Policy Framework for CARE International’s Relations with Military Forces

DRAFT ver. May, 2009
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Introduction

The increase in military involvement in the context of humanitarian aid has been a major concern since the 1990s. Since the conflict in Somalia in 1992, several humanitarian crises have occurred in which the military has been directly involved and in which several problems have developed in cooperation between the armed forces and aid or development organisations.

This issue became particularly stringent in 2001 after the US lead operations in Afghanistan where humanitarian aid became a strategic element in “the war on terror”. Since then, NGOs are often seen as part of a more holistic political and military approach. Moreover, as an expert rightly said, “humanitarian operations have become a mainstream non-combat function of armed forces, employed equally in combat, stabilization operations or as part of nation-building agenda”.

CARE has very soon realized the importance of the various humanitarian challenges represented by the integration of humanitarian response into an overall military and security concept.

The current draft document has been initiated in 2000 by Howard Bell (CI Secretariat) and subsequently developed by Howard Mollett (CARE UK). It also benefited from experience made in the field especially in Afghanistan compiled by Marit Glad. In 2008, CI SSU was asked to thoroughly review the original guidelines as well as to include the security dimension.

The purpose of this document is to propose basic guidelines which shall govern the organisation’s relations with the international and national military contingents. The question of interaction between CARE and non-state armed groups will be addressed in a separate document.

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CARE INTERNATIONAL
A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR CARE INTERNATIONAL’S RELATIONS WITH MILITARY FORCES

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1. Policy Statement: Executive Summary

In the past decade international responses to complex emergencies have increasingly called on peacekeeping and military-led missions, alongside the more traditional and standardized military responses to natural disasters. Increased interventionism on the part of the UN, regional organizations and the major Western powers in response to internal conflicts has led to new challenges to military and humanitarian interaction. In both natural disasters and conflict, the members of the CARE confederation often find themselves working in proximity to a range of military actors, state forces and international operations.

The humanitarian and military actors have fundamentally different institutional thinking and cultures, and the two groups have different mandates, competencies objectives and modus operandi, which should not be confused.

CARE’s decisions about how it interacts with the military should always be consistent with its principles and obligations. There are five organisational principles (described in more detail further below) that are central in defining CARE as a non-governmental organisation engaged in humanitarian action.

- Distinction
- Humanitarian imperative
- Safety and security of staff
- Impartiality
- Consultation

Humanitarian principles constitute the core basis for CARE’s ability to work safely and effectively in conflict. While the threats confronting aid agencies are manifold, the safety and security of CARE’s staff, programmes and beneficiaries is contingent on CARE’s neutrality, impartiality and independence from military operations. Inappropriate interactions or the perception of blurred lines between humanitarian and military actors can undermine aid agencies’ acceptance among local populations and parties to the conflict as well as increase the level of insecurity. The unintended negative consequences of associations between aid programmes and military forces can outweigh any short-term benefits.

CARE also recognises that military forces have obligations related to humanitarian assistance and protection of civilian populations, as established by international

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1 CARE International (CARE) comprises all CARE International Confederation members.
2 Confusion between humanitarian action, principles and mandates and political action.
humanitarian law and customary law\textsuperscript{3}. Under certain circumstances, the military may provide assistance or support relief operations. In such contexts, military involvement in relief operations should always respect the principle of distinction between military and humanitarian operations.

CARE will strive to develop joint approaches with other aid agencies to civil-military relations.

2. Definition

“Civil–military relations” (CIVMIL) is the term used by humanitarian agencies to describe the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles and to clearly spell out respective competencies and responsibilities.

3. Purpose

This document provides a policy framework to guide CARE managers’ decisions about managing interactions with military forces and their police components. It provides a framework to promote consistency with CARE’s values and mission, as well as best practice and principles identified by the wider humanitarian community. The proposed framework establishes a common policy for use across the CARE Confederation and is intended to ensure that CARE’s position on relations with military forces is clear to internal and external stakeholders.

4. Scope

In both natural disasters and conflict, NGOs often find themselves working with or near military forces. This policy is primarily focused on CARE’s relations with national and international forces. CARE is present in countries in which foreign national, multilateral and coalition forces operate; including peace-keeping, peace enforcement, integrated missions, and combat operations. While decisions on relations with military forces are informed by circumstances and change over time, this paper provides an over-arching framework and guidance for staff on the ground.

This CARE policy is structured around the following levels of potential action related to civil-military relations:

- Context Analysis and Emergency Preparedness
- Dialogue
- Coordination and Cooperation

5. Rationale

Civilian leadership is essential to ensure the primacy of humanitarian action, based on needs, over military objectives derived from political strategic goals. The interaction

\textsuperscript{3} E.g.: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Part IV, Art. 51 “Protection of the Civilian Population”, Art. 70 “Relief actions in favour of the civilian population”, Art. 81 IV “Activities of the Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations”.
between military forces and CARE is characterized by the need of coordination between all actors in the field and the necessity to preserve humanitarian space.

6. **Normative and Legal framework**

Humanitarian principles constitute the core basis for CARE’s ability to work safely and effectively in conflict. CARE’s decisions about how it interacts with the military should always be consistent with CARE’s values and obligations.

For this reason, CARE supports the broad principles set forth in the following principles and guidelines outlined below in the **primary references**:

**Primary references**

- **Annex II-1**: Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief
- **Annex II-2**: Oslo Guidelines on: The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, 2006 (covering natural, technological and environmental emergencies)
- **Annex II-3**: UN and IASC Civil Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies, 2008

**Secondary references**

- **Annex II-4**: Guidelines on the domestic facilitation and regulation of international disaster relief and initial recovery assistance (IDRL Guidelines 2007), Art. 11
- **Annex II-5**: Guidelines on the use of military and civil defence assets (MCDA) to support United Nations humanitarian activities in complex emergencies, 2003
- **Annex II-6**: UN guidelines on Use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys, 2001
- **Annex II-7**: Guidelines for UN and other Humanitarian Organizations on Interacting with Military, Non-State Armed Actors and Other Security Actors in Iraq, 2008

7. **Organisational principles**

CARE’s interactions with the military should be informed by **five organisational principles**. Their consistent application in CARE’s operations is central to the ability to work successfully and sustainably in complex and often dangerous environments. Cooperation with military actors must also be considered in terms of short-term and long-term impact and must take into account possible evolution of the political context.

- **Distinction**
  CARE must ensure that its identity and activities are, and are perceived to be, distinct from military aims and operations. Policies and operations that blur the lines between military and aid operations may undermine CARE’s humanitarian space – eroding CARE’s acceptance among local communities and stakeholders, and thereby turning CARE, its staff, local partners,
programmes and beneficiaries into parties to the conflict and therefore into potential targets. For these reasons, CARE should always ensure that any interactions with military forces do not compromise – or appear to compromise – its identity as an independent organisation committed to the humanitarian imperative and not to a political agenda.

- **Humanitarian imperative**

  The humanitarian imperative obliges CARE to acknowledge the absolute right to assistance of all victims of disaster, and, constrained only by its own capacity, to respond to humanitarian need whenever it can. This imperative is at the heart of all CARE’s humanitarian operations.

- **Safety and security of staff**

  The safety and security of personnel is an overriding consideration in all that CARE does. It is all the more pressing in the often dangerous environments in which emergencies occur.

- **Impartiality**

  CARE seeks to pursue the provision of humanitarian assistance in a way that does not discriminate with regard to race, religion, nationality, or political affiliation. Any decision to cooperate with the military on humanitarian response must not compromise, or create the impression of compromising, this principle of impartiality. It should ensure that CARE has non-discriminatory access to all victims.

- **Appropriate Consultation**

  Effective civil-military relations should be centred on appropriate and effective dialogue with the military. Consultation and communication with military actors should be clearly distinguished from, and should not be mistaken for, collaboration or cooperation. Active consultation and communication with other key stakeholders engaged in civil-military contexts is an essential adjunct to dialogue with the military.

8. **Levels of civil-military interaction**

This policy identifies the three levels of potential action related to civil-military relations: Context Analysis and Emergency Preparedness; Dialogue; Coordination and Cooperation. While context analysis and emergency preparedness should always take into consideration CIVMIL issues, any dialogue or coordination and/or cooperation will only be taken forward once consideration is given to the above organisational obligations.

**LEVEL ONE: Context Analysis and Emergency Preparedness**

Given the possible role assumed by military forces in response to natural and man-made disasters, civil-military relations should also be figured into all CARE Country Office emergency preparedness plans (EPPs). As such, context analysis and preparedness planning on CIVMIL should be taken forward alongside efforts related to risk management, conflict sensitivity and staff safety and security (as per Country Office Safety and Security Management Plans).

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4 e.g. UN, INGOs/NGOs, affected populations, governments etc.
Responsibility for managing civil-military relations resides with CO senior management (e.g. policy and decision making). However, there is also a need for the delegation of responsibility for developing the relevant analysis and support of management decision-making to a relevant member of staff (e.g. Safety and Security Officer or Conflict Advisor).

**LEVEL TWO: Dialogue**

Effective civil-military relations should be centred on appropriate and effective dialogue with military. CARE’s communication with military (and paramilitary) forces should serve to clarify CARE’s vision, mission, values and operational practices. As such, dialogue with military organisations, both in the field and at headquarter levels shall serve to advance mutual understanding. It can help to prevent dangerous misunderstandings in the field. However, CARE should resist attempts by the military to promote shared roles that do not advance CARE’s core humanitarian mission. Consultation mechanisms and communication channels should be clearly distinguished from an integration process and/or operational collaboration. Forms of communication that blur the lines between military and humanitarian operations should be avoided.

In situations where military forces and paramilitary forces are playing an active role, CARE shall liaise with the military chain of command. Dialogue with the military is an essential element in order to promote agency security and humanitarian access. The objectives of such dialogue are:

- To ensure CARE’s overall activity is consistent with the five organisational principles set forth above.
- To communicate on operations and programmes as well as ensuring that CARE can operate freely and independently;
- To voice concerns about policies or actions which may undermine the situation of the civilian population;
- To be informed of any military development, plans or operation that can hamper CARE operations or endanger CARE’s staff; and CARE’s beneficiaries
- To make representations in cases of breaches of international humanitarian and/or human rights law.

**LEVEL THREE: Coordination and Cooperation**

In exceptional circumstances and as a last resort measure CARE may decide to coordinate or cooperate with military forces on humanitarian affairs, or seek assistance from them. In case of deciding to operate under level three, the request shall be submitted for a formal decision from the respective Lead Member and CI Secretariat.

Potential areas for coordination and cooperation include inter alia:

- Logistical support;
- Securing access to beneficiaries;
- Evacuation and protection of staff or beneficiaries.

Any decisions to work with military forces should be informed by a careful analysis of potential impacts on CARE’s obligations as a humanitarian agency. Evaluations have shown that aid can do harm as well as good. There are increased sensitivities and potential risks when the delivery of aid involves assistance of military forces\(^5\). For this

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reason, CARE is obliged to account for any medium- or longer-term impacts of its actions.

Adequate information and consideration of the following issues should always inform the decision:

- **All non-military alternatives have been explored** and it is determined that support from the military is essential in order to fulfil CARE’s mission.
- **Short-term and long-term impact on local perceptions and humanitarian access has been thoroughly assessed**: Interactions with the military may affect perceptions of CARE and other aid agencies amongst the local population, parties to the conflict, and local authorities. These perceptions will have consequences for CARE’s level of humanitarian access to beneficiary communities.
- **Potential negative consequences for safety and security of staff, partners and beneficiaries have been considered**: Interactions with military forces have implications for staff safety and security, as well as the protection of local partners and beneficiary communities.
- **Scale and urgency of humanitarian needs are confirmed**.
- **Cooperation with military forces does not lead to CARE being associated with violations of international humanitarian or human rights law**.
- **CARE’s commitment to independence and distinction between humanitarian and military operations will not be compromised**. Core aspects of independence include: freedom of movement for humanitarian staff, freedom to conduct independent assessments, freedom of selection of staff, freedom to identify beneficiaries on the basis of need, and the free flow of information between humanitarian agencies.

Any decision to work with the military will be uniquely informed by prevailing exceptional circumstances. Managers should continuously re-assess the basis of decisions to engage with military forces in any given operation. As events unfold, new analysis may indicate a higher level of engagement, a modified and more conditional approach to military cooperation, or, as civilian options emerge, a termination of any operational interaction. As the situation returns to normal CARE should revert to its traditional operation mode as soon as possible.

Once coordination and/or cooperation with military forces has been initiated, CARE must always be open to all parties about the nature of its relations with military forces. To this end, when the decision has been made to work with the military in a given emergency, CARE will sensitively communicate its principles on military relations to the military, civil authorities and beneficiaries. CARE will also distinguish itself from those forces at all times. Engagement with military forces should not be considered if this transparency, independence and distinction cannot be maintained.

**Promotion of normative approach**

CARE shall continue to address the need to strengthen, safeguard and implement international and country-specific CIVMIL rules and guidelines. Aid activities including communication plans and advocacy campaigns shall be informed under the appropriate form by CARE’s CIVMIL policy and in particular promote a clear distinction between military operations and humanitarian assistance/development work.

**Monitoring**

Through its presence in the field, CARE shall monitor within its own sphere of operations the degree of implementation of the above-mentioned rules and guidelines. CARE will take the necessary steps to intervene in case of serious breach of CIVMIL principles, or launch advocacy campaigns to counter initiatives aimed at weakening the capacity of NGOs to act independently.
Mainstreaming
CARE shall introduce effective and appropriate CIVMIL coordination mechanisms and processes at field and international/HQ levels and should as appropriate negotiate with donors to cover the costs of such coordination mechanisms in project budgets.

Funding and relief goods associated with military forces and objectives
Donor governments use their aid budgets to pursue their wider national security or foreign policies. For this reason, CARE needs to exercise caution in relation to funding or other relief goods that are associated with military or security institutions or objectives. In general, CARE members and country offices should not accept funding from ministry of defence institutions or funding streams, or from military operations deployed at the field level, unless authorization to do so has been received by the appropriate lead member in consultation with the CI Secretariat. This policy encompasses defence agency budgets associated with civil-military relations and assistance-related tasks. It also applies to the budgets allocated to specific military forces for quick-impact projects and other forms of assistance. Military forces also occasionally offer military goods, including food and non-food items, to be used as part of a humanitarian response. In general, CARE needs to adopt a cautious approach; balancing the humanitarian needs of crisis-affected populations with the potential consequences of using such items. In such contexts, CARE should advocate for and seek funding from aid channelled through civilian institutions, such as bilateral or multilateral donor agencies. In all cases, CARE should emphasise the importance of civilian control over humanitarian, recovery or development aid funding.
ANNEX I - Operating scenarios

Given this need for a flexible yet principled approach, the following are illustrations of ways in which CARE might think about its interaction with the military in a range of different environments where humanitarian need can exist.

Scenario 1: Ongoing conflict, or stand-off, between governmental or organised anti-government military forces, in the absence of external peacekeeping forces (e.g. Sudan, Nepal, Sri Lanka)

This scenario would cover CARE operations occurring within the context of “conventional” conflict between states, or conflicts between national government forces and anti-government insurgents or movements, in the absence of external peacekeepers. Unlike the previous scenario, the military forces involved would be more obviously pursuing military and political agendas, rather than economic opportunism.

In these (often fluid) circumstances, CARE’s operational decision-making and its interaction with military forces need to be completely faithful to the principles of independence, impartiality and transparency. A compromise seems inadequate here. To do so could jeopardise CARE's ability to maintain its operations, particularly where access to one side is contingent on the permission of the other (as is often the case), and may significantly endanger staff. What this means is that, unlike Scenario 1, CARE’s operational principles must not be seen to be diminished for the sake of increased ability to meet humanitarian access, improved security or other obligations. Therefore, any interaction with military forces must be contingent on CARE being satisfied that all three operating principles can be met and be seen to be met.

Scenario 2: Ongoing conflict, or stand-off, between governmental or organised anti-government military forces, but in the presence of external peacekeeping or enforcement forces (e.g. Sierra Leone (1999-2005), pre-1996 Bosnia)

The third scenario is identical to the second except that it features the presence of international peacekeepers or peace enforcers. In this case similar considerations must apply to CARE's relations with the conflict's principal military protagonists, including those involved in peace enforcement. But can the same be said for peacekeeping forces?

The problem here is that often peacekeepers are not always perceived by the belligerents in a conflict as being neutral and impartial. And that by allying CARE too closely with a peacekeeping operation, we may undermine the perception amongst the population at large that CARE is indeed independent of and impartial towards all actual and possible belligerents to the conflict. As mentioned, it is the population's acceptance arising from these perceptions that often provides CARE with the ability to operate successfully in dangerous environments.

Unlike Scenario 2, where full compliance with three key operating principles was an absolute requirement for any kind of military co-operation to be considered, here we are dealing with a much less cut-and-dried situation. CARE can and does work with peacekeeping forces in situations of conflict and military stand-off. But the nature and extent of CARE’s involvement with the military needs to be justified by transparent arguments (based on security and humanitarian access considerations) and associated with demonstrable impartiality in the work we do. Impartiality is crucial and probably involves using CARE’s involvement with the peacekeeping military to access humanitarian need on both sides of the conflict.

In addition, it is important to stress that CARE’s involvement with peacekeeping military forces under this scenario needs to be conditioned by the requirement that deployment of military assets for humanitarian purposes be done within a civilian-led humanitarian decision-making structure.
Scenario 3: Peacekeeping within a stable, post-conflict situation (e.g. Bosnia (1992-1995), Kosovo (1999-), Timor-Leste (1999-))

This scenario is a natural progression from Scenario 3 in as much that it is hoped that a given conflict will come to an end and that the peacekeeping environment will become increasingly stable. Such has been the case in Bosnia, Timor-Leste and Kosovo more recently.

Once a conflict has stabilized, ideally military involvement in humanitarian affairs should be phased out as quickly as possible. While this does not often happen in practice, CARE needs to make every effort to ensure that each of its operating principles are strongly established both in fact and in the eyes of the population at large. This will mean making special efforts to ensure that CARE is seen to be independent of military operations and decision-making. It also suggests that CARE should give even more added weight to the importance of civilian decision-making in humanitarian affairs. To this latter end, CARE should seek ways to help civilian authorities - including local government, civil society groups, the UN, and other NGOs - to establish mechanisms for aid distribution and programming.

Scenario 4: Natural disasters occurring in stable circumstances (e.g. Hurricane Mitch (1998), Orissa Cyclone (1999), Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004), Pakistan Earthquake (2005))

In the context of natural disasters the sensitivities of working with military forces are generally far lower than during a conflict. Saving large numbers of lives in the midst of catastrophe becomes the dominant goal. Safety and security of personnel does not usually present a problem, and the wider implications of CARE’s intervention are dwarfed by the immediacy and scale of unmet humanitarian need and carry out humanitarian assistance.

In the wake of natural disasters, the military is often a vital provider of logistical capacity. CARE will generally find a certain level of local acceptance to working with military forces in such a situation, since the military is often the only organisation with the logistics capacity to respond on a massive scale. Principles of transparency, independence, and impartiality may be less relevant by comparison. Civilian leadership of aid distribution decisions is still critical, however, since humanitarian workers are often best qualified to assess needs.

Scenario 5: Donors directly engaged in a conflict as belligerents in pursuit of strategic objectives (e.g. Iraq 2003-2004), Afghanistan 2001-)

This scenario presents the most politically challenging as well as risky context for INGOs such as CARE, and thus the decision to deploy or remain in-country should be based on a high-threshold analysis of benefits and harms. There is a significant possibility that INGOs, regardless of their actual or stated position, will be perceived as aligned with the belligerent donor and thus become a target for opposed belligerent sides. INGOs are also likely to face political and financial pressure from the belligerent donor to cooperate in integrated civil-military operations (e.g. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan). In these circumstances, CARE’s operational decision-making and its interaction with military forces need to be rigorous and transparent regarding CARE’s adherence to the principles of independence, impartiality and transparency. CARE advocacy should aim to influence belligerent donor operations, such as quasi-assistance programs delivered for ‘hearts and minds’ objectives, that impact negatively on humanitarian space, civilian protection or other CARE priorities. Engagement at country level is best pursued through the mediation of neutral, third-party channels, such as UN OCHA, and ‘integration’ into belligerent operational or coordination structures should be avoided. Compromise is unlikely here.
ANNEX II - References

Annex II-1: Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief

Introduction
The Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, was developed and agreed upon by eight of the world's largest disaster response agencies in the summer of 1994 and represents a huge leap forward in setting standards for disaster response. It is being used by the International Federation to monitor its own standards of relief delivery and to encourage other agencies to set similar standards.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s there has been a steady growth in the number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), both national and international, involved in disaster relief. In the autumn of 1994 there were over 120 NGOs registered in Kigali, the war ravaged capital of Rwanda.

Many of these agencies, including National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the church agencies, Oxfam, the Save the Children Fund or CARE, have a history going back many decades and have gained a reputation for effective work. Others, more recently formed, such as Médecins Sans Frontières, have rapidly evolved to become respected operators. Along with these large and well-known agencies there are today a multitude of small, newly-formed groups, often coming into existence to assist in one specific disaster or in a specialised field of work.

What few people outside of the disaster-response system realise is that all these agencies, from the old to the new, from multi-million dollar outfits to one-man shows, have no accepted body of professional standards to guide their work. There is still an assumption in many countries that disaster relief is essentially "charitable" work and therefore anything that is done in the name of helping disaster victims is acceptable.

However, this is far from the truth. Agencies, whether experienced or newly-created, can make mistakes, be misguided and sometimes deliberately misuse the trust that is placed in them. And disaster relief is no longer a small-time business. Today, even if those caught up in war are excluded, something in the region of 250 to 300 million people a year are affected by disasters, and this figure is growing at a rate of around 10 million a year. The Federation alone assisted some 19.4 million disaster victims during 1994.

The immediacy of disaster relief can often lead NGOs unwittingly to put pressure on themselves, pressure which leads to short-sighted and inappropriate work. Programmes which rely on foreign imports or expertise, projects which pay little attention to local custom and culture, and activities which accept the easy and high media profile tasks of relief but leave for others the less appealing and more difficult ones of disaster preparedness and long-term rehabilitation.

All NGOs, big and small, are susceptible to these internal and external pressures. And as NGOs are asked to do more, and the incidence of complex disasters involving natural, economic and often military factors increases, the need for some sort of basic professional code becomes more and more pressing.

It is for all these reasons that six of the world's oldest and largest networks of NGOs came together in 1994 with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to draw up a
professional Code of Conduct to set, for the first time, universal basic standards to

govern the way they should work in disaster assistance.

The Code of Conduct, like most professional codes, is a voluntary one. It is applicable to
any NGO, be it national or international, small or large. It lays down 10 points of principle
which all NGOs should adhere to in their disaster response work, and goes on to describe
the relationships agencies working in disasters should seek with donor governments, host
governments and the UN system.

The Code is self-policing. No one NGO is going to force another to act in a certain way
and there is as yet no international association for disaster-response NGOs which
possesses any authority to sanction its members.

It is hoped that NGOs around the world will find it useful and will want to commit
themselves publicly to abiding by it. Governments and donor bodies may want to use it
as a yardstick against which to judge the conduct of those agencies with which they
work. And disaster-affected communities have a right to expect those who seek to assist
them to measure up to these standards.

**Principle Commitments:**

1. The Humanitarian imperative comes first.

2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and
without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of
need alone.

3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.

4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.

5. We shall respect culture and custom.

6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.

7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of
relief aid.

8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as
meeting basic needs.

9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from
whom we accept resources.

10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster
victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects.

**Annex II-2: Guidelines On: The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets In
Disaster Relief – “Oslo Guidelines”**

(Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), view

The "Oslo Guidelines" were originally prepared over a period of two years beginning in
1992. They were the result of a collaborative effort that culminated in an international
conference in Oslo, Norway, in January 1994 and were released in May 1994. The following States and Organizations were involved in this effort:

Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, the Netherlands, Norway, Russian Federation, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, AFDRU, Brown University's Watson Institute, DHA, European Union/ECHO, ICDO, ICRC, IFRC, INSARAG, NATO, Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, UNHCR, UN Legal Liaison Office, University of Naples, University of Ruhr, WHO and Western European Union. Over 180 delegates from 45 States and 25 organizations attended the conference.

The unprecedented deployment in 2005 of military forces and assets in support of humanitarian response to natural disasters, following an increasing trend over the past years, confirmed the need to update the 1994 "Oslo Guidelines". The Consultative Group on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA), at its annual meeting in December 2005, tasked OCHA's Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) with this facelift, to reflect current terminology and organizational changes, following a layout similar to the 2003 "Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies" ("MCDA Guidelines").

The Oslo Guidelines were re-launched at an event hosted by the Government of Norway, in Oslo, on 27 November 2006, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Consultative Group on the Use of MCDA. Norway, Switzerland and Sweden took the lead in the update, facilitated by OCHA's Civil-Military Coordination Section / Emergency Services Branch.

Changes in this Revision 1.1 concern the addition of the word "foreign" in the title, as well as additions for clarification to paragraph 5, as per consensus in the Extraordinary Session of the Consultative Group on the Use of MCDA, on 28 November 2007.

**Annex II-3: Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies**


'CIVIL-MILITARY GUIDELINES & REFERENCE FOR COMPLEX EMERGENCIES' is the first collection of core humanitarian instruments developed by the United Nations (UN) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) on civil-military relationship in complex emergencies. Its goal is to help promote respect for international law, standards and principles in these situations.

Engaging military support for humanitarian operations is not a new endeavour. In today's security environment, however, the military are ever more involved in the 'direct' provision of aid, while humanitarian actors are often faced with situations where there
are no alternatives but to rely on the military, as a last resort, for safety and to access populations in need - at the serious risk of compromising their neutrality, impartiality, and/or independence, and thus their ability and/or credibility to operate.

Combined with the tides toward 'integration' and 'whole-of-government' approaches, as well as the increased propensity of some Governments to deploy mixed civilian-military teams to provide aid as a 'tool' to address security threats, the situation calls for enhanced understandings between the military and humanitarian professionals at all levels.

International law, standards and principles can assist both actors to properly and legitimately discharge their respective missions in far-away lands. Adhering to these and de-conflicting each others' activities can maximise the effectiveness and efficiency of the respective operations. These tasks are crucial when working in the same area.

Written in a practical, user-friendly style that brings together the essential guidance materials on the subject into a single form, the Booklet aims to assist professionals to handle civil-military issues in line with such law, standards and principles, in a manner that respects and appropriately reflects humanitarian concerns at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
**Annex II 4-9: Secondary references**


ANNEX III - Field Office Checklist

To be completed