Military Operations (CMO) or CIMIC (G9):** Not all staffs will have a G9 section and the level of training and experience will vary significantly between forces. In most staffs where this section exists, they will have primary responsibility for interactions with the civilian actors, including humanitarian organizations. Most CIMIC sections will operate a CIMIC house of Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) as a venue for interaction with the humanitarian community and a location for requesting information or assistance. Military officials may use the term Civil Affairs (CA) interchangeably with CIMIC or CMO.

- **Engineers:** In most armed forces the engineers, not the intelligence officers, are responsible for maps. They normally have the capability of producing special maps and are responsible for the collection of topographical information in order to update maps. They will also monitor weather conditions for their impact on the roads and the ability to move cross-country. They will project the impact of floods and will forecast the flood plains for rivers and streams.

- **Public Affairs or Public Information Officer:** This section is responsible for the command’s relationship with the press and media. They will formulate official statements, organize press conferences, escort media representatives and may serve as the official spokespersons for the command. They may also have responsibility for monitoring the press or media to determine how well their messages are getting out and how the force is being portrayed. If the military force publishes a
local newspaper for the soldiers or maintains a website for the force, this section will edit the paper and manage the website.

- **Psychological Operations and Information Warfare:** These elements of the staff are normally under the control of the operations section. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) make use of information to gain political and military advantage. They can produce leaflets or in more sophisticated operations broadcast radio and television directly to the local population. They attempt to develop themes that will undermine the population’s support for any adversaries and discourage the enemy. Information warfare officers are responsible for operations targeting the enemy’s command control and information systems.

- **Special Security or Counter Intelligence Officers:** Under normal conditions the UN-CMCoord Officer is unlikely to encounter these personnel. However, they are responsible for ensuring information and operational security. They will be responsible for investigating anyone who is believed to be conducting espionage against the command or any unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

- **Chief of Staff or Executive Officers:** At higher headquarters commanded by General Officers there will be a Chief of Staff (CoS) and at lower headquarters an Executive Officer (XO) or Second in Command (2IC). These persons set priorities for staff work, determine which staff section has the lead on certain actions, and assign the tasks of preparing messages for the commander’s signature. They also set the agenda for staff meetings and briefings.

- **Aide de Camp or Personal Staff:** These Officers often have direct access to the commanding general and assist with personal correspondence. The aide de camp, or personal assistant, will manage the general’s calendar and may be able to identify unscheduled opportunities to chat with the general, such as during a shared trip on an aircraft. A military chaplain serves as a personal adviser to the commander on matters of
• Political, Humanitarian, and Other Special Advisers: Most senior military commanders will have a group of special advisers. Among these advisers is normally a political adviser from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Typically this is a career diplomat and this person will maintain close communications with the cognizant embassy and the capital. They should have direct access to the commander and will have access to diplomatic communications channels. Commanders may also have an adviser from the governmental aid agency of their country. These personnel are alternative routes for communications with the commander.

• Military Attaches: The duties of military attaches vary widely between countries. In some cases they are career military intelligence officers and in others they are the official representative and liaison to the armed forces of the state in which they are posted. In some cases they are both. Normally, these persons are not directly in the chain of command of the force commander. However, they will have direct access to both the military commander and the ambassador of their country in the affected state. Attaches may also be responsible for military cooperation, or separate liaison offices may exist in the embassy for this function. In US Embassies, these cooperation offices bear a variety of names, such as Security Assistance Office, Military Group (MilGroup), Military Assistance Group, etc. They may have access to the local mission commander or, where relevant, to the host nation military commander.

• Military Observers, UN Military Advisers, Military Liaison Officers: Military officers attached to UN mission staffs may have access and credibility with military headquarters from their home nation. Or, they may be able to provide advice on the best means to develop effective CMCoord communications with a headquarters from their nation or an allied nation.
• Police Organizations: In certain mission environment, international police contingents or the local police play a critical role. Military forces in the mission environment may develop special, cooperative relationships with such organizations, and the UN-CMCoord Officer may find a relationship with them a valuable complement to direct coordination to the military headquarters.

4. Minimum Communications and Information Management

Arrangements:

In the chapter on “Security, Safety, and Medical” and in the chapter on “Transport and Logistics” this portion of the chapter focuses on the minimum essential information that needs to be exchanged. This section focuses on the essential mechanisms that the UN CMCoord Officer should seek to emplace in order to ensure that the opportunity and means exist for effective information sharing. These procedures are particularly important when a coexistence strategy is pursued, and normal coordination and information sharing mechanisms such as a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and Humanitarian Information Center (HIC) are not present.

• Dynamic Contact List: This is perhaps the important tool of the UN-CMCoord Officer. He or she must know how to get in contact with the right people, both military and humanitarian, in the most expeditious and appropriate manner to facilitate resolution of civil military issues. When possible this list should include alternate points of contact and addresses where these personnel can be reached during non-duty hours. While the military operations center should be able to locate key military personnel in an emergency and the radio operator in the UN mission should be able to do the same, there is no substitute for direct access.

• Request for Information (RFI) and Notification Process: Until a formal RFI process is established for the humanitarian community to request information from military forces, the UN-CMCoord Officer must establish a working understanding and
procedure with military counterparts in each mission. If a Civil Military Operations Center is present or a humanitarian liaison officer has been assigned to the military headquarters, they may be the appropriate persons to manage this process. An important element is the screening of the request to ensure that the military forces understand what is being asked for and why. Blanket requests for data such as overhead imagery and mapping of the country will probably not be granted. In addition, responses to RFI's should be audited and tracked so that any issues regarding timeliness may be resolved. Notifications passed to the military concerning humanitarian activities, such as convoys, should be tracked with similar rigor and in a consistent format.

- **Emergency Communications and Liaison Procedures**: These procedures are normally maintained by the security officers and may be included in disaster contingency plans. However, both civilian and military organizations will maintain alternative internal communications plans. Knowing the back-up systems, frequencies, and procedures and how they work in an emergency allows the UN-CMCoord Officer to assist in the reestablishment of communications and coordination when systems are disrupted. Remember that when the military reacts to an emergency one of the first things they will do is restrict access to their critical facilities such as their operations center. The UN-CMCoord Officer must know how to gain access in these emergencies and continuously facilitate these arrangements before the emergency.

- **Standard Map Sheet, Coordinate System, and Location Names**: The military will work from a standard map or map series and a common coordinate system. The same is not true of the humanitarian community, especially the NGOs. Most military organizations use the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid system and maps in common sizes such as 1:25,000, 1:50,000 and 1:250,000. Most commercial GPS work in longitude and latitude. The UN-CMCoord Officer must be prepared to work in both the military system and the civilian system and should seek to ensure military and humanitarian
counterparts effectively communicate their understandings in geographic terms. In some cases sophisticated GIS systems will translate between these systems and laptop software can perform essential coordinate conversations; however, the most reliable means is to have a transparent overlay with the alternative grid system for the military map and the most common humanitarian maps. In addition, a consolidated list of place names with alternative versions in the native languages and variants in spelling must be maintained because most incident information received from local sources will reference neither the military or civil grid system.

- **Frequency and Bandwidth Management:** Control of the use of the electro-magnetic spectrum is the responsibility of the government in each state. Specific frequencies are reserved for specific activities. Important frequencies for international communication, such as air traffic control, are established by international treaty. Other frequencies such as those used for commercial radio transmission are controlled by the government and licensed. In the absence of an effective governmental agency to deal with the monitoring and enforcement of these matters, the international military and civilian communications specialist must come to an agreement on these matters or communications can be severely disrupted, especially in emergencies where radio discipline may be weak. In addition, larger more sophisticated military forces will often buy satellite access from commercial satellite providers to supplement their own satellite systems. This can dramatically increase the price of access or limit availability for humanitarian actors. A memorandum of understanding should be negotiated to ensure equitable access to both frequencies and satellite resources, or at a minimum the UN-CMCoord Officer should seek to facilitate a cooperative understanding of frequency and bandwidth management.

- **“Rumor Control” Plan:** The environment of an emergency is very conducive to rumors and misinformation. Rumors about the military will circulate within the humanitarian community. Rumors about humanitarians will circulate within the military
community and rumors about both will circulate in the population. Erroneous information, especially among suspicious recipients can have a very damaging impact on civil military relations and the perceptions of both military and civilian actors. Systematically monitoring this phenomenon is normally the responsibility of public affairs officers in both the military and humanitarian organizations. The UN-CMCoord Officer may be the first one to recognize a distortion in civil-military perceptions. Hence, the UN-CMCoord Officer must be prepared to assist in this effort and seek to ensure that both sides have ready access to the correct information and are prepared to counter damaging false or distorted information. A key resource in this effort is timely translations from local languages of public information reflecting the statements of local opinion leaders. Careful use of minutes in civil-military coordination perhaps prepared and reviewed jointly, can reduce misunderstandings. This will contribute as well to the routine deconfliction of daily reporting by humanitarian and military counterparts.

5. Possible Communications and Information Management Tasks and Activities:

When conditions are appropriate, the UN-CMCoord Officer may facilitate interaction between the military and humanitarian actors beyond the minimum essential dialogue to an appropriate division of tasks and some collaborative activities. The following activities might be considered. Before recommending or undertaking any of these or similar activities, consider how these actions will be perceived by outside observers. Also take care not to become dependent on military actors for their services or resources.

- In a more collaborative environment there could be a sharing of operational and assessment information. The role of the UN-CMCoord Officer should be to facilitate and advise on the civil military interaction with regards to the sharing, standardisation, control and vetting and analysis of such information.
• Some communications architecture, such as VHF repeater towers, is expensive and ideal locations are limited. It may be possible to share infrastructure such as towers, satellite up-link locations, and telephone exchanges. Before doing so, weigh cost savings and expedience against the possibility that these services will compromised if military communications infrastructure becomes the target of violence or other disruption. Coincident disruption of humanitarian and military activities due to co-dependence on infrastructure might compromise popular perceptions of the neutrality of humanitarian operations.

• Repair and maintenance of communications systems often requires technical skills that may be limited in the local economy and costly to import. If the military forces have the technical capability and are willing to evaluate or repair communications or computer systems this may be an area of low visibility indirect assistance that could benefit the humanitarian community. If such arrangements are made, be careful not to advertise them too broadly and try to limit them to emergency repairs.

• Military public affairs and media can be used to reinforce advocacy issues and common themes that are not necessarily associated with either the military or the humanitarian community. For example, public health, driving safety, respect for human rights, weather reports and warnings, can normally be broadcast over a number of channels without being associated with a particular source.

• On occasion, joint press conferences or media briefings may be appropriate. This may be the case when attempting to manage disinformation of particularly damaging rumors. On even rarer occasions, joint press releases might be issued. However, it is more likely that separate press releases properly timed will have better impact.

• Data on the population and humanitarian conditions in remote or inaccessible areas may be able to be collected by military
personnel. For example, military medical personnel often conduct clinics in the areas that humanitarians may not be able to reach. While the preferred solution is direct access to the population, military medics, with some training, could collect data on indicators of malnutrition among the patients they see. Sharing of humanitarian assessment formats, data structures, software tools may help keep such data collection, storage, and products open and unclassified. Collaboration and cooperation in information gathering and in the assessment process will have limitations. Overly “joint” efforts may compromise essential neutrality of the humanitarian effort.

- Evolving standards, technologies, and practices through international initiatives such as the Information Technology for Crisis Management (ITCM) may produce greater possibilities for cooperation in the future.

6. Civil Military Considerations in Planning Communications and Information Management Solutions:

To increase effective cooperation, the UN-CMCoord Officer should understand the military and humanitarian issues that may arise in their respective planning processes. These issues can be organized around the information management cycle. The five principal components of the cycle are used below to identify how these issues may impact information sharing and the effectiveness of communications between military and humanitarian organizations.

Information Needs:

The informational needs of military and humanitarian actors are different even when they involve the same subject or topic. This often requires explanation of what the data will be used for and what the implications are for humanitarian operations. Assuming that a formal request for information system has been established, the following should be considered when explaining the needs.

- Be specific and clear about terms and language. Keep watch for misconceptions that may arise from use of specialized
vocabulary and acronyms. Common terms used by the military and civilians often have different meanings. For example, the term “sector” means a geographic area of responsibility for a military organization while it is a technical area such as water/sanitation, food, shelter, etc. for the humanitarians.

- Be clear with military counterparts when and why certain information is needed. The urgency of the need for humanitarian data may not be readily evident to the military. When the request is passed to those who must collect the data, the priority may be altered due to other informational needs of a higher military priority. Try to avoid depending on the military for data which is time sensitive and has not been shared before.

- Due to institutional cultures and perceived mission needs, the military may be less forthcoming than humanitarians concerning the underlying purpose of information needs; nevertheless, it is generally advantageous for the military counterpart to understand as much as possible about the humanitarian information need. Specific mission guidance and the mission environment will shape the best course of action in this regard.

- When requesting data or information from the military it is normally better to state the need in terms of the decision which must be made and the desired outcome instead of the raw data that is being used to make the decision. For example, imagery of mountain passes is of use to humanitarians in determining when passes might close. Instead of asking for imagery, ask for a forecast of when the passes will close or no longer be accessible by a particular mode of transportation.

- On the other hand, humanitarians need raw data in order to perform humanitarian analysis. For example, data analysis performed by the military concerning health conditions may aggregate factors and omit details that would be valuable to humanitarian planners and analysts. Seek to routinely gain
access to raw data along with interpreted data reports; i.e., if possible get the data "behind the PowerPoint slides."

Gathering Data:

Both humanitarian and military organizations need information about the operational environment in its physical and human dimensions. The military is supported by a variety of sophisticated intelligence collection systems. Most are designed to gather information relevant for military operations and some are extremely classified and the information collected by these sources is carefully controlled by the military. Local information about the human environment is used by military commanders primarily for force protection. By contrast, humanitarian organizations depend on open sources of information or information gathered directly concerning needs in the local human environment. Some information in these two distinct systems, military and humanitarian, is similar even if it is gathered for different reasons.

- The military is more likely to be effective in gathering data about tangible measurable things such as the length of an airfield and the number of structures in a village that have their roofs intact. They generally lack the skills to make more than broad observations about issues such as food security, access for ethnic minorities, etc., and they seldom make them. Humanitarian organizations are not likely to obtain useful information of this sort from military sources.

- In many militaries deployed outside of their own countries, direct interaction with the population is limited either by policy, regulation, or tactics. Effective interaction, when it is permitted, may be further limited by language, culture, or distrust. Much of the information collected by the military regarding the population is collected by junior ranking soldiers on patrol. In some militaries there are dedicated, trained personnel who interact with the population and conduct CIMIC patrols to collect or verify data. When evaluating information provided by the military, it is important to know how the data was collected and whether or not it has been verified before basing humanitarian decisions upon it.
Military assessments of the physical environment can provide a valuable resource. These may include assessments of trafficability of roads and bridges, mine field maps, stability of earthen dams, meteorological data, analysis of local commercial fuel quality, description of airfield conditions and capabilities. Other seemingly relevant data may lack the detail or focus needed for the humanitarian mission. For example, medical, local hospital, water quality, disease prevalence and vectors, sanitation, etc., are likely to focus on their potential impact on the mission and safety of the military force. Threat assessments may have some value to the extent the humanitarian effort is threatened, but military headquarters will be generally reluctant or unable to share threat information due to information sensitivity or classification.

Humanitarian officers are likely to have a much more intimate feel and knowledge of the human environment than their military counterparts. Mission guidance and common sense will inhibit the amount of information humanitarians can appropriately give to military organizations. The UN-CMCoord Officer should inventory the documents and information available within the humanitarian effort that is appropriate for release to military counterparts.

Humanitarian information is often more actionable than information collected by the military as part of their programmatic focus. Humanitarian agencies tend to collect information in their area of specialization. Therefore, where possible data should be gathered jointly (between humanitarian agencies) so as to limit assessment fatigue. As with military information, it is important to know how the data was collected and whether or not it has been verified.

Be mindful of the sensitivities in exchanging information between humanitarian and military organizations. As a general rule, the UN-CMCoord Officer should only request information from the military that cannot be obtained reliably from open sources. This avoids needless dependency and complications.
from handling information the military considers sensitive even if unclassified. When responding to a request for information from the military, the UN-CMCoord Officer should be wise to avoid becoming a source of intelligence that may undermine the perception of neutrality of the humanitarian effort. For example, consider the perception and damage if information entrusted to a humanitarian organization by the local population or shared among humanitarian agencies is later disclosed from a military source.

Analysis of Data and Production of Information:

Both humanitarian and military organizations perform analysis of information received from a variety of sources to produce usable knowledge. For example, the analysis of data and the production of information are done in almost every section of a military staff. Special staff sections such as the aviation section will focus on its area of expertise and analyze data regarding airfields, landing zones, the availability of aviation fuel, etc. Similar analytic activity takes place in the medical, communications, and other specialized staff sections. If a dedicated a CIMIC staff section (G9) exists it will normally be responsible for analysis of the state of well-being of the population. If this section is not present, this analysis will probably be done by the Intelligence (G2). Similarly, the humanitarian community is quite diverse with diverse cultures, mandates, information requirements, and analytic capabilities.

- The military’s Intelligence and CIMIC sections are unlikely to have native language speakers or personnel with direct experience in humanitarian assistance. In some headquarters, the CIMIC section may have a number of officers or soldiers who have had little or no formal training in this function. They may defer to or depend upon the humanitarian community on analytic issues. By contrast, humanitarian organizations are very likely to have local officials and locally hired persons who can provide linguistic support and insights into local culture and customs.
The amount of analysis done by military organizations related to humanitarian issues reflects the military mission and the priorities of the military commander. Military response to requests for information from the humanitarian community to support this analytic effort will be shaped by the commander’s personal interest in this area.

The military often has an interest in analysing and receiving information on the humanitarian situation as it affects the security and success of military operations. Be aware that they may come asking for analysis on this basis.

Humanitarian information gathering potential and capacity for analysis will often be relatively substantial. And, the military may desire an arrangement to participate in the analysis. The UN-CMCoord Officer should be aware that this military analysis may lead to unilateral, military action which would require deconfliction with humanitarian operations.

**Dissemination of Information:**

Humanitarian and military organizations seek to manage the dissemination of information to ensure the right officials receive the information they need. Even so, there is a tendency toward information flows primarily in "stovepipes". The information related to humanitarian operations may flow primarily between CIMIC offices and occasionally through command channels. Humanitarian organizations also tend to move information primarily in functional channels. In both cases, there is an opportunity to enhance information flows through more lateral communications.

Within a given military force the chain of command is the primary conduit for dissemination of important and urgent information. More routine information flows along staff lines such as logistics. Logistics issues will only flow along command lines when they can directly impact mission accomplishment. For example, the status of fuel stocks will normally be reported from a logistics officer in a lower staff to the next logistics officer in a higher staff. However, the order
to conserve fuel or a report that fuel levels are dangerously low will pass through command channels in addition to logistics channels.

- If a CIMIC channel for information exists between lower and higher levels of military command, this will be the primary channel for reporting CIMIC information, addressing issues, and dissemination. There is a natural tendency to avoid placing bad news into command channels.

- Dissemination within multinational commands poses its own special kind of problems. There are the obvious problems of language and culture. However, there is also the problem of differences in communications equipment and in national restrictions on the sharing of intelligence. Although information may have been shared with the headquarters or one contingent of a multinational force, there is no guarantee this information will reach all contingents.

- The rotation and cycling of staff in both humanitarian and military organizations effectively decays information sharing understandings over time. This means the UN-CMCoord Officer needs to keep track of staff cycles and continually brief and re-brief new counterparts. Relationships are key for information dissemination and need maintenance to insure understandings are not lost.

- The dissemination of dynamic information may be “push” or “pull.” The UN-CMCoord Officer must understand the organization culture and needs of humanitarian and military organizations and ensure the flow of information is timely and relevant.

**Maintaining Institutional Knowledge:**

Both military and humanitarian organizations depend upon institutional knowledge to enable current operations and functions. The military generally does a much better job than the humanitarian community in terms of maintaining institutional knowledge. The synthesis of this
institutional knowledge is known as military doctrine. These are the accepted military practices for approaching different types of military missions, situations, and problems. Most modern forces have doctrine for relations with civilians and doctrine for conducting humanitarian operations. If such doctrine does exist, the UN-CMCord Officer should take the effort to become familiar with these documents. Humanitarian organizations depend upon the accumulative experience of people as the foundation for institutional knowledge.

- Military personnel are developed in part through schoolhouse instruction, home station practical exercise, training deployments, and peace and combat operations. Consequently, many officers have significant book learning and, compared to their humanitarian counterparts, relatively less “field time.” Humanitarian officials have little school instruction and years of experience in the field. As a consequence, the humanitarian officials tend to carry their own version of institutional knowledge based on their own operational experience.

- Doctrine may not be the primary factor in how a given unit approaches its interaction with the civilian population or humanitarian organizations. Recent experiences of the unit and past experience of key leaders may have a greater influence. It is worthwhile for the UN-CMCoord Officer to know something about the unit and individual histories in order to more effectively communicate and anticipate the unit’s reaction to both information and situations.

- Information sharing understandings are likely to be eroded over time. Staff rotation serves to remove key persons with a shared memory of procedures. The UN-CMCoord Office can counter this tendency by collecting and sharing lessons learned and debriefing colleagues on current operational experience. The simple discipline of keeping a log of activities can heighten the value of the UN-CMCoord Officer to both humanitarian and military counterparts.
7. Lessons Observed and Best Practices:

The following are lessons observed and best practices related to communications and information management. Since it is often difficult to distinguish the two, a single list is provided. They may or may not be appropriate for a particular emergency or situation.

- Information expectations between the military and the humanitarians must be carefully managed. The military has been repeatedly told that the humanitarians have superior knowledge of the humanitarian situation, culture, language, and the population in general. Humanitarians have grown to believe that the vast intelligence capabilities of modern states and militaries are available to all military units. Inordinate expectations lead to the belief that information is intentionally being withheld and that erroneous information was intended as disinformation.

- The military employs standard date time groups to log reports using Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), Universal Time (UT), or Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) on a 24-hour clock. This practice allows the military to sort out multiple observations of the same event and to determine the most recent report. The absence of such procedures in the humanitarian community can result in multiple reports of the same incident being misinterpreted and mistakes regarding the current situation due to late arrival of an earlier report.

- Almost all reports involve some the use of units of measurement. The military within a given nation will have standard measurements that they use for certain types of situations and may not repeat them in all reports. Confirm the metrics and do not assume that the national metrics for that nation apply. For example, the United States of America measures distance in miles, but the US Army measures distance in kilometers.

- Ideally, the UN-CMCoord Officer should be fluent in the culture of the main component of the military force. This not only
applies to the basic language, but also to the specific usage, terminology, and culture of the counterpart military. UN-CMCord Officers are better received by military counterparts when they understand the military's terminology and traditions. It is useful to start building a local glossary of military terms early in the coordination effort for one's own use and for use by coordinating humanitarian organizations. Familiarity with the military's rank insignia and sensitivity to protocol traditions can prevent embarrassment situations.

- The use of standardized forms for needs assessment and requests for information can add consistency and clarity in CMCoord communications. Where possible, linking the purpose, use, and content of such forms to the commander's intent will facilitate information sharing.

- It helps to communicate to the military counterpart the UN-CMCord's intended use, timeline, handling, and final repository for military information requested and provided. Conversely, it is important to understand the military's need and uses for information concerning the mission environment. Recognizing any coincidence or convergence between the commander's intent and the humanitarian mission may build confidence. Providing appropriate humanitarian information may facilitate an exchange for military information. Civilian and military organizations will resist giving up information in a one-way flow.

- The format for data sharing is important. If electronic data can be received and used by the UN-CMCord Officer with minimal preparation, the UN-CMCord Officer is likely to receive better cooperation at the working level. The UN-CMCord Officer needs to know what formats are useable and preferred by humanitarian organizations in the mission environment. The UN-CMCord Officer may find it useful to have access to the data behind the PowerPoint slides.

- The military may have an unrealistic expectation for the UN-CMCord Officer's ability to present a common humanitarian
operational picture. The Humanitarian Information Center is moving in the directly of maps and GIS, but may never achieve the currency and detail expected in modern militaries for a common operating picture.

- Building a list of actors, both military and humanitarian, with their contract information is a first and foundational step in the CMCoord effort. Next it is valuable to offer a briefing to the military commander and staff of the humanitarian mission, organizations represented, and the current situation. Prior arrangements, made before an emergency need arises, are preferred.
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Chapter 7: UN Civil Military Coordination (CMCoord) Assessment

This chapter is designed to assist the UN Civil Military Coordination Officer in assessing the situation in a particular mission. This assessment is part of a logical process that provides the foundation for three very distinct products:

- Proposed Policy on Civil Military Relations
- Proposed Civil Military Coordination Structure and Mechanisms
- Draft Civil Military Coordination Action Plan

The proposed policy is the country or mission specific guidelines to be issued by the Humanitarian Coordinator regarding the relationship with military forces. This policy is based on the principles and concepts identified in Chapter 2. It must be consistent with the key references issued by the IASC referred to in Chapter 3. An annotated outline for use in formulating these guidelines is provided at Chapter 8. The assessment process is designed to ensure that the UN-CMCoord Officer is sufficiently aware of the civil military situation in the country in order to begin drafting these guidelines.

Any proposed civil military coordination structures and mechanisms must be consistent with the guidelines and explain when where and how the civil military dialogue and interaction will take place. Normally there are four basic options in terms of this interaction with a given military force. These options are collocation, liaison exchange, liaison visits and interlocutor. The situation can become very complicated when there are multiple international and indigenous forces involved in the mission. The assessment process informs this decision and provides the information to allow the UN-CMCoord Officer to recommend a structure, mechanism and venue.

The Draft Civil Military Coordination Action Plan is a sequenced and coordinated set of actions that the UN-CMCoord Officer proposes to
take in order to implement the policy, establish the necessary structures and mechanisms, and to address any current or anticipate issues that arise from the assessment. A recommended approach to developing this action plan and presenting the plan for the approval of the humanitarian coordinator is provided at Chapter 9.

The CMCoord Assessment should begin as soon as the UN-CMCoord Officer becomes aware of the possibility of the mission. In many cases, some of the information necessary for an assessment is more readily available outside of the mission due to communications infrastructure and easier access to knowledgeable individuals. As the UN-CMCoord Officer progresses through the assessment process they should also collect an issues into an issue list and begin collecting the information necessary for a CMCoord contact database. The Assessment has five essential elements:

- Inventory of Actors, Missions, and Mandates
- Analysis of Civil and Military Relations
- Coordination Structures and Mechanisms
- Requirements for and Availability of Military and Civil Defense Assets
- Current and Potential Issues

1. **Inventory of Actors Missions and Mandates**

The focus of this portion of the assessment is to determine who the critical actors are on both the military and civilian side that will impact the effectiveness of humanitarian actors. This includes anyone that can control access to the beneficiaries, impact the security or logistics of the relief operation, provide additional resources, especially in emergencies, or can provide good offices to help expedite relief and resolve issues. It is often easiest to “brain-storm” the list and then remove actors if their missions or mandates do not apply. This reduces the chance of missing a key actor.
Step 1: Identify the Actors:

Possible Domestic Civilian Actors:
- National and local emergency management authorities (LEMA)
- Civil political structures overseeing the LEMA
- Primary ministries and agencies providing services
- National and Local Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
- Religious Organizations
- Commercial entities, especially those with foreign links
- Local NGO’s
- Political Parties and Trade Unions

Possible Domestic Military and Paramilitary Actors:
- National Armed Forces
- National, regional and Local Police
- Paramilitary structures such as border and customs forces
- Other indigenous military or paramilitary forces

Possible International Civilian Actors:
- United Nations Agencies and Implementing Partners
- Key nations with special interest and relations in the country
- Regional organizations
- International members of the Red Cross Movement
- International NGO’s
- International Governmental Organizations
- Religious orders and Churches with links to the affected area
- Commercial entities

Possible International Military Actors:
- International Forces stationed in the country or region
- UN Peacekeeping Missions in the country or region
- Countries with military attaches in the country
- Regional alliance members
- Nations with bilateral military assistance agreements

Step 2: Determine Missions and Mandates:
For each of the actors identified briefly identify their mission or mandate. At a minimum the civilian agencies that have the mandate for relief and reconstruction need to be identified. Give special attention to the role of the domestic military structures in providing emergency relief and to the mandates of international military forces. For each military force consider the following aspects of their mission and mandates:

- What is the legal status of any military forces?
- What is the primary mission of the military force?
- Does the force commander have authority to respond to an emergency?
- Does the commander need permission from headquarters to provide resources?
- What role do these forces play in controlling access to beneficiaries?
- Is the military involved in police functions?
- Are military facilities and communications used to coordinate relief?
- Does military control extend to infrastructure such as ports, airfields?

2. Analyze the Civil Military Relations:

There are six possible areas of interactions as depicted in the following diagram.
While the primary responsibility of the UN-CMCoord Officer is in the realm of the relationship between the international civilian humanitarian actors and the international military forces operating in the country, it is critical that the other five sets of relationships be fully understood. Perhaps the most important of these relationships is the civilian-civilian relationship between the international humanitarian actors and the civil government and other domestic civilian institutions. This is the first line of assistance and in general these are the institutions should be responding to most emergencies. However, the division of responsibility is different in each country. The following questions are designed to identify the critical interfaces, uncover the important coordination structures, and help identify any potential issues that will impact civil military coordination:

**Step 1: Domestic Civilian and International Civilian:**

- Do the domestic civil agencies have primary authority in the emergency?
- Have these authorities requested international assistance?
- Are there any restrictions on the international civilian response?
- Which international actors had a presence in the country before the emergency?
- Have the civilian authorities been effective in similar emergencies in the past?
- Are there any pending political issues that will impact aid and assistance?
- How strong is the national Red Cross or Red Crescent Society?
- Does the Red Cross Movement have an international presence in the area?
- What UN agencies are present?
- How are the UN agencies organized for the emergency?
- What are the mechanisms for UN interaction with the government?
- What role do INGO's and national NGO's have in the emergency?

**Step 2: Domestic Military and International Military:**

- What is the status of the international military forces?
- Are international military forces collocated with domestic military forces?
- Do they share installations or bases?
• Does the international military force have freedom of movement?

• Are these relations part of a regional alliance system?

• Do international military forces have any arrest or detention authority?

• Are international military forces involved in combat operations?

• To whom do the international military forces report?

**Step 3: Domestic Civilian and Domestic Military:**

• Does the military have a legal or constitutional role in relief or reconstruction?

• What is the relationship between regional military commanders and governors?

• Who provides the national/local coordination or operations centers?

• Is the military the exclusive provider of key resources such as helicopters?

• What is the relationship between the military and police?

• Does the military control civil defense or civil protection units?

• Do active or retired military officers lead key civilian ministries or agencies?

• Are there areas of the country under direct military control or martial law?

• Is the military responsible for aircraft or maritime search and rescue operations?
• Does the military manage any medical facilities?

• Does the military have specially trained search and rescue teams?

• Is the military dominated by a particular ethnic group?

• Are there groups opposed to, or frightened by, the military/police?

• Is there a relationship between the military and any civilian service providers?

• Does the military have a domestic intelligence role?

Step 4: Domestic Military and International Civilian:

• Can the domestic military and police forces provide adequate security?

• Are these forces responsible for the security of any beneficiaries?

• Does the military control any facilities need by international relief organizations?

• Does the military control access to areas that may hold beneficiaries?

• How does the military control access to restricted areas?

• Can and will the military assist international civilian organizations?

• Is the military involved in any direct distribution of relief?

• What is the process for addressing any issues with military commanders?
• What is the military’s attitude regarding women and female international staff?

• Are there valid human rights concerns about the domestic military?

• Are there child soldiers in any of the indigenous military forces?

Step 5: International Military and Domestic Civilians:

• Is there an international military force permanently based in the country?

• Does the international military force have authority to assist civilians?

• Which international military forces have responded to past disasters?

• Does the international military force have direct contact with the population?

• How does the local population view international military forces?

• Is the international military force involved in a “hearts and minds” campaign?

• Are international military forces involved in direct assistance projects?

Step 6: International Military and International Civilians:

• Are civilian aid organizations associated with any of the military forces?
• What is the relationship between NGO’s and military from the same country?
• Have military commanders and staffs worked with the UN or INGOs before?
• Does the military force have a doctrine for relating with civilian actors?
• Does the force have explicit orders to support or protect humanitarians?

3. Assess Coordination Mechanisms, Structures, and Potential Venues:

There should be some means of coordination at various levels between the six pairs of actors identified. For example, the Humanitarian Coordinator may be responsible for strategic coordination of UN agencies including the identification of relief priorities with the affected state. Operational issues regarding the use of military airfields including issues such as “slot times” for aircraft of international military forces will probably be addressed by special meetings or procedures. It is important that a clear picture of the coordination structures and mechanisms for addressing civil military issues be developed prior to establishing any additional structures or mechanisms.

Step 1: Inventory Structures and Mechanisms:

One way to inventory these structures and mechanisms is to ask: How is key information exchanged between the different sets of actors and what are the mechanisms for resolving issues?

Example: Domestic Civilian and International Civilian
Strategic: ResRep/HC meets weekly with Minister of Emergencies
Operational: Head of Water Department attends daily Watsan cluster meeting.
The key is to determine what mechanisms are available for addressing civil military coordination issues and determining which of these mechanisms and structures need to be closely monitored and which ones need only be engaged if there is a specific problem or issue. In addition, these channels of communications will also be important in the function of advocacy for humanitarian principles and issues.

**Step 2: Assess Possible Venues:**

In most cases it will be necessary to meet on a regular basis with the actors involved in the civil military coordination effort. The frequency and visibility of these meetings will depend on the coordination structure and mechanisms identified for this interaction. However, regardless of the type of interaction the following should be taken into account in the selection of meeting venues:

- Security
- Accessibility
- Available Support

This is by no means an exhaustive list of the factors to be considered, but it offers a start point for deliberate consideration of venue options.

**4. Assess Need and Availability of Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA)**

It is important to draw a distinction between the availability of MCDA and the decision to use MCDA in a particular situation. In general, the UN-CMCoord Officer should first determine what is likely to be required from the military forces. In a sudden onset emergency the situation will be vague and neither the affected state nor the international humanitarian community are likely to know exactly what is required, what is on the ground, and what is on the way to the disaster area. Keep in mind that it is equally important to identify what is not needed so that unnecessary resources do not clog the logistics pipeline.
In a natural disaster where the affected state has the lead on the emergency response it is the government that should make the decision on whether or not they will accept international military forces. The Humanitarian Coordinator must ask the government if the UN system can use international MCDA and if any national MCDA will be available to support the international civilian response. If the government accepts, or is willing to make available these resources, the task is then to determine what is needed. This will normally be done by making an initial inquiry of the operational clusters or sectors.

In a complex emergency, where there are UN agencies are already operational, the decision on whether or not to use MCDA will rest with the Humanitarian Coordinator or the SRSG. Again, after an initial determination of the appropriateness of MCDA, the initial requirements should be identified by cluster or sector.

Immediate requirements will have to be filled with either national MCDA or international forces that are already deployed. If these resources are inadequate or there is likely to be an extended need for MCDA, UN-MCDA mobilized from international assets should be coordinated by CMCS in Geneva.

The authority of national and international military commanders to assign relief support missions to their soldiers should be determined and staffs should be asked to begin contingency planning for the use of resources, especially if the situation worsens.

At the same time it must be determined what information is required and who will approve the use of these resources. Recommended procedures for civilian requests for military and civil defense assets are contained at Annex A: Request for Military Assistance.

5. Identify Current and Potential Issues:

Throughout the process of assessing the civil military coordination situation the UN-CMCoord Officer has to identify issues that will have to be addressed if an effective coordination system is to be established. One way to inventory these issues is to look for difference in the positions of key actors over the basic elements of coordination. One
way to divide the potential issues is in terms of information sharing, task division, and planning.

Once the issues have been identified, the UN-CMCoord Officer can gain a better appreciation for these issues by building a Stakeholders Matrix which lists the Issues across the top of the matrix, the actors down the side of the matrix and the positions of the actors regarding the issues in the cells of the matrix. This method helps identify the actors involved in a particular issue and may provide insights into which actors to approach first in resolving the issues.

Stakeholders Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Information Sharing</th>
<th>Task Division</th>
<th>Planning</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Issues</strong></td>
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<td>Issue 1</td>
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<td>Position of Civil Actors on Issue</td>
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<td>Military Actor 1</td>
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<td>Position of Military Actors on Issue</td>
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Chapter 8: Development of Country Specific Guidelines

The decision on whether or not to issue country specific guidelines for managing the relationship between UN humanitarian actors and military forces will normally rest with the Emergency Relief Coordinator or the Humanitarian Coordinator. One of the principal responsibilities of the UN-CMCoord Officer deployed in the early stages of an emergency is to make a recommendation on whether or not such guidelines are required.

The need for country specific guidelines will vary depending on the situation. In most cases this will be based on the type of emergency. For this purpose the emergencies can be divided into three types: Natural Disaster in Stable Political Conditions, Complex Emergencies, and Natural Disaster in Unstable Political Conditions or a Conflict Zone.

Natural Disaster in Stable Political Conditions

Assuming that all of the necessary actors are familiar with the Oslo Guidelines, country specific guidelines will normally not be require in a natural disaster since the decision on how to use military resources will rest with the affected state.

If this is a natural disaster in a politically stable area outside conflict zones, country specific guidelines will normally only be required if one or more of the following conditions exist:

- UN agencies and implementing partners on the ground have requested or are likely to request the use of military or civil defence assets to assist in their response.

- National or local emergency relief authorities have requested assistance from the United Nations in managing the international relief effort and a significant portion of the international relief effort is comprised of military and civil defence resources.
• The use of military and civil defence assets by the international humanitarian actors in this particular emergency is likely to impact perceptions of the neutrality and or impartiality of international humanitarian actors in other emergencies.

If none of these conditions exist, the ERC or the HC may determine that the Oslo Guidelines are adequate. If there is a limited understanding of these guidelines the HC may direct the UN-CMCoord Officers to focus on the dissemination of and advocacy for compliance with this guidance.

Complex Emergencies

In complex emergencies, country specific guidelines will normally be required if an international military force is present or if the actions of domestic or indigenous armed forces will have a significant impact on the work of the international humanitarian community. Therefore, guidelines may not be required if one of the following situations exists:

• The presence of international forces is expected to be extremely short, limited in scope, and result in minimum interaction with the international humanitarian community or the beneficiaries.

• The international military force is part of a UN mission, with a clear mandate in terms of its responsibilities to the humanitarian component of the UN mission, and this relationship has been clearly defined in the planning and preparation for deployment of the force.

• Humanitarian activities and military activities are being conducted in clearly different geographic areas and there is little likelihood of interactions with these forces.

• The interactions of the international humanitarian community and the military forces are limited to the mandate of a single agency or a single sector, and are of such a limited and technical nature that they are unlikely to attract attention or result in any controversy.
Natural Disasters in Unstable Political Conditions or Conflict Zones

Due to the ambiguity of these situations, specific guidelines will almost always be required for these emergencies, especially if this situation has not been anticipated in the country specific guidelines for the complex emergency or there are no such guidelines.

Sample Outline for Country Specific Guidelines:

Note: There is no approved format for the Country Specific Guidelines. These guidelines should be consistent with the basic policy references cited in Chapter 3 of the Handbook and should be tailored to the situation in the specific emergency. Guidelines should be updated as the situation changes.

1. Situation and Background:

Explain as clearly as possible what conditions exist in this particular emergency that necessitates establishing the guidelines. If these conditions are likely to change, explain what conditions may require the guidelines to change, especially incidents or conditions that would require stricter control over the interactions between the humanitarian and the military community.

2. Purpose of the Guidelines:

3. Scope and Applicability of the Guidelines:

To whom are these guidelines applicable and under whose authority are they being issued. While the ERC or HC has authority to issue these guidelines, they are likely to have greater influence on the behavior of the humanitarian community if they are done in consultation with the IASC or Country Team. Likewise, there is likely to be greater respect for these guidelines by the military force if they are at least consulted. In rapid onset emergencies, interim guidelines may be required while this dialogue takes place.
4. **Key References:**

   In addition to the basic guidelines, include any relevant guidance received or deliberations that may have take place in the preparation of the guidelines.

5. **Main Actors:**

   - Government
   - United Nations
   - United Nations (Humanitarian)
   - Other Humanitarian Actors
   - Military
   - Other Armed Forces

6. **UN Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination Strategy (Cooperation or Co-existence):**

   Based on the UN-CMCoord assessment the UN-CMCoord Officer will have made a recommendation of whether to pursue a cooperative or co-existence strategy with the military force(s) present in the country. The rationale for this decision by the HC should be explained and clear examples given of how close a cooperative relationship should exist or how distant of a coexistence relationship should be maintained.

7. **UN Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination Structures (Co-location, Liaison Exchange, Liaison Visits, or Interlocutor):**

8. **Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA) to Support Humanitarian Activities (Direct, Indirect, and Infrastructure Support):**

9. **Authority to Use or Request MCDA in Emergencies and Disasters:**
In most cases, international humanitarian actors and international military forces are present in an emergency because the affected state lacks the capability to respond. While the crisis may be man-made it can be significantly worsened by the onset of a natural disaster. Regardless of the civil military relationship, be it cooperation or coexistence, the international actors will be expected to respond in a coherent and coordinated manner. If the planning for these contingencies can not be done by the affected state, the responsibility for this planning within the humanitarian community must be identified. In addition, any restrictions or exceptions on the use of MCDA from international and domestic forces should be included.

10. **Guidance on Coordination of any assistance projects initiated by military forces:**

11. **Authorizations and Limitation on:**

   - Information Sharing
   - Collaboration on Tasks
   - Planning and Preparation for Contingencies

12. **Key Points of Contact for Civil Military Coordination Issues in the areas of:**

   - Policy
   - Security
   - Logistics
   - Air Transportation
   - Medical
   - Communications
13. **Any restrictions on the involvement of military or civil defence personnel in sector of cluster level coordination activities, especially meetings:**

14. **Any exceptions to standard UN humanitarian policy on military personnel or weapons in UN compounds or vehicles:**

15. **Any Exceptions to standard UN restrictions on UN personnel using military transportation of visiting military facilities:**

16. **Other Restrictions on Interactions while on Official Business:**

17. **Any Restrictions on Social Interaction:**

18. **Authority and Procedures for Exceptions:**

19. **Procedures for Reporting Violations:**

20. **Responsibility for Review and Update of Guidelines:**

21. **Responsibility for Advocacy, Dissemination and Training of Guidelines:**
Chapter 9: CMCoord Action Plan

The Action Plan lays out the actions the UN-CMCoord Officer will take to implement the CMCoord Strategy (Cooperation – Coexistence), establish the appropriate coordination mechanism (Co-location, Liaison Exchange, Liaison Visit, or Interlocutor), and to address the issues raised in the CMCoord Assessment.

If possible the CMCoord Action Plan should be prepared in a collaborative manner that includes dialogue with the relevant UN agencies and programmes involved in the CMCoord issues.

Possible Action Plan Outline:

- Civil Military Situation
- Key Actors Involved
- Critical Areas of Civil Military Interface
- Proposed CMCoord Strategy
- Proposed Coordination Structure including Liaison Arrangements
- Preparation of Country Specific Guidelines (if Appropriate)
- Dissemination Plans for Guidelines
- Availability and Potential Need for MCDA
- Proposed Procedures for Requesting MCDA
- Reporting Lines and Coordination with UN Agencies and Programmes
• Issues Identified in Assessment

• Proposed Actions to Resolve Issues

• Plan for Advocacy of Humanitarian Principles with Military Forces

• Timeline for Key Actions

• Resources Required including time of Humanitarian Coordinator

Presenting the CMCoord Action Plan to the Humanitarian Coordinator

Humanitarian Coordinators will have different approaches to management and decision-making. They will also have different preferences on how they receive information. Especially in the early phases of an emergency there will be little tolerance for an extended planning effort, elaborate planning meetings or exhaustive briefings. Consider the following in presenting your Action Plan to the Humanitarian Coordinator.

• Do you have direct access to the Humanitarian Coordinator?

• Does the Humanitarian Coordinator have any background or experience in CMCoord or previous interactions with military forces?

• Will he/she prefer a briefing or a decision paper?

• How much time or space will you have to present the plan?
• Can you reduce the essence of the plan to a one-page concept?

• Can the critical decisions associated with the plan be broken into steps and presented at different points in time?

• How much direct involvement of the HC and other staff will be required to implement the plan? Is this realistic given their responsibilities?

• Whose support will you need to get the plan approved?

• Who else will or should be present at the briefing?

• Who should you pre-brief on the plan?

• Can the plan be seen as intruding on the authority or mandate of others?

• What are the risks of beginning to execute the plan without full approval?
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Chapter 10: Establishing Liaison with Military Forces

In many humanitarian operations it will be important to have a structured and formal interaction with the military forces. This may involve liaison exchanges or liaison visits. It is important to remember that normally the military has very specific expectations of liaison personnel in terms of expertise, information, authority and seniority.

The type of liaison established will in be based, at least in part, on CMCoord strategy established by the ERC or the HC.

CMCoord Strategy, Methods, and Structures

Prior to the Mission:

- Identify the headquarters and the military units they will control
- Identify the commander and the principal staff officers in the headquarters
- Determine the structure of the headquarters
- If this is a multinational force, determine the participating nations
- Identify any subordinate headquarters and higher headquarters
- Search the Virtual OSOCC and CMCoord databases for graduates in the forces
- Confirm your Terms of Reference and any restrictions on interaction with the force
- Confirm when the first situation report is expected and how frequently it will be required
- Confirm press guidance for the mission
- Confirm that country security clearance has been granted
- Query UN agencies and NGO communities on their liaison plans
- Determine appropriate lodging, meals and transportation support
- Establish a point of contact at the headquarters and advise them of your arrival
- Determine the point of access to the headquarters and any identification requirements
- Consider requesting an escort officer to meet you at the gate or entrance
- Request an initial courtesy call with the Chief of Staff
- Ask about any restrictions on mobile phones, photography, or communications
• Determine if the headquarters can provide telephone, fax and internet access

• Determine if any medical support will be available

• Determine how the UN will pay for expendable supplies and any office expenses

**Immediately Upon Arrival:**

• Confirm arrival and provide alternative numbers for contacting you at the headquarters

• Make courtesy call on the Chief of Staff and request an appointment with the commander

• Make courtesy call on Chief of CIMIC or J9, if the headquarters has the function.

• Establish contact with any other UN or humanitarian liaisons at the headquarters

• Confirm the mission of the force and its composition

• Determine the briefing times and operations tempo

• Determine which meeting/briefings you are expected to attend and/or present at

• Determine if there is an on-going planning effort and if you are expected to contribute

• Obtain the necessary badges and passes for access to the headquarters

• Confirm the communications arrangements including phone, fax and internet
• Establish communications with CMCoord officers in the field

• Submit an Initial Situation Report

• If this is a liaison exchange, ensure the office location and markings are appropriate

• Determine how to obtain access after duty hours

• Request a briefing or orientation on the security for the compound and the office

• Visit the emergency aid station or the medical facility

**During the First Several Days:**

• Have your initial meeting with the Commander

• Confirm the mission of the unit and its ability to support humanitarian activities

• Determine the forces involvement in direct, indirect, or infrastructure support assistance

• Determine if there is any dependency has been established on MCDA

• If other UN liaisons are present, agree on appropriate division of responsibilities

• Provide for widest possible distribution of your contact details

• Identify staff officers to be briefed one-on-one, such as Operations and Logistics

• Determine procedures for use of military transport, if authorized.
• Confirm procedures for emergency evacuation

• Determine if a visit by OCHA leadership or Humanitarian Coordinator is needed

• Identify liaison officers from other nations that may be present

• Determine how the force interacts with its national aid agencies

• Make contact with the ICRC or IFRC delegate responsible for the area

• Determine the optimum staffing requirement and if necessary request support

• If possible arrange visits to humanitarian actors in the area of operation

Maintaining the Liaison:

• Carefully manage expectations on both the civilian and military sides

• Establish a dialogue and rapport with the commander's personal staff

• Find out who maintains the computers and communications systems

• Establish procedures for requesting MCDA, if appropriate

• If granted access to classified information know your responsibilities

• Once you identify key individuals, anticipate their rotation or replacement
• Find opportunities to present the humanitarian viewpoint and advocate for humanitarian principles and humanitarian space

• Be prepared to assume the responsibility of other UN liaison officers, if they are deployed to the field or withdrawn from the headquarters

• Keep a good log of activities and messages, as well as reports sent and received

• Find an appropriate way to thank people who have provided support

Talking Points for Courtesy Call with the Commander

Commanders are always busy. They normally have little time to chat and it is unlikely that they have had much experience with an UN humanitarian liaison officer. Plan the first meeting carefully and be on time. If you plan to raise any urgent issues, coordinate this with the Chief of Staff. Initial courtesy calls are not usually used for addressing issues, but if they are urgent, the Commander may want all or a portion of this staff present.

• Explain your mission, key terms of reference and who you represent and report to.

• Be prepared to explain OCHA’s role and the structure of the UN mission.

• Confirm the mission of the command and the commander’s view of the operation.

• Ask the commander about previous experiences working with the UN and humanitarians

• Determine his expectations of the humanitarian organizations and of you
• Ask if you can have direct access to his office in emergencies

**Orientation Briefing for the Staff:**

• UN Charter
• UN OCHA Role and Responsibility
• Organization of UN Country Team or Mission
• Role of the Humanitarian Coordinator
• Overview of Humanitarian Situation
• UN Agencies Operating in this Emergency
• UN Definition of Civil Military Coordination
• Roles and Responsibilities of UN Liaison Officers at the HQ
• Current Guidance on Civil Military Relations
• Current Coordination and Liaison Structures
• Guidelines on Use of MCDA
• Any UN MCDA Planned or in Use
• Anticipated Use of MCDA for Other Deployed Forces
• Anticipated CMCoord Issues
• Contact Details
• Website References
Chapter 11: The Cluster System

In September 2005, it was determined by the IASC to initiate a series of actions to improve the predictability, timeliness and effectiveness of response to humanitarian crises. The focus of these actions was to strengthen leadership and accountability in key sectors of humanitarian response.

As of the publication of this handbook, implementation of these humanitarian reforms is still in progress. There are still a number of issues to be decided by the international humanitarian community and the IASC that will impact civil military coordination in humanitarian emergencies. Among these issues are:

- Role of cluster leads in the determination of last resort
- Status of Humanitarian Common Services already chartered by the IASC
- Participation of military and civil defence organisations in Cluster meetings
- Implications of the new Logistics Cluster for UNJLC and CMLOG functions

These issues are being addressed by CMCS and will be posted with updates to the Handbook as they become available. The most recent information on the Humanitarian Reform Agenda is available at http://ocha.unog.ch/humanitarianreform/

The critical sectors that were identified as being in need of improvement were: protection, emergency shelter, camp coordination/management, water and sanitation, nutrition and feeding, health, logistics, telecommunications and early recovery. A cluster has been established for each of these areas.

These include clusters that are primarily concerned with “service provision” (e.g. telecommunications and logistics), with provision of “relief and assistance to beneficiaries” (e.g. nutrition and feeding, water
and sanitation, camp coordination/management, emergency shelter and health) and those that cover a broad range of “cross cutting issues” (such as protection and early recovery).

The Cluster system includes measures to enhance the response for all affected populations, including IDPs, in sectors where critical gaps have been identified, in both complex emergencies and natural disasters. The cluster system also aims to strengthen existing collaborative approaches through a system of enhanced accountability.

**Key Elements of the System**

A cluster is a group comprising organisations and other stakeholders, with a designated lead, working in an area of humanitarian response in which gaps in response have been identified. Clusters are being organised at both the Global and Country or Field level.

Clusters are intended to fill identified gaps in humanitarian response, to ensure accountability with strengthened leadership and clearly identified roles and responsibilities and, to bolster coordination and synergy of efforts. The goal is to improve the predictability, efficiency, and effectiveness of emergency preparedness and humanitarian response capacity.

At the Global level, the aim is to strengthen system-wide preparedness and technical capacity by designating Global Clusters Leads who are responsible for ensuring predictable and effective inter-agency responses within particular sectors or areas of activity. The added value of the approach at the Global level includes:

- Better surge capacity and standby rosters
- Consistent access to appropriately trained technical expertise
- Enhanced material stockpiles
- Increased engagement of all humanitarian partners

At the County or Field level, the aim is to strengthen the coordination framework and response capacity by mobilising clusters of agencies, non-UN organisations and NGO’s to respond in particular sectors or
areas of activity. Each cluster will have a clearly designated lead agreed to by the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Country Team.

The involvement of national and local institutions in the clusters is critical for success. The cluster participants will continue to ensure that local capacities are strengthened; available resources are fully utilised and that humanitarian action is well-coordinated and does no harm.

Functions and Responsibilities of the Cluster Leads

At the Global level, Cluster Leads are responsible for:

- Up-to-date assessments of the overall needs for human, financial, and institutional capacity within the cluster
- Reviews of currently available capacities and means for their utilisation
- Links with other clusters, including preparedness measures and long term planning, standards, best practice, advocacy and resource mobilisation
- Taking action to ensure that required capacities and mechanisms exist, including rosters for surge capacity; and training and system development at the local, national regional and international levels

At the Country level or Field level, Cluster Leads are responsible for:

- Ensuring predictable action within the cluster for analysis of needs, addressing priorities, and identifying gaps in the cluster areas
- Securing and following up on commitments from the cluster to contribute to responding to needs and filling gaps
• Ensuring that activities within a cluster are carried out and act as a provider of last resort

• Sustaining mechanisms through which the cluster as a whole assesses its performance

All Cluster Leads and other stakeholders need to work together to ensure that common information management systems are further enhanced to more effectively support operational and strategic planning requirements within each sector and system-wide planning and coordination. Cluster Leads also need to engage partners within each cluster/group to develop a common system that is also compatible with each partner’s priorities to identify gaps and monitor the delivery and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance.

Participants working within each cluster are obligated to fulfil their commitments. In addition, the Cluster Leads also are accountable to Humanitarian Coordinators (HC's) at the Country or Field level, and globally to the ERC - in his or her capacity as chair of the IASC.

In principle, this approach to cluster leadership can be applied to all sectors or areas of activity. However, the implementation must be tailored to specific country circumstances. Country level clusters may not necessarily replicate the global cluster arrangements. In all instances, the key is ensuring the Country level clusters address all identified critical gaps in humanitarian response and that gaps are not neglected simply because they are not part of a Global cluster.

Designated Global Cluster Leads:

Service Provision:
  Logistics – WFP
  Emergency Telecommunications -- OCHA (Process Owner), UNICEF (Common Data Services), WFP (Common Security Telecommunications Services)

Relief and Assistance to Beneficiaries:
Camp Coordination and Camp Management -- UNHCR (For Conflict Generated IDP’s), IOM (For Natural Disasters)
Emergency Shelter -- UNHCR (For Conflict Generated IDP’s)
IFRC (Convenor for Emergency Shelter Cluster in Natural Disasters) Health -- WHO
Nutrition -- UNICEF
Water Sanitation and Hygiene -- UNICEF
Education – UNICEF

Cross Cutting Issues:
Early Recovery -- UNDP
Protection -- UNHCR (For Conflict Generated IDP’s). UNICEF and OHCHR (For Natural Disasters)

A Review Team lead by UNDP is working to develop a comprehensive approach to integrating other cross cutting issues within the cluster approach. These issues include: Gender, HIV/AIDS, and Environment. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has stated that its position on the cluster approach is the following: “Among the components of the Movement, the ICRC is not taking part in the cluster approach. Nevertheless, coordination between the ICRC and the UN will continue to the extent necessary to achieve efficient operational complementarity and a strengthened response for people affected by armed conflict and other situations of violence.”

Activation of the Cluster Approach

There are three possible reasons to activate the cluster approach:

- In response to a dramatic event or emergency
- To fill major gaps in humanitarian needs identified by the agencies and by a host government
• By initiative and guidance of the concerned HC's/RC's in consultation with the Country Team members

Implementation of the Cluster Approach

As agreed by the IASC principals in December 2005, the cluster approach will be applied to all new major disasters. The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) has directed that contingency planning for potential emergencies should use the cluster approach. For ongoing emergencies prior to December 2005, the IASC has agreed that, if current arrangements are working well, there is no need to change. However, the IASC Country Teams on the ground may choose to implement the cluster approach where they feel it will add value to the humanitarian response. In addition, where arrangements are not considered to be working well, and critical response gaps remain, IASC Country Teams may decide to phase in the cluster approach. Eventually, the approach will be applied to all emergencies.

Strategies for Exit from the Cluster Approach

This approach required detailed inter-cluster discussion and joint planning at the start of the emergency phase. At the end of an emergency phase, some clusters would need to be terminated (e.g. emergency telecommunications). Other clusters (e.g. emergency shelter, nutrition, camp coordination, protection) would need to transit to the early recovery phase, while others (e.g. health, education, WASH) would be phased into recovery, reconstruction and longer term development phases.

As a matter of policy, strategies and procedures for phasing out and terminating different activities should be included into the work of all clusters. In all instances, there should be benchmarks with measurable indicators to gauge progress and time the exit or transition moves.

The Way Forward

It is anticipated that the Cluster Approach will add value for the beneficiaries of humanitarian action. It is primarily designed to enhance
humanitarian co-operation, and underpin an improved, collective, response to new crises. It should also improve response in current major emergencies. It is not intended to undermine existing arrangements when they are effective. Both the process - and its benefits - will be reviewed after two years.

References:

IASC “Strengthening the Humanitarian Response” Notes dated 12 Sep 2005
IASC Guidance Notes dated 24 Nov 2006
IASC Operational Guidance dated 23 May 2007
IASC Self Assessment of implementation of the cluster approach in the field dated 15 Nov 2006
Chapter 12: Deployment Considerations

UN-CMCoord officers are generally deployed for longer durations than UNDAC teams or rescue personnel responding to a humanitarian crisis. For that reason, it is not cost effective to have personnel on continuous standby for immediate deployment. OCHA's deployment strategy for UN-CMCoord officers is to use OCHA/CMCS staff for immediate deployment and then to draw personnel from an established roster of personnel who can be deployed, through various mechanisms, to provide additional surge capacity or for longer missions.

Roster

The UN-CMCoord Deployment Roster is populated by personnel who have been specifically identified, trained, and equipped to perform the tasks of a UN-CMCoord officer in both natural disasters and complex emergencies. Personnel are placed on the roster based on their experience, skill sets, and availability to deploy for one to three months, or longer.

Contracting Personnel on the Roster

Since there are several different contractual options for UN-CMCoord officers, there is not one standard mechanism for deploying personnel from the roster. In order to expedite the deployment, the most rapid and cost effective funding option will be utilized.

Training

Candidates for inclusion on the UN-CMCoord Deployment Roster must complete the UN-CMCoord IMPACT electronic self-study tool, the UN-CMCoord Course, and the UN-CMCoord Staff Course. UN-CMCoord Deployment training is conducted as part of the Staff Course.
Suitable candidates who have completed the training, and who qualify for generic UN-CMCoord positions at the P-3/P-4 level will be placed on the roster. (Terms of Reference for the positions are included in an Annex to this handbook.) Personnel on the roster are encouraged to submit a P-11 (recruitment form), complete the Basic and Advanced Security in the Field training (and obtain certificates for each), and to maintain up to date contact details with OCHA.

Deployment Phases

Initially, an OCHA staff member, who is trained as a UN-CMCoord officer, will deploy immediately to respond to a humanitarian emergency. In a natural disaster response, the officer(s) may be deployed with, or in parallel to an UNDAC Team. A non-UN OCHA staff member who is qualified and available for deployment with the UNDAC team can, on a case-by-case basis, serve as a UN-CMCoord officer.

Should there be the need for an extended presence of a UN-CMCoord officer, recruitment will be done from the roster for a period not exceeding six months. Personnel from Stand-by Partner arrangement could be recruited for this phase, dependent on the availability of trained UN-CMCoord officers through this mechanism.

For a field presence in excess of six months, recruitment would be accomplished through a vacancy announcement and funded by the requesting office / agency.

Deployment Preparations

The UN-CMCoord officer will be expected to establish an awareness of the area of operations, to include the status of current UN, IO, and INGO agencies that are operating in the area, as well as the role of the Government of the affected state in the operation. Other factors that are normally of importance are the political environment and any existing coordination mechanisms that have been established by the government or the international relief community.
Such information can be acquired from web resources, including www.reliefweb.int and www.ochaonline.org. In addition, deploying officers are encouraged to make use of the global CMCoord network and the Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre, which will have a dedicated page for each emergency.

When preparing for a mission, UN-CMCoord officers should be aware of cultural issues that may exist in the area of operations, and how those issues may impact on the mission. The UN-CMCoord officer must be prepared to adapt to local customs in such a way that his/her behaviour is not offensive to the local population. When possible the deploying UN-CMCoord Officer will receive a briefing from the OCHA Desk Officer responsible for the country or region.

Clothing and equipment requirements for each mission will vary according to the location of the deployment, the climate and culture of the affected area, extent of damage (in the event of a natural disaster) and other factors.

UN-CMCoord officers who are members of the deployment roster are expected to maintain a sufficient level of readiness that will allow them to deploy on mission at short notice, if required. This includes medical clearance, updated vaccinations, completion of the Basic and Advanced Security in the Field training, and the absence of other factors that may preclude their deployment.

It may also be necessary to operate independently and self-sufficiently during the immediate deployment phase in regard to food, clothing and personal effects.

**Personal Considerations Prior to Deployment**

There are a number of tasks that require action and consideration prior to deployment. Some of those tasks are detailed below; however, this list is not exhaustive and pre-deployment considerations will vary on
context, location and personal circumstances.

Completion of personal paperwork, such as legal documents (Will, Power of Attorney, mortgage documents, etc), valid passport, banking needs, medical insurance, etc. It is a good idea to back-up and scan all documents in case of loss or destruction.

There will be a requirement to obtain a medical clearance, which is likely to include vaccinations. Standard vaccinations as recommended by your medical practitioner may include: Tetanus, Polio, Hepatitis A and B, Typhoid, Meningitis, Yellow Fever (Africa) and Japanese Encephalitis (Asia).

UN staff members are required to receive a security clearance from the Designated Official prior to deployment into the area of operations. This will be facilitated through the deploying agency.

Visa requirements vary, based on national passport and the deployment location. For persons travelling on national passports the requirements for visas will normally be available through the web site or consular section of the Foreign Ministry.

**Equipment and Clothing**

The following items are a suggested list of equipment. The list is not intended to be prescriptive, but rather, should be used only as a guide:

**Technical Equipment and Information:**

R-BGAN with extra battery and power supply
Network cable, 10m long, to hook up to internet in the office or with BGAN
Laptop with power supply
External disk drive
Spare CD's and DVD's
Converter(s) (adaptable to all types of power supply)
Extra mobile phone to put in local SIM card plus convertible power supply
Head torch
Hand torch
Printer with power supply and USB cable (Install and test prior to departure.)
Paper
CDs with drivers/ installations/ resource material such as handbooks etc
Digital camera with USB cable plus battery charger
Software (Acrobat Lotus, as applicable, etc)
Satellite Phone
Electronic maps where applicable
GPS
Spare Batteries
(Scan all relevant operator's manuals or documents on to laptop and flash drive.)

Official Documents:

Current Passport (and/or UNLP) and visa, if applicable
Travel documents including tickets and itineraries.
Health certificate (H803)
Security certificate
Copies of communications granting security clearance
(Make copies and store separately as well as electronically.)

Medical Kit containing, at a minimum, the following items:

Anti-diarrhoeal medicine
Aspirin
Malaria prophylaxis and treatment (Depending on Mission Area)
Anti-histamines for allergies, rashes etc
Anti-mosquito-bite cream
Re-hydration salts.
Painkillers
Anti-inflammatory cream
Foot cream or powder
Insecticide powder
Band-aids
Bandages
Saline solution
Disinfectant
Cotton swabs
Any required prescription medicine

**Hygiene and Health Supplies:**

Mosquito spray
Insect repellent
Wet disposable towels (baby wipes)
Antiseptic hand lotion or hand wash
Mosquito net, as applicable
Sun block cream, as necessary
Sun hat
Toothpaste and brushes
Body lotion
Shampoo/shower gel
Soap
Towel
Wash cloth
Flip-flops or shower shoes
Shoe/boot polish and brushes
Washing powder
Toilet Paper

**Clothing and Sleeping Gear:**

One week’s worth of clothing appropriate to the environment.
Jacket and tie (equivalent for female) for meetings with local officials
Wet weather clothing
Sleeping bag with liner
Air mattress or sleeping pad
Poncho or plastic sheet
Personal Kit and Survival Items

Extra pair of prescription glasses
Extra contact lenses
Sunglasses
Ear plugs
Torch with spare bulb and batteries
Pocket knife/multi-tool
Sewing kit
String
Plastic bags
Matches
Candles
Water bottle (or camel back) with purification-filter
Water purification tablets
Sanitary items, as applicable
Mobile phone
Alarm clock
Binoculars
Electrical adapters for appliances
High energy food bars
Reading material
Dictionary

Miscellaneous and Luggage:

Sufficient cash until banking system and/or access to funds is established
Business cards
Credit card (s) (Make photo copies and leave on copy at home.)

Ensure that both carry-on and checked luggage are in secure and rugged suitcases and/or backpacks. The journey to the affected country may involve flight changes, with varying degrees of baggage entitlements. Equipment should be packed to allow easy access to equipment en route as necessary.
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Annexes
Annex A
Request for Military Assistance

Flowchart

RFA Unfulfilled

MCDA Capable

N

Y

Need filled by

RFA to CMCS

N

Y

Other RFAs

Forces HHQ capable?

Need filled by HHQ

RFA submitted to:

N

Y

Deployed military forces capable?

Need filled on site by deployed military

RFA submitted to deployed military

N

Y

Other Source

On Site UN/NGO/other capable?

Need filled by on site UN/NGO/other

Y

Host Nation capable?

Need filled by Host Nation

Local needs identified through assessments

*includes civilian and military actors
CMCS SAMPLE REQUEST FOR MCDA

To: (see attached distribution list)
Fax: (see attached distribution list)
Date: [date / month / year]
From: [name]
Chief
Civil-Military Coordination Section
Emergency Services Branch
Subject: Request for Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA)
Ref.: [emergency title] - MCDA Request No. [insert].

YOU SHOULD RECEIVE ... PAGES (including cover sheet)

URGENT URGENT URGENT URGENT URGENT

In connection with the emergency: [emergency title and date of emergency].

The OCHA Civil Military Coordination Section (CMCS) has received a request from [requesting organization] in [location] for:

[MCDA MODULE - X]

Details

Background

Timing:

Contact Information:
Please inform CMCS NLT COB [insert deadline] if your country/organization is interested in supporting this operation, entirely or partly. Please also indicate if your country is willing to provide these assets free of charge. For further information please contact the Action Officer, coordinates detailed below.

Action Officer:
[name]
CMCS, ESB, OCHA - Geneva
Tel. +41 (0) 22 917 [...]
Mobile phone: +41 (0) 79 [...]
Fax. +41 (0) 22 917 0023
Back-up tel. nos. +41 (0) 22 917 1394
Back-up fax no. +41 (0) 22 917 0363
E-mail: cmcs@un.org

PLEASE REPLY TO THIS REQUEST NO LATER THAN CLOSE OF BUSINESS [INSERT DEADLINE].
Annex B:

GENERIC TERMS OF REFERENCE
UNITED NATIONS CIVIL – MILITARY COORDINATION OFFICER

POSITION TITLE: Civil–Military Coordination Officer
GRADE: P/L-4
LOCATION: Office of [Humanitarian Coordinator / Regional OCHA Office]
DURATION: [x] months, commencing as soon as possible
DUTY STATION: [town, country]

Organizational Setting and Reporting Relationships: This position is located in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The Civil – Military Coordination Officer (UN-CMCoord) will be deployed to [town, country]. The UN-CMCoord Officer will report to the Humanitarian / Resident Coordinator through the Head of the OCHA Office in [country].

Accountabilities: Within limits of delegated authority, the UN-CMCoord Officer will be responsible for the following duties:

Serve as an adviser to the HC/RC for humanitarian civil-military coordination (UN-CMCoord) matters; advise on overall policy direction on specific issues; and, more generally, review and provide advice on a diverse range of policy issues related to UN-CMCoord and the safeguarding of humanitarian principles.

Serve as primary focal point for all matters, including policy, related to civil-military coordination, in close consultation with the HC/RC.

Assist and advice in the development of country-specific guidelines on civil-military relations and use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA), based on the current “IASC Reference Paper on Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies”, “Guidelines on the Use of MCDA to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies”
and the “Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys”, applicable Security Council resolutions and other relevant instruments.

Ensure that the country-specific guidelines and, if necessary, the generic guidelines mentioned above are properly disseminated and understood by both the humanitarian actors and the military forces present, as well as by local actors, as appropriate. Promote and ensure adherence to the above Guidelines within the entire humanitarian community and advise on potential consequences if these principles are compromised.

Establish and maintain dialogue and coordination with the military forces in the area of responsibility. Identify, establish and maintain contact with the appropriate military counterparts and ensure mutual exchange of information about ongoing humanitarian assistance issues. Advise the military forces in the area of responsibility on international humanitarian coordination mechanisms. These mechanisms may include the UN Country Team, UN Security or Disaster Management Teams, UN Joint Logistics Centre, Humanitarian Information Centre, Humanitarian Clusters, etc.

In parallel, establish and maintain contact with civilian humanitarian actors in the area of responsibility and serve as an information channel and advocate for their issues with relevant military systems.

Work in close cooperation with UN OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) in Geneva to support the UN-CMCoord training programme as appropriate. Identify and coordinate with OCHA/CMCS regarding potential candidates for inclusion in the UN-CMCoord Training Programme.

In coordination with UN OCHA/CMCS, establish and maintain contact with actors involved in military exercises in area of operation and advise on which events should be monitored and/or supported. Support planning for and execution of exercises, lessons learned workshops, seminars, and training events with military participation, as appropriate.
Monitor, analyze and report on any major accomplishments and progress as well as identify any difficulties in relations between the humanitarian and military communities.

Participate in work groups, meetings and consultations with other UN agencies and humanitarian partners; organize meetings with Heads of Agencies on UN-CMCoord matters.

Support logistics and operations personnel in the area of responsibility on all issues connected to civil-military relations.

Establish, if appropriate, an information exchange forum for stakeholders and interested parties in civil-military relations and participate in relevant meetings.

Prepare or provide input to requests for MCDA assets.

Provide situation reports on ongoing civil-military activities and the overall civil-military relations situation in [country] in agreed formats and timeframes. Upon concurrence with the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator, these reports should be disseminated to the UNCT, UN OCHA Office in [country], UN OCHA/CMCS, relevant CRD Desks, PDSB/PHA. Reports may also be disseminated to other agencies if relevant and appropriate.

Any other duties as may be requested by the Humanitarian / Resident Coordinator.

Qualifications / Experience

Education: Advanced university degree (Master's degree or equivalent) in international relations, political science, law, management, or similar specific field of study; or military academy degree with advanced training in these areas; or equivalent combination of academic background and practical experience in a relevant field.

Experience: Minimum of 7 years of progressively responsible professional field and/or headquarters experience in civil-military coordination, humanitarian affairs, and/or crisis/emergency relief
management; previous experience with OCHA and/or in a related way in civil-military coordination desired; or previous experience in the military with relevant experience in major humanitarian operations.

Languages: Fluency in oral and written English, and [other UN and/or local language(s)]. Fluency in [other UN and/or local language(s)] would be an asset.

Other skills: Experience from working with a humanitarian organization interacting with an international military force is a strong advantage; completion of the UN training in civil–military coordination (UN-CMCOrd Course); ability to work in high-pressure environments and under difficult living conditions. Previous experience in and good knowledge of [country] is an advantage.
Generic Terms of Reference for the UNJLC Civil-Military Coordination Functions

- **UNJLC CMCoord in Contingency Planning:**
  - Establish and maintain contact with the relevant Military Authorities to agree on procedures for exchanging logistics related information to support and facilitate humanitarian relief operations
  - Establish and maintain contact with civilian humanitarian actors in the crisis area and serve as an information channel for de-conflicting their planned operations
  - Coordinate and agree on safe passage procedures and corridors for conducting humanitarian air operations
  - Establish and maintain dialogue and liaison with the military and security forces in the region and ensure mutual exchange of information as appropriate
  - In coordination with OCHA, prepare and Requests for Information (RFI) procedures for obtaining information to support and sustain humanitarian operations
  - Pursue declassification process for information to support humanitarian logistics information and planning activities
  - Anticipate bottlenecks and coordinate border-crossing procedures to avoid unnecessary delays at the entry points
  - Advise the humanitarian community and the appropriate military authorities on existing MCDA support capabilities and application of procedures for requesting such support
  - In coordination with the OCHA’s CMCoord staff (if deployed) establish procedures for compiling and
forwarding regional MCDA requests for approval to the relevant authorities

- **UNJLC CMCoord at Field Level:**
  
  - Establish and maintain contact with civilian humanitarian actors which conduct relief operations in the region and serve as an information channel for bringing their operational requirements and priorities to the attention of the military authorities
  
  - Establish and maintain contact with appropriate military counterparts and ensure mutual exchange of information on relevant logistics issues
  
  - Advise local military authorities on humanitarian coordination mechanisms at operational level
  
  - Obtain information from UN and Military security personnel on security issues related to logistics movements
  
  - Obtain and forward Requests for Information (RFI) to the relevant military authorities and pursue compliance with these requests
  
  - Obtain information from military authorities on military actions which could endanger or constrain humanitarian logistics operations
  
  - Monitor and pursue the application of safe passage procedures to secure humanitarian air operations
  
  - Provide inputs to Civil/Military logistics-related activities for publication in the UNJLC Bulletin
  
  - Participate in and report on local meetings pertinent to Civil/Military relations
• Undertake any other tasks related to logistics operations, requiring inter-action between civilian and military actors in the area of responsibility

• Ensure that military support activities are in line with the HC Guidelines and coordinate with OCHA CMCoord on possible incompatibility

• **UNJLC CMCOORD within Military HQ:**

  **UNJLC CMCoord officers will be reporting on policy matters to the Head UNJLC Core Unit Rome and on operational matters to the Chief UNJLC in the crisis area. He/she will ensure that all actions are in line with UN-CMCoord policy and coordinate with the OCHA CMCoord representative (if in place). The UNJLC CMCoord staff should be thoroughly briefed on the ongoing operations, both humanitarian and military and the command relationships, including key players in major military formations participating in the operation. He/she should be fully conversant with the UNLC concept of operations, locations, manning and any special logistics considerations. Additionally, UNJLC CMCoord officers should:**

  • Establish and maintain contact with other liaison officers assigned to the HQ by UN Agencies or actors involved in the relief operation

  • Ensure that he/she remains fully briefed on UNJLC activities and humanitarian operations within the crisis area. Up-date Commander or Chief of Staff (via military POC) as necessary

  • Inform Commander or Chief of Staff (via military POC) of any significant problems being experienced by CMCoord
or liaison officers in other locations. If possible, suggest ways in which such problems could be alleviated

- Obtain information from main UNJLC on humanitarian priorities and possible need of MCDA
- Obtain Requests for Information (RFI) and pursue compliance with these requests
- Pursue MCDA requests at HQ level and re-iterate requirement, if needed
- Attend HQ briefings and military meetings related to humanitarian assistance. Represent UNJLC at regular meetings of relevant working groups
- Submit comprehensive Sitreps to Chief UNJLC with copies to other staff officers in UNJLC (Main) and UNJLC (Core)
- Maintain an accurate record of all actions and reports
Generic Terms of Reference for the UNHCR
Military Liaison Officer (MLO)

Reporting to the UNHCR Country Representative, the MLO will perform a countrywide function that may involve travel both within the country and the sub-region. The MLO will be responsible for the following tasks:

1. Ensure the essential dialogue and interaction between UNHCR and the military actors that is required to protect, promote and ensure that humanitarian principles are applied and humanitarian operational goals achieved, and in doing so, de-conflicting and/or minimizing any inconsistency in the pursuit of appropriate common goals.

2. Contribute to the UN interagency coordination process and share relevant information with all actors, providing specialist assistance to other agencies as and if requested.

3. Co-ordinate with UNHCR and other UN actors in the sub-region regarding the civil-military co-operation in-country with UN Peace-Keeping forces.

4. Advocate that the UN Peace-Keeping forces apply a 'Code of Conduct' (referring to existing UN-DPKO policy) and facilitate awareness training on the mandate of UNHCR and the rights of refugees, IDP's and others of UNHCR concern.

5. As required, advocate that the above-mentioned forces provide all urgent and essential assistance to the UNHCR component of the humanitarian operation, and as per UN policy and guidelines on ‘The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies’. This may include:
   - Static security to locations which will allow the
presence of the humanitarian organisations and the delivery of such assistance; and protecting refugee and IDP camps and transit centres.

- GIS specific information on operational environment security. This information will contribute to the overall UN country-level information mechanism shared with all humanitarian organisations.

- Providing logistical support when the operational capacity of UN/HCR is inadequate to meet a specific operational task (i.e. as a "last resort" on a case by case basis).

- Ensuring an acceptable means for distinguishing humanitarian assets and that any MCDA provided by the military have the markings of the UN humanitarian agency. When and if such military assets are provided, the appropriate white markings and UN symbols should be used.

6. Promoting the deployment and use of civil-military liaison officers (CMLO's) to strategic locations throughout the AOR where UNHCR are engaged in humanitarian activities.

7. In conjunction with the UNHCR FSA / UN FSO, develop and formalise an agreement regarding support intervention in the case of emergency medical and security evacuation of UN staff, if required.
Generic Terms of Reference for the
WFP Civil-Military Liaison Officer

The incumbent will be based in the country of operation, with in-country and regional travel as required. He/she will report directly to the relevant Agencies' Country Representative. The incumbent will consult and coordinate activities with the designated OCHA CMCoord officers and UNJLC CMCoord officers, if deployed.

He/She will further:

1. Establish and maintain regular contact with partner organizations and serve as an information channel for bringing their concerns to the attention of relevant military authorities/entities.

2. Establish and maintain regular contact with relevant military authorities/entities, ensure mutual exchange of information on relevant food relief assistance issues and serve as an information channel for bringing their concerns to the attention of their relevant agency.

3. Advise humanitarian organizations on structure, mandate and hierarchy of the relevant military authorities/entities and organize training and/or briefing sessions of humanitarian staff on above mentioned matters.

4. Advise the Agency on structure, mandate and hierarchy of humanitarian organizations and humanitarian coordination mechanisms and organize training and/or briefing sessions of agencies' staff on above mentioned matters.
5. Advise and support the agencies’ Country Representative on all issues concerning civil-military relations.

6. Advise the agencies’ security personnel on civil-military relations relevant for security issues and work in close collaboration with them.

7. Liaise with UN Civil Police and National Police Service in negotiating relevant issues for food deliveries and recoveries and lead the process when directed.

8. Provide inputs to operational, strategic and policy planning and processes of the Agency, if and when required.

9. Advise Country Representative on UN and agencies’ policy issues related to civil-military relations.

10. Inform military authorities/entities of agencies’ policy with regard to civil-military relations.

11. Advise and assist the Agency in negotiating relevant issues for food deliveries and distribution operations with military authorities/entities and lead the process if necessary.

12. Design and devise mechanism and procedures within the civil-military coordination sphere that will enhance movement of agencies’ personnel/cargo.

13. Submit regular reports to the relevant Country Representative on ongoing civil-military activities and the overall situation relating to civil-military relations.

14. Participate in and report on local meetings pertinent to civil-military relations.
2. Undertake any other tasks requiring interaction between civilian and military actors, which have relevance to the mission of the parent Agency.
Annex C: NATO/Military Acronyms

A

ACABQ
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

ACC
Air Coordination Cell

ACCORD
African Centre for the Constructive Resolution Of Disputes

ACFL
Agreed Cease Fire Line

ADAMS
Allied Deployment and Movement System

AEW
Airborne Early Warning

ALITE
Augmented Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies

AOCC
Air Operation Coordination Center

AOR
Area of Responsibility

AOT
Area of Transfer

APOD
Air Port of Departure

APOE
Air Port of Embarkation

AU
African Union

B

BDUs
Battle Dress Uniforms

B-FAST
Belgian First Aid and Support Team

BKS
Barracks
C

C-SPT
Commander for Support

C/I/S
Civilian Staff

CA
Civil Affairs

CAP
Consolidated Appeals Process

CAS
Close Air Support

CCECSP
Cooperation of Central European Countries to Support Peace

CE
Combat Engineers

CEPD
Civil Emergency Planning Directorate

CERF
Central Emergency Revolving Fund

CFV
Cease Fire Violation

CHAP
Common Humanitarian Action Plan

CIMIC
Civil Military Cooperation

CIS
Commonwealth of Independent States

CIVPOL
Civilian Police

CJCCC
Combined Joint Communication Coordination Centre

CL (CFL)
Confrontation Line

CMA
Civil-Military Affairs

CMC
Civil-Military Cooperation
CMCO
EU-Civil-Military Co-ordination
CMCoord
Civil-Military Coordination
CMO
Civil-Military Operations
CNN
Cable Network News
COMMZ
Communication Zone
COS
Chief of Staff
CP
Command Post
CPIC
Coalition Public Information Centre
CPSE
Corps Psyops Support Element
CRD
Coordination and Response Division
CTG
Commander Task Group
CVRT
"Combat Vehicle, Reconnaissance Track"
CVTG
Aircraft Carrier Task Group
DAC
Development Assistance Committee
DDP
Detailed Deployment Plan
DESA
Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DMT
Disaster Management Team
DMZ
Demilitarized Zone
FCSS
Field Coordination Support Section
FEMA
Federal Emergency Management Agency (US)
FI
Fire Incident
FITTEST
Fast IT and Telecommunication Emergency Support Team
FOM
Freedom of Movement
GLIDE
Global Identifier
HABITAT
Un Centre for Human Settlements
HADRO
Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief Operation
HC
Humanitarian Coordinator
HEP
Humanitarian Evacuation Program
HMV(HUMMV)
High Mobility Vehicle
HNS
Host Nation Support
HOCC
Humanitarian Operation and Coordination Centre
HUMRO
Humanitarian Relief Operation
IAET
Inter Agency Emergency Telecommunication
IASC
Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IBRD
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICDO
International Civil Defense Organization
ICISS
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICRC
International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA
International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP
Internally Displaced Person
IDRA
International Disaster Relief Assistance
IERCM
International Emergency Response Consultative Mechanism
IFRC
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IG
Inspector General
IGAD
Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGO
Inter-governmental Organisation
IHL
International Humanitarian Law
IMPP
Integrated Mission Planning Process
IMTF
Integrated Mission Task Force
INSARAG
International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
InterAction
American Council for Voluntary International Action
IO
International Organization
IRC
International Rescue Committee
IRIN
Integrated Regional Information Network
ISDR
International Strategic Disaster Reduction
IVO
In the vicinity of

J

JAC
Joint Analysis Centre
JMC
Joint Military Commission
JMCC
Joint Movement Control Centre
JOC
Joint Operation Centre
JSTARS
Joint Surveillance and Tactical Attack Radar System
JTF
Joint Task Force
JVB
Joint Visitors' Bureau

L

L&R
Logistics and Resources
LAN
Local Area Network
LCC
Logistic Coordination Centre
LEMA
Local Emergency Management Authority

M

M&T
Movement and Transportation
MAHE
Military Assistance in Humanitarian Emergencies
MC
Mine Countermeasures
MCC
Movement Control Centre
MCDU
Military and Civil Defence Unit

164
MCR
Military-Civil Relations
MDTF
Multi Donor Trust Fund
MEU
Marine Expeditionary Unit
MIC
Monitoring and Information Centre, European Commission
DG Environment
MND
Multinational Division

NAVAIDS
Navigational Aids
NEPAD
New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NFZ
No Fly Zone
NGO
Non Governmental Organisation
NOK
Next of Kin
NSE
National Support Element

OCHA
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OP
Observation Post
OP AREA
Operational Area
OPCON
Operational Control
OSA
Operational Support Aircraft
OSOCC
On-site Operation Coordination Centre
OXFAM
Oxford Famine

165
PAHO
Pan American Health Organisation
PBC
Peacebuilding Commission
PBSO
Peacebuilding Support Office
PIP
Partnership for Peace
PI
Public Information
PIMS
Partnership for Peace Information Management System
PIO
Public Information Officer
PK
Peacekeeping
PMSC
Political-Military Steering Committee
POW
Prisoner of War
PSYOP
Psychological Operation
R
RACVIAV
Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre
RAMCC
Regional Air Movement Co-ordination Centre
RC/HC
Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator
RCCA
Resident Coordinator Competency Assessment
RDRA
Regional Disaster Response Advisor
RECCE
Reconnaissance
ResREp
UN Resident Representative
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RM</td>
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<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>Small Arms</td>
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<td>Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee</td>
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<td>SCHR</td>
<td>Steering committee for Humanitarian Response</td>
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<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
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<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Multinational UN Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMART</td>
<td>Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transition</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of (UN) Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACP</td>
<td>Tactical Air Control Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAOO</td>
<td>Theatre Area of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>Troops Contributing Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNCT
UN Country Team
UNCTAD
UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNDAC
UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination
Stand-by Team
UNDMT
UN Disaster Management Team
UNDP
UN Development Program
UNEP
UN Environmental Programme
UNESCO
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA
UN Population’s Fund
UNHAS
UN Humanitarian Air Services
UNHCR
UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRD
UN Humanitarian Response Depot
UNICEF
UN Children’s Fund
UNITAR
UN Institute for Training and Research
UNJLC
UN Joint Logistics Centre
UNMAS
UN Mine Action Service
UNRWA
UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
In the Near East
UNV
UN Volunteers
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
UTC
UNIVERSAL Time Coordinated

VFR
Visual Flight Rules (Air Navigation System)

VOICE
Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies

WCP
Weapons Collecting Point

WFP
World Food Programme

An extensive listing of military terms, acronyms and abbreviations can be found at the Joint Electronic Library located at URL: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpreferencepubs.htm
Annex D
Military Ranks and Insignia

Military rank is more than just who salutes whom. Military rank is a badge of leadership. Responsibility for personnel, equipment, and mission grows with each increase in rank. Regardless of the country, the military is hierarchical in structure. The structure provides a clear chain-of-command (CoC) to those on the inside, but may appear confusing and unnecessarily rigid to civilian personnel.

A key element to effective interaction with any military organization is understanding the military rank structure and the flow of authority and responsibility that is commensurate with rank. While the individual may change the role does not.

Military personnel are extremely appreciative (and usually surprised) when addressed appropriately by their rank by a civilian. Identifying which military forces are present in the area of a humanitarian operation and taking the time to become somewhat familiar with the insignia will help smooth the coordination process.

There are two primary rank classifications of military personnel, enlisted and officer. Enlisted personnel make up the majority of any military. They are the core of the military working force. Junior enlisted personnel can be thought of as the line workers while the mid-level ranks are technical experts and supervisors, higher enlisted ranks are managers. Officers derive authority directly from a sovereign power and, as such, hold a commission charging them with the duties and responsibilities of a specific office or position. Commissioned officers are typically the only persons in a military able to exercise command over a military unit. Some militaries, have a rank between enlisted and officer, these are the warrant officers. In general, they are specialist in a particular field and are generally from the senior enlisted ranks.
While there are too many different military forces that may be encountered in humanitarian operations to show their insignia in this handbook, a few representative styles are shown in the following figures.
Figure 1 Canadian Army

Enlisted Ranks

Trained Private
Corporal
Master Corporal
Sergeant
Sgt. Shovel Sleeve Order
Warrant Officer
Master Warrant Officer
Chief Warrant Officer
Command Chief Warrant Officer

Officer Ranks

2nd Lieutenant
Lieutenant
Captain
Major
Lieutenant Colonel
Colonel
Brigadier General
Major General
Figure 2 Chilean Army
Figure 3 Russian Army

Enlisted Ranks
- Private
- Lance Corporal
- Jr. Sgt
- Sgt
- Sr. Sgt
- Sgt Major

Warrant Officer Ranks
- WO
- Sr. WO

Officer Ranks
- Lt
- Lt 2nd Class
- Lt 1st Class
- Sr. Lt
- Captain
- Major
- Lt Colonel
- Colonel
- Major General
- Lt General
- Colonel General
Figure 4 United States Army
Annex E
Military Staff Structures

Basis for Staff Organizations

Military staffs are organized based on three considerations:

- Mission.
- Broad fields of interest (functional responsibilities).
- Regulations and laws.

The mission determines which activities to accomplish. These activities determine how commanders organize, tailor, or adapt their individual staffs to accomplish the mission. The mission also determines the size and composition of the staff. Regardless of mission, every Army staff has common broad fields of interest that determine how the commander divides duties and responsibilities. The duties and responsibilities inherent in a field of interest are called functional responsibilities. Grouping related activities allows an effective span of control and unified effort. Fields of interest may vary slightly, depending on the echelon of command, mission, and environment. For example, at battalion level there is no resource manager, while certain logistic units combine the intelligence and operations functions. Common fields of interest and the abbreviations for the staff sections to which they are assigned are:

- Personnel (G-1/AG [S-1]).
- Intelligence (G-2 [S-2]).
- Operations and training (G-3 [S-3]).
- Logistics (G-4 [S-4]).
- Civil-military operations (G-5 [S-5]).
- Command, control, communications, and computer operations (C4OPS) (G-6 /S-6)).
- Information operations officer (G-7 [S-7]) (corps, divisions, and selected brigades only).
- Resource management (RM).

The commanding officer’s rank determines whether the staff is a G staff or an S staff. Organizations commanded by generals have G staffs, other organizations have S staffs.

Factors Affecting Staff Organizations
Commanders use their professional knowledge, experience, and leadership style to organize their individual staffs. Several factors influence staff organization:

- Size and diversity of responsibilities.
- Local (distinct) requirements.
- Amount of relevant information (RI) each section manages.
- Availability, qualifications, and performance of personnel.
- Organization and locations of command posts (CPs).
- Mobility requirements.
- Requirements for 24-hour operations and security.
- Ability to combine related activities.
- Desired span of control.
- Preferences of the commander and chief of staff.

Staffs at every echelon are structured differently; however, all staffs are similar. The basic staff structure includes a chief of staff (COS) or executive officer (XO), and three staff groups: coordinating, special, and personal. (figure 1.) The number of coordinating, special, and personal
staff officers within each staff group varies at different levels of command.

The COS (XO) is the commander's principal staff officer. He directs staff tasks, oversees staff coordination, and ensures efficient and prompt staff actions. The COS oversees coordinating and special staff officers. He does not necessarily oversee the personal staff officers, although he normally interacts with them. The commander normally delegates authority to the COS for executive management of coordinating and special staff officers.

Figure 1

Coordinating staff officers are the commander's principal staff assistants. They are directly accountable to the COS (XO). They have functional responsibilities over one or a combination of fields of interest. Collectively, through the COS (XO), coordinating staff officers are accountable to their commander for all their responsibilities.
Commanders may designate coordinating staff officers as assistant chiefs of staff, deputy chiefs of staff, directors, or regular staff officers. These positions generally reflect the degree of authority the commander delegates to them and the scope and complexity of operations conducted by the command. However, commanders establish a staff officer’s actual authority if it is not inherent in the position’s title.

Coordinating staff officers’ authority is limited to advising, planning, and coordinating actions within their individual fields of interest. They also exercise planning and supervisory authority over designated special staff officers. Commanders may also delegate to coordinating staff officers additional authority to act on specific matters within the staff officer’s field of interest. Directors have both staff and line authority. For example, directors of logistic operations might be responsible for operating support activities in addition to their normal responsibilities. Typically, commanders delegate to directors significant responsibility for specific functions and the authority necessary to accomplish them. Normally, coordinating staff officers have a direct interest in other staff officers’ fields of interest. Clearly defined staff responsibilities are necessary to facilitate coordination and eliminate conflict. Unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) or organization and functions manuals contain procedures that specify primary responsibilities and coordination requirements.

Coordinating staff officers are responsible for collecting information and analyzing its implications and impact on the command. More important, coordinating staff officers provide timely and accurate recommendations to their individual commanders to help them make the best possible decisions. While doing so, they often request and receive information and recommendations from special staff officers. They also inform other coordinating staff officers, as required.

Special Staff Group
Special staff officers help commanders and other staff members perform their functional responsibilities. (figure 2.) The number of special staff officers and their duties vary with the level of command. Special staff sections are organized according to professional or technical responsibilities. In some cases, special staff officers command units. Special staff officers usually deal routinely with more than one
coordinating staff officer. For example, the provost marshal (PM) usually functions under the G-3, but coordinates with the G-1, G-2, G-4, G-5, and G-7.

![Diagram of Army staff organization](image)

**Personal Staff Group**

Personal staff members work under the commander’s immediate control. They also may serve as special staff officers when they coordinate with other staff members. When performing their duties as special staff officers, personal staff officers may work through the COS (XO) and under a coordinating staff officer for coordination and control purposes. Members of the personal staff include:

- Personal assistants, such as aides-de-camp.
- Personnel the commander desires to supervise directly.
- Personnel who, by law or regulation, have a special relationship to the commander.

**Staff Models**

Army staff organizations at the battalion through corps levels follow the same organizational model. (Figure 1.) Commanders tailor their individual staffs to meet their specific needs.

**Major Command (Corps and Divisions/G Staffs)**

Figure 2 shows the typical staff organization for a corps or division. The staff of a major command has each of the major staff groups: coordinating, special, and personal. In corps and divisions, deputy or
assistant commanders extend the commander’s span of control over areas and functions the commander designates.

Figure 3

Smaller Units (Regiments, Brigades, and Battalions/S Staffs)
Figure 3 depicts a typical smaller-unit staff structure. Smaller-unit staffs generally perform the same functions as larger staffs. However, the operational nature of smaller units sometimes requires modifications. For example, staff activities (such as, advising, planning, coordinating, and supervising) are more informal at lower levels. Often supporting unit
commanders—for example, the engineer battalion commander at maneuver brigade level—serve as special staff officers for their individual fields of interest.
Military customs and courtesies have a long tradition. They are acts of respect evolving as a result of a need for order and a sense of brotherhood that exists among military personnel. They go beyond basic politeness and are an intricate part of the discipline, morale, esprit de corps and mission effectiveness. As a civilian interacting with the military, basic knowledge of some customs and courtesies will be helpful.

- Expect to be escorted where ever you go on a military installation
- Be on time-military meetings start on schedule (most of the time). In fact be 10-15 minutes early at the meeting location. (Allow additional time for in processing through the gate)
- When a senior military officer enters the room (if he/she outranks any other officer already present) the room will be called to attention. You are expected to stand until the officer is seated or says “as you were” or “please be seated”.
- All military personnel are addressed by their rank or title. A military member may introduce him/herself by their given and surname, but in the presence of others they are always addressed by rank and surname.
- When introduced to a senior officer, you may address them by rank and surname, rank only or sir or ma’am, whichever is appropriate.
- The senior officer will be first to leave a room, generally last to enter a room, first to leave a vehicle and last to enter a vehicle.
- When walking with a senior officer, he/she should be on your right.
- If you are present when the military host’s national anthem is played, stand quietly until the music stops. The same principle applies if the host’s national flag is being carried by or posted.
Annex G
Military Map Symbols

In addition to the standard topographical symbols (figure 1) used to represent natural and manmade features, the military uses specific symbols to designate locations of units, activities and installations. Common military symbols are presented here for your information. (figure 2).

Figure 5 Topographical Map Symbols
Figure 6 Military Map Symbols
Annex H: Converting Longitude and Latitude To Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) System

Military maps are divided into grids to provide a uniform system for referencing and making measurements. Military grids consist of two sets of equally spaced and parallel, straight lines intersecting at right angles and forming a series of squares. Each grid line is an even interval of the selected measurement unit, such as meters. The dimensions and orientations of different types of grids vary, but all military grids have three things in common:

- They are all true rectangular grids
- They are superimposed on top of the geographical projection
- They permit linear and angular measurements.

Designations on the map are based on the military principle of “Read RIGHT then UP”. Each coordinate on a UTM map consists of an even number of digits, usually a minimum of six. This allows for more precise pinpointing of object locations. On the grid shown below, the “X” is located at grid coordinate 697373. The more number of digits in the coordinate, the closer the object can be pinpointed,
There may be a time where you need to provide a map location to a military unit. The military uses the UTM system for locating positions on a map. Non-military organizations are more likely to use longitude and latitude. Providing a location to a military unit using the non-military system may cause confusion and unnecessary delay. Therefore it is strongly recommended that you convert the location to UTM prior to contacting the military with the designated coordinates.

Unfortunately the mathematical calculations for converting one system to the other are somewhat complicated and cumbersome, requiring knowledge of both algebra and trigonometry. The formulas can be found at: http://www.uwgb.edu/dutchs/UsefulData/UTMFormulas.htm

Fortunately there are tools already developed and readily available to do the conversion.

There is a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet that will perform the calculations for you. The spreadsheet was developed by Professor Steven Dutch, from the Department of Natural and Applied Sciences, University of Wisconsin, USA, and may be used by anyone for non-commercial purposes. The spreadsheet and directions for use can be found at: the above listed link.

There is also an application called GeoCalc© which is a freestanding program developed by Vic Fraenchel and is available as freeware. The program works well and has additional options for conversion. The application can be downloaded at: http://www.windreader.com/geodesy/download.htm
Annex I
Voice Radio Procedures

There may be occasions when you need to use a military radio net. You might borrow a military radio station (asset sharing) to send a message or you may be contacting a military unit for a specific purpose (emergency assistance) or you may be vectoring in a helicopter. In any instance using proper military voice radio procedures is essential to facilitate clear communication.

A radio net is two or more stations operating on the same frequency for the specific purpose of exchanging information. The net is controlled by the net control station (NECOS). The NECOS enforces proper procedures on the net, improper use or language or improper procedure may result in you being denied net access.

Equipment: There are three types of radios commonly used in a field situation: High Frequency (HF), which affords communication over great distances, Very High Frequency (VHF) which allows communication slightly beyond line of sight (LOS) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) which works only in LOS situations.

VHF radios have a reliable range of no more than 15-20 kilometers and are dependent upon the terrain, atmospheric conditions and the power output of the battery. UHF can be used for ground-to-air communication or air-to-air communication and effective distance can be up to 500 kilometers as long as the target object is in sight.

HF and/or VHF are the radios you will most likely encounter. In preparation for use:

VHF Hand Held – Always ensure that the battery is charged and a charged spare is available; Check antenna is attached

HF Mobiles/Base – Check power supplies regularly; Check cable connections (i.e. antenna, power supply, microphone) are tight
Be sure you know what frequency you are authorized to use, your station's call sign and the call sign of the station you are attempting to contact.

**Radio procedures:** In order to effectively use radio equipment, you must be aware of the proper operating rules/techniques and the proper use of procedural words. The purpose of radio procedures is to enhance the requirements for an effective communications system: reliability, security, and speed.

1. **Reliability**
   a. Messages should be written.
   b. Messages should be transmitted by the radio operator exactly as they are written.
   c. When sending complicated messages, the message should be delivered directly to the designated recipient, to reduce confusion or misunderstandings.

2. **Security**
   a. Do not violate radio silence.
   b. Use minimum power when transmitting.
   c. Transmit messages only after they have been signed by a releasing officer.
   d. Avoid excessive radio transmissions (i.e., non-essential talking).
   e. Do not use improvised codes or personal characteristics which could identify the operator (and the unit).

3. **Speed**
   a. If you are sending to more than one station, send at the speed of the slowest receiving operator.
   b. Use authorized procedural words.
   c. Listen before transmitting to ensure that other stations are not transmitting.

4. **Voice techniques.** The use of proper voice techniques will enhance the quality and speed of transmissions.
   a. Speak clearly, distinctly, and without personal quirks or accents.
   b. Speak at the speed of the lowest operator and in understandable phrases.
   c. Use a normal voice level; don't yell.
d. No profanity

e. **Procedural words.** Procedural words (prowords) are pronounceable words or phrases which have been assigned meaning for the purpose of expediting message handling on radio nets. These include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proword</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THIS IS</td>
<td>This transmission is from the station whose designation immediately follows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVER</td>
<td>This is the end of my transmission to you and a response is necessary. Go ahead; transmit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUT</td>
<td>This is the end of my transmission to you and no answer is required or expected. <strong>Since OVER and OUT have opposite meanings, they are never used together.</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROGER</td>
<td>I have received your last transmission satisfactorily.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I SPELL</td>
<td>I shall spell the preceding word phonetically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORRECTION</td>
<td>An error has been made in this transmission. Transmission will continue with the last word correctly sent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILCO</td>
<td>I have received your message and will comply. <strong>Since the meaning of ROGER is included in that of WILCO, these two prowords are never used together.</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAY AGAIN</td>
<td>Repeat all of your last transmission, or used with ALL AFTER or ALL BEFORE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I SAY AGAIN</td>
<td>I am repeating the transmission or portion indicated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORD TWICE</td>
<td>Communication is difficult. Transmit each phrase twice. This proword may be used as an order or request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL AFTER</td>
<td>The portion of the message to which I have referred is all that which follows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL BEFORE</td>
<td>The portion of the message to which I have referred is all that which precedes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORD AFTER</td>
<td>The word of the message to which I have referred is that which follows ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORD BEFORE</td>
<td>The word of the message to which I have referred is that which precedes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAIT</td>
<td>I must pause for a few seconds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAIT OUT</td>
<td>I must pause longer than a few seconds, I will call you back.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>READ BACK</td>
<td>Repeat this entire transmission back to me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I READ BACK</td>
<td>The following is my response to your instruction to read back</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SILENCE</td>
<td>Cease all transmission immediately. Will be maintained until lifted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SILENCE LIFTED</td>
<td>Resume normal transmission. (Silence can be lifted only by the station imposing it or by higher authority; this transmission should be authenticated.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPEAK SLOWER</td>
<td>Your transmission is too fast to copy. Reduce the speed of your transmission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERIFY</td>
<td>Verify with originator and repeat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I VERIFY</td>
<td>Message or portion indicated has been verified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MESSAGE FOLLOWS</td>
<td>A message requiring recording follows; standby to copy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURES</td>
<td>Numerals or numbers follow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEGATIVE</td>
<td>No/Incorrect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFFIRMATIVE</td>
<td>Yes/Correct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex J
International or NATO Phonetic Alphabet

During radio communications it often becomes necessary to clarify messages due to background noise, poor reception, or language barriers. The NATO Phonetic Alphabet, also called the International Phonetic Alphabet, was developed in the 1950s to be intelligible (and pronounceable) to all NATO allies in the heat of battle. It is now widely used in business and telecommunications throughout Europe and North America.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Phonetic Pronunciation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Bravo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Charlie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Echo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Foxtrot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Golf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Hotel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Juliet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Kilo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Lima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Oscar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Poppa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Romeo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Sierra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Tango</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>Uniform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Victor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>Whiskey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Xray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Yankee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>Zulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. (decimal)</td>
<td>Decimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. (period)</td>
<td>Stop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Zero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wun (One)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tree (Three)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fower (Four)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fife (Five)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Six</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Seven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ait (Eight)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Niner (nine)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex K
Vectoring Helicopters

This appendix covers setting up a landing zone, the landing zone brief provided to the pilot and vectoring or guiding the pilot in for landing. Additionally, a brief synopsis of medical evacuation procedures is included.

Landing Zone/Site Requirements

A helicopter landing zone (LZ) is specified ground for landing helicopters to embark or disembark personnel or cargo. A landing zone is designated by a code name. It may include one or more landing sites. Depending upon the terrain you can divide the LZ into several landing sites. A landing site is a specific location within a landing zone in which a single flight of helicopters may land to embark or disembark personnel or cargo. Landing sites are designated by color, such as landing site red. A landing site contains one or more landing points (figure 1).

![Figure 7 Landing Zone/Sites/Points](image)

A helicopter landing point is an area within a landing site where an individual helicopter can land. Landing points are designated by two-digit numbers, such as landing point 12. For identification purposes, the landing points are identified by the use of smoke or air panels during
daylight and low-intensity lights at night. A general rule is to position landing points ten times as far from an obstacle as the obstacle is high (10:1 ratio) (figure 2).

**Preparation of the Landing Zone**

When planning the preparation of an LZ, you should take several factors into consideration. First, you should know what type of helicopters will be using the landing zone.

*Approaches and Exits:* The ground approaches to the LZ and exits from the LZ must be free of major obstacles that might obstruct landing or takeoffs, such as tall trees, telephone poles, or power lines. Approaches and exits should also be clear of obstructions that are 10 meters or higher, extending at least 50 meters in the direction of approach and exit paths. The rule of thumb for determining the distance required between the landing point and a high obstruction is a 10:1 ratio. This means that the distance a landing point is located from a tree is ten times the height of the tree. Example: A helicopter landing or taking off near a 30-foot tree needs at least 300 feet of horizontal clearance (figure 2).

*Ground Obstacles:* Obstacles on the ground, such as stumps or rocks, should not exceed 1 foot in height on level ground and should be less on sloping ground.

*Gradient (Slopes):* Ground slope has a considerable effect on selecting a landing site or landing point within the LZ. A helicopter cannot land safely in locations where the ground slopes more than 14 degrees. When pilots land on a slope, they prefer to land uphill because of the tail down attitude of the helicopter.

Figure 2: Horizontal Clearance
**Surface Conditions:** Mud, excessive dust, and loose debris are considered undesirable surface conditions for helicopters. Mud causes a helicopter to become bogged down. Excessive dust reduces visibility and compromises the location of the site. Loose debris is dangerous because they are sucked up into the rotor blades or turbine intakes, causing serious damage. Shallow water, less than 18 inches deep and with a firm bottom, can be used as a landing site.

**Winds:** When the wind at ground level exceeds 10 knots, the helicopter must land into the wind.

**Landing Site Dimensions**

Landing site dimensions vary, depending on the number of landing points required. For each landing point, a fuselage safe circle is cleared of all obstacles, such as stumps, rocks, or bushes. Clear a rotor safe circle of all obstacles that could obstruct the rotor blades (figure 3).

![Figure 3 Landing Point Dimensions](image)

When there is to be more than one landing point within the landing site, separate the landing points so the helicopters can simultaneously land safely in the landing site. Use figure 4 as a guide in selecting the appropriate size landing zone.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Overall Length</th>
<th>Landing Zone Diameter</th>
<th>Obstruction Height (Feet)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Feet)</td>
<td>5-40</td>
<td>40-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1E/N</td>
<td>57/57</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G/J</td>
<td>53/53</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1T</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-46</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-53/53E</td>
<td>89/99</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4 Landing Zone Diameter

Marking the Landing Zone

Once you have established the LZ, the landing sites, and the landing points, you need to direct the helicopter to the location of the LZ. The proper marking of the LZ will aid the pilot in locating it.

Recommendations for marking an LZ and for guiding a helicopter to a LZ are as follows:

1. Daylight landing: The landing zone is equipped with a means of showing wind direction and velocity. This is usually accomplished by the use of smoke or by verbal radio message. Expedient methods for determining wind direction and velocity are as follows:

   a. Grass drop method. Extend your arm straight out and drop the grass from your hand. Point the extended arm at the dropped grass on the ground. The angle between the arm and the body divided by four is the wind velocity in knots.

   b. Angle of smoke method. Observe the angle at which smoke blows. The wind speed is as follows:
      - If smoke goes straight up, no wind.
      - If smoke blows at a 30-degree angle, wind is 3-5 knots.
- If smoke blows at a 60-degree angle, wind is 5-7 knots.
- If smoke blows along the ground, wind exceeds 8 knots.

Use smoke and landing zone panels to mark a landing zone by day. Both should be the same color as the designation of the landing zone. This will aid the pilot in locating the landing zone. Mark obstacles that cannot be removed within the landing zone with single red panels staked to prevent uprooting by rotor wash.

**SECURITY CAUTION:** If smoke is used to mark the landing zone, use only as needed and do not tell the pilot the color of smoke; ask the pilot to acknowledge the color after the smoke grenade is set off.

2. Night landing: The organization and use of an LZ at night or during periods of low visibility is more complex compared to daytime operations. Special lighting equipment or field expedients as required.
   a. You must indicate outlines of landing zones by low-intensity markers.
   b. You must show obstacles near the landing zone by low-intensity markers or voice radio instructions.

Another method of guiding the aircraft to the zone is vector instructions. This is simply relaying instructions to the pilot by radio. For example, the radio operator spots the helicopter. Using a compass, the radio operator shoots an azimuth of 135 degrees from the LZ to the helicopter and quickly computes a back azimuth of 315 degrees. The radio operator then transmits the following message:

"HOME WISH, THIS IS FLIGHT BEE . . . VECTOR THREE ONE FIVE TO LANDING ZONE HAWK . . . OVER."

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The pilot then acknowledges the message and takes up the correct heading of 315 degrees. The term vector is always used in a situation like this to prevent misunderstanding. As the helicopter approaches, minor corrections will probably be necessary. These are given as corrections to the original heading by the following:

"HOME WISH, THIS IS FLIGHT BEE . . . COME RIGHT FIVE DEGREES OF PRESENT COURSE . . . OVER."

When the situation does not allow the use of a compass, you can vector the helicopter to an LZ by using the clock system:

"HOME WISH, THIS IS FLIGHT BEE . . . MY POSITION IS AT YOUR NINE O’CLOCK . . . OVER."

The aircraft would then execute a 90-degree turn to the left.

**Landing Signalman Enlisted (LSE) Signals**

Once the pilot has located the LZ, you can now help the pilot land the helicopter. These signals are visual arm-and-hand signals used by personnel to “talk” to the pilot of the landing helicopter. The confidence of the pilot in the LSE’s signals depends on the precise manner in which the LSE gives the signal. Movements are sharp and precise. LSE’s signals are executed exactly as prescribed. The LSE must always remain alert for signals from the pilot. During night operations, LSEs must use illuminated wands. During a landing approach, the LSE’s functions are as follows:

1. Inform the pilot of the approaching helicopter that you are the LSE. You do this by means of the Prepare for Guidance signal. (Figure 5)
2. Indicate the landing point to the pilot by positioning yourself 25 meters in front of and 10 meters to the right of the landing point as the pilot looks at it.

3. Aid the pilot in landing safely on the landing point. The pilot is responsible for the approach and landing of the helicopter. However, the pilot relies heavily on the LSE to provide warning of conditions of which he or she is not aware of and to direct the helicopter to a safe landing point.

4. The only signal that the LSE must give to the pilot on the deck is the Wave-Off signal. All other signals are advisory signals to the pilot. The decision to accept or reject the signal is solely the responsibility of the pilot. Responsibility for the safety of the aircraft can never be relinquished to the LSE. The Wave-Off signal is given when it is not safe for the helicopter to land.

5. Indicate to the pilot when it is safe to take off.

**NOTE:** The signals are used for daytime operations. Signals given at night are executed in the same manner except that an illuminated amber director's wand (Chem Lite) is held in each hand.
Landing Zone Brief

When a helicopter has to land for personnel pickup/drop, resupply, MEDEVAC, or for any other reason, the pilot must have certain information to ensure a safe landing. This information is provided in the landing zone brief. (Figure 16)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Landing Zone Brief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mission No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COOD/RAD/DMB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Unit Call Sign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRI UHF________FM________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SBC UHF________FM________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>LZ Marking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Wind Direction/Velocity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Elevation/Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Obstacles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Friendly Positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Directions/Distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Hostiles Positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Directions/Distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Last Fire Received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time/Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Direction of Fire/Distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Clearance to Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direction/Distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Approach/Retirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Recommended)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Personnel/Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Each line of the landing zone brief is explained below:

**Line 1:** The mission number will be assigned to the pilot by Direct Air Support Center (DASC) personnel. Under normal circumstances this line is not used by personnel at the LZ.

**Line 2:** Give at least a six-digit grid to identify the location of the LZ.

**Line 3:** Your call sign.

**Line 4:** Self-explanatory.

**Line 5:** List the methods of marking the LZ. For example, smoke, air panels, signal mirrors, lights and so forth.

**Line 6:** State the direction from which the wind is coming and the wind speed if known.

**Line 7:** State the elevation of the LZ (air is thinner at higher altitudes) and the size of the LZ.

**Line 8:** An obstacle is anything higher or deeper request than 1 foot on the LZ or anything near the LZ that may create a hazard to the aircraft.

**Line 9:** State where friendly troops are in relation to the LZ.

**Line 10:** State the location of the hostile forces in relation to the LZ.

**Line 11:** Self-explanatory.

**Line 12:** Self-explanatory.

**Line 13:** State the direction and distance the helicopter can fire without endangering friendly troops.

**Line 14:** If possible, the approach heading should be into the wind. The retirement or departure should be clear of hostile forces positions.

**Line 15:** The different helicopters used for MEDEVAC operations vary in the number of personnel and equipment they can transport. Increased elevation and temperature decrease the weight capacity of a helicopter. A helicopter pilot must know exactly the number of personnel and what type of equipment is to be transported.

**Line 16:** Anything not previously mentioned that could help the pilot in anyway.

Figure 17 shows a sample Landing Zone Brief.
Sample Landing Zone Brief

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transmission Item</th>
<th>You Say</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mission No.</td>
<td>Provided by higher authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Location: COOD/RAD/DMB</td>
<td>Grid 456129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Unit Call Sign</td>
<td>A4F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Frequency</td>
<td>PRIMARY FM 30.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SECONDARY FM 45.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*5. LZ Marking</td>
<td>Signal Mirrors/Air Panels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**6. Wind Direction/Velocity</td>
<td>Wind from East at 14 knots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Elevation/Size</td>
<td>2,500 ft/size 180 ft in diameter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Obstacles</td>
<td>40 ft tree 90 Meters south of landing zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Friendly Positions</td>
<td>Friendlies southeast 100 Meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Hostiles Positions</td>
<td>Hostiles southeast 500 Meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Last Fire Received</td>
<td>1800/ Small arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Direction of Fire/Distance</td>
<td>Enemy fire from Southeast 500 Meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Clearance to Fire</td>
<td>South and Southeast 150 Meters from LZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Approach/Retirement (Recommended)</td>
<td>Approach Heading 90 degrees Return Heading 350 degrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Personnel/Equipment</td>
<td>6 personnel with Alice Packs &amp; Rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Other</td>
<td>5 degree slope</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* CAUTION: As a security caution, if you use smoke to mark LZ, DO NOT tell pilot what color smoke will be. Ask pilot to acknowledge color after smoke grenade is set off.

** Determine and report wind condition and direction: For angle of smoke method, observe smoke blowing if the wind is blowing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Smoke Direction</th>
<th>Wind Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Straight Up</td>
<td>No Wind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 degrees</td>
<td>Wind at 3-5 Knots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 degrees</td>
<td>Wind at 5-7 Knots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Along Ground</td>
<td>Wind in Excess of 8 Knots</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 18.—Sample of landing zone brief

Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC)

A MEDEVAC request contains all the information that Direct Air Support Center (DASC) personnel need to dispatch a helicopter to your position. In a combat situation, the Combat Operation Center (COC) routes the request from the battalion aid station to higher headquarters. Higher headquarters will route the request to DASC personnel. In extreme
situations where communication to the COC or the battalion aid station is interrupted, platoon commanders or company commanders should have the knowledge and capabilities to request a MEDEVAC. The operation plan (OPLAN) will explain the routing of a MEDEVAC request. A MEDEVAC request does not actually bring the helicopter to the LZ. The request simply identifies the requesting unit, location of the LZ, and describes the casualty. The DASC will make the necessary arrangements/decisions concerning the MEDEVAC.

The importance of a well-thought-out MEDEVAC plan cannot be emphasized enough. The lives of everyone in the unit depend on it. All personnel assigned to the unit must know the MEDEVAC procedures. The elements requiring special consideration are litter bearers and LZ security.

**Litter Bearers:** Litter bearers should be individuals capable of safely carrying the litter and the patient from the edge of the LZ to the helicopter. A minimum of two people is required, one at each end of the litter however a four-person carry (figure 18) is highly recommended for both patient and bearer safety.

![Figure 18](image)

A member of the helicopter crew will provide direction for bringing and loading the patient for transport. The wash from the helicopter blades will generate a great deal of dust and debris, be sure to remove any hats before entering the LZ and use protective eyewear. In most cases of MEDEVAC, the pilot will not shut down the engine or rotors to load the patient.
NOTE: DO NOT approach the helicopter until directed to do so by a member of the crew.