External Evaluation of the Haiti Emergency Relief & Response Fund (ERRF), 2008-2011

FINAL REPORT, 18-Apr-11
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Acknowledgements

The contents and conclusions of this evaluation report reflect strictly the opinion of the author, and in no way those of UN, OCHA or donors.

All stakeholders that shared their opinions with me (beneficiaries, recipients, would-be recipients, donors, clusters leads, project managers, ERRF managers and more) are warmly thanked for their generous time and insightful advice. I hope to have correctly captured your concerns. A special thanks to those in OCHA/Haiti and NY for the excellent organization and logistics that guided this evaluation mission.

Questions, corrections and concerns can be directed to me by email: lezlie@email.arizona.edu.
Executive Summary

The Haiti Emergency Relief & Response Fund (ERRF) was activated in 2008 (start-up funding by Sweden) with the goal of enabling the international community to better support local authorities by providing rapid and flexible funding to meet unforeseen needs in the event of disasters of natural origin. From the beginning, the two planned outcomes of the Haiti/ERRF were reduced human suffering and improved coordinated response through strategic financing.

The Haiti/ERRF, responsible for the largest annual portfolio in the history of the mechanism, is one of 16 of its kind managed by OCHA across the globe. The Haiti/ERRF has received a total of approximately $85.2 million in donations from at least 42 different donors since August 2008. Norway (for hurricanes in 2008) and Denmark (for 2010 earthquake) were the earliest funds available to OCHA. Sweden (for hurricanes in 2008) and Saudi Arabia (for 2010 earthquake) were the largest contributors. Sweden is the most sustained donor (contributions to both disasters and to the ERRF start-up fund).

From January to March 2011, the full Haiti/ERRF mechanism was evaluated by an external independent consultant. The aim of the evaluation was to explore how the mechanism contributed to a more timely, predictable, effective and accountable humanitarian response. The evaluation compiled evidence from in-depth key informant interviews, focus group discussions, grant registry analysis, an e-survey and site visits to six projects. Built on a thorough review of donor expectations and past evaluations, evaluation results are detailed in the present report.

Results

Although not mentioned in the generic ERRF Management Terms of Reference (ToR), one of the most important and time consuming tasks perceived by ERRF management is the design of proposals—a strong factor in quality control. Also played down by the ToR is the overwhelming responsibility of P-4 level leaders in a constantly evolving OCHA County Office. Another controversial task is CERF management, which draws on the same knowledge base required by ERRF. It appears that when crafting these ToR, insufficient evidence and knowledge of day to day realities may have been applied.

The Haiti/ERRF has, to date, disbursed $74.8 million to 51 Implementing Partners to roll out 80 projects that responded to three discrete disaster events: hurricanes of 2008/9, earthquake in January 2010 and cholera.

As a response to the 12 January 2010 earthquake, decisions were made to channel over $45 million through the Haiti/ERRF to UN agencies with envelope sizes that were stark exceptions to that accepted under ERRF mandate. Even if these exceptional envelopes were designed for eventual redistribution to NGO implementing partners (for which evidence was scant), they did not make humanitarian response any more rapid and their existence detracted from the ERF mechanism mandate.
Prior to project implementation, Haiti/ERRF proposals go through five stages of processing: 1) design/vetting, 2) review board, 3) endorsement, 4) clearance and 5) disbursement. Thereafter, granted projects enter their implementation phase in which ERRF management is responsible for oversight, review, M&E and later, close-out.

Together, Stages 1 to 4 represent an average of 64.8 calendar days invested (excluding an additional average of 12 days for Stage 5, disbursement). Exceeding two months, this period from first proposal to signed authorization to start activities is difficult to consider rapid. Evidence suggests that Stage 1, Design (resting on the shoulders of ERRF and IPs) consumes nearly half (48) of this time and Stage 4, Clearance (mainly with OCHA AO) another third (36%). Furthermore, retroactivity of expenses to the date of the HC endorsement ended in Nov 2010 and there is great concern from IPs that this will cause further delays. The Haiti ERRF was nonetheless rapid when it absolutely had to be: during the response efforts immediately following the earthquake and cholera outbreak, ERRF was able to accelerate and lobby for faster processing rates for all stages.

Out of 58 earthquake and cholera projects, evidence suggests that half were suggested by the cluster mechanism, roughly one-third from the ERRF Management team and the rest unsolicited from partners. No matter the trigger, all 58 and those in 2008/9 went through the same rigorous and documented review process. The cluster coordination mechanism was successful in bringing to the surface appropriate proposals that meet identified needs. The ERRF management team took seriously their role of identifying needs and soliciting the right match of geographical and technical focus with partners that were able to produce positive results.

At each of the five processing stages, there are checks and balances assuring quality control. At least 232 proposals were received and archived by ERRF management. The overall project success rate is 35% with an additional 44% rejected and 13% withdrawn. As further testament to the prioritization of project design and formulation, the average number of proposal versions submitted per successful project is 2.65 (the highest is 8). There were at least three incidents whereby a proposal was rejected at the level of the Review Board.

Post grant monitoring of Haiti/ERRF projects has been less systematic. As of the present evaluation, a total of 30 M&E visits had been conducted by various ERRF and OCHA staff, representing more than half the Haiti/ERRF earthquake portfolio. Monitored projects were duly reviewed, documented and rectifications proposed when appropriate. Evidence suggests that a single M&E visit, however, entails an investment of minimum 10 hours work. Finding the required 62 days at the right time within an ERRF officer’s one year contract is a monumental task—one that would entail craftily planning roughly one (1) visit every working week.

All responsibilities described above and many more have been managed by no more than two (2) staff at any given time since the inception of Haiti/ERRF. In the aftermath of the humanitarian industry’s largest urban disaster (12 January 2010) and given both the plentitude of funding and numerous evaluations stressing the importance of...
appropriate ERF staffing, this evaluation has failed to gather sufficient evidence to understand how one of the largest ERFs in the history of the mechanism was managed by one of the smallest ERF field teams.

Achievements

NGO:UN Ratio of ERR Portfolio: Excluding the Exceptional Envelopes (EEs, >$45 million allocated to UN/IOM for which decisions were not the responsibility of Haiti/ERRF), the Haiti/ERRF mechanism remained true to its aim of prioritizing NGOs over UN/Int. Org. at a ratio of 74:36.

Two outcomes and objectives: The Haiti ERRF appears to be primed for success in meeting its objectives and outcomes. Out of 80 projects, 54% have objectives that aim to contribute to reduce suffering. Another 19% of the projects aim to contribute directly to improved coordination. At least 11% of the 80 projects explicitly aim to support GoH structures. Another 38% of the 80 projects were designed to specifically nurture links to long-term development initiatives. Although it is not possible to empirically conclude on success prior to consistently rolling out M&E, this analysis demonstrates that projects are aligned to ERRF goals and criteria.

Strengths: Despite overwhelming constraints, the main strengths of the Haiti/ERRF include flexibility, proximity, approachability, alignment inside the cluster architecture (fostering coordination), visibility for OCHA and ability to leverage $163 million in additional funds (indicating that approved projects were worth more than three times their weight). Flexibility was the single most recognized quality of the Haiti/ERRF, followed by targeting of marginalized populations and relevance. Informants found that the ERRF derives its relevance by addressing evolving priority needs—as manifest in the evolution of project selection criteria with each new disaster event.

Weaknesses: Many of Haiti/ERRF weaknesses are bound more by the design of the mechanism than its manifestation in Haiti. They include: ambition fraught with contradictions (i.e., life saving, but with a measurable link to recovery/development and a design for field-based localized efforts primarily outside CAP, but subject to 50% redirection by exceptional decisions made at a higher level). Other weaknesses are feeble support to government and national NGOs and inadequate monitoring and communication.

While only a manager of funds, Haiti/ERRF threw OCHA into the driver’s seat among major donors; with $80 million, ERRF was suddenly perceived by many as “one of the big-boys” in Haiti, and was ill-equipped (experience, number of staff and a completely different mandate) to join that club. The Haiti/ERRF presented a unique opportunity and a rare volume of funding that may never be replicated. If volumes of this level were to become a trend for ERFs, it could entirely change the future face of OCHA—who must be poised to take on this new profile based on evolving perceptions of stakeholders.

ERF is a convenient channel for humanitarian funding, especially into countries where donors have no presence. This is conditional, however, on full trust in the transparency of ERF management and its M&E capacity—transparency that is not felt to date by donors. Few of the Haiti/ERRF weaknesses would have been evident
had there been adequate numbers of staff at the right times.

**Recommendations**

Among the main recommendations, most of them fall on FCS to oversee and monitor. The majority of them can be applied to ERFs in general. In the final chapter, specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and, when possible, time-bound recommendations are provided for each main category that follows:

1. **Strictly respect the ERF mandate—without allowing ‘exceptional’ uses.** Allow ERF to be true to its mandate and OCHA to add, through the ERF, greater transparency to selection of partner/project. To this end, OCHA/FCS will need to provide more analysis and tracking of the various funding mechanisms available to absorb large donations.

2. **Reform the human resources component of ERF management:** strengthen and finalize staffing recommendations highlighting the following: numbers of projects (as opposed to total volume), varying staff needs (numbers and profiles) at different times and recognizing that grant management post disbursement through close-out is equally—if not more—important than proposal processing. A roster of ERF experienced and trained professionals needs to be developed. ERF and CERF leaders need to seriously explore the merging of fund management in the field. Cluster coordinators and OCHA field staff need to specifically mention ERF tasks in their Terms of Reference.

3. **Compile a greater support package to Haiti/ERRF from OCHA headquarters.** This includes more frequent visits, the production/updating of a set of ERF support tools (guidelines, ToRs, best practice templates, briefing packages and a certificate training course to use with cluster coordinators, IPs and OCHA field officers). To better liaise with donors and track progress, the production and tracking of two new frameworks are recommended: ERF Mechanism Logical Framework and a Comprehensive Project Logical Framework (examples are provided). Regarding financial management, it is suggested that FCS lobby for 20% allocation from that mechanism to ERF, that retroactivity of funding be granted, that a thorough study of the five phases is conducted to propose strategies to reduce delays, and that blanket audits are reconsidered.

4. **Build closer partnerships with national and local governments and NGOs:** organize a workshop to exchange options and best practice.

5. **Strengthen ERF process of strategizing:** produce a strategy revision template and organize stakeholder discussions on the pros and cons of ERF Advisory Boards.

6. **Improve ERF communication and M&E components:** develop a series of tools that simplify communication to a few clicks. Streamline M&E tools and use OCHA field staff and cluster coordinators more creatively to monitor every project at least once.

Much more than simply “80 beautiful adventures”, the ERRF portfolio in Haiti has made history as the largest ERF ever managed. Many efforts combined to make it the success it continues to be. Despite all of its weaknesses, voices converge to say that ERRF is, and should remain, a pertinent pillar in the humanitarian architecture in Haiti.
Contents

1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1
   1.1 Background .................................................................................................................. 1
   1.2 Evaluation Goals and Objectives .................................................................................. 2
   1.3 Methodology: Approaches and Tools Used ................................................................. 3
   1.4 Strengths and challenges ............................................................................................. 5
   1.5 Structure of findings and the present report ............................................................... 6

2. ERRF/Haiti context ............................................................................................................... 8
   2.1 History & Timeline ....................................................................................................... 8
   2.2 ERRF/Haiti Stakeholders ............................................................................................. 9

3. ERRF/Haiti mechanism & management ............................................................................ 12
   3.1 Roles & Responsibilities ............................................................................................ 12
   3.2 Project selection ......................................................................................................... 14
   3.3 Quality Control .......................................................................................................... 16
   3.4 General Project Management and Timing of Processing Stages ............................... 20
   3.5 Human Resources ...................................................................................................... 27
   3.6 ERRF Portfolio ........................................................................................................... 28

4. ERRF/Haiti achievements ................................................................................................ 32
   4.1 Meeting Objectives .................................................................................................... 32
   4.2 ERRF/Haiti strengths: double edged swords ............................................................ 32
   4.3 ERRF/Haiti Weaknesses: fraught with contradictions ............................................. 36

5. Discussion: Answering key questions .......................................................................... 40

6. Conclusions & linked recommendations .......................................................................... 53

Annexes and Support Documents: .................................................................................. 59
Tables & Figures

Tables

Table 1: Overview of ERRF/Haiti (2008-11) .......................................................... 2
Table 2: Case Study Hypotheses that guided ‘Diversity Sampling’ ............................................. 5
Table 3: Success Rate of ERRF Proposals ........................................................................... 17
Table 4: ERRF Monitoring Visits ....................................................................................... 19
Table 5: Timing of ERRF Stage “0” ................................................................................... 21
Table 6: Days Invested in ERRF Processing, per Stage ......................................................... 23
Table 7: ERRF/Haiti Staffing compared to Draft Recommendations ........................................ 27
Table 8: Synthesis of the Haiti/ERRF Portfolio (2008-11) .................................................... 29
Table 9: Comparative Distribution of ERRF Funds: NGOs and UN/Int. Org. ............................... 30
Table 10: Most Funded Implementing Partners .................................................................... 31
Table 11: Geographical Focus of ERRF Projects .................................................................... 31
Table 12: Double-edged Swords of Haiti/ERRF .................................................................... 36
Table 13: Proposed Mechanism Log Frame for Future ERFs ................................................ 44
Table 14: Comparison of CERF and ERRF, as responding to the CAP (Adapted from CERF Website) ................................................................. 50

Figures

Figure 1: Stakeholder Mapping ......................................................................................... 10
Figure 2: Project “Triggers” .............................................................................................. 15
Figure 3: Flow of Projects, Newly Approved and Monitored .............................................. 18
Figure 5: Contribution of 4 Stages to the Haiti/ERRF Grant Processing Period .................. 25
Figure 6: Number of Projects at Each Stage of ERRF Processing ........................................ 26
Figure 7: ERRF, rapid when it must be ............................................................................. 48
Acronyms

**ACF**, Action Contre la Faim

**ACTED**, Agence d’aide a la Coop Tech. et au Development

**ALNAP**, Active Learning Network for Accountability & Performance

**AMURT**, Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team

**AO**, Accounting Office (OCHA GVA)

**CAP**, Consolidated Appeals Process

**CCCM**, Camp Coordination Camp Management

**CDAC**, Communication with Disaster-Affected Communities

**CERF**, Central Emergency Response Fund

**CfW**, Cash for Work

**EE**, Exceptional Envelopes

**ER**, Early Recovery Cluster

**ERF**, Emergency Response Fund (OCHA NY)

**ERRF**, Emergency Relief Response Fund

**ERC**, Emergency Relief Coordinator

**HC**, Humanitarian Coordinator

**HODR**, Hands On Disaster Relief

**FAO**, Food and Agriculture Office

**FCS**, Funding Coordination Section (OCHA NY)

**FG**, Focus Group

**GoH**, Government of Haiti

**GVA**, Geneva

**HAO**, Humanitarian Affairs Officer (OCHA)

**HoO**, Head of Office (i.e., OCHA)

**ICC**, Inter Cluster Coordination

**IOM**, International Office for Migration

**INGO**, International Non-Governmental Organization

**IRC**, International Rescue Committee

**KI**, Key Informant

**LOE**, Letter of Endorsement

**M&E**, Monitoring and Evaluation

**MINUSTAH**, UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti

**MOU**, Memorandum of Understanding

**NCE**, No Cost Extension

**NGO**, National Non-Governmental Agency

**NY**, New York

**OCHA**, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

**OIOS**, Office of Internal Oversight Service

**PAH**, Pharmaciens et Aide Humanitaire

**PSAE**, Protection against Sexual Exploitation and Abuses

**SIDA**, Swedish International Dev. Agency

**ToR**, Terms of Reference

**UNEP**, United Nations Environmental Program

**UNOPS**, United Nations Office for Project Services

**USCRI**, US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants

**WASH**, Water, Sanitation & Hygiene Cluster

**WFP**, World Food Program

**UN**, United Nations

**UNDP**, United Nations Development Program
1. Introduction

1.1 Background

In 2007, aiming to address disaster response, recovery and reconciliation needs in Haiti, two multi-donor funds were put in place, with support from Noraid and SIDA: the Recovery and Reconciliation Fund (RRF, set up to support newly acquired community stability and to assist the democratic process) and the Emergency Relief Response Fund (ERRF, created to enable partners to respond quickly and in a coordinated manner to address unforeseen needs arising from disasters linked to natural and other hazards). Together they formed the 3R Mechanism (Relief, Recovery and Reconciliation) in Haiti. Elsewhere, these funds are commonly referred to as ‘Emergency Response Funds (ERF)’—a humanitarian pooled funding mechanism managed by OCHA since 1997\(^1\) across 16 countries.

The ERRF in Haiti focuses on emergency response and enables the international community to better support local authorities by providing rapid and flexible funding to implement projects that meet unforeseen needs—the key words being local, rapid, flexible and unforeseen. As per the approved and final proposal document (24 June 2008), the two main outcomes of the ERRF in Haiti are the following:

- **Reduced human suffering** through quick and effective response to sudden emergency/natural disasters by meeting short-term humanitarian needs, such as food, shelter, water and sanitation and health care services; and
- **Improved coordinated response** to an emergency through strategic financing.

Additional objectives of the ERRF are to:

- **Strengthen coordination mechanisms** among partners and minimize duplication through enhanced consultation at different levels and involvement of relevant clusters;
- **Support joint initiatives** in providing capacity to deliver visible and high impact projects that garner public confidence in the state (Government of Haiti), reducing vulnerability and risk;
- **Solidify links with long-term development programs** by supporting coping strategies that prevent further erosion of livelihood assets through community-driven initiatives.

Although not a formal outcome or objective per se, project and approach innovation has also been encouraged by the Haiti/ERRF.

At least 42 donors combined to provide roughly $85.5 million in funds to be managed by the Haiti/ERRF. The Haiti/ERRF has, as of the date of this evaluation, disbursed $74.8 million in funding to 51 Implementing Partners (IPs) to roll out 80 projects that responded to three discrete disaster events (See Table 1, all numbers are approximate and are derived from ERRF databases and archives as of 27 January 2011).

\(^1\) The first ERF was developed inside OCHA/Angola in 1997 (included in CAP). Source: Qualitative Description, 7 April 2006.
1.2 Evaluation Goals and Objectives

The goal of the evaluation is to take stock of the Haiti/ERRF since its 2008 activation in Haiti and to provide feedback on its relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and connectedness to stakeholders, with the aim of highlighting ERRF operational strengths and areas for improvement, while also noting anecdotal evidence that may be directly attributed to the ERRF. The evaluation is a part of the requirement set under the ERRF donor agreement conditions.

The evaluation aims to explore how the ERRF has contributed to a more timely, predictable, effective and accountable humanitarian response. It will assess both the management processes and operational aspects of the fund. The objectives of the evaluation are to:

1) Assess to what extent the ERRF was able to meet its objectives (two primary and three secondary);
2) Identify strengths and weaknesses in operational processes (i.e. governance, project selection, decision making process for fund allocations);
3) Review standard ALNAP criteria such as the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, connectedness and cross-cutting issues (such as gender and vulnerable groups);
4) Identify improvements that would help strengthen the functioning of the ERRF as well as areas working particularly well which might be systematized and applied in other ERF contexts.

The period covered by the evaluation was fixed for September 2008 to February 2011 (the date of the analysis) —fully including the evolution during and since the January 2010 Earthquake. It should be noted, however, that when comparing its management under Tropical Storms 2008/9 and the sheer volume of destruction, needs and humanitarian aid related to the 2010 Earthquake, the ERRF mechanism was and remains inevitably different. The current focus of the present evaluation is strictly on the ERRF and does not include the earlier Recovery and Reconciliation Fund (RRF) component of the 3Rs Mechanism, which was scaled down in 2009.

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2 An addition $3.5 million in projects are being reviewed and are likely to be approved.
1.3 Methodology: Approaches and Tools Used

This evaluation triangulates qualitative/anecdotal and quantitative information at multiple levels. It employed the following approaches, listed in order of use through time, starting 24 Jan 2011:

- In-depth discussions
- Desk Review
- Stakeholder Mapping Exercise
- E-Survey
- Focus Group Discussions and Interviews with Key Informants
- Case Study/Field Visits.

Each of the key evaluation questions that were listed in the Terms of Reference for the present evaluation are tallied in Appendix B with a tabular explanation of which methodological approach most readily contributed answers found in Chapter 5.

In-depth discussions

Discussions were organized for four (4) full days with the initial and former Haiti/ERRF Manager: Caroline Pégue and Evaluation Reference Group (24-27 Jan 2011 in NY). Caroline Pégue holds the only institutional memory of the Haiti ERRF in OCHA since its 2008 inception. Beyond a broad and general understanding of the history of the Haiti/ERRF, products resulting from the period together were the transfer of necessary documents and files for the Desk Review (Annex D) and a draft Stakeholder Mapping/analysis. Similar in-depth discussions, in which products and elements of understanding were refreshed and updated, continued throughout the two-week mission to Haiti with Bernard LePlaive, current ERRF Manager.

Desk and Database Review

The main component of the Desk Review included an examination of all Haiti/ERRF documents and project databases. These have been studied so as to gain clear understanding of priorities, evolution, and full coverage of funded projects/beneficiary targets (cluster and geographic spread of the impact of the ERRF). All previous evaluations of pooled funding mechanisms, especially those linked to the UN humanitarian system, form a baseline and foundation for the present evaluation. A list of documents reviewed to date appears in Annex D.

The ERRF database and archives analyzed were compiled and maintained by ERRF/Haiti staff. They tally details of each proposal presented to ERRF, including those later withdrawn or rejected, and supply dates and explanations for each stage of the review, selection, and contracting processes. The databases and archives are organized in a logical format with sub-directories holding multiple versions of all proposals and related reports, official signed documents and copies of email correspondence relating to each partner. From the ERRF database (version updated 27 Jan 2011), the evaluation has been able to calculate success rates of project proposals per cluster and type of partner, rapidity of disbursement (in relation to disaster events), time invested in each stage of the review and contracting processes,

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3 The database for 2008/9 (prior to the earthquake) did not include dates for each stage of the process and was therefore excluded from the timing component of the analysis.
and total funding allocated or disbursed per cluster, partner type and geographical region.

**Stakeholder Mapping**

Stakeholder mapping was used as a starting point for debate to increase understanding of stakeholder perceptions. The diagram puts the ERRF mechanism at the center, and aims to demonstrate relationships between the stakeholders. *Size* of shape / entity denotes influence on the ERRF. *Proximity* to ERRF explains typical / daily interaction during the roll-out of the ERRF for a given emergency. During in-depth discussions with the initial Haiti ERRF Manager, Caroline Pégue, an initial stakeholder mapping exercise was drafted. This was later updated in Haiti with current ERRF Manager, Bernard LeFlaive.

**E-Survey**

An E-Survey was prepared in two languages and sent to all known Haiti/ERRF stakeholders. A link to the on-line survey was sent in a cover letter from SIDA to all stakeholders on 14 Feb 2010. Heads of agencies and cluster coordinators associated with projects funded by Haiti/ERRF were encouraged to forward the E-survey invite/link to all staff exposed to this pooled funding mechanism. Those targeted for this E-Survey are over 200 as follows:

- recipient or implementing partner entities since 2008 (app. 80 projects / 51 entities);
- donors to the OCHA ERRF/Haiti (app. 40);
- other stakeholders (HC and OCHA staff, management, etc.).

A sample of this wide set of potential respondents is not necessary as the link was sent to all available email addresses without any additional effort. Moreover, the greater the number of addressees—the higher was the potential number of responses. A response rate of 10% was desired, and 18% (N=33) was achieved when the survey closed on 4 March 2011. The E-Survey was set up in surveygizmo.com and was designed to take no longer than 15min for any respondent on-line. See Appendix F for a copy of the e-Survey instrument.

**Key Informants (KI): Focus Group (FG) and Interviews**

As part of the field work (11 to 23 Feb 2011), a focus group was organized with all active Cluster Coordinators (≈15) in Haiti to gather perceptions from a wide set of stakeholders that form one of the main targets and mechanisms for the roll-out of the ERRF semi-structured interviews and less formal communications providing qualitative evidence were held with over 70 key informants identified during the stakeholder and database analysis. These included many levels of inquiry such as HQ and Haiti, UN Agencies, I/NNGOs, Donor entities, members of the ERRF Review board and the Humanitarian Coordinator. A topical outline used for FG and KI discussions is attached in Appendix G.

**Case Study / field visits**

Also as part of the field work, the evaluation sampled and visited a select group of ERRF-funded projects to assess results that may be attributed to ERRF funding. This information is anecdotal and there was no expectation of finding visible results from
projects completed in 2008/9. For these visits, the only feasible ‘sampling’ of site visits was inevitably non-representative. The ‘sampling’ technique employed, therefore, is often referred to as “diversity selection”. Site visits were organized with six projects that, together, were thought to demonstrate widely diverging criteria, as diverse a set of projects as was possible. The six visits were hypothesized to capture at least five aspects differently (see Table 2), allowing an exploration of the range of impacts and challenges, as perceived by the person who best knows the current portfolio, i.e., the ERRF Manager.

Table 2: **Case Study Hypotheses that guided ‘Diversity Sampling’**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency (Project#)</th>
<th>Emergency / Cluster</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Funding Scale</th>
<th>Alignment w/ Community or GoH</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. AMURT (#56)</strong></td>
<td>Earthquake/ER-Env</td>
<td>Anse Rouge</td>
<td>High (leveraged $1.3m)</td>
<td>Com: Strong</td>
<td>1st and only project with ERRF, low visibility, strong integration in community, good use of Cash for Work and environment protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. PAH (#62 and 75)</strong></td>
<td>Earthquake and Cholera / Health</td>
<td>Petit Goave</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>GoH: Strong</td>
<td>2 projects simultaneously, with strong capacity building of state structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. HODR (#69)</strong></td>
<td>Earthquake/Shelter</td>
<td>Leogane</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Com: Strong</td>
<td>1st and only project with ERRF, good community integration, innovative approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. ACF (#71)</strong></td>
<td>Cholera/WASH</td>
<td>Gonaives</td>
<td>Medium (leveraged $3.1m)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Regular ERRF partner (4 projects since 2008) with long term presence in area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Handicap Int’l(#79)</strong></td>
<td>Cholera/Log</td>
<td>Petit Goave</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1st and only project with ERRF, filled important gap in logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. ACTED (#80)</strong></td>
<td>Cholera/WASH</td>
<td>St. Marc</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Com: Strong</td>
<td>Regular ERRF partner, 1st ERRF project in WASH (out of 3 total since 2008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.4 Strengths and challenges

The strength of this choice of methodologies is derived from its triangulation of multiple sources of information. A larger number of sources typically fosters a finer level of understanding. The methodology proposed, however, has found imperfect solutions to compensate for two interlinked fundamental challenges:

- high turn-over of personnel from all levels, agencies and clusters (including OCHA): only rarely were we able to find people who had been in Haiti (or at least knowledgeable about efforts in Haiti) for an extended period of time or during the moments for which we were seeking key information (e.g., decisions, first contact with ERRF, etc.);
- the time frame of the evaluation covering projects dated back to 2008.

One solution identified by OCHA/FCS was to organize for the former ERRF Manager to spend one intensive week with the evaluator in NY. Another potential solution was to

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4 The E-Survey was developed explicitly to offer greater chances of capturing the opinions of a wider, more representative range of stakeholder opinion. Over 200 respondents received invitations to complete the survey online.
send E-survey invitations to managers of former projects (and their respective agencies) as well as ERRF/Haiti managers and donors, hoping to capture their perspectives. In fact, the E-survey captured the opinions of at least 5 stakeholders from the 2008/9 Hurricane Response (15% of all respondents).

1.5 Structure of findings and the present report

In summary, results, conclusions and recommendations compiled in this report are aligned from four main sources of evidence of very different nature:

- **Qualitative evidence** is compiled from observation and from discussions with over 70 key informants during focus group meetings, interviews (formal and informal) and case studies. As for most evaluations, the largest portion of findings for the present effort is derived from this qualitative evidence.
- **Electronic-survey**: an additional source of information on 33 respondents that lends itself more readily to numbers but is neither statistically valid nor representative of any subset of respondents.
- **Database review and analysis**: a source of information that relies entirely on the rigor and validity of the ERRF/Haiti proposal/grant registry (with files and dates for each project, partner and phase) through 28 January 2011.
- **Literature review**: past evaluation reports, pertinent texts and ERRF documents were carefully reviewed to gain perspective for this evaluation.

All of the four sources above produce data—pieces of information that, when triangulated and compared across the full set, become information. If the information appears pertinent, it is considered a finding, or a result. Descriptive text in this evaluation results from both qualitative and quantitative findings; it is systematically compiled and derived from the pieces of evidence tallied above. When the analysis of a piece of evidence aligns across cases or sources to tell a story within this evaluation it is then substantiated and serves to fuel conclusions and eventually recommendations.

All of the evidence compiled—qualitative and quantitative—is filtered through the eyes and ears of the evaluator. It is thus invariably subjective but gains validity through rigorous triangulation, the profile and experience of the evaluator and a transparent presentation. Most of the conclusions and recommendations are also therefore inevitably subjective, although derived from all possible sources of evidence.

In the present evaluation report, compiled evidence is laid out through results in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.

- In Chapter 2, Context, the evidence is derived from an analysis of timing and stakeholders that are crucial to fully understand the ERRF/Haiti mechanism.
- In Chapter 3, the evidence is compiled from all four sources to foster a solid understanding of the ERRF mechanism and its management in Haiti.
- In Chapter 4, evidence is aligned to highlight the Haiti ERRF achievements, as compared to its original objectives.

Together, these three chapters form the results of the evaluation.

Starting at the end of results above, but above all highlighted in Chapter 5 (Answering Key Questions) is analysis and discussion, in which main trends are teased out of the
evidence presented earlier. It refers specifically to the Evaluation’s Terms of Reference questions.

In Chapter 6 (Conclusions & Recommendations) very succinct concepts are carried forward to fuel the articulation of specific/single, measurable, achievable, result-oriented and time-bound (SMART) recommendations.
2. ERRF/Haiti Context

2.1 History & Timeline
The ERRF Component of the 3R (Relief, Recovery and Reconciliation) Mechanism was proposed by OCHA personnel to Swedish representatives visiting Haiti in 2008. At that time, ERFs already existed since 1997 in various forms across a dozen or so countries, often funded by Sweden/Sida (e.g., Angola, DRC and Somalia). Near the end of June 2008, OCHA prepared a proposal, entitled “Emergency Relief Response Fund of the Relief, Recovery and Reconciliation Mechanism” and submitted it to Sida as a project. The original budget was for US$2 million to cover ERRF activities from Sep. 2008 to end Nov. 2009 (15 months). These documents form the foundation and baseline for the evaluation.

A timeline (See Annex Table A1) depicts the evolution of events across four categories: disasters, ERRF mechanism, funding and human resources. Shaded cells (or those with an ‘X’) depict the months of occurrence; numbers depict the date of a given month, when such detail was available and pertinent. Greater detail on each category is provided below.

Disasters and events
Although the chronic fate of the country, disasters of natural origin in Haiti seem to have accelerated since the ERRF was created. Although recurrent in low lying parts of the country (22% area), floods were rarely signaled as requiring humanitarian assistance except for 2007, and to a lesser extent in 2009 (mentioned in CERF projects). The series of destructive hurricanes (Fay, Hanna, Gustave and Ike) in August and September 2008 triggered the first major ERRF/Haiti response. The infamous devastating 12 Jan. 2010 earthquake was followed in July and Sept. of the same year by short-lived nameless storms; Hurricane Tomas struck Haiti shores on 7 Nov. 2010 with only minor destruction. The first case of cholera was detected on 19 Oct. 2010, just one month before the first tour of the presidential elections.

ERRF Mechanism
Although conceived in August 2007, the ERRF component was proposed and approved mid-year 2008 and funds were available starting 10 August 2008. ERRF projects addressing humanitarian needs resulting from the hurricane season started as early as Sep. 2008, the ensemble of which lasted over 12 months. There was a short break

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5 During the 19-26 Feb 2008 mission to Haiti, “Swedish SEKA/HUM met with the DSRSG/UN RC/HC in Haiti, Joel Boutroue, and OCHA/UNDP staff, Caroline Péguet, who presented a proposal to support an Emergency Response Fund for Disasters in Haiti. SEKA/HUM expressed initial interest in these plans and requested additional information on the fund as a response to possible disasters, including applicable lessons from the ERF evaluation in 2007 by Development Initiatives” (SOURCE: Sida Trip Report).
6 Shortly prior to this series of events, in 2007, the Norwegian government had financed the start-up of Haiti’s Recovery and Reconciliation Fund (RRF), an earlier now inactive component of the same 3R Mechanism.
7 Source: DPC/WB/UNDP
for ERRF until the first of 65 earthquake response projects received disbursement on 8 Feb. 2010. Around 27 May 2010, after relative calm returned, ERRF made the decision to stop reviewing all projects for a few weeks in order to strategize for the imminent hurricane season, introduce the return and reintegration of earthquake IDPs and plan more systematic M&E. Shortly after this hiatus, Hurricane Tomas and, more importantly the cholera epidemic, set into motion another series of projects (10 to date) starting 8 Nov 2010.

**ERRF Funding**

A final official agreement was signed between Sweden and OCHA (6 Aug 2008) providing 12 million SEK for 22 months (Sep. 2008 through 30 Jun 2010; 6 million SEK 1 Oct 08; 6 million SEK on 1 Oct 09 and another 12 million SEK on 4 Dec 2008). An additional sum was donated by Sida in early December 2008 following the hurricanes (US$ 886 115). United Kingdom and Norway also contributed to the Haiti/ERRF in 2008.

The earliest major donors following the 12 Jan. 2010 earthquake were Denmark ($5.1 mill on 19 Jan 2010) and Saudi Arabia ($50 mill on 19 Jan 2010). Inevitably, volumes of this size drastically changed its face and personality and stakeholders started to perceive Haiti/ERRF as a donor.

Project ceilings varied with each new emergency from $130,000 following the 2008 hurricanes, $750,000 for the earthquakes to $500,000 for cholera. A major funding issue, the retroactivity of expenses to the date of Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) endorsement (LoE), was permissible until 11 Nov 2010; this is mentioned here because since that date it is an important constraint that incurs significant delays in ERRF’s humanitarian response. It is explored in greater depth below.

**Human resources**

The P-2 level officer assigned to MINUSTAH but working in the Office of the DSRSG/RC/HC mainly supporting OCHA was in Haiti at the inception of the ERRF/Haiti (starting in April 2007 based in the HC Office). She managed the ERRF until her departure from Haiti on 11 October 2009. She returned (as a P-3) to Haiti under surge capacity for earthquake response on 24 January (following 4 days in DR while she assisted with a CERF proposal) and stayed with ERRF until 5 April 2010. During that period, she trained a P-2 ERRF recruit who started on 5 March and stayed for under one year. The latter was accompanied, starting 1 April 2010, by a P-4 officer who will end his one year contract 31 March 2011. The original officer returned to Haiti as surge from 4 to 22 August 2010.

### 2.2 ERRF/Haiti Stakeholders

Stakeholder hereby signifies all actors that have an investment and/or interest (actual or idealized) in the Haiti/ERRF. Stakeholders of the Haiti/ERRF are numerous and include but are not limited to the following: project beneficiaries, Government of Haiti

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8 The total Swedish contribution for the effort prior to the 12 Jan. 2010 earthquake was approximately US$3.7million. Adding the SIDA contribution post-earthquake in 2010 (US$817, 560), Sweden has contributed nearly US$4.5 million.
(GoH), Implementing Partners (IPs, recipient NGOs and UN bodies), the larger ERRF/Haiti Review Board (including both cluster leads, coordinators and participants), donors, OCHA/Haiti office, the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), OCHA/AO-Geneva, OCHA/NY-Funding Coordination Section (FCS, created in Jan. 2009) as well as the ERRF Manager and Support Officers.

The relationships between these stakeholders are displayed in Figure 1 below. This mapping exercise was conducted with both ERRF Managers but represents the current, rather than the combined, state of perceptions. The map is inevitably static and does not show nuances of evolution through time. With the Haiti/ERRF as the center black rhombus, relationships are depicted through their size (importance to ERRF/Operations) and distance (tightness of communication channels). The donors are on the left while the most active partners in review and project implementation are on the right.

From the mapping exercise above, as validated by the ERRF Managers, the most important stakeholders include donors, the clusters and the HC, following, as a close third, by the OCHA Country office and NGOs. The common perception is that the least important stakeholders to ERRF management have been the GoH and OCHA’s FCS
Desk, based in NY. In terms of communication channels, the OCHA Country Office and Clusters provided the most daily contacts while GoH, FCS and to a lesser extent, donors, formed the most distant channels. The Review Board is the ERRF mechanism’s entity created to validate the review process, guided closely by Cluster Lead Agencies and other pertinent members at large.

It is useful to note here that in many ERFs an additional fluid entity, Advisory Board, exists somewhere on the left hand side, as a platform for strategic reflection and guidance. This board never existed in Haiti due to time constraints and manpower—beyond the pages of certain documents; prior to the 12 Jan 2010 Earthquake, donors were routinely copied on communications to the Review Board to satisfy commitments while saving time.

The OCHA Country Office was reportedly requested by FCS to assemble an advisory board; the issue was discussed at various intervals but never materialized, mainly due to perceived lack of added value given time constraints. This was due to a combination of factors: one, the rhythm of the period was still frenetic; two, the team in charge lacked in experience and three, the Terms of Reference for the Advisory Board were in very draft form making membership very unclear—especially with regards to high turnover of staff in country (potential members were either in surge capacity or very recently arrived). At this moment, organizing an additional meeting was considered potentially counter-productive and the decision not to activate the Advisory Board was made by the Head of Office (HoO).

In retrospect, current ERRF management reports that an Advisory Board could have been organized to endorse the refocus of the ERRF strictly on cholera ($500,000 ceiling and 3-month projects) but the strategic refocus at that time was obvious to everyone engaged and the information was disseminated through the OCHA bulletin, inter-cluster and cluster meetings, and field offices.
3. ERRF Mechanism & Management

This section compiles evidence from all four sources to help understand the ERRF mechanism and its management. Starting with Roles & Responsibilities, the chapter explores the evidence compiled on project selection, quality control, general project management (by phase) and time required for each processing stage and human resources. It ends with a presentation of the ERRF Portfolio. Although mainly particular to Haiti, comparison is also made when possible to ERFs in other settings.

3.1 Roles & Responsibilities

Prior to analyzing the adequacy of human resources put at the disposal of the mechanism, and later its eventual effectiveness, efficiency and impact, etc., it is essential to understand the Terms of Reference for ERRF Managers as well as the way the mechanism operates.

The generic Terms of Reference for the position of ERRF Manager includes four main areas of responsibility: management / coordination (with 10 tasks such as support to Head of Office (HoO), supervise staff, manage guidelines, project identification/selection, training, etc.), resource tracking (with 4 tasks such as tracking all donor financial data and reporting on funding gaps), monitoring and evaluation (with 4 more tasks such as grants tracking and management, impact assessment and lessons learned), and donor relations/reporting (with 5 tasks such as assuring income and funding information is distributed to stakeholders).

This section derived evidence from in-depth and key informant discussions as well as observation in the ERRF/Manager office over a span of two weeks. ERRF/Haiti management tasks are numerous and have evolved over time to meet the needs and priorities of OCHA Heads of Offices—an evolution that also reflects the personalities of managers. In reality, in order of time invested, the following list demonstrates how Haiti/ERRF management perceives the role. It is important to note that this is not a list of what is considered ideal, but rather, how the day-to-day management of the responsibilities has evolved since the 12 Jan. earthquake. In order of time invested overall, the main responsibilities and tasks perceived by ERRF management include:

- Contribution to proposal design (prior to submission to Review Board);
- Management of grants and contracting (after HC signature prior to project start-up);
- Contribution to proposal review (through to HC signature) including managing the influx of project inquiries (including projects rejected/withdrawn) and a permanent dialogue with clusters, partners and stakeholders, founded in an understanding of the humanitarian situation, needs and gaps;

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9 Details in this section were pieced together from in-depth discussions with managers, OCHA HoOs and from observation (sitting in the ERRF/Haiti office over a two week period).

10 Very often, ERRFs are started by transferring a set of packages and products used in a previous country to the new setting (Dev. Initiatives, 2007). It has yet to be confirmed if the Terms of Reference referred to here were used elsewhere, or were in fact the ones presented to the ERRF/Haiti Managers, if any.
- Participation in OCHA office routine (management team, staff meetings, administration, workshops, etc.);
- Management of project closing (NCEs, Audits, etc.);
- Monitoring of projects/site visits;
- Donor relations;
- Other (CERF, coordination, meetings, etc.).

Although many of these may occur in both, it is interesting to take note of those tasks that appear in either the generic Terms of Reference or the list above, but not both. Appearance of an element in one or the other list does not mean that the tasks were not completed adequately, but rather helps to understand how the reality of the humanitarian response combined with office constraints gives precedence to some tasks over others.

Elements that appear *per se* only in the terms of reference:

- **Contribution to project design** (the first on the ERRF Manager list) appears nowhere in the generic Terms of Reference. Design, here refers to the integral task of assisting the Implementing Partner (IP) in appropriately compiling evidence on needs, articulating objectives and identifying the right mix of techniques and resources to achieve them.
- **Management of CERF**: Informal correspondence with Haiti/ERRF managers confirms that up to 10% of their daily workload has been invested in managing a completely separate humanitarian financing tool, the CERF. Although purportedly discouraged by FCS as an inappropriate task, the field consensus is that managing the CERF alongside the ERRF makes sense and is best practice to ensure complementarities in view of the understood needs. Another argument for CERF falling into the ERRF portfolio is that no other agent present at OCHA Country Office holds this responsibility, so the CERF falls to ERRF by default.

Elements that appear *per se* only in the Terms of Reference include the following. Most of these are/were completed *de facto*, but were not given precedence in a cursory listing of time-consuming tasks:

- **Staff supervision**: as one of very few P-4s in OCHA/Haiti, the ERRF manager inevitably played a major senior role *de facto* in the general supervision of Humanitarian Affairs Officers, representation, attendance at non-OCHA led meetings, repeatedly serving as Acting Head of Office (HoO), briefing donor and evaluation missions etc.
- **Developing, enhancing and implementing guidelines**: Although not given priority by ERRF management, on 19 August 2010 the ERRF/Haiti Management Guidelines were revised by the team, adding useful detail as compared to the earlier version (18 Jan 2010). Other elements altered include: the project proposal templates11 (in May/June 2010), the design of a new interim report template (June) and final report template (July) and a revision of

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11 The project proposal template changes included a simplification, a streamlining. Instead of requiring three files, the proposal, a workplan and the budget, the workplan was worked into the proposal document. Under each objective and indicator, partners were asked to list the related activities (many times, when useful, with an actual calendar).
the Terms of Reference (ToR) for Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E, August 2010).

- **Training:** ERRF contributed daily to on-the-job training (for both staff and recipients) and also to a 2-day workshop organized by Action-Aid to train National NGOs how to access international financial mechanisms. Cluster coordinators were regularly briefed on ERRF tools. Given the high turn-over of 12 cluster coordination team members, this was in itself a heavy task.

- **Assessing vulnerability and ensuring appropriate target mechanisms:** the analytical task of identifying causes of vulnerability and ensuring the appropriate targeting of projects to populations in need can be onerous. In theory, it is also the task of clusters and much of this information is compiled by OCHA Humanitarian Affairs Officers (HAOs). This was done by the ERRF team *day to day*, using common sense based on a wealth of humanitarian experience and best practice. Given the rush and rhythm of events, it would have been a luxury to provide any greater level of, or better documented analysis. One opportunity was the concept of increasing funding to areas outside the worst hit zone, to contribute to spreading out both populations and partner efforts, and deconcentrating Port au Prince. This was supported by ERRF to a limited extent, but may have been more insightful had there been more time to step back and analyze.

- **Humanitarian financial analysis and identification of funding gaps:** in the same manner, this entails an investment in time that the Haiti/ERRF team never had. Analysis was conducted when needed to address specific issues but never in a comprehensive and analytical manner and never documented.

- **Communication** to stakeholders and donors: this was a real gap—admitted by ERRF management—that may have led, at times, to the appearance of a lack of transparency. Communication (beyond project specifics), such as strategies and summaries of funded projects, was rarely routinely disseminated. In early June 2010, a 2-paged “Key Facts and Update” was disseminated over 1300 recipients and then to all queries made about the ERRF (July and September). No updates in communication were made since Hurricane Tomas or the outbreak of cholera.

### 3.2 Project selection

Deciding which of 232 project proposals formally submitted to ERRF/Haiti deserve to be nurtured (even if not ultimately funded) is an onerous task for any individual in a calm or peaceful context. Now, set the task amidst the flurry and hectic pace of humanitarian response and add the hundreds of other project ideas that are presented to managers via telephone, unscheduled visits or at meetings. Discussions with ERRF/Managers and key informants permitted a qualitative listing of the ways projects are “conceived”. Typically embedded in some level of analysis of humanitarian need, project ideas can arise from:

- **Leaders:** Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs at country level) or Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC, NY);
- **Clusters:** in coordination meetings and with specific cluster teams;
- **ERRF Management or OCHA**, especially field offices;
- **Implementing partners (IPs) /** recipient agencies themselves.
Based on the 65 successful\textsuperscript{12} earthquake or cholera response projects managed by the current ERRF/Haiti Manager, these four triggers were explored to better understand the role of the ERRF/Manager and the oversight needed to control for quality while satisfying many ERRF selection criteria.

One\textsuperscript{13} granted project was shepherded by the Haiti/HC (WFP, #79, Logistics for Cholera Response) and seven Exceptional Envelopes (EEs) were identified by the ERC\textsuperscript{14} in collaboration with the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC).

Out of the remaining 58, half were determined to have been triggered by / suggested from the cluster mechanism, roughly one-third from the ERRF Management team and the rest unsolicited from partners. See Figure 2. All 58 of them as well as those in 2008/9 went through the same rigorous and well documented review process despite the type of trigger. Although active clusters were reportedly involved, evidence for the same level of oversight could not be confirmed for the Exceptional Envelopes (EEs).

It is important to note, also, that ERRF project triggers have evolved over time. In 2008/9, for example, there was a notable effort of ERRF Management to publicly inform the Inter-Cluster Coordination (ICC) mechanism and specific clusters—appearing in meetings to present exactly what funds were available for what type of activities—thereby launching an informal invitation, or call, to propose projects. The current ERRF Manager made it very clear, however, that such briefings or other communications (email or other ‘calls’) that launch similar invitations may produce entirely unmanageable results, such as more proposals than can be adequately reviewed, technical content of projects of lower priority and greater rejection rates. As clearly stated by ERRF management:

\textit{“It is more time-efficient to call up a partner who has already proven their capacity (for that sector and/or geographical area), then to cast a wide call for}

\textsuperscript{12} The term successful here indicates ‘having been granted’ and says nothing about the impact of the project towards its objectives.

\textsuperscript{13} Although UNOPS # 70 (Earthquake, impacted buildings assessment) was initiated/submitted by the agency, it was more or less shepherded by the HC.

\textsuperscript{14} Shortly after the 28 Jan 2010 $50 million donation from Saudi Arabia, seven UN/IOM projects were reportedly identified by the ERC; they constitute a series of “Exceptional Envelopes” (EE) totaling over $40.6 million disbursed to UN Agencies/IOM, perhaps in an effort to move funds more quickly into Haiti to jump-start the response. At this moment, the ERRF resembled a CERF, and the more rigorous review common to ERRF was appears to have been theoretically sacrificed on the altar of speed. This is entirely conjecture, though, as those queried to date have been unable to confirm and provide a paper trail for decisions made regarding this allocation (prior to processing the ERRF paperwork, which was done post facto). The seven projects were granted to four agencies UNDP, IOM (2), FAO (2) and WFP (2). The aspect of rapidity, however, is also questioned since the only project that was signed rapidly was UNDP for Early Recovery efforts (on 10 Feb 2010, less than one month from the date of the earthquake). All of the other EEs were too late to be considered rapid response (LoE signed between 25 Feb and 28 March 2010).
Although this approach may not give visible space to a wider group of partners, it is a strategy representing a savings in time that is even more critical during the urgency of disaster response on the scale of the 12 Jan 2010 earthquake.

3.3 Quality Control

Quality control in selection process

Although drafting was initiated following the ERF workshop (January 2007, Ethiopia) and the Pooled Fund Workshop (August 2008), Generic Guidelines of the OCHA ERF Mechanism are still in draft form (v27, Oct 2010) but are routinely used by all ERF launches as a baseline.

ERRF/Haiti Guidelines (latest update, of 19 August 2010) insist on projects and partners (implementing agencies) that meet many criteria. Projects must be in French or English, use provided templates and be designed with measurable indicators articulated in an M&E strategy; they must be humanitarian needs-based (targeting the most vulnerable) and follow best humanitarian practice (aiming to address underlying causes while meeting immediate needs, positive spin-offs for community, participative and using local actors whenever possible); they must be aligned with both common humanitarian (Flash Appeal) and ERF strategies; complement other activities and be coordinated with / approved by both clusters and local authorities. Partners must have proven capacity in the sector and preferably an established presence in the geographical area targeted. Finally, granted proposals commit partners to share findings and lessons learned back to HC, OCHA and especially the pertinent clusters, upon request. No partner should have more than two on-going ERRF grants and there is typically a grant ceiling that may change for each disaster context.

One proof of some level of quality control in ERRF/Haiti surfaces from the study of the volume of proposals rejected (e.g., by ERRF management, Clusters or HoO/HC) or eventually withdrawn. At least 232 proposals were physically received by ERRF management. Table 4 below describes the success rate of these 232 proposals, portraying the minimum number currently under review, withdrawn, rejected and funded, by cluster. The project success rate is 35%, with 18% of successful projects found in the health cluster; 44% are rejected and 13% withdrawn.

As further testament to the prioritization of thorough project design and formulation, the average number of proposal versions submitted (and archived) per project is 2.65, the highest being 8 (for IRC, Protection Cluster). Three projects produced six (6) versions prior to being finalized: Floresta (Ag), UNOPS and ACTED (both CCCM). Only 17 projects were granted after a single version.

Yet another quality control mechanism built into the Haiti/ERRF is the multi-level technical and strategic screening process: Clusters, Review Board and both Head of Office/HC. It is insufficient for an ERRF Manager to deem a project or concept appropriate. Even if confirmed by nothing more than a phone call, proposals are
typically commented on by the pertinent cluster before launching the formal Review Board process.

In the early years of the Haiti/ERRF (and especially in the absence of an active second board, often named Advisory Board), founding donors (such as Sweden/SIDA) were routinely copied on Review Board emails. Although absence of a reply is considered consent, the ERRF Manager makes sure that s/he receives written response from at least one entity copied. The Review Board process, and the stages that follow in Haiti, are nonetheless rarely, if ever, launched until the ERRF Manager is nearly certain that all criteria are satisfied.

Examples of the review process taking humanitarian quality control seriously surfaced from discussions with ERRF Managers. There have been at least three incidents whereby a proposal was rejected or questioned at the level of the Review Board; two of these were rejected on technical/strategic grounds (proposals presented by PSAE-Protection against Sexual Exploitation and Abuses-Consortium and Haiti Participative) and one was modified for later approval (IRC). In the life of ERRF/Haiti, there has not been a formal rejection at the level of OCHA Head of Office (by refusing to sign prior to the HC), HC or Geneva to date.

**Project Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)**

Project Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) likewise creates opportunities for quality control during implementation. Each approved Haiti/ERRF proposal has between one and four measurable objectives that form the effort’s logical framework and guide the roll-out of activities. Their existence lays the foundation for the M&E component of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Under Review</th>
<th>Withdrawn</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Funded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wash</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Recovery</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-cluster</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FoodAid</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>232</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
<td><strong>102</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** ERRF/Haiti Database/Archives

15 The present evaluation has come to the understanding that a decision at the level of OCHA/FCS was made (late 2009 or early 2010) to stop copying donors on Haiti/ERRF Review Board mailings. Although this may demonstrate logic to a certain degree (i.e., 42 donors following the earthquake, fear of complicating the review process, and the perceived existence of an Advisory Board that would otherwise engage the donors), intentionally changing a system that worked (i.e., strengthened donor relations) without offering an explanation and a concrete parallel solution to donors’ concerns was not judicious and likely caused more harm than good.
project management. Implementing partners are required to produce an Interim Report, as an internal-evaluation, at the half life of each project. Best ERF practice proposes the strategy of “one-M&E visit from ERF per project”.

It is vital to note that ERF/Haiti staff were managing up to 49 funded projects at any given time, each with a life span of between two and six months (not counting eventual No Cost Extensions) for a total of 62 projects to be monitored and visited at an adequate time. Organizing such an endeavor entails a simple calculation. Experience from Haiti shows that travel from one point to another one way in Port au Prince (PaP) alone is typically estimated at 90 minutes minimum in transport due to heavy traffic; for many ERF/Haiti projects in PaP it could take up to 2.5 hours one way. The closest project site outside PaP is Leogane—2 hours one way from PaP. For each M&E visit, thus, the following steps are required:

- Planning, logistics, communicating with partners and monitoring collaborators (2 hours);
- Travel (round trip, 3-8 hours depending on distances travelled);
- Site visit (3-4 hours minimum);
- Documenting results (2 hours).

Overall, a single M&E visit easily entails an investment of minimum 10 hours work (more than one full day). Finding the required 62 days at the right time (not too soon after the project has commenced and not too late to provide feedback that can make a difference) within the one year contract of a ERF officer is a monumental task, one that would entail craftily planning a minimum of one M&E visit every working week.

During the August 2010 SURGE visit from former ERF/Haiti Manager, one of the tasks requested of her was to document the M&E strategy and to launch the monitoring of projects that had a feeble start 5 May 2010 (ERF visit to Solidarités site) and 1 July 2010 (Joint donor monitoring of IOM). No written M&E strategy was presented.

**Figure 3: Flow of Projects, Newly Approved and Monitored**

16 Note that a 12-month contract in Haiti provides the unquestioned right to one week of R&R following every six weeks of work plus annual leave, travel days, official holidays. The result is that the officer may only be at post to work for 10 out of a 12 month contract. At this rate, one visit per week needs to be scheduled (10 x 22 work days = 220 days / 65 M&E visits = 1 every 3.4 working days, or at least one a week), disregarding where projects may be in their work plans.
(beyond the proposal baseline and guidelines) appears to have existed prior to this. The new M&E strategy was documented in a ‘Generic Terms of Reference, M&E’ complete with participants, objectives and a 6-page template for documenting results and perceptions (August 2010). The template was later adapted to include progress towards each of the approved project objectives (i.e., logical framework).

Urged on by attentive management of the OCHA Head of Office, and with full acknowledgement of the importance of M&E by all stakeholders, the ERRF team solicited support from other OCHA Humanitarian Affairs Officers to set in motion a series of monitoring visits. It is evident that as the number of newly signed projects subsided, more time was available to engage in monitoring, see Figure 3.

As of the present evaluation (mid Feb 2011), a total of 30 M&E visits had been conducted by various ERRF and OCHA staff, representing more than half the Haiti/ERRF Earthquake Portfolio. Out of these, 18 (or 35%) of the entire portfolio) were documented with reports (at various levels of detail) in the archive. See Table 4 for details on these visits.

Another added value of monitoring is to elaborate lessons learned from projects. Several monitoring missions triggered the inclusion of a lessons learned exercise to be shared with relevant clusters and/or relevant GoH bodies, as an output of the logical framework.

Table 4: ERRF Monitoring Visits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency/effort monitored</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Monitors</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Report Available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solidarites</td>
<td>PAP only</td>
<td>OCHA (Laetitia)</td>
<td>5/5/2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Joint Donor</td>
<td>1/7/2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>OCHA (Bernard)</td>
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<td>27/1/11</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Coral</td>
<td>OCHA (Bernard)</td>
<td>19/1/11</td>
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<tr>
<td>HODR/All Hands</td>
<td>Leogane</td>
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<td>PAH</td>
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<tr>
<td>Handicap International</td>
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<tr>
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<td>St. Marc</td>
<td>OCHA (Bernard)</td>
<td>17/2/11</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Gonaives</td>
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<td>17/2/11</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMURT</td>
<td>Source Claude</td>
<td>OCHA (Bernard)</td>
<td>18/2/11</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 30 of all monitoring visits: 60% 18
58% <- out of 52 earthquake projects --> 35%

SOURCE: ERRF/Haiti Database & Archives
3.4 General Project Management and Timing of Processing Stages

ERRF management entails many tasks: here below are presented the six (6) stages of ERRF selection and grant processing, from disaster event to funds available, from arrival of first proposal in ERRF office to disbursement of funds, etc. An important part of the efficiency of the ERRF depends on the speed at which the mechanism can be accessed by implementing partners (IPs) to conduct emergency response efforts. The timing of each stage of the process to access funds from the OCHA-managed ERRF has also been analyzed. This analysis is derived from the registry of records maintained in ERRF/Haiti and OCHA/HQ (Geneva). These results were thereafter triangulated with qualitative aspects / opinions of key informants.

Please bear in mind that what these stage reviews do not capture many other unmentioned tasks involved in fielding questions from partners on activity start-up, staying involved in the implementation and communicating regularly with partners and stakeholders about ERRF portfolio status.

Stage 0: From disaster event until pledged funds are available to OCHA

ERRF’s existence relies on donor funds. There is confusion, however, among ERRF staff as to both their mandate/role, and the time available, to fund raise and/or lobby for unmet needs. Although this is more clearly the role of the Humanitarian Coordinator, some ERRF Managers consider this part of their ongoing tasks. More importantly, adequate revision of the ERRF strategy greatly benefits from knowledge of future–even potential– volume of funds.

Because of the lack of clarity and control (by ERRF officers) of this stage, for the purposes of this evaluation and analysis it has been named Stage ‘0’. The timing assessed at Stage “0” is between the very moment a disaster event strikes and the day funds are available for OCHA to dispense. Here, hurricanes, quakes and cholera events are analyzed in relation to the first funds available to the ERRF. Table 5 summarizes the time invested in this stage.

The 2008 Storm season brought at least 5 hurricanes with an impact on Haiti: Fay (16-23 August 2008), Gustave (25-31 August 2008), Hanna (29 Aug – 5 Sep 2008), Ike (5-10 Sep) and Paloma (5-11 Nov 2008). Together they caused 793 deaths, and affected over 800,000. By 5 of September 2008, Norway had already made US $367,061 available to OCHA. Five days later, on 10 September 2008, Sweden had made $0.8 million available to the ERRF. Using the earliest date (Fay, 15 August) the time between event and funds available is therefore roughly 20 days.
The worst earthquake in the history of the region occurred on 12 January 2010. By 19 January 2010, Denmark had made $1.6 million available to the ERRF to disburse to qualified projects. This is a one week—7 day—wait for the first funds to arrive. The next disbursement to OCHA/ERRF was from Brazil on 21st Jan 2010 (~$8 million) and there were three more on the 28th (Saudi Arabia: $50 million; Nigeria: $1.5 million; Sweden: $0.8 million). This represented a substantial sum for ERRF to manage within 16 days of the quake.

Table 5: Timing of ERRF Stage “0”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event details</th>
<th>Donor (Total); Date available to OCHA</th>
<th>Total Delay (Days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hurricane Season</td>
<td>Norway ($367,061): 5 Sep 2008</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake: 12 Jan 2010</td>
<td>Denmark: ($5.5 mil): 19 Jan 2010</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil (~$8 mil): 21 Jan 2010</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. Arabia ($50 mil), Nigeria ($2.5 mil), Sweden (0.8 mil):</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28 Jan 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: OCHA FTS (tentative figures provided by OCHA)

The cholera epidemic (Haiti’s very first epidemic), started on 20 October 2010 and has continued to escalate ever since. No funds were provided to the ERRF specifically for this event, but having uncommitted earthquake funds available for use, enabled the speed and flexibility for which ERRF is generally known, and it took little time to direct them to the humanitarian response of this disaster event. The actual timing involved is discussed in the post-donor stages below.

**Stage 1: DESIGN/VEETING**

*From IP proposal received to submission to Review Board (RB)*

Stage 1 is the pre-selection stage in which negotiation and design are key, followed by an ongoing check of minimum criteria to be met by each partner and proposal. Approval by the cluster lead agency, although entirely systematic, may leave no paper/virtual trail. It is understood, however, that Stage 2 (discussed below) is an additional and more formal opportunity for the Cluster Lead as well as anyone on the Review Board to register a formal concern, or even rejection.

Once a first proposal for any singular effort is received from an IP by ERRF staff, a series of steps are set into motion. The proposal must pass strategic and technical inspection by the appropriate Cluster Leads. However, before, during and after the clusters give their opinion, ERRF staff typically actively engage with the IP in an iterative review of the proposal. At any moment, ERRF staff suggests both technical and administrative changes that align with best practice; suggestions may include anything from budgeting coherence, better use/respect of templates provided to geographical targets. The first eventually funded proposal was received by ERRF on 22 January 2010 (USCRI, Project # 53, in Protection Cluster).

Across the 62 funded projects since January 2010, the average delay for Stage 1 is **30.3 days** (See Table 6) —the longest among the five stages. It is highest for INGOs
(31.8 days) and lowest for UN/IOM (29.9 days but 18.8 days for the Exceptional Envelopes). There has been an apparent improvement during the management of cholera; the earthquake average of 31.5 days reduced to 24.3 days for cholera. The difference may also reflect ease in processing the size and number of projects/grants; cholera has only 10 to date compared to the frenzied 52 requiring processing for the earthquake. Food Aid (15 days) and Shelter (21.3 days) proposals seemed to pass the most readily through Stage 1. Early Recovery (51.4 days) and Protection (47.7 days) took the longest time to successfully pass through Stage 1. This makes logical sense since food aid and shelter are quite straightforward relief items while ER and Protection are more complex instruments requiring software and more in-depth analysis.

The best record for Stage 1 is less than one day, due to the urgency of an imminent deadline to sustain Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC, e.g., for Internews, Earthquake, Protection, Project #67). The worst record can be explained by delays incurred during high staff turnover in the WASH cluster (e.g., 62 days to process Premier Urgence, Cholera, WASH Project #78) or substantial design changes resulting in four versions of a proposal (e.g., 149 days, to process HODR, Quake, ER, Project #69).

**Stage 2: REVIEW, From submission to Review Board to submission to HC**

The Review Board process is launched by email from the ERRF/Manager when s/he is ready to detail the project’s objectives and funds requested (with proposal attached) and inviting all addressees to approve or disapprove the effort within 48 hours (working days only). Review Board members typically include the HC, OCHA Head of Office, ICC Lead, pertinent cluster(s) leads, and when pertinent NGO and/or government authority.

The shortest of all five stages, Stage 2 typically requires no more than 48 hours. Frequent delays, however, result from weekends and holidays. **The average time invested in this Stage is 3.19 days.** Differences between cholera and earthquake response are coincidental. As noted above, there are at least three times that Review Boards rejected a proposal (one was only temporary). The first Review Board email was issued on 4 February 2010 (UNDP # 19, Exceptional Envelope, Early Recovery Cluster). Noteworthy anecdotes for Stage 2 include substantial debate on budgetary line items with the HC (e.g., 11 days to process the grant to UNEP, Earthquake, ER/Env, #68).

**Stage 3: ENDORSEMENT, From submission to HC to submission to AO**

After the Review Board process is complete, ERRF staff must be present and poised to physically carry or oversee the sending of appropriate documents to OCHA Head of Office (HoO) for signature, from there to HC office for signature, from HC signature to scanner, scanner to computer and computer to email attachment. These are minor but essential details that can become problematic when an officer is acting alone during an emergency, when printers or scanners are not functioning, when electricity
Table 6: Days Invested in ERRF Processing, per Stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed Project</th>
<th>Stage 1</th>
<th>Stage 2</th>
<th>Stage 3</th>
<th>Stage 4</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Stage 5</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>DESIGN &amp; VETTING</td>
<td>REVIEW BOARD</td>
<td>ENDORSEMENT</td>
<td>CLEARANCE</td>
<td>SUM STAGES 1-4</td>
<td>DISBURSEMENT</td>
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<td>22.45</td>
<td>64.79</td>
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<td>7.78</td>
<td>18.22</td>
<td>63.39</td>
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<td>188</td>
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<td>6.85</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>188</td>
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</table>

All are estimates in DAYS; as of 27 Jan 2011 (SOURCE: ERRF Database)

Timing Information Not Available

HURRICANES 08/09
is out or signatories are absent. When any element in this chain breaks, hours may extend to days, reducing the impact of ERRF as a rapid mechanism.

Stage 3 typically requires leg work from Haiti/ERRF staff who must process the papers, provide them in hard copy to OCHA Head of Office to endorse (the final proposal document is reviewed but is most often pre-empted by previous discussions with ERRF staff). The “Letter of Endorsement” (LoE) is hand carried to the HC’s office for a second and final signature. Delays occur when one of these signatories are not in the office, are very busy or have particular issues with the proposal. Until November 2010, IPs could spend retroactive to the date of this HC-signed LoE.

As the final step in Stage 3, ERRF/Haiti drafts the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and sends all pertinent and signed documents as email-attachments to OCHA’s Administrative Office (AO) in Geneva for their financial clearance (Stage 4). The email must also include as attachments banking information from partners—another source of delay. Banking details are provided by partners during this stage; as one example, delays with Viva Rio were because of time the IP took to provide the right documents.

At each of these steps, an ERRF officer registers the date (along with many other details) of the passage in the ERRF database. Seemingly benign tasks, they often seem insurmountable without assistance, and when conducted simultaneous with many other project management tasks. The first project submitted for HC signature was on 8 Feb 2010 (UNDP # 19, Exceptional Envelope, ER Cluster). Stage 3 is an ERRF-Intensive stage that depends on the presence of key signatories. Averaging one week (6.95 days), it can range from the same day (ACTED, Earthquake Agriculture Project #37) to 53 days (Viva Rio, Wash Project, #64).

**Stage 4: CLEARANCE, From submission to AO to the return of MOU to ERRF**

Upon receipt of these documents, the Administrative Office (AO) in Geneva performs two main functions related to Haiti/ERRF: the clearance of agreement documents is the first. Main AO concerns in the clearance process are inaccurate budget calculations, unauthorized modifications to the standard agreement language, incorrect banking information, and missing supporting documents. Stage 4 is mostly beyond Haiti/ERRF control, except in the provision of appropriate documents and liaising with partners when required. ERRF also works to get new partners set up with standard recognized profiles in Geneva archives.

When the OCHA Administrative Office of Geneva validates the documents, they send back the signed MoU ready for IP signature. The first project MoU returned from AO was on 9 Feb 2010 (UNDP #19, Exceptional Envelope, ER Cluster), nearly one month after the earthquake.

**Stage 4 has a combined average of 22.45 days, the second longest of the 5 stages.** The Stage 4 average of 24 days for earthquake projects has been reduced to roughly 15 days for cholera projects. Encouraged by various reviews, internal workshops/discussions and supported by the recent OIOS recommendations, a new unit was created in AO (Geneva) to take over the ERF functions, starting October 2010. The strong reduction in Stage 4 delays may reflect improvements since the
creation of the new ERF unit in AO and/or the absence of any Exceptional Envelopes (EE).

During Stage 4, UN/IOM grants appear to be much slower to process (averaging over 40 days as opposed to roughly 18 for NGOs). Evidence suggests that this is due to difficulties negotiating between two cumbersome UN bureaucracies as well as the need to obtain signatures from the partner agency’s headquarters (as opposed to Haiti Country Office) before returning the documents to Haiti/ERRF. The prominent example is UNEP’s grant (EE #68) which was delayed in Stage 4 for 78 days, while seeking signatures from UNEP headquarters in Nairobi requiring direct interaction from UNEP Geneva office with OCHA AO. Another delay resulted from UN agencies submitting budgets with insufficient detail relative to the large sums requested and later challenged by AO (i.e., for the Exceptional Envelopes).

**Total of Proposal Processing Stages 1-4**

All together,** stages 1 to 4 represent an average of 64.79 calendar days invested**

from proposal to signed MoU. A decrease from 67 days in earthquake response to 52 in cholera results from multiple factors. One, a huge difference in volume of need and proposals received and two, contracting with known entities (9 of the 10 signed to date have received Haiti/ERRF grants prior to their cholera grant). Familiarity on both sides jump started processing of ideas and proposal templates were well-known, etc. A third possible factor is the creation of the AO unit fully delegated to ERF processing.

Figure 5 portrays the time invested in Stages 1 to 4, as a proportion of the average of 64 days. In comparison to the 3-country review, ERRF’s 65 calendar days is roughly equivalent to the 11 weeks averaged by OIOS (although the latter may include disbursement).
Stage 5: DISBURSEMENT, From return from AO to first disbursement to implementing agency

The disbursement of funds is the second main task (after clearance) performed by the AO (Administrative Office). Once the cleared MoU is received by ERRF/Haiti from the AO, ERRF contacts the partner to come to OCHA Country Office for official signatures to send back to AO—who will only then proceed to disbursement. Regarding the timing of disbursements (Stage 5), the AO reportedly requires at least 10 working days (approximately 15 calendar days\textsuperscript{17}) from the date the complete payment request is received to process the disbursement. Based on an initial assessment of the payments processed for Haiti since October 2010, AO estimates the average disbursement time at 11.5 calendar days per transfer. This compares favorably to the estimates produced by the present analysis (averaged at 12 days).

Again, at each of these steps, an ERRF/Haiti officer registers the date (along with other details) of the passage in the ERRF database. According to the ERRF/Haiti registry, the first project having received disbursement was on 17 March 2010 (ARC, #46, Health Cluster)—more than two months after the earthquake.

The Haiti/ERRF team managed many projects at each of these phases simultaneously. Table A2\textsuperscript{18} in Annex and Figure 5, below, demonstrate the chronogram of successful projects passing from Stage 1 (first draft received) to 2, 3, 4 and 5. When the number turns to an ‘X’, the project is in implementation stage (ending between 2 and 6 months, not accounting for No Cost extensions, NCEs). It is noteworthy that at the height of the work load (27 July to 20 Aug 2010), ERRF Officers were managing 49 successful grants—not counting unregistered queries and the dozens of other tasks. This number stayed above 40 projects from 10 March (two months after the earthquake).

Figure 6: Number of Projects at each Stage of ERRF Processing

\textsuperscript{17}The table in Annex is a very partial excerpt of the larger database file available upon request. Many periods of time and projects have been made intentionally invisible to make it more legible; ERRF management for 2008/9 is not included because the level of timing data for that period is not comparable.

earthquake) to 31 October 2010, and at no point in time since the arrival of the current Haiti/ERRF manager has the flow fallen below 23 granted projects.

**Retroactivity of expenses**

Although not assessed in depth, it appears from discussion with IPs who have access to other institutional donors (ECHO, OFDA, Dfid, Sida, etc.) that the duration of the ERRF process is more or less equivalent. The most striking difference, however, concerns the eligibility date of expenses: most of the other donors apply retroactivity to a date prior to the signature of the grant. This may either be the submission date of the first proposal, the first intention/concept note document or a date set by the donor itself (such as the 12th of January for the Earthquake response or the date when the cholera outbreak has been officially declared by the GoH).

In both 2009 and 2010, the HC in Haiti signed ‘Notes for the File’ authorizing ERRF/Haiti partners to apply incurred costs retroactive to the date of the signed Letter of Endorsement (LoE). Given the delays detailed above to get through the various stages, this permitted important response activities to be started as soon as possible—at least by those partners who were able to advance funds while awaiting formal disbursement from OCHA/AO. It is important to note that if ERRF continues to tailor the mechanism to small and local initiatives, few partners will be able to advance funds prior to the first disbursement, thereby further decreasing the ‘rapidity’ of the ERRF mechanism.

This retroactivity appears to have ended abruptly, as signaled by an 11 Nov 2010 email from AO to ERRF. During the evaluation, key informants expressed strong concerns about this issue and the delays it will cause in response start-up.

**3.5 Human Resources**

Across the world, OCHA’s ERF Mechanisms have been managed by fund management teams of between zero and four staff (Development Initiative’s 2007 Review of ERRFs in six countries, see adapted version in Annex Table A5). In the OIOS Audit (2009), the annual average across 9 ERF countries in 2008 shows 2 professional staff and 1 general services staff managing $12 million and 22 projects. OCHA FCS has been working on documenting standards for appropriate staffing of pooled funds; initial recommendations were tabulated in the OIOS 2009 audit document. These draft recommendations have been adapted, with comments, in Table 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ERF Size</th>
<th>Annual Volume; No. Projects</th>
<th>Team Composition</th>
<th>ERRF/Haiti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Max $10 mil; 15 projects</td>
<td>1 Professional, 1 GS</td>
<td>With never more than 2 staff, between 24 Jan and end Oct. 2010 (when the numbers started to wane), Haiti/ERRF managed up to $71 million and 50 projects at any point in time (not counting NCEs and oversight for the audit of 18 ERRF grants from 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Max $25 mil; 50 projects</td>
<td>3 Professional, 1 GS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Max $50 mil; 60+ projects</td>
<td>4 Professional, 2 GS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from OIOS Audit
An international P-2 (who later became P-3) Officer managed the Haiti/ERRF from 2008 to April 2010 (not counting numerous absences), with the assistance of another P-2 starting in March 2010. In April 2010, an international P-4 took over the management, retaining (until early Feb. 2011) the second P-2 officer. Given various leave and R&R policies, however, senior OCHA staff expressed concerns about there “never being more than one ERRF Officer present at a time”. Various email correspondence attests to an engaged and recurrent request by OCHA Head(s) of Office for FCS support to help find a solution; the challenges continue to date.

To better interpret Table 7 above, it is important to note the timing of two events:
- The volume to be managed by ERRF/Haiti crossed the $50 million mark as of 28 January 2010, when the Saudi funding arrived. This would normally indicate passage into a “Large Sized ERRF”. Two, not four, professional fully-delegated staff became officially available in Haiti as of 5 March 2010.
- The number of fully approved projects managed by ERRF/Haiti crossed the OIOS threshold of 16 on 3 February 2010 and was already at 43 when the P-4 Officer arrived in country (1 April 2010, the only P-4 ever assigned to manage an ERF). These numbers indicate that the ERRF was more than a “small sized” outfit.

Combining these two elements, the very minimum to be estimated according to the table is “Medium Sized ERF”--indicating the need for 3 professional and 1 GS staff, compared to the 2 professionals made available 5 March 2010 to manage the Haiti/ERRF.

ERF management is typically absorbed into the annual Country Office Cost Plans as a service for donors—usually for an overhead of between 3 and 13% of funds disbursed. The 3% figure is considered, by many donors, a healthy incentive to attract donors. In the original budget approved by Sweden / SIDA in August 2008, however, the start-up costs for the Haiti/ERRF were estimated at $2 million including a delegated line item for a full-time P-3 position (12 months) to manage the fund for that period. It appears that, to date, Haiti/ERRF staff have been paid strictly under normal Cost Plan mechanisms. Furthermore, early (albeit hazy) discussions on the subject seem to have resulted in the decision that OCHA’s “No Growth” strategy for human resource would not approve the addition of a SIDA-funded staff for ERRF, or, it appears, to the addition of an ERRF staff by any method of funding.

3.6 ERRF Portfolio

At this stage, having explored the history, processing stages and many challenges involved in managing the fund, it is useful to present to the reader an overall perspective on the Haiti/ERRF portfolio. Table 8 synthesizes the Haiti/ERRF since its inception, with sections on donors, partners, clusters and geography.

The Haiti/ERRF has received a total of approximately $85.2 million in donations from at least 42 different donors since August 2008 (See Table 8). Out of these donations (as of 27 Jan. 2011), approximately $74.9 million have been allocated to

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19 This total is for ERRF only and does not count Norway's donation $1.8 million for the early reconciliation component.
### Table 8: Synthesis of the Haiti/ERRF Portfolio (2008-11)

#### Analysis by Donor (Funds Pledged) and Date Received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Date Rec'd</th>
<th>Value Projects</th>
<th>Date Rec'd</th>
<th>Value Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>$3,606,970</td>
<td>9/10/2008</td>
<td>25 others</td>
<td>$81,615,247</td>
<td>1/12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK/DfD</td>
<td>$2,258,104</td>
<td>12/11/2008</td>
<td>$8,028,700</td>
<td>11/21/2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>$2,418,250</td>
<td>1/1/2009</td>
<td>$5,522,300</td>
<td>1/1/2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>$4,706,227</td>
<td>2/3/2010</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>1/1/2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>1/1/2010</td>
<td>$950,000</td>
<td>1/1/2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>$817,560</td>
<td>1/1/2010</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
<td>1/1/2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
<td>1/1/2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$3,606,970</td>
<td>9/10/2008</td>
<td>25 others</td>
<td>$81,615,247</td>
<td>1/12/2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Analysis by Implementing Partner / Recipient & Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Name-No. Projects</th>
<th>Value Projects</th>
<th>Clusters</th>
<th>Main Clusters</th>
<th>Clusters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18 (Name-No. Projects)</td>
<td>$2,258,104</td>
<td>38 (ACF-2, AVSF-2, MdM, Oxfam, AVSI)</td>
<td>12 (FAO-3, UNOPS-3, WFP-3, IOM-2, UNDP)</td>
<td>8 (VR, PU, PAH, Merlin, IHC, HI, Acted, ACF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18 (Name-No. Projects)</td>
<td>$2,258,104</td>
<td>38 (ACF-2, AVSF-2, MdM, Oxfam, AVSI)</td>
<td>12 (FAO-3, UNOPS-3, WFP-3, IOM-2, UNDP)</td>
<td>8 (VR, PU, PAH, Merlin, IHC, HI, Acted, ACF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18 (Name-No. Projects)</td>
<td>$2,258,104</td>
<td>38 (ACF-2, AVSF-2, MdM, Oxfam, AVSI)</td>
<td>12 (FAO-3, UNOPS-3, WFP-3, IOM-2, UNDP)</td>
<td>8 (VR, PU, PAH, Merlin, IHC, HI, Acted, ACF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Analysis by Main Cluster

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Name-No. Projects</th>
<th>Value Projects</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Port au Prince (PAP)</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18 (Name-No. Projects)</td>
<td>$2,258,104</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18 (Name-No. Projects)</td>
<td>$2,258,104</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18 (Name-No. Projects)</td>
<td>$2,258,104</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Analysis by Geographical Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Name-No. Projects</th>
<th>Value Projects</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Port au Prince (PAP)</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18 (Name-No. Projects)</td>
<td>$2,258,104</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18 (Name-No. Projects)</td>
<td>$2,258,104</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18 (Name-No. Projects)</td>
<td>$2,258,104</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Most Important in ERF

- **Country:** Sweden, Brazil, France, Denmark
- **Cluster:** Early Recovery, WASH
- **Department:** Agriculture, Food Aid
- **Recipient:** UN, IOM, Prodeva
- **Donor:** SIDA, UK/DfD, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Algeria

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*Note: This table provides a summary of the portfolio's synthesis, including analysis by donor, implementing partner, geographical distribution, and the most important entities involved in the ERF.*

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*Final Evaluation Report* | *Haiti/ERRF*
80 approved projects. Norway (for Hurricanes in 2008) and Denmark (for earthquake) funds were available to OCHA before all other donors. Sweden (for Hurricanes in 2008) and Saudi Arabia (for 2010 earthquake) are the largest contributors. Sweden is the most sustained donor (contributions to both disasters and to the ERRF start-up fund).

The Haiti/ERRF, from its inception to 27 Jan 2011, disbursed $74.9 million to 51 different partners and 80 different projects. The distribution of these funds, across actors (partners), number of projects, direct grants (with and without sub grants; with and without the CERF-like Exceptional Envelopes) is portrayed in Table 9. For three of the five lines of comparison (number of actors, number of partners and grants minus the Exceptional Envelopes), NGOs are given preference at a minimum ratio of 74 to 26. For one line of comparison, direct grants, UN/IOM appears favored with an approximate 60:40 ratio. For the redistribution (subcontracts to NGOs reallocated to the NGO column), the two are roughly equivalent.

Table 9: Comparative Distribution of ERRF Funds: NGOs and UN/Int. Org

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NGO (INGO and NNGO)</th>
<th>UN (and IOM)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Actors</strong></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Projects</strong></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct Grants (US$ million)</strong></td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>74.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Redistribution of Grants</strong> (Sub-Grants from FAO, IOM, WFP allocated to NGOs, US$ million)</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>74.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct Grants Excluding the DUMP (US$ million)</strong></td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ERRF/Haiti contributed to a very wide portfolio of activities, across 10 different clusters. All grants combined, clusters that attracted the most ERRF funding were shelter (22%), CCCM (16%), logistics (14%), early recovery (13%), health/nutrition (10%) and agriculture (10%). The distribution changed for each disaster response (6 clusters were included in ERRF/2008 and only three (3) clusters were used for cholera response).

Among ERRF/Haiti implementing partners (IPs), those most funded are portrayed in Table 10. The top three most funded in each category are listed, as well as those funded for at least one project during all three events. Among INGOs, ACTED was the most funded while Action Contre la Faim had smaller envelopes throughout the ERRF
timeline. Overall, IOM, WFP and UNDP received the largest total normal and Exceptional Envelopes (EE).

Table 10: **Most funded Implementing Partners**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Total Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Storms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>$1,472,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC - International Medical Corps</td>
<td>$1,452,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viva Rio</td>
<td>$746,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Refugee Service</td>
<td>$1,172,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitat for Humanity</td>
<td>$1,171,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Contre la Faim</td>
<td>$259,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-NGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspectives (pour la Sante et le Developpement)</td>
<td>$823,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floresta</td>
<td>$476,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prodeva</td>
<td>$248,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intl Org, UN Bodies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>$381,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>$10,078,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>$129,459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An equitable geographical distribution of the Haiti / ERRF Portfolio is not a goal in and of itself. Rather ERRF aims to identify and contribute to meeting humanitarian needs supported by evidence. It is nonetheless interesting to review the coverage of the Haiti/ERRF portfolio. Table 11 summarizes the geographical coverage for all projects combined, since 2008. Projects with a National focus make up a quarter of the projects and the majority of grant funds. As for the breakdown by disaster, 67% of earthquake grants went to projects with a National focus, as opposed to 32% for the Cholera response and 17% for Hurricanes in 2008. In second place, one fifth of ERRF portfolio’s earthquake response (and up to 40% of the cholera) focused on Port au Prince, followed by two Departments, the Ouest (13%) and Artibonite (4%).

Table 11: **Geographical Focus of ERRF Projects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. Projects</th>
<th>Grant Volume</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>$47,104,360</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PaP</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>$14,235,465</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouest</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>$8,995,391</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artibonite</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>$3,538,906</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SudEst</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$910,253</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$78,183</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
<td><strong>$74,862,558</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 ‘National’ is defined by the proposal language itself, but also includes projects that focus on more than two departments.

21 Most of the major “Exceptional Envelope” grants to UN entities/IOM were proposed as national efforts, thereby once again running contrary to the mandate of the ERRF for localized efforts.
4. ERRF/Haiti Achievements

4.1 Meeting Objectives

The present evaluation studied the degree to which the Haiti/ERRF Mechanism fulfilled the outcomes and objectives set up under official agreement between OCHA and Sweden, dated August 2008, namely 1.) reduced human suffering and 2.) improved coordination. ERRF Objective A also focused on humanitarian coordination, while Objective B aimed to garner public confidence in the Government of Haiti, and C, to strengthen links with development programs.

The logical frameworks of each of the 80 projects were studied to classify each of their respective project objectives according to these four (4) ERRF elements (the two outcomes and objectives B and C). Table A4 in the Annex portrays the results of this classification, with a tally of each project’s objectives as they align with these four official ERRF priorities.

Each project/objective was assigned to the (1) ERRF Outcome or Objective that it targets most clearly. Out of 80 projects, 54% have approved objectives that aim to contribute to reduce suffering (Outcome 1). Another 19% of the projects have objectives that, if achieved, contribute directly to improved coordination (Outcome 2 and Objective A). At least 11% of the 80 projects explicitly aim to support Government of Haiti structures or processes (Objective B). Another 38% of the 80 projects were designed to specifically nurture links to development initiatives (Objective C) among their other efforts.

To help read the table, human suffering objectives were dominated by life-saving and rapid response. Coordination outcome mentions "coordination" in the objective or interaction with other actors. Support to GoH specifically mentions an official authority or entity. Links to development includes early recovery (ER), livelihood, educational objectives and infrastructure. The objectives are set up chronologically: cells in blue were from the Hurricane 2008 phase, and yellow, from the more recent cholera phase. Gray cells indicate that the same project is featured in more than one ERRF Outcome/Objective (the set of project objectives were divided accordingly).

The results of the E-survey are also portrayed in the Annex (Table A3). The averages are made over 23 ERRF/Haiti recipients, 4 respondents whose proposals were rejected (last column) 2 ERRF reviewers and 2 donors.

4.2 ERRF/Haiti strengths: double edged swords

Despite overwhelming constraints, the strengths of Haiti/ERRF were loudly voiced by key informants and e-survey respondents alike. The main strengths include flexibility, proximity, approachability, alignment inside the cluster architecture (fostering coordination), visibility for OCHA and ability to leverage additional funds.
**FLEXIBILITY**

The single most recurring strength echoed throughout the evaluation is flexibility. According to E-survey respondents, flexibility received the highest scores of any other ERRF qualification (an average score across all respondents of 3.31 out of 10, where 1 is best). More precisely, stakeholders consider the ERRF to be flexible in regards to evolving needs and project management. This flexibility is not, it was learned, to be considered as the antonym of rigorous, because the flexibility occurred after contracting and not before. In other words, rigor was maintained in the design and formulation of projects, but once signed, flexibility was applied, when appropriate, to make sure that the funds were ultimately geared to have the greatest humanitarian impact.

One example is when an IP saw fit and requested a portion of the project funds to target farmers affected by Hurricane Tomas rather than entirely the proposed farmers affected by the earthquake. The flexibility described is generally seen as an added-value for ERRF—at odds with most bi-lateral donors—as a key quality of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD).

As a double-edge sword, the flexibility lauded as a key strength also led to some resentment. When ERRF, for very good reasons, saw it time to ebb the flow of funding to camps and start to support return, actors hoping to contribute to camps that (to date) suffer from lack of management were disappointed. The ERRF move to focus on an unforeseen emergency—cholera, triggered a need to back out of some projects under discussion and which had already processed multiple proposal versions, etc. for psycho-social efforts linked to earthquake.

**PROXIMITY**

The second most commonly heard strength of the ERRF/Haiti (from e-survey respondents and key informants) comes from both its design and mandate: funds located in the affected country and allocations that are field-driven. Not unique to Haiti, the proximity of ERRF to the place of humanitarian need fosters a better understanding of the needs, as well of the conditions and constraints in/with which stakeholders work.

The flip side of this proximity is distance from OCHA Headquarters. There are a good number of challenges (i.e., strategies, rapidity, staffing, fundraising, etc.) that result from this distance. Many of them (without engaging in micro-management) would be at least partially resolved with regular visits from OCHA HQ and/or appropriate delegation of authority for MoU clearance.

**APPROACHABILITY**

Because the Haiti/ERRF team was in-country, they were physically present to engage in discussions. Approachability, however, is much more than a physical presence. All Haiti/ERRF staff were strongly commended by multiple respondents for welcoming, and being entirely open to discussions about needs, possible projects and advice on how to proceed with proposals, etc. These discussions were very often impromptu (without appointment), as witnessed during observation inside the ERRF/Haiti office.
ERRF staff were repeatedly described by key informants as open, personable, supportive, polite, discrete\(^{22}\) and frank.

Although not a donor under the conventional definition of the term, and never having claimed donorship (ERRF is very purposefully and systematically referred to as ‘managed by OCHA’), this distinction is much nuanced. Under the ERRF mechanism, OCHA serves as a steward of un-earmarked funding from multiple donors, while bilateral donors are stewards of tax payer and other monies from their respective countries. Both make major decisions in regards to where funds are directed and are accountable for the results.

Findings from this evaluation (specifically discussions with key informants and case study partners) point to OCHA as perceived by Implementing Partners in much the same way as are other donors. Furthermore, a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) team visited ERRF/Haiti in 2010 encouraging them to promote the GHD principles—a suggestion that was apparently warmly received by ERRF management. Quite obviously, ERRF/Haiti staff aimed to de-stigmatize the common quasi-donor-recipient relationship\(^{23}\). This approachability resulted very commonly in a rapport with partners that was positive, to say the least. Respondents repeatedly expressed the following:

> “working with ERRF/Haiti was more of a partnership, than a donorship”

> “at last, a donor that will take risks with us”.

These comments, alone, are emblematic and embody the general essence of the mandate of an ERF.

**ALIGNMENT WITHIN HUMANITARIAN ARCHITECTURE**

The Haiti/ERRF is intentionally embedded in the humanitarian “cluster” system: projects are not approved without cluster approval. This alignment can be perceived as the quintessential example of ERRF enhancing humanitarian coordination: it forces the clusters to take official position on the appropriateness of a proposal and its fit inside the larger (reportedly needs-based) strategy of each sector. This was one of two official outcomes expected when Sweden launched the creation of the Haiti/ERRF. Cluster leads estimate spending roughly one half day each week on ERRF review.

Inevitably, alignment of ERRF/Haiti within the clusters is a double edged sword. The result is that the Haiti/ERRF took on the personality (strengths and weaknesses, quirks and bouts) of each and every cluster it served. When clusters were slow to strategize or respond to IP requests, so was ERRF/Haiti. Comments from E-survey respondents highlighted the high turnover of cluster leads that fueled, in part, unprofessional and untimely decisions from clusters,

\(^{22}\) Discretion in ERRF/Haiti was laudable, and reasonable. Although contracts with IPs requested that they not show the OCHA logo, this may need to be reviewed as OCHA and ERRF often lost visibility when all bilateral donors were put in the limelight.

\(^{23}\) The extent to which this ERRF/Haiti personality is that of the staff employed or of the mechanism itself is very uncertain.
as well as decisions that transcended their strategic and technical roles. Clusters outside of Port au Prince were known to be problematic and erratic.

**POSITIVE REPUTATION for OCHA**

Haiti/ERRF is seen to have provided OCHA/Haiti a positive boost in reputation. Months after the earthquake, informants conveyed that:

“actors knew of and appreciated OCHA only because of the ERRF”.

This visibility strengthened OCHA as a reputable player. However, there seems to be confusion among some stakeholders between OCHA as organizer of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and OCHA as manager of ERRF. A disappointed stakeholder, as only one example, was displeased with their efforts appearing and then suddenly disappearing from the CAP lists and attributed this to a weakness with the ERRF Review Process. ERRF was not specifically involved in the CAP, as it is the responsibility of OCHA’s National Coordination Pillar. However, the ERRF had to deal with multiple requests from many humanitarian partners about the CAP. There is still a lot of confusion about the CAP that is only a resource mobilization tool, but often understood as a funding mechanism.

OCHA, as a fund manager, also presents a double-edged sword. Haiti/ERRF threw OCHA among major donors (Haiti/ERRF ranked #6 of top ‘donors’ in Haiti, according to FTS). With $80 million, ERRF was suddenly “one of the big-boys” in Haiti, and may have been ill-equipped (experience, number of staff and a completely different mandate) to join that club. The long-term impact of donorship on OCHA remains to be seen and merits continued monitoring. If flexibility was scored by E-survey respondents in first place, it is likely the result of ERRF Management trying to comply with GHD. On the other hand, predictability (another GHD principle) is unachievable given the irregularity of contributions.

**LEVERAGING**

ERRF/Haiti has been poised since 2008 to meet humanitarian needs. Rather than hold the ambition of funding stand-alone efforts, however, the ERRF/Haiti is typically a top-up or a scale-up source of funding. This means that nearly every project was co-funded by other sources, either in money, in kind or both. The majority of projects that did include other funds, managed to leverage $163 million in additional funds. This indicates that approved Haiti/ERRF projects were worth more than three times their weight.

The flip side of leveraging means that ERRF partners needed to be able to identify, lobby for and obtain funds to match an ERRF funded effort. Many informants to this evaluation, and not only smaller national NGOs, expressed frustration with this challenge. Others found it impossible and were left out of the game.

Although predominately a “top up” in 2008/9, in 2010 ERRF became more often the main source of funding for many projects; 32 projects (40% of the portfolio, of which
38% were UN or Int’l. agencies) were approved without mentioning any “other” related sources of funding. This change implies the necessity of ERRF to support a share of IP support costs which goes contrary to ERF Guidelines and leads to some misunderstanding with AO and confusion about support cost in project budgets.

In summary, The Haiti/ERRF has many strengths—each has a double-edge. The strengths and their edges are summarized in Table 12, below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Strength explained</th>
<th>Double-edge: Weakness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>ERF responds to evolving needs (i.e., geographical coverage, or move from camp to quartier focus)</td>
<td>Good proposals under discussion suddenly lost importance after cholera broke out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity</td>
<td>Field-based decisions, ERF has eyes and ears on the ground</td>
<td>Distance from FCS results in significant misunderstanding without regular visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approachability</td>
<td>ERF staff personable and open</td>
<td>Actors that didn’t have or make time to develop face to face contact with ERF staff often lost out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing Coordination</td>
<td>Alignment inside cluster architecture theoretically assures better coordination of meeting humanitarian needs</td>
<td>ERF is branded with the well-documented weaknesses of the cluster system and the personality of each evolving lead: high turnover, personal agendas, standards that are seen to squelch innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visibility for OCHA</td>
<td>ERF improved OCHA reputation; temporarily member of the “big-boy club”</td>
<td>Concern about the long-term impact of donorship on a coordinating office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leveraging</td>
<td>ERF as a top-up or scale-up funding scheme, not for stand-alone projects: was able to leverage a total 3 times its weight</td>
<td>Creates significant burden for recipients to identify and confirm parallel donations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3 ERF/Haiti Weaknesses: fraught with contradictions

There are other weaknesses in the Haiti/ERRF; many of them are bound up in the design of the mechanism itself and not uniquely in its presentation in Haiti. They include insufficient staff, ambition fraught with many contradictions, feeble support to government and national NGOs, and insufficient communication; each is described below.

**INSUFFICIENT NUMBERS OF STAFF**

Repeatedly, key informants and E-survey respondents stressed that two Haiti/ERRF officers were too few to adequately manage the volume of funds provided for ERRF management. Some stakeholders went so far as to say:

“It is simply amazing that the Haiti/ERRF staff were able to achieve as much as they do/did.”
Repeated calls for support from OCHA/Haiti to FCS to reinforce the numbers, despite plentiful evaluations promoting the need to provide more staff, met with no concrete result to date. FCS is of the opinion that the majority of funds was already spent before April 2010, making additional staff unnecessary. There are two problems with the FCS analysis. One is that the number of fully approved ERRF/Haiti projects (the indicator most closely correlated with workload) continued to rise until end July 2010. The second is the volume and number of projects managed from 28 January 2010 onwards was beyond the threshold suggested for two professional staff, according to the OIOS recommendations.

**AMBITIOUS and FRAUGHT WITH MANY CONTRADICTIONS**

An ERF cannot reasonably be expected to succeed in every dimension. The ERF mandate as it stands today may still be ambitious. The apparent contradictions below are complex signs that the ERRF/Haiti may be, as one respondent stated, “*biting off more than it can chew*”:

- **Life saving, but with a measurable link to recovery/ development:** Unlike the CERF, ERRF funds can and visibly did provide a genuine contribution to longer term development efforts. The reader is reminded that this was one of the additional objectives signed with Sida at the creation of the Haiti/ERRF. Many examples attest to this contribution (documented exit strategies, visible environmental improvements, short-term income for beneficiaries).

- **Destined for projects covering two to six months, but requiring measurable indicators and full financial audit:** It is challenging to juggle short-lived efforts and make them meet all obligations (measurable indicators, mid-term report, final evaluation and audit) required of 12-36 month projects. Although understood as best-practice for any funded effort, it would be valuable to make a clear comparison and official statement of what can reasonably be expected of such short projects, and depending on level of funding received.

- **Rapid, but, in fact, cumbersome and slow.** As stated convincingly by one Haiti/ERRF stakeholder:

  “*The mechanism has two Rs in its name, and neither of those represents ‘rapid’*."

  Rapidity got an average score of 4.16 out of 10 from E-survey respondents (the fifth best out of 15 qualifications evaluated). In fact, most stakeholders—and often the same that complain of the delays—continue to refer to the ERRF as a rapid response funding mechanism. The delays described above, after more careful study, can likely be reduced to a certain degree. Having funding in country (albeit unintentionally), as for cholera, is added proof that pre-positioning will make ERRF even more timely and efficient.

  Another confusing element of *rapid response* is that the ERRF projects tend to linger on, through multiple No-Cost Extensions (NCEs). Very few of the 65 earthquake response projects have finished in the proposed time frame; some required multiple NCEs. The average life span of ERRF projects (from proposals...
prior to 27 Jan 2011) is 5.2 months and one project (WFP Exceptional Envelope) was ‘exceptionally’ approved for 12 months. This is an issue that all humanitarian donors and partners have reportedly had to confront. This is also related to the fact that the ERRF in 2010 was disproportionate with the original mandates of classic ERF efforts (top up or scale up because of a sudden emergency versus acting as one of the ‘big boys’).

- **Aiming to promote innovation, but confined to a cluster review that promotes standards and strategies that stifle.** There were good examples of ERRF fostering innovation (and pilot projects). Examples of innovation in approaches include use of volunteers or innovation in technical design (use of biodigesters, earthboxes, etc). Other stakeholders found innovation and use of clusters as extreme opposite ends of a continuum. In fact, clusters are set up to strategize and to a degree, standardize, so inevitably, they may stifle innovative approaches. Cluster-led meetings are, nonetheless, the perfect venue for projects to formally present lessons learned on innovative techniques employed in their ERRF-funded efforts. ERRF/Haiti has started to insist on partners’ obligation to debrief the clusters.

- **Although designed for smaller localized efforts primarily outside CAP, over one half the ERRF/Haiti funding was redirected by decisions made at a higher level.** The exact story behind the decisions for the Exceptional Envelopes (EE) is yet to be fully understood. It is clear, however, that the envelopes were “exceptional”–contrary to the nature of the ERRF. The official LoEs for each of these envelopes specifically request “making an exception to the project ceiling” and/or the length of action (i.e., 12 instead of 6 months).

As such, no matter how well founded the ERC/HC/cluster decisions were regarding these EEs, it is understood that the $45 million was not a usual, intended or established use of an ERF or of the Haiti/ERRF. As such, the EEs were driven more by the availability of a large amount of funds (wanting to put them quickly to use) than by specific needs. Ironically, analysis demonstrates that none of the EEs were processed (through end of Stage 4) before 22 March 2010 and were therefore not put to use any more rapidly than other true-to-mandate ERRF-channeled projects. Evidence also suggests that it is nearly impossible to confirm and/or measure the extent to which the EEs to WFP, UNDP and IOM succeeded in subcontracting to IPs in their respective clusters, as may have been the original intent. Audits of these EEs are also not expected.

It is important to note that system reliance on Cluster Leads / Coordinators directly to contribute to those highly visible decisions, if existent, sidelined OCHA. As a more neutral reviewer of the wider humanitarian need, OCHA and in particular here, ERRF, would typically add a valuable level of transparency and credibility to the decision. The EEs greatly skewed the ERRF in favor of UN/IOM. The ERRF paperwork was prepared in accordance with the accepted process, but pretty much after the fact. No paper trail or evidence was produced (despite repeated requests through OCHA channels) to demonstrate why such funds needed to be channeled through the ERRF (when there was no clear intention to respect the ERRF mandate) nor how the volume, exact
clusters and/or partners concerning these EEs were identified and ranked as recipients in this EE process.

**FEABLE SUPPORT TO GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL NGOS**

The reader is reminded that one of the additional objectives of the Haiti/ERRF since its inception was to support initiatives that **garner public confidence in the state (Government of Haiti)**.

At least 11% of the ERRF funded projects made a clear contribution to the Government of Haiti in their design. Although efforts were made to involve national and local authorities in the review process—to clear proposals with appropriate government authorities, this was not done systematically and largely depended on the relationship the supporting cluster agencies had with authorities. ‘Support to government’ scored in last place out of 15 ERRF qualifications (averaging 5.00 out of 10 possible points).

Furthermore, it was felt by all, including ERRF management, that National NGOs were insufficiently included in the ERRF process. In 2008, 3 N-NGO projects were funded and in 2010, 4 projects. This unfortunately requires human resources and time that the staff did not have.

**INADEQUATE COMMUNICATION**

Lack of regular communication invites questions and doubt about transparency; it may have given the impression that ERRF has something to hide. This evaluation found nothing to support this impression, but rather, a desire to improve and broaden their impact. The rare instances when ERRF/Haiti put project screening on hold (for a few weeks) to take a big enough step back to strategize, plan and document, this was misunderstood by OCHA / HQ as purposefully delaying project processing and slowing the rhythm of allocations. The same period resulted in a very useful 2-page communiqué describing four new strategic axes and newly approved projects. The received message from HQ was understood and retained as **volume allocated and speed should be sacrificed for strategy and quality control**.

**THOUGHTS FROM THOSE REJECTED**

The many proposals that were rejected by ERRF (N=102, or 44% of the 232 archived see Table 3) and some that may never have received appropriate feedback by ERRF staff, inevitably incurred strong resentment from the respective actors. Four of the 33 E-survey respondents had presented proposals that were rejected and the average of their scores in Table A4 in Annex clearly reflects their frustration. Many other funded recipients that responded also had proposals that did not garner the attention (by ERRF and/or Clusters) they thought they deserved. The combined comments of those disappointed by ERRF highlight many issues: “no formal reply on proposals”, “unprofessional behavior among cluster leads”, “lack of transparency in project selection and review board membership”, “cumbersome and slow”. Evidence suggests that few of these would concerns would have been expressed had there been adequate ERRF/Haiti time and staffing.
5. Discussion: Answering Key Questions

This chapter returns to the key questions asked in the Evaluation Terms of Reference to provide answers drawn from the results described in the three preceding chapters. The only new evidence infrequently portrayed in this chapter is drawn from E-Survey results.

Relevance

1. How relevant is the ERRF to the humanitarian needs in Haiti? Is the ERRF associated with more timely and effective funding to address the critical gaps?

There are disasters of natural and man-made origin of sufficient frequency and severity to merit the existence of an on-going ERF mechanism in Haiti. ERRF/Haiti has had a sufficiently good impact on humanitarian response to merit continued funding from Sweden and all other donors interested in meeting humanitarian needs under the ERF mandate.

Despite analysis indicating slower than ideal (and even expected) proposal and grant processing, ERRF/Haiti is still considered a rapid response mechanism and evidence indicates that the mechanism was rapid when speed was most important—at the onset of crises. Evaluation findings align to conclude that ERRF/Haiti was more effective than efficient (explanations follow).

2. Is ERRF the appropriate mechanism?

More than half of the funds channeled through ERRF/Haiti since 2008 were directed to projects that were true exceptions to the ERRF mandate. Evidence attests to the fact that these “Exceptional Envelopes24” (EE) did not satisfy any other more crucial criteria (e.g., speed in disbursement25, etc.) to promote humanitarian response. Decisions for these EEs to UN/Int’l. entities through ERRF/Haiti are therefore deemed inappropriate and unnecessary, as they go against the mechanism’s mandate and raison d’etre. If a similar case presents itself in the future, other financial mechanisms should be used (i.e., CERF) or additional SURGE or delegated staff should be deployed to accelerate true-to-mandate ERF grant processing.

3. Are the funded activities in line with local needs and priorities?

All sources align to confirm that the majority of the 80 projects were set up to address relevant humanitarian needs. The E-survey respondents scored relevance at 3.34 (out of highest score of 1)—third most witnessed quality of the Haiti/ERRF, following flexibility and targeting of gender equity/marginalized populations. Many informants found that the ERRF derives its relevance by addressing evolving priority needs, as manifest in the evolution of project selection criteria with each new disaster event. Yet another example of relevance was when ERRF moved to end water trucking or ebb camp management, as these were no longer considered pertinent or sustainable methods.

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24 Exceptional Envelope or EE is a term created for the purposes of this evaluation, using the language of the HC Letters of Endorsement which request funding that is outside, or “exceptional”, to the ERF mandate (i.e., project ceiling and length of project).

25 Two of the largest EEs did not complete proposal processing Stage 4, Clearance, until May 2010.
Evidence indicates that ERRF management team took seriously their role of identifying needs and soliciting the right match of geographical and technical focus with partners that can rapidly produce the desired humanitarian results. The absence of a formal rejection at the level of OCHA Head of Office (i.e., by refusing to sign prior to the HC), HC or Geneva demonstrates confidence leaders have in the relevance of decisions under the cluster architecture, the ERRF team, as well as the commitment and diligence of the ERRF/Haiti officers.

**Effectiveness**

Based on evidence compiled from key informants, the Haiti/ERRF team appears to have been effective under heavy constraints. OCHA can be commended for finding the right profiles of three officers and to produce a well-matched pair (demonstrating a combination of vision and rigor) following the earthquake; identifying replacements of same caliber is no small feat.

1. **To what extent does the portfolio of projects funded by the ERRF attain the mechanism's objective(s)?**

Aiming to grasp the big picture of the ERRF in Haiti across 80 projects since 2008 resulted in the need to compile and compare the individual objectives of each approved project and identify how each one contributes, or not, to the main objectives of the mechanism itself. Table A4 in Annex, ERRF Comprehensive Log Frame Compilation, was the result of this effort.

In summary, the ERRF Log Frame Compilation tool demonstrates that Haiti ERRF appears to be primed for success in meeting its objectives and outcomes. Out of 80 projects, 54% have objectives that aim to contribute to reduce suffering. Another 19% of the projects aim to contribute directly to improved coordination. At least 11% of the 80 projects explicitly aim to support Government of Haiti structures or processes. Another 38% of the 80 projects were designed to specifically nurture links to long-term development initiatives. Although it is not possible to empirically conclude on success prior to fully engaging in M&E, this confirmed probability of success demonstrates that projects have objectives aligned with the ERRF goals and criteria. Confirmation of the above would require more routine and exhaustive M&E.

2. **To what extent do individual project activities produce expected results? How do we know?**

It is impossible for the present evaluation to state with any confidence that all ERRF projects met their stated objectives. To do so correctly would entail a thorough quantitative impact evaluation for a stratified random sample of the 80 projects with control group of non-beneficiaries.

Monitoring visits were conducted by ERRF management for more than half of the earthquake response projects and a cursory review of the corresponding reports confirm that the results were on par with what was proposed. Furthermore, six projects were visited during the field work for this evaluation and all were producing expected, and a few additional unanticipated positive, results.

3. **Are sufficient quality control mechanisms in place for: a) planning and design, b) approval of projects, c) fund disbursement, and d) monitoring, reporting and review?**

Evaluation evidence highlights the fact that for the vast majority of projects (not including EEs), great attention was spent on their design and to keep projects on par with approved objectives.
Stage 1, Design, is the longest out of the five proposal management stages studied—thereby proof of substantial emphasis on quality control, as well as service and capacity building of IPs as they craft their proposals. ERRF/Haiti staff appear to do everything in their power to front load the review process, making every subsequent step more and more of a formality. This indicates that they take a major responsibility—burden—on themselves before passing the proposal to later stages of review. These are indicators of quality that, not currently visible in any log frame, make up the daily routines of the ERRF staff. In conclusion, sufficient quality control mechanisms are in place for the planning, design and approval stages of the process.

Monitoring & Evaluation visits were organized for over half of the current projects to date. Although set as a priority, monitoring all projects once would entail a field visit of at least one full day each week. This important responsibility is fully recognized and accepted but represents more than the ERRF/Haiti team was quite literally able to do given human resource constraints.

To gain approval and continued support from donors that prioritize the latter phase, however, OCHA must recognize that staffing requirements are highest after, rather than prior to, grant signing.

4. Are stakeholders (headquarters and country level) receiving all necessary and relevant information?

Despite numerous interactions with donors for ERF countries and three donor meetings each year, evidence suggests that FCS and ERRF/Haiti were unable to satisfy Haiti/ERRF’s main donor, Sweden (Sida). Communication beyond the processing stages of grants is a definite and recognized weakness of ERRF/Haiti that impairs, for some, the impression of transparency. Both communication and M&E appear to have become luxuries given the workload since the earthquake and is the first task to be set aside when time-bound priorities are pending.

It is important to determine how to satisfy donors without unnecessarily encumbering the ERF process (e.g., Advisory Boards). Especially at times when staff seem insufficient, it is vital to develop and or streamline mechanisms that make communication and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) more routine and simple while strengthening the reputation of transparent management.

One example of such a mechanism is a simple electronic or physical checklist with space for the names of each subsequent Cluster Lead. At each turn-over of leads, there is a column to check off when a newly-arrived player is ERRF-initiated or compliant (in-person briefing and/or sending of FCS-prepared or electronic packet).

Another example would be to develop a mechanism that more clearly manages proposal rejections. Aligning rejections to the proposed (and adapted) Comprehensive Logical Framework may help to guide this process.

There can also be a mechanism set up where at regular intervals, with the simple click of a button, a form is printed with the names (and limited details) of all new ERRF-funded projects, by event, cluster or geography, etc. Once saved as a PDF, it could be attached to a bi-monthly ERRF update sent to a
predetermined list of stakeholders not limited to the review board. None of these mechanisms should be time-consuming, after the initial set up.

An element meriting streamlining is the M&E reporting template: prior to completing it, it covers six pages. This is a formidable task for any busy officer and it is not surprising that more were not completed (even when the visit was conducted). If it would encourage more M&E visits, a simple 1-page should suffice.

5. **What key indicators are used to for measuring the success of the ERRF and how can data collection processes be strengthened? Has OCHA established adequate monitoring and reporting mechanisms for measuring progress?**

A very rich detailed registry that tracks proposals and grants through all stages of management was developed and managed by ERRF/Haiti. Even though it can be improved, it is a good example of best practice. The registry was analyzed to provide much of the evidence detailed above.

No tracking system to monitor the success of ERRF/Haiti as a mechanism was identified. To date, ERRF/Haiti success appears to be measured differently by each stakeholder. Based on compiled evidence:

- Sida appears to measure ERRF/Haiti success by the quality of projects (as monitored) and the achievement of documented objectives and mandates.
- Humanitarian Coordinators may measure ERRF/Haiti success by how much it contributes to coordination (i.e. ICC mechanism) and how satisfied the government and high-profile stakeholders are with the general response.
- OCHA/FCS—understandably pushed to spend down humanitarian funding—appears to measure ERRF/Haiti success by how quickly they can sign grants and use the funds.
- Implementing Partners (granted and potential) measure success by how much and how fast they can obtain humanitarian funds to meet needs and how transparent they find the ERRF process.

It is simple to see how hard—impossible—it is for ERRF/Haiti to satisfy so many stakeholders and measurements simultaneously.

Key indicators that would more readily measure ERRF success may take the form of an ERF Mechanism Log Frame; one is proposed in Table 13 below. The table includes suggestions, and each proposed indicator will require careful study before finalization. There is danger that insisting on tracking indicators may increase workloads more than they actually benefit the mechanism.
Table 13: Proposed Mechanism Log Frame for future ERFs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ERRF Objective</th>
<th>Potential Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide rapid funding</td>
<td>Avg. number of days invested on Stages 1, 2, 3 and 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide flexible funding</td>
<td>Avg. number of approved changes to project post signature, number of NCEs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide funding that supports national and/or local authorities</td>
<td>Presence of a governmental delegate on ERRF Staff and/or RB sending; Number of projects that are approved/proposed by communal authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to unforeseen needs</td>
<td>Number of projects signed that were not mentioned in most recent CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen humanitarian coordination</td>
<td>Number of approved projects proposed by clusters; number of projects presented back to clusters as &quot;debriefing / lessons learned&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to joint initiatives</td>
<td>Estimated value of &quot;other&quot; funds leveraged with / by ERRF funded projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to national initiatives</td>
<td>Ratio of projects funded to NGOs to INGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to innovation and pilot efforts</td>
<td>Number of projects granted to a pilot/new effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support link to development</td>
<td>Number of projects with clear and valid exit strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to under-covered / forgotten emergencies</td>
<td>Number of projects targeting these efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to marginalized target groups</td>
<td>Number of projects with clear gender, vulnerable group targeting criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability and quality control</td>
<td>Length of Stage 1, Ratio of rejected to received proposals, Number of completed M&amp;E visits, number of interim reports received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Number of ERRF briefing packets provided to interested parties; Number of Strategic or sectorial updates disseminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strive for balance between NGO/UN entities</td>
<td>Ratio of projects funded to NGO to UN / Int'l. Entities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connectedness to other financial mechanisms</td>
<td>Number of projects co-funded by other donors ; Total volume of funding leveraged</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Did the ERRF contribute to strengthening the coordination mechanisms and the role of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Haiti? If yes, how? If no, what were the inhibiting factors?

It is without a doubt that the Haiti/ERRF contributed to stronger coordination of the humanitarian response. Under the broader ICC perspective, Haiti/ERRF alignment within the cluster system enhanced humanitarian coordination: it forced the clusters to take official position on the appropriateness of a proposal and its fit inside the larger strategy of each sector. This was one of two official outcomes expected when Sweden launched the creation of the Haiti/ERRF.

The cluster coordination mechanism was successful in bringing to surface appropriate proposals that meet identified needs within the overall cluster objectives and best practice. During key informant discussions with cluster coordinators, some took the filtering of ideas and proposals (as “opposed to letting actors bombard the ERRF team directly”) as their role and personal responsibility.

It is uncertain, however, that ERRF was perceived as a strategic tool for the Haiti/HCs. Inhibiting factors may include the complexity of an integrated mission (with differing responsibilities for the HC) and the lack of time to foster more direct exchanges between HC and ERRF. To the benefit of a transparent response, the HC endorsed ERRF projects readily (after being positively reviewed by clusters and OCHA head of office), trusting all levels to do their review job.

26 Despite this, ICC in Haiti has been systematically held in low esteem by most stakeholders due to high turn-over and recognized recruitment error. Had it been stronger, ERRF may not have spent as much time in identifying, needs, gaps, priorities.
Efficiency

1. To what extent does the ERRF function efficiently? Could it be improved, and, if so, how?

Although relatively effective despite all constraints, ERRF/Haiti did not function efficiently. Human resources and strategy, the two main elements that hindered ERRF/Haiti efficiency, are explored here. ERRF/Haiti can improve its efficiency with greater understanding and supply of human resources and the strengthening of the mechanism, as described below.

Human resources

There are many weaknesses in the Haiti/ERRF. Few of them would have been evident, however, had there been adequate numbers of staff at the right times. ERRF/Haiti could be made more efficient if the management team were better supported with appropriate numbers of qualified staff at the right times. Insufficient staffing has been provided to adequately employ (and improve) strategy development, M&E and communication / reporting to donors.

FCS can be congratulated for having equipped the Haiti/ERRF (the only ERF ever out of the existing 16) with a P-4 level manager as well as SURGE support in January and August 2010. It is important to note, however, that although the higher level manager was a welcome gesture to build an ERF portfolio with quality, the volume of work required by ERRF/Haiti projects demand a timely and equal or greater emphasis on quantity (i.e. man-hours).

General understanding from headquarters appears weak regarding the time required for ERRF/Haiti management to achieve their ultimate aims and how HC and OCHA offices are run in the aftermath of huge humanitarian disasters. A wealth of knowledge can be gained from spending one week in the Haiti/ERRF office—even without visiting any projects—and the evaluation suggests more frequent visits from FCS leaders (decision makers) to country offices. Having invested so much in design (discussed above) demonstrates, on the part of Haiti/ERRF staff, an acute quality control mechanism as well as the desire to prioritize humanitarian needs while partnering with non-traditional, or less experienced actors. In the spirit of the mechanism, however, it would be beneficial to fund more national NGOs—which means an even greater role for ERRF in project design.

Most importantly, when estimating ERF Human Resource needs, two poorly understood notions are crucial to improve the mechanism:

- While in the beginning of humanitarian response, ERF staff numbers must be sufficient to rapidly produce proposals and sign / disburse grants, later, ERF staff numbers must be equal or even higher to adequately review, adjust and monitor projects. It is a lethal mistake—and one very controversial for donors—to assume that once any part of the funding has been signed over to an IP, that ERF management becomes that much less demanding to manage. On the contrary, upon signature and disbursement, the role of ERRF/Haiti must be even greater to assure accountability. The ERF management workload does not

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27 Two of the largest EEs did not complete stage 4 until May 2010—at which point ERRF review and M&E should routinely start-up. It would be imprudent to imply at any given time that the ERRF/Haiti was managing “only $20 million” out of the $80 provided for management.
suddenly fall off or even decrease when a grant has been signed or disbursed. Enabled by a mandate for flexibility, (many stakeholders suggest that) the real ERF work begins at that very moment, constantly aligning ongoing projects with the ever changing realities of humanitarian response.

- **The number of projects is more important than the monetary value of funds managed.** Despite the volume of funds, the number of projects provides a stronger indication of workload\(^{28}\), or time required for management. The total volume managed by the ERF is a much less useful indicator because every project—no matter its size—requires stepping through all processing phases followed by review, M&E, NCE if necessary, and audit/close-out.

It is difficult to understand how, in the aftermath of the humanitarian industry’s largest urban disaster (12 January 2010), and given the plenitude of funding and numerous pertinent evaluations relating the importance of appropriate staffing of ERFs, requests for more ERRF/Haiti staff could result in the decisions (or lack thereof) they did. Meanwhile, **one of the largest ERFs in the history of the mechanism, it turns out, was managed by one of the smallest ERF field teams.**

**Strategy**

Haiti/ERRF has been criticized by senior humanitarian leaders to have shown no clear ERF strategy (beyond the use of clusters) in the first three months following the earthquake. By June 2010, Haiti/ERRF officers took the time to strategize, and produce a 2-page circular summarizing their position—an act that seems to have strengthened their portfolio and reputation.

At least four elements should be considered within an evolving strategy thought-piece:

1. project funding ceiling (i.e., keep project ceiling low to ward off big players and encourage N-NGOs),
2. partner profile preference (i.e., I-NGOs, N-NGOs or UN/IOM),
3. geographic focus, (i.e., move efforts away from Port au Prince), and
4. technical focus: (i.e., priority for certain sectors or for approaches within sectors (i.e., moving away from water trucking or CCCM).

Without the inconveniences of a formal ‘Call for Tenders’, the strategy should be brief, and articulated to attract specific actors to unforeseen needs or forgotten emergencies, while bracing for the next hurricane season, etc.

Strategies are strengthened when fund volumes can be anticipated. How can donors and FCS encourage and expect ERF management to be strategic when field officers have no idea of future or prepositioned funds? Who has the role to fund-raise for ERRF/Haiti?

\(^{28}\) Analysis of the six proposal management phases indicates that the Haiti/ERRF team managed dozens of projects at each of the phases simultaneously. The total work load was above 40 projects from early March (two months after the earthquake) and reached its height from July to Aug 2010 when ERF Officers were managing 49 grants—not counting unregistered queries and the dozens of other tasks.
The strategic thinking described above may or may not benefit from an Advisory Board. If such a board is too cumbersome in a heightened response period, strategizing can be done informally through a simple exchange of emails. The most important part is not how to strategize, but to do it as best possible.

Two other ways to improve efficiency, retroactivity and audits, fall under financial management structures. They are discussed below, under Efficiency Questions 2 and 3, respectively.

2. How much funding was passed on to NGOs? How long did it take to forward the disbursements? When were NGO programmes actually implemented? Are there any differences in disbursement to NGOs and UN Agencies?

Across most of the lines of comparison, the Haiti/ERRF remained true to its aim of prioritizing NGOs, with the significant exception of the Exceptional Envelopes (EEs, >$45 million, these decisions not under the control of Haiti/ERRF management). Due to the EEs, the comparison of direct grants results in UN/IOM being favored with an approximate 60:40 ratio. If we retain only the funds whose decisions were under the control of the Haiti/ERRF team, the ratio was even better than 70:30. Readers are reminded to review Table 9: Distribution of Funds between NGOs and UN/Int. Organizations.

Disbursements to IPs averaged 77 calendar days from first proposal submitted. The issue of activity start-up dates for NGOs is very important when exploring efficiency. Evidence suggests that ERRF/Haiti disbursement to NGOs is generally more rapid than to UN/IOM entities (due to reasons discussed previously). This brings more weight to the ERF mandate of supporting smaller endeavors with greater chance for measurable field-based impact.

Given delays in Stage 5 of the process, Disbursement (discussed above), however, Haiti HC’s approved eligibility of project expenses retroactive to the date of his/her signature of the Letter of Endorsement (LoE) can gain up to 20 days for response activities. Although a huge and appreciated savings in time, this only helps NGOs that have the capacity to advance significant volumes of funding to start up approved projects while awaiting the actual disbursements.

Since November 2010, AO does not recognize any retroactivity. The long-term effect of ‘no retroactivity’ for projects granted remains to be fully understood. Not having this flexibility, the ERRF becomes much less attractive compared to institutional donors. Beyond reducing the risk of IPs initiating implementation prematurely, it also relieves the pressure and associated stress on ERRF management and partners from delivering paperwork (i.e., mistakes and errors made from rush, constant phone calls and emails etc.).

The possibility of institutionalizing the retroactivity of the eligibility of expenses to the date of HC signature of the LoE should be further explored. Although AO states that it is impossible (insisting only on finding ways to accelerate the clearance process), the HC is ultimately accountable for ERPs and should be able to influence the decision when it is appropriate, as s/he has in the past.
Actual NGO ERRF funded activity could start no earlier than 28 February 2010 (date of LoE signed by HC, 3 NGOs in cluster sector)—and only if NGO had sufficient funds to advance while awaiting formal disbursement.

3. Financial grant management: How long does it take to disburse to Implementing Partners?
The total average number of days for proposal/grant processing (all 5 stages) is 75 (64 if disbursement, Stage 5, is not included in the calculation). A period exceeding two months from first proposal to signed authorization is difficult to consider rapid. All stages of proposal processing would benefit from improvements that make them flow more rapidly and systematically. Out of the first 4 stages of proposal management, nearly half is invested in the Design (Stage 1) and another third in Clearance (Stage 4).

Overall, despite the delays discussed in this section, it is understood that the Haiti ERRF was in fact rapid when it had to be (See Figure 6). Using a moving average of days per stage during the 12 months following the earthquake, Figure 6 portrays two main dips in four of the five studied stages. The two dips correspond to the heightened response efforts of the earthquake, and of cholera. During these moments, ERRF was able to accelerate or lobby for faster processing rates of most stages of the process.

Figure 6: ERRF, rapid when it must be

Rapidity in humanitarian response is an odd element. Although aiming to save lives, ERRF action starting one month after a disaster is too late to literally save lives. As a stakeholder eloquently reported, “quick and dirty is only as good as the person who cleans up the mess later on”. It is actually easy to fast track grant approval and such needs to be done on the onset of a disaster. Later, however, all rapid decisions require careful and thorough documentation and project documents need to be more fully
completed to restore complete transparency and accountability. All grants signed in the third month (especially the EEs) had to be thoroughly reviewed and revised.

Lastly, audits are recognized as core financial monitoring tools that enable OCHA to ensure that donor funds are used responsibly. It must also be recognized that audits are costly, cumbersome and in the case of ERRF/Haiti’s audit series for 2008 projects, often too late to be feasible. The concept of responsible use of funds applies equally to audits themselves: it is incumbent on all donors (and fund managers) to employ the audit mechanism responsibly. This indicates the need for a more creative exploration, with donors, of best practice of small and rapid humanitarian project audits—rather than insisting on a classic blanket audit for all.

**Connectedness**

1. **What is the current relationship between the ERRF and other humanitarian financing mechanisms?**

**Connection between ERRF and classic donors**

ERRF is connected to other funding mechanisms (through jointly funded efforts—the majority of the portfolio). Links to other bilateral aid mechanisms are indirect. It was often the case that a visited ERRF project received simultaneous funding for the same project from four different donors, e.g., OFDA, ECHO, Canada and ERRF. For some projects and partners, especially those less able to readily access funds, “ERRF opened the door to other donors”. Often evidence pointed to ERRF being reserved for last use by IPs—prioritizing the spending of ECHO funds, for example, before starting up the nearly/already approved ERRF funds. Evidence indicates that IPs often gave classic donors priority (in project start-up) considering them long-term development donors, while ERRF may understandably be perceived as a less important and ephemeral quasi-donor.

**Connection between ERRF and CERF**

Human resource connection: The Common Emergency Response Fund (CERF), an instrument that funds only UN Agencies, has been active in Haiti since at least 2006. ERRF/Haiti is also intimately connected to the CERF because ERRF/Haiti officers played the role of oversight and proposal preparation for the CERF mechanism. ERRF/Haiti staff claimed that up to 10% of their time may have been invested on CERF management.

Consensus in the field holds that appointing a separate officer to manage the CERF would add to duplication in OCHA. As the tasks and required profiles are nearly identical, CERF and ERF field management should be joined. If CERF is retained among the duties of an ERRF Officer, it needs to be more formally explored between CERF and FCS leaders at headquarters, recognized and human and financial resources adjusted accordingly.

Another ideal connection between the two mechanisms is direct. As suggested in the 2007 workshop on ERFs in Ethiopia, the routine allocation of 20% of all CERF funds to ERFs would allow them to be more strategic and more GHD compliant with regards to predictability.
Indirect connection: A rapid comparison of the CERF and the ERF within the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP, including Flash Appeals) underlines the erratic nature of, and evolution between, the two. See Table 14. In 2008/9, CERF provided more than 10 times the volume that ERRF managed. Following the Flash Appeal of 16 Jan 2010 and revisions (14 Jul 2010), ERRF managed nearly twice the CERF volume. Following the 2011 CAP, CERF again took a lead twice that of ERRF. Since 2008, ERRF has been listed as a project, alongside those promoted by the CAP; the ERRF volume varied between $2 and 23 million. Furthermore, the CERF funds were disbursed to Haiti as early as 7 October 2008 (for the hurricanes) and 20 January 2010 (for the earthquake); on both instances, ERRF funds arrived earlier: 5 September 2008 and 18 January 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAP Dates</th>
<th>Required Funds (in USD)</th>
<th>ERRF Mention in CAP Document</th>
<th>ERRF Disbursements</th>
<th>CERF Disbursements</th>
<th>Total (CERF and ERRF)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAP 2011 (mainly cholera)</td>
<td>15-Nov-10</td>
<td>$906,961,206</td>
<td>ERRF listed as a project for $15 million, p147</td>
<td>$4,706,227</td>
<td>$10,371,212</td>
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<td>Flash Appeal 2010, v1.1</td>
<td>16-Jan-10</td>
<td>$575,010,654</td>
<td>ERRF listed as a project, no $ target, p26</td>
<td>$16,030,104</td>
<td>$2,258,104</td>
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<td>CAP 2009 NO DOCUMENT PREPARED</td>
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<td>$4,995,766</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP 2008 Flash Appeal Revision</td>
<td>19-Dec-08</td>
<td>$127,525,485</td>
<td>ERRF described, no funding needs mentioned</td>
<td>$2,258,104</td>
<td>$16,030,104</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP 2008 Flash Appeal</td>
<td>10-Sep-08</td>
<td>$107,714,621</td>
<td>ERRF listed as a project for $1 million (p13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Connection between ERRF/Haiti and other ERFs

Another comparison that is interesting to review is between ERRF/Haiti and the ERF in many other countries. In Annex A, the Development Initiatives (2007) multiple country comparison was adapted adding data from Haiti.

2. What effect has the presence of ERRF have on the overall levels of humanitarian funding available for a crisis? What is the optimal size for the fund in Haiti?

The Haiti/ERRF presented a unique opportunity and a rare volume of funding (for an ERF) that may never be replicated. It is too early to consider this a global trend. If volumes of this level were to become a trend, it could entirely change the future face of OCHA—who must be poised to confront their newly perceived role as ‘donor’, even if only serving as fund managers.

A more thorough analysis could highlight the timing, advantages and disadvantages of major donors in Haiti. The FTS places ERRF in sixth place, among Haiti ‘donors’ after the earthquake. In a very qualitative initial analysis, ERRF came in, at times, last place on many criteria and other times, ERRF was tied for fastest ‘donor’. Most often ERRF volume was small compared to the other ‘donors’, but the mechanism was less flexible in terms of retroactive dates for project start-up (discussed above) and only 80% receipt of funds prior to project audit/closure.

To many bilateral donors, ERF is a considered a convenient funding channel: some donors have expressed interest in moving all their humanitarian funding into the ERFs in countries where they have no presence. This is conditional, however, on full trust in the transparency of ERF management and its M&E capacity. When bilateral donors choose to fund NGOs directly, however, it is because NGOs are more

29 Sources include various email and telecommunications with ERF donors.
agile, open for dialogue, not constrained by UN security rules, and impose lower transaction costs.

3. To what extent has the ERRF contributed to local capacity building and made linkages to recovery and longer term development programmes?

E-survey respondents scored the ERRF/Haiti link to recovery and development as mediocre (4.32 out of 10; 1 is best). It would be beneficial to produce a clear statement clarifying where ERRF draws the line between life-saving and “accompanying the affected all the way back to their homes”. It is also important to explore with ERF donors how strong links to development must reasonably be in view of a 2-6 month project and what coherence exits strategies even have for very short-lived projects.

The GoH has articulated to the HC frustration with the UN Cluster system, and its desire to move from the clusters to the Tables Ronds Departementales. Evidence also suggests that it is time for Haiti/ERRF to explore closer linkages to GoH at multiple levels without changing project selection criteria or further delaying ERRF processes. OCHA is not a capacity building or development entity, but ERF is a mechanism within OCHA that could be greatly enhanced by a closer collaboration with GoH—a win-win situation for both.

Although there seems to be no clause forbidding ERFs to provide funds directly to government entities, there is also no precedent for this and many donors may not approve of it. URD30 however, states that “the integration of sector-based coordination mechanisms into governmental bodies should be the rule”. Although a challenge in and of itself, ERRF/Haiti could go a step further than simply making GoH contributions to cluster coordination more systematic.

Without providing funds directly to the GoH and without conflicting standard principles of humanitarian action, at least three options can be explored:

- The future ERF Unit, still managed by OCHA, could be fully housed inside an appropriate government agency;
- A GoH agent could be identified and fully-seconded (possibly at no cost to OCHA) to work inside an OCHA-based ERF Unit;
- An NGO could receive ERRF funds to finance an agent who sits inside a government entity serving as a liaison between GoH and ERF, fully equipped with a well-articulated Terms of Reference and engaged National GoH counterparts.

Any of these options would go a long way to lend visible support to government while producing and managing an ERF portfolio that more closely aligns with Haitian realities.

Cross-cutting issues

1. To what extent did the portfolio of projects funded by the ERF take gender equality into consideration? Was gender equality a consideration in the selection of individual projects?
2. To what extent did the portfolio of projects funded by the ERF take into consideration vulnerable and marginalized groups?

Vulnerable target groups were routinely addressed by ERF/Haiti projects. This quality of ERF was one of the most commonly recognized among E-survey respondents.

respondents (in 2nd place with a score of 3.35 out of 10; 1 is best). Gender equity elements and marginalized groups were systematically targeted by the portfolio. One example is in Cash for Work (CfW) projects, in which every effort targeted a certain proportion (normally 30%) of women. Funded projects (such as Viva Rio and Prodeva) were actors that accepted to work in certain red-zone quartiers of Port au Prince (PaP).
5. Conclusions & linked recommendations

The present evaluation contributes more evidence to the numerous evaluations documented since 1997 in many of the 16 ERF countries that can help OCHA strengthen the ERF mechanism. For all discussion points made previously indicating the need for improvement, a succinct conclusion (on left in italics) is made here accompanied by specific, measurable, achievable, result-oriented and time-bound (SMART) recommendations, on the right.

Recommendation 1:

**Strictly respect the ERF mandate—without allowing ‘exceptional’ uses**

FCS to lobby at a high level (i.e., ERC and HCs) for funds to be channeled through an ERF only *if and when* the funds can be managed as an ERF, without making exceptions to the strategies (i.e. envelope ceilings, project duration) in place.

1.1. Establish and circulate widely a clear exhaustive list and analysis comparing available funding mechanisms and identifying the best channel to use for different situations (i.e. a sudden donation of $50 million from Saudi Arabia earmarked for a given country). The list should contain compelling advantages and disadvantages of each mechanism.

1.2. Develop and use a funding mechanism checklist linked to the above analysis and updated regularly to rapidly help decision makers confirm whether appropriate systems and sufficient resources (human and technical) are in place or swiftly available in a country to manage whatever volume of funds is under consideration.

Recommendation 2:

**Reform the human resources component of ERF management**

2.1. Complete with greater detail, finalize and circulate existing recommendations on human resource needs for ERF management.

- Update the recommendations to give greater importance to the number of projects than to the total volume funded (i.e., ERFs with fixed ceilings).
- Update the final recommendations to recognize appropriate and varying human resources (numbers and/or profiles) at different intervals following a disaster.
- Clearly stipulate in the recommendations that the need for staff to adequately manage grants is equal to...
Projects are officially closed. ERF manpower is at least as important after as prior to, grant signature.

Early ERF work is more mechanical and later work demands much greater analysis and vision.

ERRF/Haiti staff claimed that up to 10% of their time was invested on CERF management. Field consensus holds that appointing a separate officer to manage the CERF would add to duplication.

Cluster coordinators make an important contribution to the review process that may not be explicit in their respective ToRs.

Evidence from Haiti alone suggests that many challenges could be overcome if ERF decision makers demonstrated a better understanding of ERF field operations.

or higher than the need to manage proposals through to signature and disbursement.

2.2. Describe and document ideal ERF management profiles under various scenarios. Attention to mix of profiles for a two-person team is vital to a smooth ERF.

2.3. Develop an official ERF Officer Roster (and human resource deployment system) of trained and experienced officers ready to be deployed.

2.4. Regularly refer to and use the official recommendations, profiles and roster when setting up or revising ERF management staffing.

2.5. Explore conclude on and document, at the level of ERF and CERF decision makers, the merging of the two mechanisms in terms of joint field management and what this entails for human and related financial resources.

2.6. Lobby with ICC mechanism leaders to officially and routinely add “management of review and monitoring components of funding mechanisms” into their Terms of Reference.

Recommendation 3:

**Greater support to Haiti/ERRF from OCHA Headquarters (FCS and AO)**

Explore the many ways that FCS could lend support to field country management to lay a solid foundation for future ERFs.

3.1. To foster understanding of a constantly moving target, add to ERF Guidelines the requirement of an annual FCS visit to all countries managing minimum $2 million or 25 projects.

3.2. Produce and/or update ERF support tools:
  a. Finalize and update generic **ERF guidelines**, with advice on how to contextualize them in each new setting.
  b. Review both the generic and specific **Terms of Reference for ERF management**. Careful strategic
Due to frequent turnover of cluster coordinators and NGO staff, ERRF training needs to be better packaged, simpler to conduct and monitor.

As an example of best practice, a very detailed registry that tracks proposals and grants through all management stages was developed by ERRF/Haiti.

Evidence suggests that ERRF/Haiti and OCHA/FCS have not managed to satisfy donors.

A tool or Log Frame to monitor the success of the ERF Mechanism itself as a useful component to demonstrate progress to all stakeholders is still missing.

Evidence suggests that the CERF is an appropriate channel to provide proportional funding to on-going ERFs.

3.3. Donor relations and fund-raising:
FCS to take a more active role liaising between ERF donors and ERF-country offices—more attentive to the needs of both. FCS to take the lead to:

a. Produce an ERF Mechanism Logical Framework and the related Comprehensive Project Logical Framework (see examples in Table 13 and Annex A, respectively) to evaluate ERF success, as key selling points to start the process of restoring trust with donors.

b. Create and maintain an ERF Donor Database tallying donor expectations (as per original signed agreements), in order to more routinely inform of ERF evolution and track communication.
   - Each time changes are made to a signed agreement or process, for example, FCS should inform the donor directly, or seek their approval.
   - If any of these tasks is delegated to the ERF in-country team, it should be done so with a formal communication from FCS, copying the donor.

c. Further explore and lobby for the routine allocation of 20% of all CERF funds to ERF.
3.4. Financial processes: ERRF/Haiti will benefit from the streamlining of contracting processes.

a. FCS to lobby and liaise between HC and AO to win back retroactivity of project spending (at least in the first 3 months after a disaster).

b. FCS to contract a consultant to conduct an in-depth review of each of the five ERF proposal/grant processing stages and inventory with HCs and AOs the best strategies to reduce the timing invested in each.

c. FCS to facilitate brainstorming discussions with AO to openly and creatively explore ERF project audits. They should carefully consider: inclusion of UN/Int’l. agencies, less cumbersome audits for smaller envelopes, the benefits in time and resource savings in one combined annual audit per funded agency, as opposed to one per project (following the ECHO example) or no required audit for projects under a certain level of funding.

Recommendation 4:

Build closer partnerships with national and local governments and NGOs

Paying credence to the need to strengthen recognized governments—even in their weakest moments—is considered best practice in humanitarian action.

4.1. FCS to organize with all pertinent stakeholders a workshop or a series of directed discussions that explore and document options and best practices to increase visible support to governments and national NGOs via ERFs while producing and managing a portfolio that more closely aligns with local realities. This would be useful at both global and local levels.

- The options should go beyond existing, often symbolic coordination within clusters, to consider delegated full-time government staff to be involved in strategic and grant processes.
ERRF-specific strategies (beyond systematic use of clusters) that evolve to meet changing humanitarian needs are key to effective and efficient management and were found missing in first 3 months. ERF field teams need to be enabled to take the time to strategize.

There is still confusion on the nuanced interpretation of “life saving”. The notion is important to OCHA coordination and fund mgmt.

ERFs are still considered convenient funding channels: some donors have expressed interest in moving all their humanitarian funding into the ERFs in countries where they have no presence.

This is conditional, however, on full trust in the transparency of ERF management and its M&E capacity.

ERRF/Haiti quality control was much more thorough in design and disbursement than in monitoring, reporting

Recommendation 5:

**Strengthen ERF process of strategizing**

Specific and solid ERF strategies should evolve to meet changing needs. HCs and OCHA HoOs should insist that ERFs stop project management for sufficient succinct and scheduled moments to properly strategize. FCS and other stakeholders need to accept that the slowing down of grant processing during these strategizing periods will strengthen the mechanism in the long run. The product of a new strategy should be routinely and widely disseminated.

5.1. FCS to lead discussions on and document:
   a. the contents of a Strategy Revision Template and
   b. the series of events that align to indicate when a new ERF strategy is appropriate.

5.2. FCS to lead discussions on and document, alongside experienced stakeholders and donors:
   a. exactly what criteria align to clearly indicate the absolute need for an Advisory Board, and
   b. precisely what an Advisory Board offers that a Review Board does not in varying emergency contexts.

5.3. FCS to develop and propose an OCHA position paper on the difference between life-saving and “accompanying the affected back to their homes” and which funding mechanisms are tailored to each distinction.

Recommendation 6:

**Improve communication and Monitoring & Evaluation components**

6.1. FCS to work with ERF country management to develop and document simple standard (and later contextualized) mechanisms that help communication and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) become routine tasks, while strengthening the reputation of transparent management.

Each mechanism should be described in a short Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) document advising on when and how it should be employed, etc.

Priority should be given to creating user-friendly tools for:
   a. ERF—Training of Cluster Coordinators, IPs and OCHA field Staff;
   b. Proposal rejection procedures;
   c. Simplified standard monitoring report template (minimum package);
   d. Bi-monthly ERF report showing who ERF is funding, where, doing what;
and review. Much more attention needs to be paid to post-disbursement review and monitoring as well as to communication with all stakeholders, including donors.

e. Other tools described above would also improve communication: Logical Frameworks, enhanced ERF grant registry databases, etc.

6.2. Guided by FCS, OCHA should systematically employ decentralized Field Office staff for both project identification and monitoring.

   a. Add ERF management explicitly to Field Officer ToRs;
   b. Develop motivational schemes (i.e. internal competitions or prizes) to engage field officers more readily in all stages of the ERRF process.

6.3. FCS and ERFs to explore and document a method to monitor funded project impact with mechanisms that engage direct beneficiaries themselves in the monitoring process.

Much more than simply “80 beautiful adventures”, the ERRF portfolio in Haiti has made history as the largest ERF ever managed. The efforts of many combined to make it the success it continues to be. Despite all of its weaknesses, voices converge to say that ERRF is and should remain a pertinent pillar in the humanitarian architecture in Haiti. With greater support from OCHA Headquarters and a few additional hands and minds at the right times, ERRF will continue to improve and make a more transparent name for itself as the mechanism of choice for donors interested in humanitarian response with an impact.
Annexes and Support Documents:

A. Annex of Tables:
   A1. Timeline of Events
   A2. Chronogram of Project Processing (5 Stages)
   A3. E-Survey results
   A4. Logical Framework (Project Objectives)
   A5. ERF: 7-Country Comparison (adapted from DI, 2007)

B. Persons Contacted

C. Key evaluation questions and how they were answered

D. Documents Reviewed

E. Evaluation schedule

F. Tools Used: E-Survey

G. Tools Used: Topical Outline

H. Inception Report and ToR for the Evaluation, Upon Request (removed for size)
## A1. Table: Timeline of Events

### DISASTERS and EVENTS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
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<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
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<th>2011</th>
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<td>Floods</td>
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<td>Hurricanes (Fay, Hanna, Gustave, Ike, Tomas) and Storms</td>
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<td>Earthquake (12 Jan)</td>
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<td>Cholera</td>
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<td>Elections (First Tour / Second Tour)</td>
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### ERRF MECHANISM

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<td>3-R Mechanism proposed in Haiti</td>
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<td>ERRF Proposal Written to SIDA, Revised, etc.</td>
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<td>SIDA: Agreement Signed with UNOCHA (Addendum)</td>
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<td>Funded Hurricane Projects (Start-Up date; N=18)</td>
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<td>Funded Earthquake Projects (N=15)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERRF Hiatus: New 4-point Strategy proposed and M&amp;E Improved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FUNDING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIDA Funds Available (instlt. Tot. $3.7 mil)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5.2 mil Denmark Available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$550 mil Saudia Arabia Available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution of Project Ceiling (US$)</td>
<td></td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retroactivity of spending to LOE Date (HC sig) acceptable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### HUMAN RESOURCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caroline Peguet, ERRF Manager/Surge, in Haiti (except R&amp;R)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard LeFlaive, ERRF Manager, in Haiti (except R&amp;R)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laetitia Rougeron, ERRF Support, in Haiti (except R&amp;R)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total OCHA Staff in Haiti (from Reports &quot;OCHA in...&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**numbers = dates of given month**
## A2. Table: Chronogram of Project Processing (5 Stages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-Jan-10</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-Jan-10</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Jan-10</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Feb-10</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-Jul-10</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Aug-10</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-Aug-10</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Aug-10</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-Aug-10</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-Oct-10</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Feb-11</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Feb-11</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### HOW WOULD YOU RATE HAITI/ERRF (on......)?

Averaged over each Profile Group, 1 (Best) -- 10 (Worst)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>Review / Mgmt.</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OVERALL</strong></td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>8.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEXIBILITY</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARGETING RE GENDER EQUITY &amp; MARG.</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>8.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEVANCE</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>8.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEETING UNFORESEEN NEEDS</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAPIDITY</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>9.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORRECT BALANCE BETWEEN NGOS &amp; UN</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCOUNTABILITY / QUALITY CONTROL</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINKS TO DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROMOTION OF JOINT EFFORTS</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL MANAGEMENT QUALITY</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONNECTEDNESS TO FINANCIAL MECHANISMS</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>8.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT TO COORDINATION</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROMOTION OF INNOVATION</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>8.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARGETING OF UNDERCOVERED EMERGENCIES</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORTS TO NAT/LOCAL AUTHORITIES</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REVIEW / MGMT.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECIPIENT</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DONOR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REJECTED</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### A4. Table: Logical Framework, Project Objectives vs. Mechanism Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. OUTCOME: Reduced Human Suffering</th>
<th>2. OUTCOME: Improved Coordination</th>
<th>Obj. A. Strengthen Coordination Mechanisms</th>
<th>Obj. C. Strengthen Links with Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td><strong>A.</strong> To ensure the management and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td><strong>B.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td><strong>C.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td><strong>D.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td><strong>E.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td><strong>F.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td><strong>G.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td><strong>H.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td><strong>I.</strong> To improve the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and public services to IDPs in camps through the establishment of coordination mechanisms (CCCM)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEGEND**

- **Objective 1**: To reduce suffering
- **Objective 2**: To improve coordination
- **Objective A**: Coordination
- **Objective B**: Support to GoH
- **Objective C**: Links with Dev.
- **PAH**: The Partnership Against Humanitarian Aid
- **IRC**: The International Rescue Committee
- **W. Concern**: World Concern
- **RAIN**: The Rains of Change
- **UNDP**: United Nations Development Programme
- **OECD**: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
- **HODR**: Humanitarian Operations and Development in Rwanda
- **PHELPS**: The Partnership for Health and Economic Progress
- **UNHCR**: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- **SANGERO**: Solidarity Against Gender-Based Violence
- **HAI**: The Haiti Academy of International Affairs
- **USAID**: United States Agency for International Development
- **PAH**: The Partnership Against Humanitarian Aid
- **HAI**: The Haiti Academy of International Affairs
- **SANGERO**: Solidarity Against Gender-Based Violence
- **USAID**: United States Agency for International Development
- **HAI**: The Haiti Academy of International Affairs
- **SANGERO**: Solidarity Against Gender-Based Violence
- **USAID**: United States Agency for International Development

**% of 80 projects contributing to each ERF Outcome/Obj.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 1: Reduce suffering</th>
<th>54%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 2/Obj. A: Coordination</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj. B: Support to GoH</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj. C: Links with Dev.</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ASSIGNMENT RULES**

- **Project Objectives**: Objectives from only 1 project in original proposal language. Abbreviated partner name (SWH Project #9, ordered as signed prior to 27 Jan 2011). Gray shading: the project two objectives that are aligned among at least 2 of the 4 ERF Outcomes: Yellow shading: Project targets Climate / Water shading: Project targets 2008/9 hurricanes (all which are earthquake sensitive).
## Annex A5: Comparison of 7 ERFs (Adapted from Development Initiatives, 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HAITI</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trigger</strong></td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main donors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden, S.Arabia, Brazil, France, Denmark</td>
<td>UK, Canada, EC, Italy, Neth., Norway, Sweden, USA</td>
<td>Canada, EC, Neth., Sweden, CH, UK, USA</td>
<td>Neth., Norway, UK</td>
<td>Australia, DFID, UK</td>
<td>Ireland, Norway, Sweden, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Total disbursed ($M)</td>
<td>$80</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Avg. Annual Volume Managed</strong></td>
<td>$27</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amount Disbursed to UN ($M)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>$5.5 m (35.9%)</td>
<td>$4.7 m (40.8%)</td>
<td>$3.43 m (92.9%)</td>
<td>$1.1 m (55%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>$7.08 m (86.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amount to INGOs</strong></td>
<td>27.2 (34%)</td>
<td>$9.6 m (96.6%)</td>
<td>$6.8 m (59.2%)</td>
<td>$3.43 m (92.9%)</td>
<td>$1.1 m (55%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>$7.08 m (86.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amount to local NGOs</strong></td>
<td>2.4 (3%)</td>
<td>$261,056 (7.1%)</td>
<td>$261,056 (26.7%)</td>
<td>$895,404 (45%)</td>
<td>$20,000 (50.2%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total No. of Projects</strong></td>
<td>86</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ceiling on project size</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>$100,000 increased to $200,000</td>
<td>No limit. Avg. project size ~ $100,000</td>
<td>No limit. Avg. project size ~ $400,000</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$130,000 ($200,000 in exceptional cases)</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time to approve projects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>47 days (3-103 days)</td>
<td>25.5 days (10-45 days)</td>
<td>10.4 days (2-26 days)</td>
<td>34.6 days (18-62 days)</td>
<td>47 days (10-66 days)</td>
<td>35 days (12-43 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time to disburse first tranche</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>21 days (6-42 days)</td>
<td>25 days (4-118 days)</td>
<td>21.7 days (12-66 days)</td>
<td>9.5 days (5-10 days)</td>
<td>21 days (7-28 days)</td>
<td>31 days (11-72 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size of Advisory/Review Board</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>About 5</td>
<td>CPIA: varies; RRF: 3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advisory/Review Board composed of:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cluster Leads</td>
<td>UN agencies</td>
<td>CPIA: UN, MONUC, 3 INGOs, Cluster Leads; RRF: OCHA, UNICEF, focal pt NGO</td>
<td>UN agencies and 3 INGOs</td>
<td>UN agencies</td>
<td>UN agencies, 2 INGOs &amp; 1 Somali NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size of fund management team</strong></td>
<td>1 (2008/9); 2 (until 1 feb 2011)</td>
<td>1 or 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fully Dedicated to ERF?</strong></td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>At times</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management fees (&gt; 3%)</strong></td>
<td>$148,596</td>
<td>$218,921</td>
<td>$269,000</td>
<td>$148,596</td>
<td>$218,921</td>
<td>$269,000</td>
<td>$238,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inclusion in CAP?</strong></td>
<td>YES (15m in 2011)</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>At times</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table compares various aspects of 7 ERFs across different countries, including main donors, fund duration, total disbursed amount, and other project management details. The comparison highlights differences in project management structures, funding allocations, and operational timelines.
## Annex B: PERSONS CONSULTED (N-99)

### Donors and Independent Consultants (4)
- SIDA: Maria Thorin
- URD: François Grünewald
- 2 E-Survey respondents

### NGOs (including field staff, partners and beneficiaries) (50)
- ACF: Arnaud Phipps, Anne-Charlotte Schneider, Nicholas, Francois Xavier, Kelly, Junior and beneficiaries (Augustin Jacob and many others)
- ACTED: Pauline Clement, Marianna Franco, Clementine Favier, Philippe Jantzem, Adele Bourdy, Animators (Dorus Lundy, Zelande Petit-Frere, Wilna Dorielan) and beneficiaries
- AMURT: Dharma Russafov and Paul Ziade, Vulgar and beneficiaries
- Floresta: Guy Paraison
- Handicap International: Olivier, Carol, Jules, Jerome
- HODR: Stephanie Chang, Jeremy Horan, Dylan Becker, Diana Manilla and beneficiaries
- IEDA: Phil Maanulwa
- IMC: Agron Ferati, Naomi Gikonyo
- PAH: Christien Burgle, Jean Emmanuel Julo
- Perspectives: Samuel Aleus, Weaver Destin
- Save the Children: Lilian Kastner
- Viva-Rio: Nathalie Rami
- 14 E-Survey respondents

### United Nations Agencies and IOM (25)
- FAO: Francesco Del Re, Etienne Peterschmitt
- IOM: Igor Chantefort, Bakary Doumbia, Marc Levesque, Ono Takuya
- MINUSTAH: Elsa LePennec
- PAH/WHO: Souad Lakhdim
- UNDP: Ugo Blanco
- UNHABITAT: Jean-Christophe Adrian, Nicole Galleta, Catalina Jaime
- UNICEF: Mohammed Fall, Stefano Fedele, Herbert Schembri, Olivier Thonet, Jorge Valles
- WFP: Pauline Comtesse, Elie Iyakaremye, Sandra Nurse
- 5 E-Survey respondents

### OCHA/Haiti and HQ (21)
- HCs: Nigel Fischer (Mar10 to present); Joel Boutroue (2007-Dec09)
- OCHA HoOs: Catherine Huck (present), Sara Muscroft
- Haiti HAOs: Esteban Sacco, Claudine Joseph, Maria Rosaria Bruno, Bruno Ngandu Kazadi
- Haiti Field Officers: Safari Djumapili, Jean Bosco Mofiling, Salamatou Ba, M. Angelo Diallo
- Funding Coordination Section (FCS): Shoko Arakaki and Sanjana Quazi
- AO/GVA: Marina Throne-Holst and Raim Cooper
CRD Section: Charles Bernimoulin and Heidi Kuttab

**Annex C: KEY QUESTIONS for the EVALUATION**

The questions posed in the ToR were assessed in the following way by each of the methodological approaches described in the Methodology Section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVALUATION CRITERIA</th>
<th>QUESTIONS</th>
<th>METHODOLOGY: Approaches most likely to help answer the question</th>
<th>CODES:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **RELEVANCE**       | 1. How relevant is the ERRF to the humanitarian needs in Haiti? Is the ERRF associated with more timely and effective funding to address the critical gaps? 2. Is this the appropriate mechanism? 3. Are the funded activities in line with local needs and priorities? | 1. KI/ES 
2. ES/KI, DR | DR=Desk Review 
ES=E-Survey 
KI= Key Informants 
CS=Case Study |
| **EFFECTIVENESS**   | 1. To what extent does the portfolio of projects funded by the ERRF attain the mechanism’s objective(s)? 2. To what extent do the individual project activities produce their expected results? How do we know? 3. Are sufficient quality control mechanisms in place for: a) planning and design, b) approval of projects, c) fund disbursement, and d) monitoring, reporting and review? 4. What key indicators are used to for measuring the success of the ERRF and how can data collection processes be strengthened? Has OCHA established adequate monitoring and reporting mechanisms for measuring progress? 6. Did the ERRF contribute to strengthening the coordination mechanisms and the role of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Haiti? If yes, how? If no, what were the inhibiting factors? | 1. CS 
2. CS 
3. ES/KI, DR 
4. KI 
5. DR, ES 
6. KI, ES | |
| **EFFICIENCY**      | 1. To what extent does the ERRF function efficiently? Could the efficiency be improved, and, if so, how? 2. How much funding was passed on to NGOs? How long did it take to forward the disbursements? When were NGO programmes actually implemented? Are there any differences in disbursement to NGOs and UN Agencies? 3. How long does it take to disburse to Implementing Partners? | 1. ES, KI 
2. DR | |
| **CONNECTEDNESS**   | 1. What is the current relationship between the ERRF and other humanitarian financing mechanisms, including but not limited to: agency internal resources, bilateral contributions, other funds, global funds? 2. What effect has the presence of ERRF have on the overall levels of humanitarian funding available for a crisis? 3. To what extent has the ERRF contributed to local capacity building and made linkages to recovery and longer term development programmes? | 1. DR, KI 
2. KI, ES 
3. KI, ES | |
| **CROSS CUTTING**   | 1. To what extent did the portfolio of projects funded by the ERRF take gender equality into consideration? Was gender equality a consideration in the selection of individual projects? 2. To what extent did the portfolio of projects funded by the ERRF take into consideration vulnerable and marginalized groups? | 1. DR, KI, CS 
2. DR, KI, CS | |
Annex D: Key Reference Documents and Materials Reviewed for this Evaluation

**ERRF/Haiti Proposal, Agreements and Reports to Donors**

- **OCHA Proposal** to Sweden: Emergency Relief Response Fund (ERRF) Component of the 3Rs mechanism (dated May 2008)
  - Revised version of Proposal submitted to SIDA (24 June 2008).
  - Original Budget for $2 million (ERRF Activities: Sep08-End Nov. 2009, 18 months).
  - Revised version submitted to SIDA July 10 2008 (budget on July 15, 2008)
  - Various SIDA Emails and Correspondence on the proposal and revisions
- **SIDA (Signed 6 Aug 2008), Agreement** between Sweden and OCHA on Support to Emergency Relief Response Fund of the 3R Mechanism in Haiti, Sep. 2008 – 30 Jun 2010 (6milSEK 1Oct08 and 6milSEK, 1Oct09)
  - Amendment, letter, 4 Dec 2008 proposing additional 12 million SEK
- **OCHA/Appreciation Letters to Donors, Examples Benin and France**
- **Annual Reports to SIDA** (due 30 Sep 2009 and 30 Sep 2010)
  - OCHA/ERRF Description and Report Sep 2008-Dec 2009: details 16 projects funded as a response to the series of tropical storms (Fay, Gustav, Hanna, Ike) in 2008/9
    - SIDA: Comments on Draft Report, 4/12/2010 and various emails
  - OCHA/ERRF Report: 12 January 2010 – September 2010

**ERF or ERF/Haiti: Mechanism and Support Materials**

- **OCHA ERF Generic Guidelines, v5, Draft**
  - OCHA ERF Guidelines, v27 Oct. 2010
- Guidelines for Managing/Reviewing MOUs for the Humanitarian/Emergency Response Fund
- Tracking sheets (XLS) and Databases of ERF/Haiti (starting 2010)
- **Haiti 3R Mechanism/ERRF Management Guidelines, 2007 (with RRF)**
  - Revised Guidelines Version 18 Jan 2010
  - Guide de Procédures, ERF (français, 3p)
- **ERRF Decision Making Process: Flow Chart**
- **ERRF Manager Terms of Reference, Generic Form**
- **ERRF Review Board Terms of Reference, Final Version**
- **ERRF Templates (French and English): Project Proposal Format, Initial and Final Reports, Budget, Applicant Profiles**
- **ERRF M&E Forms: Terms of Reference, Reporting sheet and one example: World Concern**

**Pooled Funding Mechanisms and Humanitarian Financing**

- Channel Research 2010-11. For OCHA: Goyder, H. Team Leader Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) and Annex Reports:
  - 2010, First Draft: Summary of Findings.
  - CAR Country Report.
o Sudan Country Report.

- OCHA Basic Facts about Country-Based Humanitarian Pooled Funds (ERRF and CHF)
- OCHA Haiti-ERRF Brief.
- OCHA/CERRF Haiti Tracking (to compare dates and rapidity with ERRF)
- OCHA/Ethiopia, Humanitarian Financing Workshop Report, Addis, Jan 2007

**Haiti Specific Reports / Evaluations**

- URD/GPPI, Aug. 2010. Interagency RTE: 3 Months after the Earthquake Haiti.
- IASC (July 2010): Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti following the 12 Jan 2010 Earthquake: Achievements, Challenges and Lessons To Be Learned.

**General Evaluation Standards**

- ALNAP, 2005. Quality Proforma (v. 02/03/05)
Annex E: Schedule

The field mission schedule was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9-Feb-11</td>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>Depart from Tucson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Feb-11</td>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>Arrive in Haiti; OCHA Office: Briefing with OCHA Office, ERF Mgr., Meetings with Key Informants, Courtesy Call with Gov/ Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-Feb-11</td>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>Meetings with Key Informants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Feb-11</td>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>Meetings with Key Informants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-Feb-11</td>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>Prep/Docu Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Feb-11</td>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>14h30: Focus Group/Cluster Coordinators, 16h Security Briefing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-Feb-11</td>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>Site Visit 1: Leogane/Petit-Goave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-Feb-11</td>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>9:30 RC/HC, Trip 2: Port au Prince</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-Feb-11</td>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>Trip 3: Gonaive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-Feb-11</td>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>Trip 3: Gonaive, return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-Feb-11</td>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>Trip 4: Port au Prince</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Feb-11</td>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>Prep/Docu Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-Feb-11</td>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>Debriefings: Cluster Coordinators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Feb-11</td>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>Debriefings: OCHA/HC-RC...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-Feb-11</td>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>Depart Haiti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
You have been contacted because of your (or your agency’s) link to Haiti’s Emergency Response Fund (ERRF, managed by OCHA). Whether you are a fund recipient (implementing partner), a donor or another type of partner/advisor/manager related to the ERRF we, as external evaluators of the Haiti ERRF (spanning 2008-present), would like to learn and benefit from your experience.

Kindly take 10-15 minutes of your time to share your opinions—good or bad—about the Haiti ERRF mechanism. A widespread set of opinions, although not necessarily representative, will help make the process stronger and more impactful for future renditions of the mechanism worldwide. Your answers will not be attributable back to you or your agency—you may remain entirely anonymous if you so desire.

If you have not formed an opinion about the Haiti/ERRF, kindly send this e-invite to someone in your agency that may. Even if s/he is no longer working in Haiti or with your agency, their opinions are important to us.

1. Please provide your name and the name of your agency, if willing.
2. How would you describe your link to the Haiti ERRF? Check all that apply
   Answers: recipient/implementing partner; donor; manager; cluster coordinator; advisor; other

3. When did you form your opinions about the ERRF? Check all that apply
   Answers: 2007-09, Since Earthquake (Jan10), More recently

4. For what event/disaster did you interact with the Haiti ERRF? Check all that apply
   Answers: Tropical Storms (Fay, Gustav, Hanna, Ike, other); 2010 Earthquake, 2010/11 Cholera; other (explain)

5. On a scale of 1 (best) to 10 (worst), what is your overall impression of the Haiti ERRF?
   Answers: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

6. In your opinion, what is the greatest strength/benefit of the Haiti ERRF? Free form text

7. In your opinion, what is the greatest weakness/gap of the Haiti ERRF? Free form text

8. What effect has the presence of the Haiti ERRF had on the overall levels of humanitarian funding in Haiti? What is the optimal size for an ERD fund in Haiti? Open text response

9. Have you noticed any evolution, positive or negative, of the Haiti ERRF through time (2008 to present)? Yes (Explain), No

10. Please rank the achievements / successes of ERRF for the following objectives or aspects?
    For each: 1(best) to 10 (least/worst)
    a. Provision of rapid funding
    b. Provision of flexible funding
    c. Support to local authorities (including capacity building)
    d. Meeting unforeseen needs
    e. Strengthening humanitarian coordination mechanisms
    f. Support to joint local, national, international initiatives
    g. Support to innovation and pilot efforts
    h. Quality of link with recovery and long-term development initiatives
    i. Support to under-covered / forgotten emergencies
    j. Support to gender and vulnerable, marginalized target groups
k. General management of the ERRF and efficiency
l. Relevance to priority humanitarian needs in Haiti
m. Accountability, transparency and quality control of funded projects
n. Balance between NGOs and UN entities, as recipients
o. Connectedness to other financial mechanisms (agency, bilateral, global, Flash Appeal, etc.)

10. Please explain any extreme scores you noted above (e.g., 1-2 or 9-10) and record any other comments you may have about the Haiti/ERRF. Feel free to request an interview with the evaluation team in Haiti (mid February), should you so desire. Thank you for your time and attention. Free form text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex G: Topical Outline to guide Key Informant Interviews and Site Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Date:..........................

1. Name, Agency and Location........................................................................................................................................

2. Describe your first exposure to the Haiti ERRF?........................................................................................................

3. Projects (number, scope, general details): ..................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................................

4. Monitoring of these projects by ERRF.........................................................................................................................

5. Overall Impression of Haiti/ERRF...........................................................................................................................
   Greatest strength/benefit
   Most important weakness/gap

6. Have you noticed an evolution of the Haiti ERRF through time (2008 to present)?
..................................................................................................................................................................................

5. Any specific comments regarding...?
   o Provision of RAPID funding
   o FLEXIBILITY
   o General MGMT and EFFICIENCY
   o M&E/Accountability, transparency and quality control of funded projects
   o Strengthening humanitarian COORDINATION mechanisms
   o RELEVANCE to priority humanitarian needs in Haiti
   o BALANCE between NGOs and UN entities, as recipients
   o Connectedness to OTHER FINANCIAL mechanisms
   o Support to INNOVATION and PILOT efforts
   o Support to GOV / local AUTHORITIES (i.e., capacity building)
   o Meeting UNFORESEEN needs
   o Support to UNDERCOVERED / FORGOTTEN emergencies
   o Support to JOINT local, national, international initiatives
   o Support to VULNERABILITY gender and marginalized target groups
   o Quality of link: LRRD initiatives