

# EVALUATION OF THE COMMON HUMANITARIAN FUND

## DRC Country Report

On Behalf of OCHA



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This document is public and can be disseminated.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

UNOCHA has commissioned an evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Funds 2006-2010. This country report of the Pooled Funds (PF) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of four final deliverables for this study. The other countries covered are Central African Republic and Sudan, and the findings from the three countries as summarized in a overall Synthesis Report.

The evaluation mission to DRC was carried out from 10-29 October 2010. The evaluation team carried out interviews and field visits in 4 provinces; Kinshasa, North Kivu, South Kivu and Province Orientale.

The PF is a mechanism by which donors contribute to a pooled fund from which the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) allocates grants to priorities identified at the country level. The PF in DRC is part of the overall humanitarian reform initiative and it aims to support cluster coordination and stronger humanitarian leadership. The PF in DRC is framed around the common appeal process, called the Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP).

### Key Findings and Recommendations

The key findings and conclusions of the DRC country study can be summarized as follows:

- **The PF has been a relevant, appropriate and effective tool for improving the ability of the humanitarian community to address critical needs in the DRC.** Its institutional set up is appropriate and effective and the fund is managed by an excellent team and supported by strong coordination mechanisms.
- **The current allocation processes of the PF strike a careful balance between democracy and effectiveness.** Balancing accountability and inclusiveness with flexibility and speed has partly been achieved through the establishment of complementary funding windows, and through extensive fine-tuning and constant analysis of the procedures in place by the Joint Pooled Fund Unit (JPFU).
- **The Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) function of the PF, while already quite advanced in the DRC in comparison to the other CHF countries, still falls short of tracking quality of implementation and longer-term impact.** The work of the JPFU M&E section is still too disconnected from the clusters despite recent efforts to develop a working relationship. If M&E of the PF projects can generate best practices and lessons learnt, the PF in the DRC could be a groundbreaker in terms of effectiveness.
- **The PF struggles to be efficient, especially from the Management Agent (MA) aspect.** While UNDP has done an admirable job with the number of NGO projects it manages, its efficiency is questionable due to management procedures that are still not suitable for a humanitarian context.
- **Information about the PF and its procedures amongst UN agencies and NGOs is often erroneous and leads to misunderstandings and unnecessary tensions.** Communication by the JPFU regarding the allocation processes need to be

streamlined and centralized and easily accessible to newcomers as the DRC experiences a high turnover of humanitarian staff.

The key recommendations linked to these findings are the following:

- **The PF needs to improve in terms of M&E procedures by linking up to clusters and by expanding the HC's 'mandate' in terms of M&E to cover the UN agencies.** JPFU M&E Officers need to actively seek cluster collaboration and vice-versa. This will depend very much on the commitment of the cluster lead agencies, which need to accept some oversight and give the clusters and the endeavour itself the appropriate level of support. The JPFU has put in place a sound M&E base that can be built upon, and there seems to be willingness on the part of several clusters to take on a more leading role to monitor the projects of partners who have signed an agreement with UNDP. However, **human resources and funding issues need to be tackled.**
- **Other options to the current arrangement of UNDP acting as the Management Agent should be explored in order to ensure that the most efficient management model possible is in place.** UNDP is first and foremost a development actor with systems and tools suitable to a stable, developmental setting. There are examples in other countries where different solutions have been tested successfully. A cost-benefit analysis should be made while balancing the accurate need for speed and accountability.
- **The JPFU must set up a user-friendly online platform, accessible by all those eligible for PF funding to ensure streamlined communication about allocation procedures.** The recently established SharePoint online platform, hosted by the JPFU, should be used to post all documentation related to the PF application and allocation procedures, decision making processes, as well as additional communiqués (such as allocation related emails). It can also be a portal for sharing best practices documented by the M&E team.
- **Establish a limited JPFU presence (e.g. one additional OCHA international staff member) in the Eastern provinces to act as an interlocutor with partners should be considered.** Alternatively, international OCHA JPFU staff currently based in Kinshasa should spend more time (e.g. 40-50% of their time) in the provinces under their purview.

The OCHA/UNDP JPFU has been run from its inception by a highly motivated OCHA manager. Under his direction, the JPFU has endeavored throughout the years to lighten the burden of administrative procedures on NGO partners<sup>1</sup>, improve the allocation process on the basis of lessons-learned, and refine the PF Project Management Cycle. The JPFU has also followed up on the recommendations of previous evaluations that could be acted upon at country level. Many of the shortcomings identified by previous evaluations have been addressed, but some key recommendations still need to be followed through such as the need for the PF Board to have at least one general policy meeting per year involving PF and other donors; the need for a stronger information management system<sup>2</sup>; developing clear

<sup>1</sup> Source: interviews, and PF annual reports (e.g. 2009 Annual Report, p. 50).

<sup>2</sup> This has been taken into account but has been slow to develop. A new online data-base is currently being created and a 'SharePoint' platform has been launched in early 2011 (Microsoft SharePoint is a family of software products developed for

criteria on what can be funded under life-saving and recovery; and the recommendations for improving M&E.

Processes have been constantly worked on and fine-tuned by the JPFU, since the beginning of the PF in DRC. The institutional set up of the PF (Advisory Board, Strategic Committee, JPFU, Technical Review Committee) is functioning well. However, communication about PF procedures must be improved as misunderstandings about the allocation procedures are widespread. This is possibly due to some extent to the constant efforts by the JPFU to improve the processes, which has resulted in frequent changes. This is also due to the high turnover of humanitarian staff in DRC.

The PF has given the HC substantial resources to support the HAP and coordination mechanisms and the capacity to act quickly in the event of an emergency. The availability of un-earmarked funds has enabled the HC to provide flexible and timely funding to the humanitarian response, and the rapid turn-around time in the case of emergencies is facilitated by the existence of a number of rapid response mechanisms and measures benefiting from predictable PF funding. It has also enabled the HC to develop a close partnership with key humanitarian players through the PF Board. While other large humanitarian donors with a presence in DRC do not necessarily take the HAP as a reference point to direct their funding or actively seek complementarities, these are de facto established as they share information about their funding through the PF Board and PF-related meetings in the provinces and are able to take into account PF funding as they programme their own assistance.

The work of the CPIAs and provincial inter-clusters has been reinforced by the PF by enabling them to define priority areas and play a key role in the allocation of resources in their provinces. CPIAs are involved in the prioritization and pre-selection at two crucial points in the process: the updating of the provincial strategies, which include priority areas, and the review of the consolidated list of projects pre-selected by the cluster coordinators prior to their review by the PF Board.

However, there are contrasting views about the impact of the PF on cluster coordination. What the PF requires from the clusters is in line with their core functions and supports them to meet their objectives and the PF has enabled the clusters to direct resources towards under-funded priorities and new emergency requirements. Nevertheless, the transaction costs involved have been quite high for the clusters as the PF has generated extra work for them, such as developing technical guidelines. The workload of clusters peaks during allocations processes, and this has exacerbated the difficulties of clusters with limited capacities and competing priorities.

The PF has also allowed the clusters to channel funding to their highest agreed priority activities, as defined in the HAP, but with certain limitations with respect to geographical coverage within each province: in the framework of standard allocations, priority areas are selected for PF operations which do not always correspond to those where cluster priorities

are highest. The standard allocation process relies on the cluster system to identify and prioritize projects and national cluster coordinators are responsible for this review, but until the second allocation of 2010, they have tended to delegate it to the provincial level. This is due to the fact that PF guidelines in place since 2008 required that a consultative process involving the provincial level be followed and that the provincial level has a better knowledge of the context, the needs, and the capacities of cluster members. The process at provincial level has generated mistrust and competition due to misperceptions, disagreements over selection criteria and conflicts of interest which arise when the cluster lead agency submits a proposal. The exercise therefore frequently ended up being a 'sharing of the pie'. Aware of this risk, the HC and the PF Board would scrutinize cluster submissions to spot eventual instances of unjustified division of envelopes.

The PF has enabled the HC to direct more funding to the most pressing under-funded needs as well as to needs resulting from new emergencies, making the fund both appropriate in its set up and relevant to the context in DRC. HAP requirements and previously neglected sectors are now better covered, and geographical coverage has been extended to all provinces of the country<sup>3</sup>. The PF has also served as an excellent vehicle for the mainstreaming of gender into humanitarian action and has considerable potential for further improving the quality of humanitarian work.

A strong emphasis on life-saving activities at the level of the PF Board, together with limited resources compared to the size of humanitarian needs, is viewed by the Education and Community Reintegration and Recovery clusters as the reason why they have received relatively modest levels of funding. While the CRR has not received much funding through the years, the HC through, the PF, has supported a multi-sector approach to displaced populations and recovery-oriented activities which is viewed as the most appropriate and effective way to respond to population displacement. However, by relying on the clusters to identify and pre-select projects, the PF allocation process is not conducive to a multi-sector approach. The process de facto facilitates the presentation of one-sector projects.

The number of national and international NGOs eligible for PF funding has increased over the years and national NGOs are now the majority on the list of eligible organisations. Direct and indirect funding to national and international NGOs has increased from 42.9% in 2006 to 54.2% in 2009 and the number of projects funded every year has more than doubled from 2006 to 2009 from 139 to 284.<sup>4</sup> In 2010, a conscious effort was made to bring projects down to a more manageable number and 185 were funded.

The HC has made a complementary use of funding resources by combining CERF allocations with PF allocations. He has given preference to the CERF for covering the requirements of UN agencies, since NGOs are not eligible for CERF funding, which has enabled him to give NGOs a larger share of PF funds. However, better use could be made of the Rapid Response Fund, an OCHA-managed Emergency Response Fund linked to the UNICEF/OCHA Rapid Response to Movements of Population project.

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<sup>3</sup> Humanitarian action in non-conflict, disaster, or disease outbreak areas is triggered by the humanitarian threshold system mentioned earlier, which seems to have mustered consensus.

<sup>4</sup> The number was 294 in 2008.



The relevance and appropriateness of PF projects are related to the needs assessments on the basis of which priorities are identified, as well as the project identification process. The projects have to be in line with priorities agreed by the cluster and be linked to one of the strategic objectives of the HAP. Projects go through a filtering process, which provides certain guarantees of relevance. Projects reviewed and visited were found to be relevant and no project was found to be irrelevant.

Steps in the allocation process, in particular the project review by a Technical Review Committee, act as a fairly effective quality control system, which needs to be further strengthened, in particular by reinforcing M&E. While the evaluation team did not witness poor quality projects, it heard reports of sub-standard implementation.

M&E of humanitarian action is acknowledged as a weakness, but in DRC a distinction needs to be made between impact monitoring, which falls under the responsibility of the clusters, and the M&E of projects. The JPFU carries out M&E of NGO projects supported by the PF as a requirement of UNDP as Management Agent for NGOs. The JPFU M&E team focuses on NGO compliance with UNDP rules and procedures, as well as the implementation and completion of activities, achievements in terms of quantitative outputs, and to a limited extent, outcomes. The system in place needs to be strengthened to enable it to probe further into project outcomes, technical quality, and impact, and identify good practice and lessons learned.

The JPFU M&E section does not monitor the projects of UN agencies, which have their own internal M&E systems but no obligation to share the resulting findings. However, a common format for UN agencies and NGOs to report on results on a semiannual basis enables the JPFU to monitor project implementation, spot poor performance, and provide an overview of cluster achievements against indicators in the annual reports. The fact that UN agencies have agreed to take part in this joint reporting system is regarded as a breakthrough.

Even if PF M&E activities fall short of evaluating outcomes, technical quality, and impact, they can be viewed as a considerable achievement. With only five evaluators for a large number of projects, an extensive territory with access and security constraints, around 80% of the PF projects are visited at least once. There is a limited feedback loop into the PF project cycle for NGO projects and to some extent UN agency projects (based on an agency's acknowledgment of a problem or the common reporting format), but no systematic knowledge management system is in place.

Several clusters are looking into ways to improve M&E of PF projects, but have pointed to a lack of mandate on the part of the HC and the clusters, as well financial and staffing constraints as the main impediments. The work of the JPFU M&E section is still too disconnected from the clusters despite recent efforts to develop a working relationship. Monitoring options being considered by the clusters include closer cooperation with the JPFU M&E staff, joint peer reviews to draw lessons and identify good practice, and hiring independent consultants. Closer cooperation between the clusters and the JPFU M&E team would strengthen the monitoring of project outcomes and the evaluation of impact. Independent project evaluations seem to be rare and this aspect of project cycle management

will need to be reinforced. The recent launch of a 'share point' on the web will improve access to key information, enable some 'real time' reporting to be made, and hopefully pave the way for closer JPFU/cluster M&E.


The main financial transaction costs are linked to UNDP exercising its role as Management Agent for NGOs. They include a management fee, bank charges on transfers to NGOs, auditing costs, and an annual budget for the functioning of the JPFU. Measures to reduce transaction costs are being put in place, in particular the implementation of the Harmonised Approach for Cash Transfers (HACT), which would lighten the administrative burden on the JPFU and NGOs. These are expected to be in place by the third quarter of 2011.

The capacity and risk assessment of NGO partners and the accompanying measures ensure that the partners receiving funds have the capacity to implement projects and have basic accountability mechanisms in place. In a more general way, the HC, the PF Board, the members of the CPIA and the cluster coordinators are aware of the strengths and weaknesses of some of the partners and poor performance is taken into account at the time of project selection. The HC and the PF Board have blocked funding to two UN agencies as well as a number of NGOs in recent years.


At the strategic level, the value added of the PF is that along with the CERF, it enables the HC to support the common humanitarian framework. The PF is more flexible and inclusive than the CERF in terms of eligible activities and partners. Balancing accountability and inclusiveness with flexibility and speed has been achieved through the establishment of complementary funding windows.




# MAPS OF AREAS VISITED BY THE TEAM



### Carte des Territoires du Nord Kivu



Sources: DCW, Mol, OMS, BCD, IGC



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .....	2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	3
MAPS OF AREAS VISITED BY THE TEAM.....	9
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	12
ACRONYMS .....	13
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS & TERMINOLOGY .....	15
1 <b>METHODOLOGY SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>16</b>
2 <b>IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATIONAL CONTEXT OF CHF .....</b>	<b>18</b>
COUNTRY CONTEXT .....	18
CHF OPERATIONAL CONTEXT.....	19
INTRODUCTION TO THE CHF OR “POOLED FUND” .....	20
3 <b>CORE REPORT .....</b>	<b>21</b>
PROCESSES AND INPUTS .....	21
RELEVANCE, APPROPRIATENESS & QUALITY .....	27
<i>Fund Level</i> .....	27
<i>Relevance, Appropriateness, &amp; Quality at Project Level</i> .....	35
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, COHERENCE AND CONNECTEDNESS .....	45
EFFICIENCY .....	52
OPERATIONAL IMPACT .....	59
ANNEX I – TOR .....	61
ANNEX II – FUNDING FLOWS ANALYSIS.....	62
ANNEX III – STRATEGIC COMMITTEE .....	64
ANNEX IV – TECHNICAL REVIEW COMMITTEE .....	65
ANNEX V - FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS OF PREVIOUS EVALUATIONS.....	67
ANNEX VI – LIST OF PEOPLE MET.....	81
ANNEX VII - DETAILED METHODOLOGY .....	86
ANNEX VIII - DETAILS OF ANY QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS UNDERTAKEN.....	88
ANNEX IX – EVALUATION TOOLS APPLIED .....	89
ANNEX X - TEAM ITINERARY .....	93

## ACRONYMS

ACF	Action Contre la Faim
CAR	Central African Republic
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CPIA	Provincial Inter-Agency Committee
CRR	Community Reintegration and Recovery
DFID	Department for International Development
DHC	Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
ERF	Emergency Response Fund
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
FT	Fast Track
FTS	Financial Tracking System
GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative
HAP	Humanitarian Action Plan
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HDI	Human Development Index
HDPT	Humanitarian and Development Partnership Team
HQ	Headquarters
IDP	Internally Displaced People
INGO	International Non Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
JPFU	Joint Pooled Fund Unit
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MSA	Multi Sectoral Assessments
NFI	Non Food Items
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NK	North Kivu
NL	Netherlands
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
PBF	Peace Building Fund
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PEAR	Programme Elargi d'Appui au Retour
PF	Pooled Fund
PRM	State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
RR	Rapid Response
RRw	Rapid Response window of the CERF
RRMP	Rapid Response to Population Movements
RRR	Rapid Response Reserve

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SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SK	South Kivu
SMART	<u>Specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, timely</u>
SRFF	Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility in Eastern DRC
STAREC	Programme de Stabilisation et Reconstruction des zones sortant des Conflits Armés
ToR	Terms of Reference
UFE	Underfunded Emergencies window of the CERF
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Flights Service
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMAS	UN Mine Action Coordination Center
UNOPS	United Nations Operations Services
UNSSSS	United Nations Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS & TERMINOLOGY

The evaluation team would like to acknowledge the support of the JPFU team in assisting with the organization and the logistics of the field mission to the DRC. We would also like to thank the Director of the JPFU for investing considerable time and resources in responding to the various queries of the evaluation team, providing endless figures and documentation and for being open and honest about the challenges faced.

### Terminology

The term 'Pooled Fund Board', as it is referred to locally, has been used through the report to refer to the Pooled Fund Advisory Board. This has been abbreviated as 'PF Board'.

With 'Cluster coordinators' the text refers to the national level cluster coordinators. Similarly, the term 'focal points' is used to refer to the provincial cluster coordinators.



# 1 METHODOLOGY SUMMARY

The Democratic Republic of the Congo country case study for the evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF) was carried out by a team of two consultants supported by the Team Leader for the first round of meetings in Kinshasa. The field visit took place from 10-29 October 2010 and covered 4 provinces; North Kivu, South Kivu and Province Orientale, with initial and concluding interviews in Kinshasa.

## In-country visits and interviews

53 meetings were held in Kinshasa and 15-20 meetings were held in each province. The meetings took the form of semi-structured interviews, focus group meetings, project reviews and at least one visit to a project site in each province. The stakeholders that were met included; staff of the Joint Pooled Fund Unit (JPFU); Pooled Fund (PF) donors and other donors (ECHO, US and Canada); Heads of UN Agencies<sup>5</sup>; international and national NGOs; cluster coordinators, cluster co-leads, cluster co-facilitators and cluster provincial focal points; local authorities in the provinces; and finally a limited number of project beneficiaries.

## Document Review

A continuous document review has been carried out before departing for the field, during and after. Much of the necessary documentation was located at the field level, spread between different actors resulting in documents being collected 'on the go'. An online database was set up by the JPFU for the sole purpose of gathering documentation from all the stakeholders for the evaluation team<sup>6</sup>. The team has gathered and read not only published reports, but also the following type of documentation:

- Official documentation by the HC and the JPFU about the allocation processes, such as guidance notes (*lignes directrices*)
- Provincial (CPIA) Pooled Fund strategy documents
- Provincial and national Cluster 'scoring' documents and/or meeting notes (*compte rendu*) of meetings where Pooled Fund allocations were discussed
- Samples of Technical Review Committee feedback to partners
- Minutes from PF Board meetings
- Inter-Cluster and CPIA meeting notes which have discussed Pooled Fund allocations
- Project Proposals and Reporting documentation
- Emails related to the allocation process as well as the implementation of the project

The recurring themes of the timeliness and predictability of funding by donors to the CHF, and by the CHF in-country presented in the previous evaluations carried out of the Pooled Fund in the DRC<sup>7</sup> were given renewed attention. In addition, the concerns raised in these reports about the allocation process in-country, monitoring and evaluation and the extent to which cluster leads are able to offer objective leadership, were also followed up on (at both the strategic and project levels) to see what, if any, actions had been taken to address these concerns.

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<sup>5</sup> With 'UN Agencies' the text refers to UN Agencies and International Organisation for Migration

<sup>6</sup> <http://rdc-humanitaire.net/?CHF-Evaluation-mission>

<sup>7</sup> Evaluation of CHF in DRC and Sudan 2006 & 2007

### Project Review

In order to address the important issues raised in the TOR around the quality and impact of CHF projects & programmes, a sample of 4 projects was selected for closer investigation in each province visited (12 in total). The team went over all project documentation, interviewed implementation staff and carried out visits to 4 project sites<sup>8</sup> in total. The number of projects visited, however, cannot be taken as a reliable sample of the 185 projects that got PF funding in 2010.

The sampling criteria for the selection of these projects were as follows:

- **Different agency types:** UN, INGOs, national NGOs
- **Range of intervention types** in the full country sample: rapid response, longer term humanitarian, and Early Recovery where relevant
- **Range of clusters/ sectors:** the project sample in the DRC covered Education, Protection, Health, Early Recovery, Logistics, Food Security, WASH, and NFI/Shelter through the RRMP.

As the total number of projects in the DRC is very high (over 1100) the final selection of projects, based on the above criteria, was done by the JPFU.

### Quantitative Analysis

A significant amount of funding data has been collected from various sources such as the OCHA Financial Tracking System and MDTF Gateway, as well as from the JPFU database. This allows the analysis of not only annual donor disbursements but also of exactly how the PF has been used in the DRC, the allocation between different agencies and clusters, and the extent to which it has been used in order to meet critical humanitarian needs – the original objective of the PF.

The quantitative data collected has also allowed the team to carry out an analysis of the disbursement processes in order to assess if they has speeded up or slowed down since 2008, as well as comparisons with other donors' and funding mechanisms' disbursement speeds.

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<sup>8</sup> One in Province Orientale, two in North Kivu and one in South Kivu.

## 2 IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATIONAL CONTEXT OF CHF

### Country Context

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) ranks among the poorest in the world (179 out of 182 countries according to the 2009 UNDP Human Development Index). The Congolese wars of 1996–1997 and 1998–2003 provoked one of the most severe humanitarian disasters since World War II. Up to 5.4 million people<sup>9</sup> have died since August 1998, when the second Congo War began, 1.5 million of them after the 17 December 2002 peace accord that formally ended hostilities. The conflict has reportedly caused more deaths than any since World War II, and in the midst of a continuing humanitarian crisis, the mortality rate (2.2 deaths per 1000 per month) remains 57% higher than the sub-Saharan average. While there is continuing insecurity in parts of the country, the main sources of mortality today are consequences of war, in particular food insecurity, dysfunctional health services, dilapidated infrastructure, and widespread population displacement especially in the two Kivu's and Province Orientale.

The latest peace process - the Amani peace process - which was held in early 2008 in Goma, aimed to create an inclusive peace, including the demobilisation of the active militias. However, partly because of incentives provided by the Amani process itself, the overall lack of progress in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process and difficulties in integrating former rebel commanders into the Congolese army (FARDC) command chain, there has been renewed mobilisation and even the (re)formation of new or dormant militias.

Negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda in December 2008 led to an agreement on a joint military offensive against the Rwandan Hutu rebel group FDLR. The ensuing military operations had a devastating impact on civilians, who became targets of the armed groups, and provoked a humanitarian emergency with high protection needs. An estimated 800,000 people (350,000 in N. Kivu and 450,000 in S. Kivu) were displaced in about six months in 2009.

An estimated 1.7 million people are currently displaced<sup>10</sup>, of whom 1.4 million in the Kivu provinces<sup>11</sup> where continuing instability has caused a protracted humanitarian situation characterized by frequent population movements, human rights violations including sexual violence, difficult humanitarian access, and insecurity. Other areas of the country remain unstable, such as Equateur province in north-western DRC where violent conflict in 2010 forced over 200,000 civilians to flee their homes. Humanitarian agencies have struggled to

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<sup>9</sup> International Rescue Committee (2008), though death rates from the DRC conflict recently have been subject to debate. The 2009 Human Security Report argues that the IRC estimate is based on an inappropriately low baseline mortality rate. With a more appropriate baseline rate, the death toll would be one-third of IRC's estimate (Human Security Report Project (2009) *Human security report 2008/9*, New York: Oxford University Press). The 2007 population of the DRC was estimated at 62 million.

<sup>10</sup> According to OCHA and *DRC – IDPs pay an unacceptable Price*, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, December 2010.

<sup>11</sup> As of April 2010, according to "Une fuite permanente", 14 September 2010, Human Rights Watch.

meet the needs of those who fled, many of whom do not want to return anytime soon. Events in Equateur underscore the overall fragility of peace still present in the Congo.<sup>12</sup> Over 450,000 Congolese still live as refugees in neighboring countries.

Humanitarian emergencies are also caused by epidemics and sudden-onset natural disasters, as well as extremely high mortality, morbidity, and malnutrition rates in several provinces not affected by conflict.

## CHF Operational Context

### Humanitarian Reform and the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative

The increasing amounts of money spent by donors on humanitarian aid since the 1990s triggered a debate among them about how to make humanitarian assistance more effective. The Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative, launched in 2003 by a group of donors as a forum to promote principled humanitarian practice, adopted 23 general principles and standards of good practice. It is in this context and that of the humanitarian reform launched in 2005 that donors encouraged the establishment of Pooled Funds in DRC and Sudan in 2006 and that DRC was selected in 2006 as a pilot country for the GHD initiative and the roll out of the cluster approach.

The same year, the Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) replaced the Common Appeals Process (CAP)<sup>13</sup>. It consists of a joint analysis of needs, strategic objectives<sup>14</sup> and indicators, and a broad prioritization of areas and interventions. Since 2008, emergency threshold levels of four key humanitarian indicators<sup>15</sup> trigger humanitarian action. On their basis, the nine clusters<sup>16</sup> agree on cluster-specific priority needs, objectives, strategies, and activities tailored to each province, aimed at bringing these indicators below threshold levels. Clusters are expected to monitor these indicators in order to ascertain the effectiveness and impact of their projects, to identify gaps, and direct their fund-mobilization activities<sup>17</sup>. Given the scope of basic needs in DRC and the limited resources available, a lot of work has gone into developing a methodology for prioritizing needs. Since 2008, the CPIAs<sup>18</sup> develop provincial strategies adapting the common framework to their contexts and define corresponding financial requirements.

The clusters are active at the national (Kinshasa) level as well as in provinces when required by humanitarian coordination needs. Outside conflict zones, NGOs act as focal points where lead agencies do not have a presence. Cluster coordinators are appointed by the cluster lead agency. In the provinces, cluster coordinators are sometimes also lead agency

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<sup>12</sup> <http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/dr-congo-spotlight-equateur-crisis>, written 31.03.2010, accessed 23.11.2010

<sup>13</sup> N. B. The HAP process is similar to the CAP.

<sup>14</sup> These are, for the HAP 2010: Increasing the protection of the civilian population; Reducing mortality and morbidity; Assisting and protecting the displaced and returned/relocated persons and host communities; Restoring livelihoods.

<sup>15</sup> Mortality and morbidity rates; malnutrition levels; protection of civilians; and population displacement and return.

<sup>16</sup> Water, Hygiene, and Sanitation; Education; Logistics; Non-food Items and Emergency Shelter; Nutrition; Protection; Community Reintegration and Recovery; Health; and Food Security.

<sup>17</sup> This seems to take place only at the time of the Mid-Year Review of the HAP.

<sup>18</sup> "The Inter-Agency Provincial Committee, coordinated by OCHA, ensures coordination between sectors and organisations at the level of provincial capitals. Its role is both strategic (policy design, designing joint approaches) and operational (monitoring the humanitarian situation, identifying and filling gaps, advocacy). It is made up of representatives of UN agencies, including lead agencies, NGOs, MONUC, the ICRC (as an observer), and donors." (HAP 2010, p. 45).

representatives and programme managers. An early development in the cluster system in DRC was the identification for each cluster of NGO co-facilitators to work in tandem with the coordinators. So far, the co-facilitators have functioned without ToR, but these are currently under discussion. Cluster coordinators and co-facilitators play a key role at all stages of the PF allocation process<sup>19</sup>.

## Introduction to the CHF or “Pooled Fund”

The Pooled Fund (PF) was established in DRC in 2006, after a pilot project was carried out in the latter part of 2005. Ten donor governments<sup>20</sup> have supported it since its inception, eight of which have made contributions in 2010<sup>21</sup>. The UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden have been its largest donors (see Annex II on funding flows). While the PF was initially conceived as a relatively modest pool of funding of about US\$ 20 million to support rapid response and meet the needs of critically under-funded sectors, by the end of 2006 it had grown to a fund of US\$92.2 million, turning it into the largest source of humanitarian funding in DRC.

To date the PF has supported close to 1,100 projects throughout DRC, without counting those approved in principle by the HC at the PF Advisory Board meeting of 8 November 2010.

For understanding PF allocation processes, it is essential to bear in mind that the HAP has served as the common framework for all humanitarian strategic planning, prioritization, and funding decisions made under the guidance of the HC since 2006. The standard allocation of the PF is meant to support the HAP, which in turn gives the PF strategic accountability.

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<sup>19</sup> Their respective roles are detailed in the 2008-2010 PF allocation guidelines.

<sup>20</sup> Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the UK

<sup>21</sup> Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and UK

## 3 CORE REPORT

### Processes and Inputs

#### Pooled Fund Structure and Processes

The PF comprises two funding windows: a standard allocation window used for allocating the major part of the resources through the clusters in support of the HAP, and a Rapid Response Reserve (RRR) used to respond to strategic needs and rapid onset or new emergency situations. The HC makes two standard allocations per year, which can be complemented by special allocations using the RRR to respond to an emergency, as was the case with the January 2009 allocations for the N. Kivu crisis and for the crisis in Haut Uele in Province Orientale.

The **standard allocation process** involves seven main independent conceived to ensure the best possible identification and selection of priority needs and areas and provide a system of checks-and-balances<sup>22</sup>:

1. The updating of the provincial strategies and priorities by the Provincial Inter-Agency Committees (CPIAs), assisted by the provincial inter-cluster fora, before each standard allocation; this exercise is based on a prior identification of priorities by the provincial clusters;
2. The definition by a Strategic Committee of the funding envelopes that it recommends be made available to the clusters for each province, on the basis of an analysis of the strategic objectives of the HAP, the funding gaps across clusters and provinces, and the provincial strategies updated by the CPIAs<sup>23</sup>; and the subsequent decision of the HC on the envelopes;
3. The submission of summary project sheets<sup>24</sup> by interested organizations in each cluster;
4. The pre-selection of priority projects on the basis of the project sheets, which in 2006 and 2007 was entrusted to the CPIAs and was later devolved to the cluster coordinators at national level, who are expected to develop a list of priority projects in consultation with their provincial counterparts, the assumption being that the latter are the best placed to identify gaps and priority projects;
5. The review of the consolidated list by the CPIA/inter-cluster;
6. The review by the PF Board of the information resulting from the pre-selection processes, as consolidated by the JPFU, and the submission of recommendations to the HC;
7. The HC's final decision "in principle"<sup>25</sup>;

<sup>22</sup> Source: interviews

<sup>23</sup> Cluster requirements for each province are given a coefficient 1 and at its meeting, the **Strategic Committee** corrects them upwards or downwards on the basis of the provincial priorities (e.g. from 1 to 0.5 if not a high priority). The coefficient approach was developed to avoid overdependence on the HAP and take into account the evolution of the humanitarian situation. The coefficients have matching minimum requirements for a viable project. The Strategic Committee then submits its recommendations to the HC who decides.

<sup>24</sup> These are called "Fiches de Projet" and follow a standard format.

<sup>25</sup> This decision is not final, but rather an approval that organizations concerned can submit a full project proposal, which will then be reviewed by a Technical Review Committee (see Relevance, Appropriateness, & Quality Section for more details).

8. The submission to the JPFU and national cluster coordinators of full project documents, developed on the basis of a standard format, for projects approved “in principle” by the HC;
9. The review of the project documents by a Technical Review Committee;
10. The final approval or rejection of a project on the basis of the technical review.

A major change in the process, introduced in 2007, is **the definition of the level of funding envelopes by province and by sector by a Strategic Committee**<sup>26</sup> on the basis of a matrix developed by the JPFU. The matrix presents an analysis of needs which takes into account the strategic objectives of the HAP, funding gaps across all clusters and provinces, and the provincial strategies updated by the CPIAs before each allocation. The development of the matrix is based on the requirements expressed in the HAP and funding gaps. The work of the Strategic Committee consists in reviewing the envelopes resulting from this rather mathematical exercise on the basis of recent humanitarian developments and priority needs as expressed in the provincial strategy (see Annex III for a more detailed description of the approach). Outside the JPFU and PF Board, however, there is little understanding of the process followed by the Strategic Committee to determine funding envelopes. It would gain from being clarified.

There seems to be some **room for misinterpretation**, at Kinshasa level, of the geographical priorities as presented by the CPIAs. This almost led to a wrong decision being taken for Province Orientale in the framework of the latest allocation.<sup>27</sup> On that occasion, the participation of the OCHA Head of Sub-office, who happened to be in Kinshasa, in the deliberations of the Strategic Committee proved to be useful.

With respect to the envelopes per provinces per sector, as a cluster coordinator put it “there are always cases of an envelope for a province, where the cluster coordinator knows that the neighbouring province had greater needs”, which suggests that clusters should be associated to the work of the Strategic Committee.

**A complementary PF window, the Rapid Response Reserve**, was initially established to guarantee funding to the RRM/RRMP (see Box below) but rapidly evolved into a tool at the disposal of the HC to provide timely and flexible funding for the response to unforeseen emergencies and strategic initiatives. In 2006 already, RRR funds started being used to support under-funded priority and strategic projects in-between standard allocations<sup>28</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> The Strategic Committee brings together PF Board members (two donor representatives, two UN agency representatives, and two NGOs) and representatives of the JPFU acting as its secretariat.

<sup>27</sup> The CPIA has identified 5 priority axis in the provincial strategy, prioritizing Ango as number 1, followed by Dangu 1 and Dangu 2, Niangara and Farradje. Kinshasa then communicated that the priority axis for Province Orientale for the second allocation of 2010 was Ango only. This caused a lot of upset as needs had been identified and assessed in all 5 axis, and because while Ango might have had severe needs, not many partners had a presence there. The OCHA Bunia Head of Office was present in Kinshasa for the Strategic Committee deliberations on the final envelopes per cluster and he was able to clarify that all axis were considered a priority. However, the confusion about the axis’ accepted lasted until the project submission stage and projects outside of the Ango axis were originally rejected as ‘not relevant axis’ by some of the cluster coordinators at the pre-selection phase. These were, however, re-considered and in some instances endorsed when the pre-selected projects were presented to the CPIA for review.

<sup>28</sup> Projects in the logistics, WASH, health, and nutrition sectors got RRR funding in 2006.



The HC decides at the time of each standard allocation how much should be kept aside for the RRR and how much will be given to the RRMP<sup>29</sup>. Initially, around 10% of the available funds were set aside for the RRR, but this proportion has increased over time. In 2006, the RRR represented around 11.5% of the PF budget, in 2007, 23.6%, in 2008, 22.6%, and in 2009, 41%<sup>30</sup>.

### Annual Contributions of the PF to the RRM/P

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2006-2010
<b>Total US\$</b>	11,654,313	18,297,305	13,261,233	10,058,000	15,400,000	68,670,851

Source: JPFU database and OCHA data

The RRR has been used for emergency projects in sectors not covered by the RRMP (e.g. emergency health), strategic projects for the wider humanitarian community (e.g. UNHAS<sup>31</sup>; Establishing a technical and logistics platform to reinforce humanitarian action; Opening roads for humanitarian access) as well as the Rapid Response Fund managed by OCHA.

Since 2008, the HC has also used the RRR to provide special allocations in response to a sudden crisis in a specific sector or geographical area<sup>32</sup>. For special allocations, a procedure close to that of a standard allocation is followed, except that the delay between project approval and the first disbursement is shorter.<sup>33</sup>

Specific procedures for the submission of projects to the RRR, referred to as “Fast Track”, have been in place since 2008: requests are addressed by email to the HC, who decides after consulting the relevant CPIA and clusters and the PF Board. Projects can be submitted throughout the year. This mechanism is open to UN agencies and NGOs, but is not well known to NGO partners<sup>34</sup>, although 17 NGOs got RRR funding in 2009<sup>35</sup> (most of them through the special allocations). While it is understandable to some degree that the RRR is not advertised widely, in order to ensure there are funds available when a special allocation is needed, the lack of information about it contributes to the perception of a lack of transparency of the PF allocation system.

### Rapid Response Mechanism and Rapid Response to Population Movements (RRMP)

The Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) was established in 2004 as a joint UNICEF/OCHA project aiming to provide rapid multi-sector evaluations and response<sup>36</sup> to sudden population movements and natural disasters, as bilateral funding took too long (3-4 months) to arrive. Although the scope of the RRM was national, it has focussed on the Eastern provinces. DFID and SIDA supported the RRM from the start and as it had become an essential tool for the HC, at the time of the establishment of the PF, which they intended to support, they agreed with the HC that PF funds would be systematically allocated to the RRM. The RRM was recently combined with

<sup>29</sup> Funding for the RRM/RRMP has always come from the RRR.

<sup>30</sup> Source: PF Annual Reports.

<sup>31</sup> United Nations Humanitarian Air Service

<sup>32</sup> Examples include an envelope of US\$ 10.5 million in 2008 for food (US\$8 million); agriculture (US\$2 million); and logistics (US\$0.5 million) to respond to a severe food crisis in North Kivu and a US\$13 million envelope in July 2009 to respond to the emergency caused by the military operation Kimia I in North Kivu and South Kivu. The latter was combined with a CERF Rapid Response window allocation of US\$ 7 million.

<sup>33</sup> The aim of the July 2009 special allocation launched on 1<sup>st</sup> July was for first disbursements to start on 23 July.

<sup>34</sup> Source: interviews.

<sup>35</sup> 2009 PF Annual Report, p. 39.

<sup>36</sup> The RRM initially focused on NFI but expanded to WASH, education, and occasionally health, in particular in the event of cholera.

another UNICEF initiative, the “Programme Elargi d’Appui au Retour (PEAR)”, which was put in place in 2006 as a counterpart to the RRM to stabilise returns. PEAR carried out rapid in-depth multi-sector needs assessments (MSAs) that were shared with the humanitarian community through the clusters, the CPIAs, and a website, and provided a response in the NFI and education recovery sectors. On its basis, UNICEF developed a multi-sector transition (education, WASH, health, and child protection) programme for vulnerable return zones, and transformed PEAR into PEAR Plus. As the distinction between areas of displacement and return became increasingly blurred, the RRM and PEAR were merged into the RRMP in early 2010 in order to improve effectiveness and efficiency. RRM, PEAR and RRMP have used protection data provided by the UNHCR Protection Monitoring project, also funded by the PF. The RRMP is based on a partnership with INGO stand-by partners in the WASH, NFI/shelter, and emergency education sectors and prepositioned stocks.

NGO partners provide the rapid multi-sector assessment and response capacity. UNICEF is in charge of the management of these partnerships with INGOs and the procurement and pre-positioning of relief NFIs, WASH supplies and security equipment while OCHA organises inter-agency needs-assessment missions, sets up mobile Emergency Field Coordination Units with the necessary communications and security equipment. OCHA also has the capacity to provide funding through a Rapid Response Fund for inter-agency needs assessment missions, emergency projects in the health, nutrition, WASH and shelter/NFI sectors in areas beyond those covered by the RRMP, and the response to natural disasters and epidemics<sup>37</sup>.

While regarded as a “provider of last resort” mechanism, the RRM/RRMP has functioned as a “first resort” response tool for the response in these sectors for a maximum duration of three months, while the corresponding clusters prepared to take over after three months. A large proportion of the funds received by UNICEF is channelled to NGOs (e.g. 55% in 2008 and 69% in 2009<sup>38</sup>).

**The HC has the overall responsibility for the management of the PF** with the support of a Pooled Fund Advisory Board (PF Board), which brings together the three largest donors to the Fund (Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK), three UN cluster-lead agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP), and three representatives of the INGOs (currently ACF, Solidarités, and CARE<sup>39</sup>, two of which attend per meeting). The PF Board provides advice to the HC on PF management and allocation of resources, including the final selection of projects to be financed. DG ECHO and USAID, the largest humanitarian donors outside the PF, are invited as observers. The main issue brought up with respect to the PF Board is the need to ensure a rotation of UN agencies on the PF Board, as a way to improve good governance and transparency, but a revision of the ToR of the PF Board in early 2011 tackled this issue by including all cluster lead agencies.

For the day to day management of the PF, the HC is supported by a Joint Pooled Fund Unit (JPFU) managed by OCHA and staffed by OCHA and UNDP. The JPFU is 24 strong<sup>40</sup> and is entirely funded by the PF. The role of the JPFU is to manage PF processes and the PF ‘project management cycle’, in particular the analysis of needs required by the Strategic Committee for its deliberations; the consultations of the CPIAs; the identification and pre-selection of projects; the technical review of projects; the M&E of projects; the reporting on results. The JPFU provides Secretariat functions to the PF Board, Strategic Committee, and Technical Review Committee and performs the Management Agent functions of UNDP. The JPFU manages a comprehensive database of PF projects, which is put to excellent use. The

<sup>37</sup> Source: 2008-2010 PF allocation guidelines and interviews.

<sup>38</sup> These figures would be higher if the significant quantity of in-kind assistance purchased by UNICEF for these programmes was included.

<sup>39</sup> The new ToR of the PF Advisory Board foresees the participation of a fourth NGO, to be designated by the INGO Heads of Mission group.

<sup>40</sup> Of the 24 staff members of the JPFU, 19 have UNDP contracts.

Administrative Agent function has been firewalled and therefore separated from the JPFU although the teams work in close coordination.

The **JPFU has been run since its inception by a single, highly motivated individual with strong backing from the HC**. His contribution to turning the PF into an effective funding mechanism is widely acknowledged even though according to someone with a good time perspective on the PF, 'there is insufficient appreciation of this strategic success'.

The JPFU has been a pioneer for developing methodologies to improve PF allocation processes and accountability and refine the PF Project Management Cycle and faced innumerable bureaucratic challenges as it has endeavoured to lighten the burden of administrative procedures on NGO partners. It has been HACT-compliant since early 2010, which places it ahead of UNDP (see later section)<sup>41</sup>.

However, **more needs to be done with respect to communication**. Much of the information circulating about the PF is incorrect (e.g. the length of projects is fairly widely believed to be limited to 6 months, whereas this is in fact the minimum timeframe, or the perception that PF guidelines constantly change). There is also a lack of understanding in the field about different aspects of the standard allocation process, such as how funding envelopes are decided in Kinshasa.

This need is particularly acute given the **high turnover of humanitarian staff in DRC**, which also affects OCHA. In the past year OCHA has had insufficient staff stability and resources in Kinshasa and in the provinces to facilitate the understanding of PF guidelines. For the second allocation of 2010, OCHA and the JPFU made an effort to go to several of the provinces to explain the process, but ensuring that the process is well understood remains a challenge not only due to the turn-over of humanitarian staff but also the lack of time field staff has to dedicate to understanding processes and procedures. Likewise, better communication seems to be needed between the JPFU and OCHA staff in the provinces. The latter do not always understand the processes and procedures themselves, despite being the obvious channels for this information. At times they have conveyed contradictory information about the PF.

Steps taken in early 2011 are an illustration of the pro-activeness of the JPFU. The ToR of the PF Board have been revised, the wording of the allocation guidelines has been improved and the guidelines will from now on be kept separate from the instructions specific to each allocation<sup>42</sup>so as to avoid potential confusion and misinterpretation, and a user-friendly interactive 'SharePoint' has been established (<http://www.pooledfund-rdc.org>) onto which the PF database is being transferred.

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<sup>41</sup> Since early 2011, UNDP HQ regards the UNDP Country Office as HACT-compliant as well.

<sup>42</sup> PF allocation guidelines have been in place since early 2007 and have not changed much over the years, despite frequent remarks to the contrary. There were some changes between the first and the second version of 2008, which concerned the partner eligibility criteria, steps in the allocation process, and the role of the clusters, the PF Board, the Strategic Committee, and the JPFU. The only change since then was the inclusion of a point in the guidelines for the second allocation of 2010 indicating the need for projects to respect the new cluster guidelines. The perception that the guidelines were frequently changing could partly be due to the inclusion at the beginning of the document, at the time of each PF standard allocation, of a different section explaining how the funds were going to be used, and a reference at the bottom of the document indicating it was a new version.

The JPFU Manager plans to develop a comprehensive training module on the process and complementarities with other funds and the role of UNDP, but needs HQ assistance for this activity.

**Most of the shortcomings identified by previous evaluations, which could be acted upon at DRC level, have been addressed**, but some key recommendations do not seem to have been followed through, such as the need for the PF Board to have at least one general policy meeting per year involving PF and other donors; developing a stronger information management system; developing clear criteria on what can be funded under life-saving and recovery; and all of the M&E recommendations (see Annex V). Some of these will require HQ support.

### **Main Recommendations**

- 1) The Strategic Committee process should involve a consultation of representatives of the CPIAs and cluster coordinators, either as a first session of the meeting or an opportunity for them to comment on the proposed envelopes before they are decided upon and announced.**
- 2) The JPFU should carry out a systematic review of recommendations of the 2007 evaluation and submit outstanding ones to the PF Board and the HC by the end of the first quarter of 2011 with an indication of possible obstacles for their implementation and steps required. The PF Board should take the lead for their follow up and agree on a calendar for implementing those that can be acted upon at country level. The HC and donors should formally request assistance from UN HQ and donor capitals as relevant for the implementation of those which require action at that level.**
- 3) The procedure and criteria for applying for RRR funds should be incorporated in the PF allocation guidelines.**
- 4) The recent establishment of a 'SharePoint' has the potential of being a highly effective means to address the communication and information management weaknesses identified in this section of the report and subsequent ones. The 'SharePoint' should include space for the sharing of good practice and lessons-learned, as well as summaries or selected parts of M&E reports.**
- 5) Establishing a limited JPFU presence (e.g. one additional OCHA international staff member) in the Eastern provinces to act as an interlocutor with partners, provide guidance on JPFU allocation processes and PCM, in particular the putting in place of an appropriate monitoring system involving the JPFU M&E section and the clusters, should be considered. Alternatively, international OCHA JPFU staff currently based in Kinshasa should spend more time (e.g. 35-40% of their time) in the provinces under their purview.**

## Relevance, Appropriateness & Quality

The following sections will first examine the relevance and appropriateness of the fund itself, before using these same criteria, combined with that of quality, at project level.

### *Fund Level*

**The PF has generated additional funding for DRC** (see Table 2 in Annex II). Several large and medium-size donors would not have been able to achieve the same level of funding and outreach without the PF, especially due to the lack of in-country humanitarian staff or limited in-country capacity to engage in humanitarian action or administer funds. They see the PF as an excellent tool and a model for other countries.

**HAP requirements went up by 216.72 % in 2006** to US\$ 696,024,728, which was matched by a substantial increase in HAP contributions to US\$ 354,219,636, i.e. a 148% increase in HAP funding share<sup>43</sup>. In 2006, 51% of HAP requirements were covered<sup>44</sup>. The proportion of HAP requirements covered by the PF was of 26% in 2006 and 2007, 25% in 2008, and 18% in 2009 (see Table 3 in Annex II).

The initial group of (six) donors, namely Belgium, Canada, Norway, Sweden, The Netherlands, and the UK, was joined by Ireland, Luxembourg, and Spain in 2007, and Denmark in 2008, bringing the total **number of donors having contributed to the PF** to 10. Of these donors, Canada contributed in 2006 and 2007 (2 years) and Denmark in 2008 (once). The eight other donors have continued supporting the PF in 2010. The number of donors pledging and contributing to the PF has increased from 2006-2008, and so has, in most cases, the size of their contributions. As a result, the size of the PF grew from US\$ 92,251,266 in 2006 to US\$ 117,788,433 in 2007 and US\$ 142,878,150 in 2008, but a downward trend started in 2008 and pledges have diminished from US\$ 109,571,067 in 2009 to US\$ 76,013,875 in 2010, as of November 4, 2010<sup>45</sup> (this amount increased to US\$ 87,158,775 by the end of 2010). The 2008 figures, however, are skewed by the fact that when new crises broke out in N. and S. Kivu and Haut Uélé in the later part of 2008, the HC appealed for more funding to enable the PF to boost the humanitarian response, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden made additional contributions at the end of the year, for a total of US\$ 13,860,774, while Belgium made one at the beginning of 2009. 2008 was also marked by exchange rate losses and gains due to the fluctuation of the dollar, resulting in an overall loss of around US\$ 210,000<sup>46</sup>.

**Overall, the funding data<sup>47</sup> indicates a strong commitment to support the PF on the part of most of the donors.** A comparison of donor contributions the year before they contributed to the PF and the first year shows that nine of them increased their level of humanitarian funding to DRC<sup>48</sup>. The proportion of this increase that went to the PF varies considerably

<sup>43</sup> 2006 DRC PF Annual Report to Donors; Table 8 - 2002–2006 Total Humanitarian Aid (Within and outside CAP/HAP), p. 21

<sup>44</sup> According to the 2006 PF annual report “In 2006, funding through the HAP represented 80% of the total humanitarian aid received for DRC compared to 52% in 2005 and to the average of 54% for the 2003-2005 CAP cycles.”

<sup>45</sup> These amounts are the totals pledged, rather than contributed, any given year. Source: PF annual reports, JPFU data, and UNDP Gateway website.

<sup>46</sup> Source: JPFU data. This figure is the sum of exchange rate losses and gains for all of the contributions made in 2008, but the loss for the DFID contribution was higher than US\$210,000.

<sup>47</sup> Source: PF annual reports, UNDP Gateway website, and OCHA Financial Tracking Service

<sup>48</sup> Increases by donor were of 8.3% for Luxembourg, 13.7% for Sweden, 34.5 for Denmark, 42.2% for Ireland, 52.7% for

from donor to donor with contributions from Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and Spain representing 93.5%, 81%, 74%, 65% and 49% of their respective humanitarian contribution to DRC, while some donors have preferred to reserve a large proportion of their funds for bilateral funding (see Table 1 in Annex II).


Nevertheless, in the following years, even though most of these donors have continued contributing to the PF, the relative level of funding of the PF when compared to HAP requirements has diminished. This, combined with some donors 'dropping out', has led to a decrease of funds available and since 2009, the PF no longer ranks as the first humanitarian donor in DRC, but as the second after the US.

Donors have explained that a **substantial reduction in PF resources experienced in 2010** is not due to a loss of confidence in the PF but rather to the economic crisis or the level of bilateral commitments. The fact that the source of humanitarian funding regarded as the most reliable and flexible was becoming less predictable has been a cause for concern to the humanitarian community in the latter half of 2010. Additional contributions for 2010 from Belgium (delayed), the Netherlands, and SIDA (new) arrived in December, as well as funds from DFID for 2011.

#### *Total PF contributions per year during the period 2006-2010*

Year <sup>49</sup>	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total
<b>Total</b>	92.253.867	112.200.117	134.715.187	139.138.384	102.593.306 <sup>50</sup>	580.900.861

Source: *Gateway - UNDG Multi Donor Trust Fund Office/UNDP; Data as of 13 February 2011*



Sources: *PF annual reports, JPFU data, and UNDP Gateway website, as of November 4, 2010.*

**With respect to the timeliness of contributions**, four of the eight core donors to the PF have had difficulties to honor their commitments the same financial year<sup>51</sup>.

Belgium, 63.4% for the Netherlands, 136% for Norway, 169% for Spain, and 175.3% for the UK. Canada contributed less than the previous year.

<sup>49</sup> This is the year when the contribution was received, not the year when the pledge was made.

<sup>50</sup> This amount includes a contribution from the UK (DFID) for 2011.

<sup>51</sup> Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg and Spain have had trouble disbursing their contribution the same year. .



From 2006 to the second allocation of 2010, standard allocations have targeted all of the 11 provinces in DRC, thereby **improving geographical coverage**. **The bulk of PF resources has gone to conflict-affected areas**, i.e. North and South Kivu, Katanga, Ituri, Province Orientale, Equateur, and Haut Uélé, as Table 4 in Annex II indicates, but the PF may have been the only source of humanitarian funding for other areas of the country where humanitarian threshold levels had been reached<sup>52</sup> and which humanitarian donors tended to disregard.<sup>53</sup> The definition, since the first allocation of 2008 of envelopes per cluster per province by a Strategic Committee as a basis for the HC's decision on where and to which sector to allocate funds has played a key role in apportioning funding to the provinces based on HAP requirements, funding gaps and priority needs.

This changed with the second allocation of 2010. Due to the smaller amount of funding available at the time of its launch, the PF Board decided to **target the Eastern provinces only**<sup>54</sup>. This change has raised concerns, in particular in the nutrition cluster, which considers that humanitarian needs in this sector in Eastern DRC are relatively well covered compared to those in the West<sup>55</sup>.

Further down the line, the CPIAs were asked for the first time to select one or two priority areas ('axes') and the Strategic Committee subsequently found itself in the difficult position of having to choose among priority areas put forward by the CPIA. **The example of North Kivu was frequently mentioned**<sup>56</sup>. The CPIA selected Walikale and Lubero as priorities, and left out Beni, an area where there had been renewed conflict and population displacements a few months before. The decision regarding Beni was questioned by some<sup>57</sup> but viewed by most as justified as Beni had benefited from an adequate response already. However, given the available envelope, the Strategic Committee only selected Walikale, which raised some controversy because the RRMP was already intervening in the area and clusters could not apply for funds for Lubero. The approach was seen as too narrow.

**The reduction of PF resources caused some tension between Kinshasa and the provinces** as PF allocation strategies had to be adapted with little prior notice and communication. In order to avoid this type of situation, **donor contributions need to be made earlier in the year**, if possible during the first six months. In addition, it would be helpful if donors indicated at an early stage during the year (to be defined by the PF Board) how much they are likely to contribute the following year. This will allow the PF Board and JPFU to adapt and communicate the strategy well in advance, and when the time comes, to prepare a **PF exit strategy**. In parallel, **humanitarian organisations in DRC need to diversify their resource basis as well as prepare for transition and the gradual handover of their activities to the competent authorities in areas where it is feasible**.

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<sup>52</sup> It should be noted that this extension of coverage to 'non-emergency' provinces has been the subject of much debate.

<sup>53</sup> NGO HR Mapping Study, DRC Report, Development Initiatives, 2008

<sup>54</sup> Standard allocations had been of a national scope until then.

<sup>55</sup> The nutrition cluster mentioned that the significant reduction in malnutrition in the East is partly attributable to the PF.

<sup>56</sup> Source: Interviews in Kinshasa and North Kivu. This question had obviously been the subject of much debate.

<sup>57</sup> One NGO was still hoping to get some PF funding for a project in Beni.



According to the 2006 PF annual report, the **PF has brought better coverage of neglected sectors and considerably reduced funding disparities across sectors**. In November 2005, an OCHA mission to DRC had identified important gaps in Protection; Water/Sanitation; Return/Reintegration, and Logistics and the HC and “the HAG decided to implement the cluster approach to help fill these gaps and strengthen the overall humanitarian response in the DRC”.<sup>58</sup> The 2006 PF annual report indicates that these sectors received 8%, 7.8%, 2.9%, and 8.7% of total PF funding respectively<sup>59</sup>. Sectoral needs in specific geographic areas have received extra support when required (e.g. food aid relief, emergency agriculture and nutrition were strengthened in the context of the food security crises in Eastern DRC in 2006<sup>60</sup>, or nutrition throughout the country). The PF has also provided funding for the provision of **essential services** to the humanitarian community, in particular logistics (e.g. the Inter-Agency Logistics Services (ILS), which enables NGOs and UN agencies to transport food and NFIs<sup>61</sup>; the UNHAS air service; NGO-run logistics platforms) and coordination.

Clusters have been able to **channel more funding to their highest agreed priority activities**, as defined in the HAP<sup>62</sup>, but with certain limitations with respect to geographical coverage within each province: in the framework of standard allocations, the CPIAs select priority areas for PF operations which do not always correspond to those where the needs identified by some of the clusters are the greatest<sup>63</sup>.

**The PF is an excellent vehicle for mainstreaming cross-cutting issues** into humanitarian action. Gender has been considered as a key cross-cutting priority in DRC for a couple of years. In 2009, UNICEF mobilised a gender advisor for DRC<sup>64</sup> through the IASC Gender Standby Capacity<sup>65</sup> (GenCap) to mainstream gender into the work of the clusters. In mid-2009, the HC and UNICEF requested the support of the same advisor so as to provide technical support on gender to all of the clusters. The GenCap Advisor and OCHA identified the PF as a quick and strategic entry point for mainstreaming gender in humanitarian action. The inclusion of a gender marker scoring system into projects for the second 2009 allocation was piloted to assess the level of gender mainstreaming into projects. Findings were that most projects were gender-blind. Project designers could not explain how they would measure effects, so the GenCap Advisor worked on the basis of project documents to provide advice to them. At the end of 2009, the PF Board validated the adoption of the gender markers as a standard tool for all allocations. They were included in PF guidelines in December 2010. This same Advisor provided training to the JPFU M&E

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<sup>58</sup> IASC Interim Self-Assessment of Implementation of the Cluster Approach in the DRC (24-27 October 2006).

<sup>59</sup> A comparison of their funding levels in 2005 and 2006 against HAP requirements shows that funding for Protection went from 30% to 46%, for Water and Sanitation from 0% to 49% (data not available for Return/Reintegration and Logistics), and that funding levels for Shelter/NFI went from 4% to 43% and for health from 16% to 34%.

<sup>60</sup> DRC Pooled Fund Annual Report to Donors; January 2006-March 2007; April 2007, p. 17.

<sup>61</sup> According to the 2010 WFP Annual Report for DRC, “some 13,000 tons of non-food items were transported in 2009 on behalf of 50 organizations, including non-governmental groups and UN agencies. More than a dozen users also benefitted from WFP’s warehousing services via the ILS.”

<sup>62</sup> Prerequisites for PF funding are that indicators reach at least one of the humanitarian thresholds and projects be in line with cluster strategies and priorities.

<sup>63</sup> Source: interviews. This is further developed in the section on Operational Effectiveness, Coherence and Connectedness.

<sup>64</sup> In the framework of the UNICEF global pilot project for mainstreaming gender into humanitarian action.

<sup>65</sup> <http://onerresponse.info/crosscutting/GenCap/Pages/GenCap.aspx>

team and reviewed their evaluation template. There is a link between the level of interest of the cluster coordinator and that of the cluster, but some cluster coordinators are still not fully engaged. Long term support will be required, as mainstreaming gender is a process which requires continuous follow up and will take time.

When the GenCap Advisor started her work with the nutrition cluster, it had no disaggregated data and could not answer her questions. Once it did, the cluster discovered that boys were significantly more affected by malnutrition than girls and they have since developed guidelines to help project designers take this into account. The GenCap Advisor considers the PF as the most-effective tool to bring about such changes.

**The PF has also been used to promote innovation and good practice spearheaded by clusters**, such as cash & voucher programmes and NFI fairs<sup>66</sup>. Since 2009, the NFI/Shelter cluster has been training cluster members to explore the use of a cash-based response and now, nearly half of the PF projects submitted for PF funding in this cluster propose some form of cash-based response, and this is eliciting interest in other clusters (e.g. food security).

**A strong emphasis on 'life-saving' activities** at the level of the PF Board, together with limited resources compared to the size of humanitarian needs, is viewed by two clusters (Education and Community Reintegration and Recovery), as the reason why they have received relatively modest levels of funding. As a matter of fact, there is no consensus at the level of the PF Board on what is meant by 'life-saving'. Donor positions on certain matters (e.g. whether emergency needs resulting from structural rather than disaster/conflict causes can be funded; what is meant by early recovery and whether it can be supported; support to building the capacity of local NGOs) diverge and are perceived as having a negative impact on the strategic direction of the fund and the allocation process<sup>67</sup>. The education cluster has received a relatively modest proportion of PF funds and the annual coverage of its HAP requirements is one of the lowest<sup>68</sup>.

**The CRR cluster got limited amounts of funding** in 2006-2008<sup>69</sup> and in the first allocation of 2010 and none in 2009. The main reasons cited for this<sup>70</sup> were the introduction of a multi-sector/cluster approach to community recovery in 2009 and the establishment the same year of a Stabilisation and Reconstruction Funding Facility for Eastern DRC<sup>71</sup> and likely expectations, given that the four donors to the SRFF are all donors to the PF, that the SRFF

<sup>66</sup> See 'Good Practices in Humanitarian Assistance: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)', Good Practice Paper Series, The NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project - <http://www.icva.ch/doc00004197.pdf>

<sup>67</sup> PF donors are involved in two strategic for a: the PF Board and the Strategic Committee.

<sup>68</sup> As per the FTS, education cluster requirements were covered as follows: 32% in 2006; 19% in 2007; 31% in 2008; 19% in 2009 and 24% in 2010, for fairly stable requirements of between US\$23million-US\$28 million for the period 2006-2010. It is worth noting that the education sector received no funding in 2005 despite much lower requirements of around US\$2.7 million.

<sup>69</sup> The CRR cluster got 2.9% of PF funding in 2006, 5% in 2007, and 4.1% in 2008.

<sup>70</sup> Source: interviews conducted during fieldwork.

<sup>71</sup> The donors who have contributed to this multi-donor trust fund are Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Projects of UNHCR, UNFPA, UNICEF and OHCHR/UNOPS have been approved so far. Funding decisions are taken with the authorities and must be validated by the Prime Minister.

would fund recovery-oriented activities<sup>72</sup>. These expectations were legitimate, but linkages between the humanitarian community and the SRFF seem to be weak. The CRR cluster, in addition, had trouble defining its approach<sup>73</sup>. The PF supports community return and reintegration (the 4th objective of the HAP) and encourages a multi-sector approach and partnerships<sup>74</sup>, so as to provide a holistic response. A special PF allocation in 2009 to support the promotion of short-term community recovery, a “fifth objective” included in the 2009 HAP, and removed in 2010, was allocated to an integrated health and WASH project to address cholera in the area of Kalemie, in Katanga Province<sup>75</sup>. This decision disappointed the CRR cluster, but is coherent with the multi-sector approach being encouraged and the provisions of the fifth objective as defined in the HAP.

**The PF has been effective at including NGOs and the fund has become increasingly relevant to them.** NGOs have been enabled to become key actors in the humanitarian response. The number of INGOs and national NGOs receiving funding has increased from respectively 32 and 11 in 2007 to 42 and 31 in 2008, 38 and 27 in 2009, and 60 and 72 in 2010. Similarly, the proportion of funding channeled to and through NGOs<sup>76</sup> has evolved to the benefit of NGOs as follows:

- 2006: 42.9% (24.5% directly and 18.4% indirectly<sup>77</sup>)
- 2007: 49.1% (34.7% directly and 14.4% indirectly)
- 2008: 54.8% (46.3% directly and 8.5% indirectly)
- 2009: 54.2 % (breakdown not available)

This is also reflected in the number of projects per type of organization:

Year	Total # of projects	# of UN projects + IOM	Total # of NGO projects	# of INGO projects	# of National NGO projects
2006	139	57	82	N/A	N/A
2007	200	104	96	79	17
2008	294	112	182	146	36
2009	284	104	180	138	42

Source: Pooled Fund Annual Reports

**However, some international NGOs depend to a large extent on the PF for core and programmatic funding.** According to an international NGO, since the PF has no ‘co-funding’ requirement, many projects are entirely funded by the PF. Some, in recognition of the risk of being too tied to the PF, are broadening their donor base. Due to the PF transaction costs (see later section of the report) and the efforts that the application requires, certain large international NGOs no longer consider it interesting to apply for PF funds if the

<sup>72</sup> The HAP 2010 includes a table indicating the nature of the activities falling within the framework of each fund and which UN agencies are involved in pursuing the respective objectives.

<sup>73</sup> Source: interviews.

<sup>74</sup> This approach calls for a multi-sector involvement in the same area through combinations of several projects in different sectors and multi-sector projects.

<sup>75</sup> DRC Pooled Fund – Annual Report 2009, p. 35


<sup>76</sup> Source: data provided in the PF annual reports.

<sup>77</sup> UN agencies are requested to report amounts channeled indirectly to NGOs; these do not include in-kind contributions.

final project budget allocated is below a certain minimum (e.g. US\$200,000 and US\$500,000)<sup>78</sup>.

**The PF is almost the only source of humanitarian funding for local NGOs** unless they are linked to international NGOs either as a partner (e.g. Oxfam) or a member of a network (e.g. CAFOD/Caritas) or to a UN agency as implementing partner. This dependency on PF funds and a sense of entitlement to it have led to unrealistic demands on the PF (e.g. capacity building of local NGOs) and a climate of competition.

The evolution of the average size of grants shows a fairly **constant increase in the size of grants to UN agencies** from 2006 to 2010, while the size of grants to NGOs increased from 2006 to 2007 and started decreasing in 2008, as can be seen in the following graph:



The HC has made a **complementary use of available funding resources**<sup>79</sup> by combining PF allocations, both standard and RRR, with CERF Under-funded Emergency (UFE) and Rapid Response allocations, “treating them as almost the same pot of money”<sup>80</sup>, while advocating for additional bilateral funding. Examples include the deteriorating situation in North Kivu in September 2007<sup>81</sup> (combined use of PF RRR and CERF RR w), the crisis provoked by the LRA in Haut Uélé in May 2009, and the deteriorating situation in North and South Kivu in June-July 2009 (use of PF RRR and CERF UE and RR windows). When the timing of CERF allocations made it possible, CERF funds have been used for covering the requirements of UN agencies<sup>82</sup>. This has enabled him to reserve a larger share of PF funds for NGOs, which are not eligible for CERF funding<sup>83</sup>. Specific projects have also benefitted from different combinations of PF, CERF, and bilateral funding (e.g. UNHAS<sup>84</sup>) when funding resources were insufficient.

In the case of unforeseen emergencies, the HC has turned to the RRR and the CERF Rapid Response window (RRw) and whenever possible, combined them to step up the response. An example is the release in early 2009 of an RRR envelope of US\$1.5 million for WFP to

<sup>78</sup> Interviews and ‘Evaluation des Projets’, Rapport Annuel 2009, Mamadou N’Daw, Head of JPFU M&E Section.

<sup>79</sup> This section is based on JPFU inputs.

<sup>80</sup> Evaluation of Common/Pooled Humanitarian Funds in DRC and Sudan, December 2007, p. 28.

<sup>81</sup> 2007 PF Annual Report, p. 23.

<sup>82</sup> Case of the Kivu crisis in June-July 2009, when several UN projects prioritized during a PF standard allocation process were eventually covered by the CERF, with the approval of the UNCT and the national inter-cluster forum.

<sup>83</sup> Source: interviews, 2006 PF Annual Report, p. 18, and 2007 CERF: Interim Review, DRC Case Study, p. 59.

<sup>84</sup> Annual Report 2009, Pooled Fund DRC, p. 34.

provide food aid in Haut Uélé, combined with US\$ 7.5 million from the CERF RRw. The HC harmonized PF and CERF project selection procedures and their reporting templates in 2007 and annual reporting for the two is combined.

The **Rapid Response Fund (RRF)** mentioned earlier is managed by OCHA as an Emergency Response Fund, although funding decisions are made jointly by UNICEF and OCHA<sup>85</sup>. It is a rapid funding mechanism for the UN and NGOs that was originally used to complement the RRM, but is now used rather independently to respond to small-scale needs. It received funding from the RRR in 2007 and 2008, but as humanitarian partners have increasingly turned to the PF to cover their requirements, including modest ones, and the very existence of the RRF is no longer well-known, it has not required new funding since<sup>86</sup>. Better use could be made of it to support rapid, small scale humanitarian operations, especially with the growing emphasis of the PF on larger projects and the time required by PF Standard allocations take time.

The future of the RRF is uncertain as according to OCHA HQ policy, a PF and an ERF cannot co-exist in the same country, but OCHA DRC would like to preserve this rapid response funding mechanism, and the most obvious alternative, i.e. turning the RRF into as a separate, specialised, window of the PF, would slow down the disbursement timeframe.

#### **Recommendations for fund level:**

- 1) In order to avoid last-minute changes in allocation strategies made at the beginning of the year, donor contributions need to be made earlier in the year and indicated early on how much they are likely to contribute the following year.**
- 2) Humanitarian organisations in DRC need to diversify their resource basis as well as prepare for transition and the gradual handover of their activities to the competent authorities in areas where it is feasible.**
- 3) The PF Board should use the PF as a vehicle to progressively mainstream other crosscutting issues in addition to gender, with a UN cluster lead agency providing the necessary guidance.**
- 4) Since the PF aims to support the HAP and is used only for projects meeting the criteria defined by clusters in the HAP, but donors have different policies which sometimes influence decision-making at the level of the PF Board, the PF Board should consider adopting, in the first quarter of 2011, the CERF Life Saving Criteria, which provide a fairly broad interpretation of the life-saving criterion<sup>87</sup>, as the**

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<sup>85</sup> This unusual feature of the ERF is a legacy of the establishment of the RRM and the RRF as complementary OCHA/UNICEF mechanisms. See the Review of OCHA Emergency Response Funds (ERFs), January 2007, pp. 8-9.

<sup>86</sup> The RRF disbursed US\$762,000 in 2005 (shelter/NFI, logistics, health, and RRM), US\$4.6 million in 2006 (RRM, logistics, WASH, nutrition, shelter/NFI), US\$1.6 million in 2007 (RRM, logistics, protection), US\$ 661,000 in 2008 (protection, logistics, shelter/NFI, health, food security), and US\$771,000 in 2009 (logistics, shelter/NFI, WASH).

<sup>87</sup> In order to guide project preparation and screening, the CERF Secretariat further refined the three basic criteria (life-saving, time-critical and underfunded) in consultation with the IASC and UN agencies. "CERF Life-Saving Criteria and Sectoral Activities", CERF Secretariat, 7 August 2007

**minimal baseline for all sectors, but without limiting the PF to the CERF guidelines, as they are more restrictive than the PF.**

- 5) **OCHA HQ should modify the policy preventing a CHF and an ERF from coexisting in the same country, given the comparative advantage of a rapid and flexible funding mechanism for responding to small needs.**

### *Relevance, Appropriateness, & Quality at Project Level*

The **relevance of projects** is related to the needs assessments on the basis of which priorities are identified and to the ulterior project identification and formulation processes (which should include the beneficiary perspective). In DRC, Early Warning systems (e.g. Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification), monitoring activities (e.g. Protection Monitoring; Humanitarian Health and Nutrition Tracking Service) and needs assessments by the clusters and the RRMP (MSAs) provide this basis. Prior to allocations, cluster partners carry out needs assessments in the priority areas selected by the CPIA to obtain the data necessary to tailor their assistance<sup>88</sup>. The projects presented for PF funding have to respond to the priority needs agreed by the cluster<sup>89</sup>.

Projects go through a **filtering process** during the allocation process, which include the pre-selection by the national cluster coordinator in consultation with the provincial cluster, the review of the list of pre-selected projects by the CPIA, a review by the JPFU when recommendations and comments are consolidated in preparation of the project review meeting of the PF Board, the review of the PF Board, and the final decision of the HC<sup>90</sup>. Each of these bodies plays a “watchdog” function and taken together, they can be regarded as constituting a fairly solid, though not flawless, system of checks and balance to ensure relevance, which also sieves out organisations that are not the best placed to implement a project or have had a bad performance in the past. While the evaluation cannot conclude that all PF projects are relevant, those visited and reviewed by the team were deemed as both relevant and appropriate. The two WASH projects visited by the team benefitted from the involvement of the communities in their identification, implementation, and maintenance. The team found little evidence in terms of anecdotes of non-relevant projects or irrelevant response. On the contrary, the discussions with the local authorities, community leaders and beneficiaries on the occasion of project visits confirmed the relevance of the projects.

**Projects can be considered ‘national’** provided that the same activity is undertaken in several provinces, the project is centrally managed, and it is vetted by the national inter-cluster<sup>91</sup>. Most of these are UN projects<sup>92</sup>. They are particularly appropriate in the sense that they either provide a service to the humanitarian community at large (e.g. logistics) or to cluster partners (e.g. procurement and pre-positioning of stocks such as Plumpy Nut, which needs to be imported, therapeutic milk, or seeds and tools; Protection Monitoring, which

<sup>88</sup> Source: interviews during field work.

<sup>89</sup> Source: JPFU database.

<sup>90</sup> Source: interviews and PF Annual Reports.

<sup>91</sup> Source: PF allocation guidelines 2008-2010.

<sup>92</sup> Of a total of 188 national projects for the period 2006-2010, eight are NGO projects.



produces protection scoring)<sup>93</sup> and present the additional advantage of realising economies of scale. However, indications are that some of them perform poorly<sup>94</sup>.

Whereas some of them get funding from the RRR (e.g. RRMP, UNHAS), most have had to go through the standard allocation process<sup>95</sup>, which puts them in competition with provincial projects and represents a disadvantage compared to projects supported through the RRR.<sup>96</sup> For the second allocation of 2009 for instance, the nutrition cluster had to convince partners at the provincial level to put 20% of the envelope aside for the procurement of nutrition supplies. When the cluster tried again in 2010, partners refused (because of pipeline problems experienced). Now that the process has been brought back to the cluster coordinators' level in Kinshasa, this should no longer be an issue.

The **timeframe of PF project is of a minimum of six months** (unless a shorter one can be duly justified by the cluster coordinator<sup>97</sup>) **and a maximum of 12 months**, while the average is 9 months. A couple of PF partners (e.g. UNFPA, education cluster) have pointed out that for longer term humanitarian needs, **predictability and continuity** are an issue as different areas are selected with each new round of funding. While the PF allocation guidelines state that the "extension in time or geographical expansion of an ongoing project (or a project recently completed) can be used as priority criteria by the clusters", whether this is ever done is unclear (e.g. the education project in S. Kivu in later section of the report).

The **appropriateness<sup>98</sup> of the projects** is also tied to the allocation process and to some extent to the criteria set at cluster level, as well as the local knowledge of the implementing partners. In inaccessible areas, many of the implementing organizations are national NGOs which know the area well, have a relationship with the communities, and are therefore able to address very specific needs. In two projects visited in Province Orientale, local building materials were used for rehabilitating schools and clinics so as to avoid having to bring in large amounts of cement by truck on bad and sometimes unsafe roads<sup>99</sup>. Using local raw materials was more cost effective and had the added benefit that the beneficiaries know how to use them, meaning that they could be employed as masons for the construction.

As mentioned earlier, **more NGOs are keen to access PF funds directly rather than being subcontracted by UN agencies<sup>100</sup>**. The implementation of some UN projects is almost

<sup>93</sup>In 2010, two clusters (NFI/Shelter and Nutrition) received national envelopes, which were largely used for contingency stocks and capacity building.

<sup>94</sup> Source: interviews with implementing partners and JPFU staff. This issue is further developed later in the report.

<sup>95</sup> Of the 188 national projects for the period 2006-2010, 31 were funded by the RRR. Of these, 13 grants were made to the RRMP, which is in line with the agreement with donors, nine were made to the JPFU (OCHA and UNDP), three for humanitarian air transport (ASI and WFP), 2 for humanitarian coordination (OCHA), and others went to projects such as logistics, strategic stocks, or the provision of NFI, shelter materials and nutritional support.

<sup>96</sup> Now that project identification/pre-selection has been brought back to the cluster coordinator's level in Kinshasa, this should no longer be the case.

<sup>97</sup> Source: PF allocation guidelines.

<sup>98</sup> The definition of appropriateness as per OECD DAC is 'tailoring of the interventions to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability and cost-effectiveness accordingly'.

<sup>99</sup> OCHA staff indicated that this practice is the norm. This sometimes means that exact standards of building are not adhered to (e.g. the separating wall between classrooms in semi-permanent schools are supposed to be of concrete, but are often made of planks instead due to the constraints and costs of bringing cement up to some of the more isolated areas).

<sup>100</sup> This issue was brought up in the 2007 CHF evaluation, which pointed out that "In an ideal system, donors would get what they paid for in terms of the role of the UN in onward granting to NGOs. There are many scenarios where the UN adds value as a grant manager – for example for smaller NGOs or those with weak capacity, where there are numerous NGOs, where it is necessary to ensure quality standards or where it is the



entirely carried out by NGOs and some of them are questioning the value added of channeling the funds through a UN agency in such cases and the fact that they have no or little entitlement to include overhead costs in their budgets<sup>101</sup>. Objectively, it would make perfect sense for PF NGOs to receive funds directly if they are on the list of eligible partners unless the UN agency has a comparative advantage (e.g. procurement of supplies for its cluster partners), but the latter would need to demonstrate it can do so in a timely way and in sufficient quantities. While it seems that some donors feel channeling the funds through UN agencies brings an added layer of accountability, in the long term the UN may need to review whether the transaction costs that are generated from this added layer are cost-beneficial.

While UN administered projects may reassure donors regarding accountability, the reality of diminishing funds and increasing humanitarian needs in the DRC suggests that the PF should be disbursed as effectively as possible. Projects implemented directly by national NGOs often present the advantages of using locally based networks and staff, having less costs incurred by security constraints, and of significantly reducing the overall cost of the intervention as their staff costs are lower than those of international NGOs and the UN. (For example at the time of the first allocation of 2010, a national NGO in Province Orientale presented a project in a priority area when INGOs operating in the area decided that the envelope was too small; this was largely possible because their staff costs were lower).

A number of steps in the allocation process act as a basic project **quality control system** and reflect the commitment of the HC, the PF Board and the JPFU to quality and accountability. These include the technical review of UN and NGO project proposal sheets by the cluster coordinators at the time of project pre-selection, the review of the complete UN and NGO project documents by a Kinshasa-based Technical Review Committee (see Annex IV for a full description of its work), and M&E activities of NGO projects carried out by the JPFU.

**The 2-3 page project sheets presented at the time of project identification and pre-selection contain summary information and an indicative budget.** The use of project sheets responds to the need to limit the amount of time and effort required at this stage, but one cluster coordinator considers that they do not provide sufficient information for appraising the technical quality of a project and pointed out that once projects are approved 'in principle' by the HC, most will end up being approved by the TRC. Indications are, indeed, that the TRC makes all possible efforts to bring projects up to standards rather than disqualify them and that occasionally, after several attempts, weariness may lead to the approval of a sub-standard project.

**The technical review is a huge endeavour given the number of projects** (e.g. 129 projects for the first allocation of 2010), the limited size of the TRC<sup>102</sup> and the aim to complete the

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*only way to enforce coordination. There are, however, some examples where the UN agency is just a conduit for funds, where it adds a layer of overhead cost and its management capacity is poor to the extent that NGO implementation is damaged."*

<sup>101</sup> One of the recommendations conveyed by Goma-based representatives of IOM and several international NGOs in a letter to the HC after the first 2010 allocation is that in such cases NGOs be invited to submit projects directly.

<sup>102</sup> At the time of its establishment in 2007, the TRC was expected to include volunteer members of the PF Board (donors and NGOs), the cluster coordinators or a technical expert appointed by the clusters, and the JPFU (2007 DRC PF Annual Report). In the PF allocation guidelines of August 2008, this list also included OCHA focal points of the clusters. In reality, the TRC is composed of the cluster coordinators and JPFU staff.

initial review within 7-10 days. It is at this stage, i.e. after a project is approved 'in principle' by the HC, that full project documents are submitted and thoroughly reviewed. Given the time pressure, the technical review does not involve any meeting with the project manager; rather, communication is based on telephone calls and email. The same proposal can be reviewed up to a maximum of three times<sup>103</sup>, which generates a heavy workload (e.g. in 2008, there were 690 revisions).

**The TRC uses a checklist** to ensure that the analysis is systematic and comprehensive as well as, since 2010, **technical guidelines developed by the clusters** at the request of the HC & PF Board as a basis for project selection and review. Several cluster coordinators observed that the process is rigorous but that JPFU TRC members do not seem familiar with the cluster guidelines and tend to defer technical questions to cluster coordinators. The understanding of the JPFU however is that this is the way their respective work should be divided. *This issue would need to be clarified between the JPFU and the cluster coordinators, and if dividing up the workload on the basis of functions (i.e. the JPFU using the checklist and the cluster coordinators verifying the technical aspects of projects) is deemed ineffective, cluster coordinators should train JPFU staff to verify technical standards.*

There is an acknowledged need to strengthen the capacity of the TRC<sup>104</sup>. Whereas the PF allocation guidelines state that the presence of the cluster co-facilitators is strongly encouraged, one of them said he had never been invited. Active outreach efforts would be needed on the part of the JPFU and the cluster coordinators to involve co-facilitators, provided their participation is agreed at a more strategic level (i.e. co-facilitator ToR under discussion).

Once the official Project Cooperation Agreement is signed by the UNDP Country Director (as MA) and the NGO, it is shared, in principle, with the cluster coordinator. A couple of cluster focal points, however, said that they usually do not have copies of the projects, which can pose a problem if they are consulted by the JPFU on the appropriateness of a no-cost extension. This could be remedied by having the JPFU systematically posting projects and other relevant data on the recently-established 'SharePoint'.

**PF allocation guidelines foresee that rejected projects should be sent back to the CPIA** to choose between three options: confirming the choice of the partner and guarantee that it will receive the necessary technical support, with the help of the relevant cluster for the revision of the project, identifying another partner for a project targeting the same priority, or withdrawing the project. One cluster coordinator mentioned that in the case of both the first and the second allocation of 2009, the partner foreseen for the implementation of an activity had to be replaced (in one instance the NGO did not pass the risk assessment) but by the time another partner was identified, the funds had 'disappeared'. The JPFU recognises that this sometimes happens, usually because so much time has elapsed between the project proposal and its rejection and the ensuing weariness of those involved.

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<sup>103</sup> Source: PF Guidelines.

<sup>104</sup> Interviews and 2008 & 2009 PF Annual Reports.

**The evaluation team did not witness poor quality projects, but heard anecdotal evidence of sub-standard implementation.** In N. Kivu for instance, one of the projects reviewed had just finished rehabilitating a stretch of road which had been rehabilitated less than two years ago with PF funds. Poor quality control is not, however, peculiar to PF projects, but systematic in the humanitarian sector in general.<sup>105</sup>

The **monitoring of PF projects takes place in a challenging context.** Considerable access problems exist, not only because of conflict, but also due to the lack of infrastructure in many places. Many projects are implemented in areas out of reach for UN staff and the sheer number of projects being implemented at the same time in a given province poses a challenge in terms of time and resources. Thorough M&E is therefore an ambitious endeavor for any actor in these circumstances.

Two distinct levels of M&E of humanitarian action in DRC need to be distinguished: **Impact monitoring of the HAP by the clusters**, which consists in monitoring cluster performance indicators rather than projects<sup>106</sup> and will not be elaborated upon in this report except for a mention that the work of the JPFU has benefitted the HAP by developing output-based quantitative indicators per cluster as a basis for measuring PF project outcomes and results<sup>107</sup>, on which HAP indicators have aligned (except for protection)<sup>108</sup>. The other level of M&E is that of **UN and NGO projects**, which in the case of PF projects is carried out by UN agencies for their own projects and by a specialized section of the JPFU for NGO projects.

**M&E of humanitarian action in DRC is perceived as a weakness**, but a sound basis has been put in place by the JPFU for the M&E of PF NGO projects, which could be further built upon and expanded in cooperation with lead agencies and clusters. The **JPFU has a UNDP-staffed M&E section** composed of an international Head of Unit based in Kinshasa and five national M&E Officers<sup>109</sup>. It has two main functions: the capacity and risk assessment of NGOs (see section on Efficiency) and the M&E of PF projects implemented by NGOs.

Given that the M&E system is run by UNDP in the framework of its Management Agent role with NGOs and pursue a formative assessment objective, JPFU M&E activities tend to focus on compliance with UNDP procedures, the completion of activities and the verification of outputs on the basis of quantitative indicators rather than project outcomes and quality. While M&E officers assess against the project document logical framework, defining results, outcomes and impact, results are mainly output-based (e.g. number of children vaccinated, of classrooms renovated, of NFI's handed out). Given the formative assessment nature of the exercise, they attach greater importance to outputs and their conclusions follow the same logic.

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<sup>105</sup> This is why the PF Advisory Board has promoted the development of technical standards by the clusters.

<sup>106</sup> HAP 2010

<sup>107</sup> Chapter 6 of the PF Annual Report for 2007 was entirely dedicated to providing an overview of results by clusters and this practice has been maintained in the following years.

<sup>108</sup> Source: Interviews with the Head of the JPFU.

<sup>109</sup> They are respectively based in Kinshasa for West, Bas Congo, and Bandundu provinces; in Goma for North Kivu; in Bukavu for South Kivu; in Bunia for Province Orientale and Maniema; and in Lubumbashi for Katanga.

With only five evaluators for a large number of projects, an extensive territory with access and security constraints, around 80% of the PF projects are still visited at least once, which is a considerable achievement. In 2008 for example, the JPFU M&E team carried out 150 visits to 119 projects.

The **evaluation format** includes questions related to the OECD DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability, but some of the criteria do not seem to be well understood (e.g. some of the questions fall under the wrong criterion or do not respond to the actual definition, in OECD DAC terms, of the criterion at all). The report has a brief section on impact but the 'information to be verified' under this section (apart from one question on project results) relates to beneficiaries' perceptions of the project and its visibility. The final section of the evaluation report focuses on the extent to which cross-cutting issues (gender, environment, HIV/AIDS) have been considered. For each section a score is given, ranging from Very Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Medium and Unsatisfactory. Based on all the scores, the overall intervention is assessed. If it is a mid-term evaluation, the evaluator will recommend, based on his findings, whether the second tranche of funding should be released to the partner for finalisation. The draft M&E report is shared with the partner concerned for comments before its finalisation.

**JPFU evaluators met by the team are extremely dedicated and go to great lengths to carry out their job**, even in areas UN staff has no access to<sup>110</sup>. They see these visits, especially in remote areas with limited access, as crucial to ensure project results and limit waste and in some cases fraud. One of the JPFU evaluators had to be relocated to another province following threats to his life by a national NGO, after travelling to a remote project site and found that the NGO had not implemented any of the planned activities by the end of the project cycle. The evaluators would probably be capable of going beyond an outputs analysis into an outcomes analysis, possibly with a little extra training, but they currently lack the skills and time to do so.

According to JPFU staff and local NGOs interviewed, the **M&E visits build the capacities of local NGOs by transferring knowledge and giving them a sense of confidence**, especially if the visits are well prepared in advance (e.g. by sharing with them prior to the visit a list of documents that the M&E evaluator will need to consult so that the NGO can have them ready, as is the practice in South Kivu). This enables them to get organised in time for the visits and improve management performance. Both the local NGOs and the JPFU also stressed that these visits bring about an element of 'auto-correction' by the local NGOs as they know an inspection will occur. Local NGOs are reportedly much more receptive to these accompanying measures than are international NGOs. International NGOs expressed much less use of these evaluations with some stating that projects they knew were not very good or even on the wrong path were given a satisfactory note by the JPFU evaluator.

One of the difficulties reported by the M&E team is that whereas project documents include indicators, they generally lack **technical standards and norms**, although this varies from one

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<sup>110</sup> It was mentioned several times by local NGOs that the JPFU officers get to their projects sites no matter what the challenges are, often moving around by motorbike, after dark, and without security clearance (which they would in any case not obtain for the projects outside of the UNDSS determined security zone).

cluster to another. In addition, while JPFU evaluators may be familiar with SPHERE standards, they do not have detailed technical expertise in all sectors. Hence, apart from basing themselves on the available cluster guidelines, it is difficult for them to assess the quality of the physical outputs, especially in terms of engineering standards, agricultural methods, etc. The extent to which the JPFU M&E officers understand the technical guidelines could not be ascertained. Further technical expertise, from the clusters, will be necessary to improve the quality of evaluations.

**The JPFU M&E function as it currently stands goes a long way in ensuring that activities are carried out as planned**, but provides a limited analysis of the outcomes and the technical quality of the projects. The impact of PF projects is still largely unknown – a frustration expressed by some of the cluster focal points in N. Kivu: “identifying positive impact is still the biggest hurdle. Allocation after allocation we discuss the same problems and plan for the same activities but we have no idea of the impact of our past activities!”

While there is a **feedback loop into the PF project cycle regarding NGO project management** and outputs (e.g. if the JPFU M&E officers have found evidence of poor performance or mismanagement, payments will be withheld), in the absence of technical M&E, there is no feedback loop on the quality of the outputs nor on the longer term outcomes (allocation-disbursement-M & E-lesson learning-allocation).

Several cluster coordinators and focal points acknowledge that **M&E is a weakness at cluster level**. The **lack of a clear M&E mandate for the HC and the clusters, as well as financial and human resource constraints** were mentioned as main causes for this weakness. Several focal points have mentioned the need for clusters to monitor project implementation in general but also for providing feedback to the JPFU given their role in PF project identification. However, they are not sure they should or have the right to monitor PF projects, given that the contractual relationship of PF NGO partners is with UNDP. Besides, the JPFU asks cluster focal points to provide advice on requests for no-cost extensions (which seemed to puzzle a few of them). At the time of the second standard allocation of 2010, a few clusters requested copies of the JPFU M&E reports to inform the review of project sheets.

**The cluster focal points pointed out that the work of the JPFU evaluators is disconnected from the clusters and expressed the need for closer cooperation with the JPFU evaluators**, eventually leading to greater integration of M&E efforts. The JPFU evaluators occasionally share their reports or excerpts of them with OCHA and cluster focal points when they have identified a problem, but the practice seems limited to a couple of clusters and it is by no means systematic<sup>111</sup>. The JPFU encourages them to debrief the CPIAs on their activities and findings at their monthly meetings, but their workload and the amount of time spent visiting projects (at least two weeks per month) has not enabled them to do so. They tend to rely on OCHA for the provision of feedback at such meetings. The JPFU is planning to make the M&E reports accessible to cluster coordinators, focal points and members of the AB through the recently launched PF SharePoint online platform.

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<sup>111</sup> They have recently received instructions to systematically share their reports with the cluster coordinators.

The capacity of the JPFU to synthesize the existing M&E information with a view to facilitating its use is weak. Nevertheless, in March 2010 the Head of the JPFU M&E section took the initiative of producing a report<sup>112</sup> on the work of the section, the achievements of the clusters, the constraints they faced and lessons learned in 2009, and recommendations for 2010. He then met with the cluster coordinators to discuss the report. While this is definitely a step in the right direction, how widely the report was made available is unclear.

Some of the clusters are putting in place approaches and considering creative ways of monitoring, identifying good practice, and drawing lessons<sup>113</sup>.

**Consultations with the JPFU are taking place and plans being made to test joint monitoring approaches** (e.g. WASH). Cluster monitoring teams or rosters, joint JPFU/cluster visits and cluster peer reviews to identify good practice and learn lessons were presented as potential ways forward. Peer reviews have been successfully tested in other countries (e.g. ECHO initiatives in Sudan and Liberia) and lessons learned from these experiences, such as the need for an impartial broker, could be drawn upon to pilot innovative approaches in DRC. These should ideally include the activities and partners of UN PF projects. The health cluster is planning to have a team including a nutritionist, a WASH specialist and an epidemiologist in 2011 to monitor cluster partner projects as well as those implemented by WHO with NGO partners and the ministry of Health.

UNICEF has piloted an interesting approach for a WASH development programme in DRC, whereby an independent company was selected, through a tendering procedure, to monitor the programme over a period of nine months. The team consisted of an international team leader and nationals. The costs were reasonable (i.e. around US\$100,000 for nine months) and the results so convincing that UNICEF plans to expand to other provinces. This may be another model worth testing for JPFU monitoring.

**Several clusters have close working relationships with the local authorities**, some of which have an oversight function and monitor projects. Clusters should consider involving them in a cluster M&E or peer review system, so as to build and expand joint capacities. Local authorities might be able to play a significant M&E role in areas out of reach for UN staff. Such an approach is recommended as it would contribute to reinforcing capacities for transition.

The **JPFU M&E section does not look into UN projects** since its M&E function stems from the UNDP MA mandate covering only the NGOs. As Administrative Agent, UNDP has no role with respect to the accountability of UN agencies. The latter have their monitoring and evaluation mechanisms but no obligation to share the resulting reports with the JPFU. UNDP disburses the entire amount approved once the Project Financing Agreement is signed and **the only reporting requirement is the submission to UNDP of annual financial reports on the use of the funds**, which have to be certified by their internal auditors.

<sup>112</sup> Evaluation des projets - Rapport Annuel 2009; Mamadou N'Daw, JPFU

<sup>113</sup> In Goma, the education cluster organizes presentations on ongoing projects.



In the first two years of the PF, most UN agencies failed to submit their reports, with WFP being the notable exception. They have all reported their expenditure of previous years in 2009, except UNDP which had not yet submitted the 2006 and 2007 financial reports about its management of PF funds as MA at the time of the visit of the Evaluation Team<sup>114</sup>. These were reportedly ready for submission by the end of 2010.

Indirectly, JPFU officers have come across cases where NGOs relying on UN supplies for their projects were unable to carry out their activities as planned because the expected supplies are unavailable or available in insufficient quantities. One NGO indicated that it and other NGOs tend to procure on their own because (UN) supplies are not always available in sufficient quantities and stated that “they are not transparent enough. You don’t know what they have”. Agreements regarding these supplies are apparently verbal, which limits accountability on the part of the UN agencies. Whether such instances are systematically followed up with the agency concerned is hard to ascertain, but it has happened in a number of cases, one of which was during this evaluation.

The JPFU introduced a **common reporting format**<sup>115</sup> (**‘Results sheet’**) for UN agencies and NGOs at the end of 2007, at the request of the HC in order to be in a position to provide an overall view of achievements through PF/CERF annual reports and compensate for the lack of information regarding UN agency project implementation. It uses key indicators, based on HAP indicators, for each sector, is due twice a year, and is linked to the JPFU database. This tool has been effective for collecting comparable data from UN and NGO partners alike and enabled the JPFU to provide an overview of cluster achievements against indicators in the annual reports, as well as detect if a UN or NGO partner is experiencing project implementation problems. It has enabled the HC to take corrective measures. **The fact that UN agencies have agreed to provide such data is widely regarded as a milestone.**

UN agencies are also required to submit an “end of project” report to the JPFU 30 days after the completion of the project for both PF and CERF funding, which includes amounts sub-granted to NGOs. JPFU staff indicated that the collection of these reports and their processing requires considerable efforts and where these reports are delayed, threats of withholding future disbursement have had to be made. . There is little capacity to process the information contained in these reports.

The **establishment of a common evaluation entity for UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP M&E** is being considered in the framework of the HACT, and agencies have committed to identifying focal points to work together and with the JPFU to this effect.

#### **Main Recommendations for project level:**

- 1) The PF Board and allocation process should provide predictable support at the beginning of each year and as otherwise required to national projects for the procurement, distribution and pre-positioning of supplies and partnerships with**

<sup>114</sup> DRC Pooled Fund Consolidated Annual Financial Report, Report of the Administrative Agent for the period 1 January to 31 December 2009.

<sup>115</sup> It is known as the ‘Fiche de résultats’ (Results Sheet).



NGOs in order to strengthen response preparedness and the flexibility and timeliness of the humanitarian response. However, national projects providing pipeline services to the humanitarian community should be submitted to systematic monitoring and peer reviews, and occasional independent evaluations, as a pre-condition for PF funding. Subsequent funding of national projects should only be granted based on demonstrated efficient performance with the previous grant.

- 2) National and multi-sector (approach) projects should be submitted to the national inter-cluster group for review and pre-selection before cluster-specific prioritization discussions take place.
- 3) NGOs on the list of eligible partners that prefer receiving funding through UNDP as MA rather than 'pass through' funding from another UN cluster lead agency for the same activities in the same areas should be entitled to receive funds directly unless the UN agency has a clear comparative advantage. Cluster coordinators and NGOs should be encouraged to discuss such matters openly at the time of project identification.
- 4) In the first half of 2011, the PF Board should request a number of cluster lead agencies and coordinators to pilot distinct, promising cluster M&E approaches under the leadership of the HC. These approaches would cover UN and NGO projects alike, as M&E requirements should be the same for all categories of partners. These pilot projects would be carried out in close cooperation with the JPFU M&E section. Lessons learned from these experiences would be reviewed during the first quarter of 2012 with a view to selecting the most effective models for institutionalization and replication. If insurmountable obstacles prevent the PF Board from giving the HC the mandate to steer PF M&E at country-level, donors should consider referring the matter to their capitals to raise at the level of the USG for Humanitarian Affairs and the boards of UN agencies.
- 5) OCHA/the JPFU should organize a workshop bringing together JPFU staff, cluster coordinators and co-facilitators in the first quarter on 2011 in order to clarify their respective role and responsibilities at all stages of the PF allocation process, review and revise the contents of the project sheet, project document, M&E template, and cluster technical guidelines based on the objectives pursued, and ensure coherence between them. PF allocation guidelines would need to be adapted accordingly.

This workshop should also look into possible training requirements of cluster and JPFU staff. If needed, OCHA/the JPFU and the cluster coordinators should provide JPFU staff and interested cluster members training<sup>116</sup> to enable them to use the OECD evaluation criteria and the technical guidelines developed by the clusters and go beyond an outputs analysis into an outcomes analysis.

<sup>116</sup> The JPFU M&E section has already organized two workshops to train the M&E team.

- 6) In the first half of 2011, OCHA should place the M&E section of the JPFU under the direct supervision of the HC. A portion of PF funds should be explicitly allocated to the JPFU for M&E rather than including an M&E budget line in projects. Its responsibilities should be expanded to analyze and summarize existing data and make it available through the 'SharePoint' and otherwise, organize independent evaluations, and monitor the work of the JPFU. It would manage all M&E activities of the JPFU. If need be, OCHA will need to reinforce its capacities.
- 7) In the first half of 2011, the PF Board should decide on the most appropriate way to fund M&E. While PF funds should be made available as a complement to UN cluster lead agency budgets, cluster lead agencies should be asked to reserve part of the 7% overheads fee to finance cluster M&E of PF projects. Alternatively, a percentage of the envelope apportioned to a cluster could be reserved for M&E.
- 8) The number of projects visited by the JPFU M&E team should be reduced (put an end to the practice of visiting each project at least once) on the basis of the risk category of the partners. The JPFU M&E Officers and the clusters should systematically work together and share findings, especially when problems are encountered. JPFU M&E officers should systematically share their monthly programme of visits with the relevant cluster focal points and co-facilitators as well as a copy of the projects they will be visiting, so as to give cluster focal points an opportunity to raise possible issues of concern. In cases where cluster coordinators have concerns about a PF project, they should bring the matter to the attention of the JPFU M&E officer in their province and request that a monitoring visit be scheduled during the month or in the beginning of the next one.
- 9) The JPFU should organize on an annual basis, under the leadership of the HC, a number of ex-post evaluations of randomly-selected projects carried out by different categories of partners (UN, international NGOs, national NGOs) by an independent international company.
- 10) Given the high transaction costs generated by the current UNDP contractual arrangements and accompanying measures for NGO partners, the UNDP Country Office should take all necessary steps to be in a position to implement the HACT by the beginning of the third quarter of 2011 at the latest. This should be accompanied by a simultaneous effort to identify how accompanying measures (in particular the classification criteria of the capacity and risk assessment, which may need to be more tolerant of risk, and corresponding administrative requirements) can be further adapted to a complex and demanding humanitarian context, on the basis of guidance provided by the HC and the PF Board and in close cooperation with the OCHA Manager of the JPFU and other ExCom agencies.

## Operational Effectiveness, Coherence and Connectedness

**Key findings**

The PF has given the Humanitarian Coordinator the ability to target funds at the most critical needs, allow rapid response to unforeseen needs.

In practice useful complementarities have been established with other non-PF donors such as ECHO and USAID as they coordinate, share information about their funding, and occasionally, funding intentions, both through the PF Board and PF-related meetings in the provinces (e.g. ECHO and USAID/OFDA take part in CPIA meetings).

While the PF has enabled the clusters to direct resources towards under-funded priorities and new emergency requirements, it has also generated important transaction costs for the clusters (in particular the cluster coordinators and focal points) by adding to their workload.

The provincial level involvement in the pre-selection of PF projects for the Standard allocation procedures prior to the second allocation of 2010 generated a lot of tension and mistrust. However, the current procedure, centralizing the decision making process in Kinshasa is also heavily criticized by many NGOs in the provinces. Individual and collective complaints about the lack of transparency of both of the pre-selection mechanisms have been frequent.

The PF, combined with the CERF, **has given the HC a key role in the allocation of resources in support of the HAP** and of coordination mechanisms, greater authority, and the capacity to act quickly as required. The decision of donors to pool resources and entrust their management to the HC, combined to the magnitude of the annual contributions, has given the HC the capacity to provide substantial funding - between 18 to 26% - to priority areas of the HAP. This has strengthened coherence between strategic humanitarian planning and humanitarian operations.

Even though different donors to the PF are bound by somewhat diverging national policy orientations regarding the use of humanitarian funding, **the HC was ultimately able to use the PF in a more flexible way than individual donors would have been able to** and through a much greater number of projects and partners<sup>117</sup>. The PF has also enabled the HC to develop a **closer partnership with several of the key humanitarian players** through the PF Board, to such an extent that it was de facto the Humanitarian Country Team until the latter was established at the beginning of 2010. In the early years, meetings of the PF Board were much more frequent than now and served as a platform to discuss policy issues pertaining to the management of the PF, which had wider implications for the humanitarian system in place. PF donors and non-PF donors alike appreciate being associated to the strategic orientation and management of the PF.

Other large humanitarian donors with a presence in DRC do not necessarily take the HAP as a reference to direct their funding or actively seek complementarities. Nevertheless, de facto

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<sup>117</sup> (He has done so by supporting the humanitarian response in areas where chronic situations spin out of control and reach emergency thresholds in areas not affected by conflict, displacement, natural disasters, or epidemics.

complementarities are established as they coordinate, share information about their funding, and occasionally, funding intentions, both through the PF Board and PF-related meetings in the provinces (e.g. ECHO and USAID/OFDA take part in CPIA meetings). Having ECHO and USAID on the PF Board improves the coordination of funding decisions among major donors. The presence of these donors as observer members at the CPIA meetings, especially when the pre-selection of PF projects is discussed, also allows for strategic allocation of PF resources and avoids duplication. Occasional meetings between the PF Board and other PF/humanitarian donors may be useful to further enhance complementarities, in particular before determining PF funding envelopes.

The **availability of un-earmarked funds has enabled the HC to provide flexible and timely funding to the humanitarian response**, in particular through the Rapid Response Reserve, which is open to UN and NGO partners throughout the year. However, this funding window is not well known to NGOs. Timeliness is much more limited in the case of the standard allocations due to the delays between the HC's decision in principle and the first disbursement, except for partners with the capacity to advance funds.

There are **contrasting views on the impact of the PF on cluster coordination**. While one **school of thought** believes that the PF has enhanced coordination by giving clusters more responsibility, visibility, and opportunities (e.g. influence how funds are used, influence on methodology and quality, possibility to promote good practice and innovation), the other school of thought views the impact of the PF on clusters as negative because it adds to their already heavy workload, diverts attention from core cluster activities, generates tensions at the time of project review and prioritization, and disappointment and de-motivation of partners in the absence of funding<sup>118</sup>. Be it as it may, it is clear that the clusters have developed a great sense of ownership over the PF and its processes.

The evaluation team believes that **what the PF requires from the clusters is in line with their core functions**<sup>119</sup> and **supports them to meet their objectives**. The PF has enabled the clusters to direct resources towards under-funded priorities and new emergency requirements, as well as promote innovation in their sector. **The PF has, however, generated important transaction costs for the clusters (in particular the cluster coordinators and focal points) by adding to their workload**<sup>120</sup>, detracting them from other functions, and exacerbating the difficulties of clusters with weak capacities. Very few cluster coordinators work full time for the cluster they manage, which means that they have competing priorities and at times come under intense time pressure.

A greater involvement of cluster co-facilitators should be explored as one way of alleviating this pressure, in the framework of a review of the general role of co-facilitators. This being said, **NGO co-facilitators face similar problems of competing priorities**, with the added

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<sup>118</sup> These contrasting views were also brought up by the IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation, 2<sup>nd</sup> Phase, DRC Country Study, 2010.

<sup>119</sup> As defined by IASC guidance: A Guidance Note on using the cluster approach to strengthen humanitarian response, IASC, 26 November 2006, and Generic Terms of Reference for Sector/Cluster Leads at the Country Level.

<sup>120</sup> For example, developing cluster technical guidelines, reviewing project sheets, meeting with partners and justifying the recommendations emanating from the project review process, taking part in the Technical Review Committee)

difficulty that most NGOs do not get financial support for the co-facilitator function<sup>121</sup>. The participation of the co-facilitators in the PF standard allocation process has been encouraged in the hope that they would act as counter-weights in a process that would otherwise be too UN-oriented. PF allocation guidelines since 2008 state that cluster coordinators should involve them in all stages of project identification and selection, but this is not happening systematically, at least at the Kinshasa level<sup>122</sup>. Two cluster co-facilitators indicated that they are not involved in project identification and pre-selection. One of them felt marginalized because consultations between the cluster coordinator and focal points take place in his absence and the cluster coordinator's decisions are not motivated. In any event, unless the NGO concerned is independent from cluster lead agency funding, the participation of an NGO co-facilitator is not as such a guarantee of a more balanced PF process.

**The standard allocation process relies on the cluster system to review and prioritize projects.** PF allocation guidelines since 2008 indicate that the national cluster coordinators are responsible for the identification of projects in consultation with their provincial counterparts: *“the cluster coordinators will “be responsible for the identification of priority projects for their respective cluster ..., while ensuring that the project selection process takes place in a participatory and transparent way... Each cluster coordinator will determine the possible consultation modalities on the basis of the cluster provincial capacities”*. This loose wording, which was meant to enable cluster coordinators to adapt their approaches to capacities in the provinces, generated confusion<sup>123</sup>. In practice, most cluster coordinators have delegated this task to the provincial level, which they consider as having a better picture of the context, the needs and the capacities of partner organizations.

As a result, the **review and pre-selection process** has generally involved provincial cluster partners acting as a review panel, often using a scoring system. In a few instances, in the absence of consensus, projects have been put to a vote<sup>124</sup>. The process has generated a certain mistrust and competition between categories of partners (e.g. local NGOs vs. INGOs and NGOs vs. UN agencies) due to perceptions that others are better placed to influence the decision-making process (e.g. those with offices in Kinshasa, UN implementing partners, coalitions, power games, etc.)<sup>125</sup>, disagreement about the appropriateness of the selection criteria, and very real conflicts of interest which arise when the cluster lead agency, or the co-facilitating NGO, submits a proposal. The cluster focal point – who is employed by the UN agency – is put in the uncomfortable position of having to facilitate its review. This is also true of cluster members who have submitted projects and take part in their review and prioritization.<sup>126</sup> The process frequently ends up being a ‘sharing of the pie’<sup>127</sup> and

<sup>121</sup> ECHO has recently taken the initiative to support NGOs for the co-facilitator function of three clusters in DRC.

<sup>122</sup> Source: interviews. At least two cluster coordinators do not involve the co-facilitators in the identification and pre-selection of priority projects.

<sup>123</sup> This confusion was brought up in « Pour un processus de sélection des projets du Pooled Fund clarifié - Contribution à la réflexion sur le Pooled Fund par Liliane Bitong Ambassa, pour le Projet ONG et réforme humanitaire », July 2010.

<sup>124</sup> Example from N. Kivu from the first 2010 PF allocation: for a particular activity, one project was not eligible whereas another one was, but the cluster decided that the envelope should be divided between the two or neither projects should be retained. The decision was put to a vote and both projects disqualified. This case had to be sorted out in Kinshasa.

<sup>125</sup> Own interviews and NGO HR Mapping Study DRC Report, Development Initiatives, 2008

<sup>126</sup> Approaches have been tried at different levels to ease the process. One of the cluster focal points in S. Kivu piloted a blind review whereby the project pre-selection was carried out on the basis of unidentifiable project sheets by cluster members who were not applying for funds. At the national level, some clusters do not invite organisations having submitted a project to take part in the project identification meeting. UNICEF, for its part, has opted to refrain from presenting projects at the provincial level through the four clusters that it leads, but this is made easier by the amount of funding these sectors receive through the

'saupoudrage'<sup>128</sup>, which compromises relevance and effectiveness. In certain cases however, as pointed out by a cluster coordinator, the envelope is divided to safeguard effectiveness, by reducing risk, when the capacities of a partner are not certain.

Individual and collective complaints about the lack of transparency of the process have been frequent. After the first 2010 allocation, several Goma-based NGO representatives and IOM sent the HC a series of observations highlighting issues that had a negative impact on the transparency of the decision-making process and recommending changes. Based on these experiences, some of those interviewed strongly insist that the pre-selection process needs to be recentralised in Kinshasa, as was done for the second allocation of 2010, while cluster focal points in North Kivu and South Kivu passionately defend the need to be involved in the process.

The second allocation of 2010 provides an example of how controversial a provincial pre-selection process can be<sup>129</sup>. The PF Board decided that the provincial clusters should not conduct any project identification and pre-selection exercise and OCHA and the JPFU made a great effort, including trips to the provinces, to convey this decision. The JPFU requested that projects be submitted directly to the (national) cluster coordinators through the generic cluster email addresses. This guidance seems to have been followed to a large extent, but at least one of the clusters in N. Kivu and another one in S. Kivu held pre-selection meetings and in both cases, their outcomes were challenged by one of the participating cluster members. In N. Kivu, an NGO with a lot of experience in the sector in which it was presenting a project was placed in a competing position with an NGO without previous experience in the sector, which had been selected as the national partner of two UN agencies, one of which was the cluster lead agency<sup>130</sup>. In S. Kivu, a project recommended by both a cluster and the CPIA was rejected by the PF Board, and the PF Board replaced it by an NGO project that had been rejected by the cluster and the CPIA. The NGO sent the HC a complaint, while another NGO sent a counterproposal arguing that the proposal selected by the PF Board did not fall within the ambit of the cluster. The JPFU conveyed the concerns of the NGOs to the HC who revised some of his decisions.

Interestingly, cluster focal points in Bunia, Province Orientale, were relieved that this contentious exercise had been taken off their hands, while still stressing the importance of consulting the provincial level. In Province Orientale at least one cluster held a pre-selection meeting, but only to discuss the projects put forward. The somewhat different experience in Bunia is likely due to the fact that there are fewer actors and a tighter knit humanitarian community, with a strong OCHA Head of Office who commands respect and knows the region and its actors well.

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RRMP and other agencies do not have the same margin of manoeuvre. As mentioned earlier, the HC has also chosen to cover the requirements of UN agencies with CERF funding in order to free up funds for NGOs.

<sup>127</sup> This is to be understood as cluster focal points dividing up the envelope into smaller ones regardless of the nature of the projects.

<sup>128</sup> Loosely translated as 'sprinkling' in English.

<sup>129</sup> Bitong Ambassa, 2010.

<sup>130</sup> Selecting an NGO with no prior experience reveals limited knowledge of the PF allocation guidelines.



**UNHCR brought up the reliance of the PF on the clusters as an obstacle to access funding for refugee programmes beyond protection** (through the protection cluster, which it leads). ‘Clusterization’ is also seen by many as leading to the fragmentation of assistance and an obstacle to multi-sector projects. Especially since 2009 **a multi-sector approach has been encouraged as the most appropriate and effective way to respond to population movements**. This approach involves either a consortium of partners presenting **complementary projects** or partners presenting **multi-sector projects**. Applying for PF funding has been a challenge as projects need to be presented through different clusters and, in the case of multi-sector projects, divided up into single-sector components<sup>131</sup>. The process is somewhat facilitated by the inclusion in the project sheet of an indication that it is part of a multi-sector approach or project, but overall, needs to be improved.

Finally, **prioritization between clusters by the clusters is regarded as close to impossible**. Given all of the above considerations, **whether relying on the clusters for the pre-selection of projects is the best option is unclear and alternative approaches may need to be considered**.

The PF **has reinforced the work of the CPIAs and provincial inter-clusters** by enabling them to define priority areas and play a key role in the allocation of resources in their provinces. **CPIAs are involved in the prioritization and pre-selection** at two crucial points in the process, first for the updating of the provincial strategy and identifying geographical and sectoral priorities, and secondly for the review of the list of pre-selected projects sent by the JPFU before they are submitted to the Advisory Board. The inter-cluster group is involved in both of these exercises, as are donors (generally ECHO) with a presence in the province.

**The quality of the provincial strategies has been inconsistent**<sup>132</sup>, which has made it difficult for the Strategic Committee to determine the highest priority needs and areas in the provinces. This would require improvement as the poor quality of a strategic document hampers the effectiveness of the prioritization process, generates doubts about its seriousness and a loss of time and efficiency at the level of the Strategic Committee.

A few cluster focal points and members stated that all cluster priorities are not always included in the provincial strategies, but except for the second allocation of 2010 where the focus was narrowed to one or two priority areas, the evaluation team was unable to determine whether this was due to a decision on the part of the CPIA or the quality of the compilation by OCHA.

**The review of the list of pre-selected projects by the CPIA/Intercluster seems to be an easier process**. At the CPIA/Intercluster meeting in Province Orientale in October 2010 where the projects pre-selected at the national level for the PF second allocation were discussed, great insight and desire to come up with the best overall response was displayed

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<sup>131</sup> This was also brought up by the 2007 WASH cluster Review (p. 4) and the 2008 NGO Humanitarian Reform Mapping

<sup>132</sup> Example: Provincial strategies should be of maximum of three pages, but one of the CPIAs sent a 60-page document for the first 2010 allocation.



by the Heads of agencies and the OCHA Head of Sub-Office. While most the projects pre-selected at the national level were endorsed by the CPIA, many were also changed and challenged based on situational and geographical knowledge and complementarities between actors and interventions. While not all the projects endorsed by the CPIA – especially those that differed to those highlighted by the national cluster – were selected for funding in the end, a very open conversation about the appropriateness of all the projects submitted were held and clear leadership was displayed by OCHA Bunia in taking the final decision in cases of dispute.

### Main Recommendations

- 1) Donors to the PF should reserve a portion of their budget or the PF budget to support the cluster coordinator and co-facilitator functions, given the degree of reliance of the PF allocation process on the clusters. This should be periodically discussed at PF Board meetings.**
- 2) The PF Board should occasionally meet with other PF and humanitarian donors, in particular before determining PF funding envelopes. The presence of an active GHD humanitarian donor group in Kinshasa, which includes PF donors as well as ECHO, France, Germany, Japan, and the US, should be taken advantage of in this respect. Such meetings would be an opportunity to update information about funding levels and intentions, enhancing complementarities, and sharing crucial information about the PF with non-PF donors.**
- 3) The PF Board should take more time to review projects (for the first allocation of 2010, close to 150 projects were reviewed in two hours), perhaps by organizing several meetings to review the proposals of different clusters and a different nature (e.g. national and multi-sector projects to be reviewed first). Cluster coordinators, who have greater technical knowledge than Heads of agencies, should be invited to take part in the PF Board review.**
- 4) Cluster coordinators should remain in the lead for project identification and pre-selection as experience has demonstrated that having the pre-selection done at Kinshasa level is conducive to a more objective debate and promotes coherence among the provinces. However, the review meeting should not be chaired by the cluster coordinator, in order to attenuate the conflict of interest problem. It should be co-chaired by the national level cluster co-facilitator and someone from the JPFU or OCHA<sup>133</sup>. The participation of the cluster co-facilitator in the meeting, or a replacement, should be required. Organizations submitting projects should leave the room at the time of the discussion of their project proposal.**
- 5) As a general principle, the PF Board should neither decide to fund a project rejected by both the cluster coordinator and the CPIA, nor reject a project approved by the cluster and the CPIA. In the latter case, the JPFU should facilitate a consultation.**

<sup>133</sup> This has been tried out by a few clusters for the second allocation of 2010 and found to be helpful.

- 6) **The provincial strategies should continue prioritizing main axes of population displacements but clearly indicate, if needed, areas of critical needs outside of the selected axes, provided clusters have been able to demonstrate (e.g. MSAs, humanitarian indicators) the existence of such needs.**

## Efficiency

At the strategic level, **the value added of the PF as a complement to other funding sources** is that along with the CERF, it enables the HC to support the common humanitarian framework. However, the PF is more flexible than the CERF in terms of eligible activities and partners and the RRR is available to provide an immediate response to humanitarian emergencies or support strategic projects anytime through the year. However, **the lack of agreement among PF donors on the type of activity falling within the scope of the humanitarian mandate** has been perceived as limiting the flexibility and comparative advantage of the PF and as a source of inconsistent decision-making.

The ‘holy trinity’ of **accountability and inclusiveness (transparency), flexibility and speed is never an easy combination**. The former HC, with the support of the JPFU, has managed to strike a balance between the three by having two funding windows which operate in complementary ways. While the consultative standard allocation process requires time and is inadequate for rapid response, the Rapid Response Reserve gives the HC flexibility in responding to urgent needs in a timely manner. The RRR has also supported response preparedness through the funding of the RRMP, which has the capacity to carry out rapid needs assessments and mobilize integrated responses in three sectors. This is an example of good practice. Similar capacity should be developed by other cluster lead agencies and systematically supported by the PF.

**The PF is a unique funding source given its highly participatory and inclusive processes** which are unlike those of any other donor. It can also work with a wider range of partners than possibly any other humanitarian funding source. Other large donors do not directly support local NGOs. **The inclusion of local NGOs among eligible PF partners presents a significant comparative advantage** in a country where humanitarian access and security pose a problem. Currently, in addition to UN agencies, the PF has 132 eligible NGO partners, which can be likened to a roster of partners ready to take action as required.

Humanitarian partners at all levels highly value the PF and have developed a sense of ownership over it. While the PF is not the only source of funding in DRC, it is regarded it as the most accessible one and the only one over which humanitarian actors have a degree of leverage. **Around 200 PF projects are ongoing at any given time and 100 more processed on the administrative side**. If the number of projects alone is an indicator, the efficiency of the PF is extraordinary compared to other major humanitarian donors.

**However, the large number of partners and projects per standard allocation slows down the allocation and administrative processes.** According to JPFU data and the calendar annexed to allocation guidelines, it takes around 8 weeks to complete the steps between the launch of the allocation process and the submission of project documents to the JPFU and another 6-7 weeks to complete the technical review of projects. This brings the total duration of the allocation and administrative processes to around 4 months<sup>134</sup>. Partly due to this slow-down, the PF Board decided in 2010 to reduce the number of projects. This is regarded by many as the only solution to improve a situation regarded as unmanageable. The system in place is seen as capable of handling a lower number of projects.

The first disbursements of funds start around the 10<sup>th</sup> week after the launch of the allocation. Concerns were expressed by UN and NGO staff alike about the **delays experienced between the project approval in principle by the HC and the first disbursement**. The shortest and longest delays between the HC's agreement in principle and the first disbursement were of 42 and 57 days respectively for the first allocation of 2009 and of 49 and 96 days respectively for the first allocation of 2010, whereas the shortest and longest delay between the signature of the Project Cooperation Agreement and the first disbursement was of 8 and 47 days (average of 19 days) and 5 and 37 days (average of 13 days) for the same allocations.

Aware of the need to speed up the process and enable organizations to start implementing, **UNDP has put in place an exceptional procedure** whereby shortly after the HC's agreement 'in principle', partners receive a letter of notification, the date of which is when they can start spending. However, while UN agencies and large NGOs may have their own funds or advance mechanisms to kick start operations, not all NGOs have a pre-financing capacity or the willingness to take the risk. The financial section of the JPFU has also taken internal measures to accelerate disbursements (e.g. the introduction of a checklist to accompany payment requests as a way to verify that all documents required are there), but is bound by general UNDP procedures in place.

**The timeframe necessary for PF Standard allocations leads to numerous requests for amendments and no-cost extensions**, as by the time the funds arrive, the situation on the ground has frequently changed and activities can only start being implemented. At the time of the evaluation team's visit, there were 287 ongoing 2009 and 2010 projects, for which 182 amendments had been requested - 92 for a change in activities and 90 for three-month no-cost extensions. This adds significantly to the workload of the JPFU. **On the positive side, NGOs have the flexibility of reorienting 20% of the budget lines without prior authorization**, and of asking a reformulation of the budget if the need arises.

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<sup>134</sup> Preparation of provincial strategies (10-12 days); analysis of priority needs and funding gaps, meeting of the Strategic Committee on envelopes, decision of the HC, and circulation of the information (7-8 days); cluster consultations and submission of the list of priority projects (13-14 days); CPIA review of lists (3-4 days); JPFU consolidation and submission of recommendations to the PF Board (4 days); PF Board decision-making meeting and HC decision (2 days), submission of project documents to JPFU (6-7 days), technical review (40-45 days), with about one week between the submission of the project documentation and the beginning of the disbursement process.

It is clear that PF partners regard PF allocation and administrative processes as too slow<sup>135</sup>, but when asked to compare, most partners consider that the **efficiency of the PF is comparable to that of other main humanitarian donors**. The perceived slowness of the PF is no doubt related to high expectations resulting from its stated objectives of rapidity and timeliness.

The current **trend to limit the number of small projects** is understandable, given the amount of administrative work they generate. However, small projects should not be barred altogether from funding as they may be needed to respond to very real needs and have a comparative advantage over larger projects. The systematic submission of small NGO projects (e.g. those with a budget of US\$ 70,000 or less) to the OCHA-managed RRF should be considered as an alternative<sup>136</sup>.

**The most salient and burdensome transaction costs**, defined as “the cumulative costs of adapting to, and integrating, the specific characteristics of the humanitarian pooled funds, both in terms of time, energy and money spent, and in terms of opportunities missed”<sup>137</sup>, encountered by the evaluation team **reside at the level of the clusters** (as mentioned earlier), **NGO PF partners** (see later part of the report), **and OCHA and UNDP in terms of the management of the PF**. However, while UNDP charges a fee for the services rendered, OCHA gains little apart from recognition for the performance of the JPFU.

The administrative and financial management of the PF was entrusted to UNDP since its inception. UNDP acts as Administrative Agent for UN agencies and Management Agent for funds allocated by the HC to NGOs<sup>138</sup>, and charges fees for its services. As **Administrative Agent**, UNDP (MDTF Office) deducts a fee of 1% from all income received from donors when contributions are deposited (i.e. around US\$5.8 million so far). As **Management Agent** for NGOs, UNDP takes a fee of 5% for “General Management Services”, which is withdrawn in tranches on the basis of actual expenditure by PF partners as expressed in their financial reports. This represents around US\$11.3 million so far, i.e. around US\$17.1 million for the AA and MA functions<sup>139</sup>. These fees<sup>140</sup> have remained stable since the establishment of the DRC PF despite an upward revision of the UNDP Cost Recovery fee by the UNDP Executive Board in June 2007, which established it at a minimum level of 7% on all external funding<sup>141</sup>.

The PF RRR also provides OCHA and UNDP with the funds required for the functioning of the JPFU. From 2006 - October 2010, this has represented a little over US\$7.6 million, of which US\$4.1 million went to OCHA (2006-2010) and US\$3.5 million to UNDP (2007-2010).

**UN agencies take a 7% fee**, while NGOs receiving funds through UNDP are entitled to use 7% of their budget for overhead costs such as management expenses due to the funds being managed by the HQ in Europe/the US. The extent to which implementing NGO partners of

<sup>135</sup> Source: interviews

<sup>136</sup> Between 2006 and 2009, the PF has funded 39 projects of US\$75,000 or less, and 48 projects of US\$80,000 or less.

<sup>137</sup> Transaction Costs Study of the Humanitarian Pooled Funds, 2009, by Praxis Consulting, p. 10.

<sup>138</sup> Funds channeled through the UN cannot be directly transferred to NGOs.

<sup>139</sup> Information or estimates based on data found on the Gateway UNDP/MDTF Office website as of 13 February 2011.

<sup>140</sup> Of this 1%, 60 % goes to the Country Office, 20% to Global Operations at UNDP HQ, 7% to the Bureau of Management, and 13% to the Regional Bureau for Africa.

<sup>141</sup> See [http://www.pnud.or.cr/dmdocuments/Cost\\_Recovery.pdf](http://www.pnud.or.cr/dmdocuments/Cost_Recovery.pdf)

UN agencies can include overhead costs in their budgets varies from one agency to another<sup>142</sup>. Interesting insights into this matter can be found in a recent report on the value added of the CERF in Kenya<sup>143</sup>.

An additional cost stems from **bank charges for in-country transactions with NGOs**, which UNDP has negotiated at 0.85%. The current agreement applies until July 2011 and according to the JPFU, UNDP has launched a request for expressions of interest in order to identify a bank with lower charges by then. In 2009, the PF paid US\$320,782 as bank charges to transfer US\$37,739,063 to NGOs.

As MA, UNDP needs to verify compliance with its procedures and accounts **and every NGO project needs to be audited once per calendar year**<sup>144</sup>. If a project spans two financial years, it is audited twice. An unfavourable comment in an auditors' report generates a new audit the following year. **While the system in place provides financial and management guarantees, the number of audits is excessive**. The most frequent complaint on the part of NGOs relates to the number of audits they are subjected to. Combined UNDP requirements overburden partners already overstretched by the effort involved in responding to rapidly changing emergency needs. Several large international NGOs consider that the administrative constraints offset the advantages of the PF and no longer seek PF funding.

**Audit requirements have both efficiency and effectiveness** impacts by involving high costs of money and time and moving emphasis to accounting issues rather than real performance.<sup>145</sup> In 2009, the cost of an audit increased from US\$4,250 to US\$ 6,700<sup>146</sup>. According to the JPFU, 156 audits took place in 2009 for a cost of around US\$ 917, 772 or about 2.56% of the audited amount. The cost of audits appears to be lower (US\$1700-2500) when managed by NGOs even though the auditing firms are the same<sup>147</sup>. UNDP has initiated a process to rationalise these costs.

In 2008/2009, audits requirements affected the internal management performance of the UNDP Country Office. The UNDP management dashboard went "red" because according to the auditors, NGOs could not justify US\$5 million worth of PF-related expenditure in 2008. Of 162 audits planned for 2010, 51 were added last year on this basis. As the problem partly stemmed from a lack of communication between the JPFU and the UNDP 'NIM DIM'<sup>148</sup> unit, responsible for the audits, the JPFU took over the management of the audit process in 2009 and hired an auditor in 2010 to act as an interface between the JPFU, 'NIM DIM' and audit companies, read through reports to spot errors or misunderstandings and help NGO partners prepare before the visit of the auditors. The arrival of the auditor at the JPFU has helped and this year, unfavourable comments concern (only) around US\$1 million at the time of writing.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> The Evaluation Team lacked time and the specific mandate to look into this issue.

<sup>143</sup> Independent Review of the Value Added of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in Kenya, Tasneem Mowjee, Development Initiatives, July 2010.

<sup>144</sup> The first audit is carried out once 70% of the budget or US\$100,000 has been spent.

<sup>145</sup> They produce an 'illusion of accountability'.

<sup>146</sup> According to the JPFU.

<sup>147</sup> Information provided by the JPFU.

<sup>148</sup> 'National Implementation' (NIM)/ 'Direct Implementation' (DIM)

<sup>149</sup> An unlikely consequence of this poor internal management performance situation is that it led to a decision on the part of

**The JPFU – both UNDP and OCHA staff - has made huge efforts to improve and lighten the procedures** in place. Nevertheless, some of them remain too rigid and cumbersome (e.g. four risk levels and accompanying measures; audits per project) or slow (e.g. disbursement of funds by UNDP as MA) and urgently require fine-tuning or more radical change to adapt them to the humanitarian working environment and the requirements of emergency response. While UNDP rules make sense in the case of recovery or development work as they reinforce financial, administrative, and PCM capacities of NGOs as potential development partners, they are ill-adapted to a rapidly changing humanitarian context.

The **Harmonised Approach for Cash Transfers (HACT)**, which the four UNDG Executive Committee (*ExCom*) agencies (UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP) have been preparing to implement in order to harmonise and simplify rules and procedures among them, is impatiently expected in DRC as a way to improve efficiency. The JPFU has been piloting the HACT since the beginning of 2010 and is 'HACT-compliant'. A taskforce consisting of the four agencies and the JPFU was put in place in July 2010 to harmonize their approach to risk management. It is in this context that the July 2010 workshop to review the NGO risk level took place. There were expectations that UNDP would implement the HACT in 2009, but it still has not. A UNDP HQ mission in 2009 reportedly recommended using HACT for moderate and low risk NGOs, and this would be helpful for the PF as the aim of the new system is to move from a system of rigid controls to a risk management approach.

**Implementing the HACT would bring other benefits for the PF**, in particular a shift from audits per project to audits per partner, which for many NGOs would significantly reduce the number of audits required, as well as the establishment of a common M&E system. UNDP HQ has indicated that based on the latest update from the UNDP Country Office at the end of 2010, the latter has completed all steps and has been labelled HACT-compliant. Expectations are that all systems required will be in place by the third quarter of 2011<sup>150</sup>.

For an NGO – national or international - to become a PF partner, the JPFU M&E Section must carry out an organizational capacity and risk assessment. This is done at the request of cluster coordinators who can each request up to five assessments prior to a Standard allocation (i.e. a potential 45 requests per allocation). The entire process takes about one week. For the first allocation round in 2010, 32 out of 38 NGOs passed the selection.

**UNDP carries out its MA function on the basis of the UNDP NGO execution modality, which aims to build the capacities of NGOs as potential development partners.** It involves capacity and risk assessments, the classification of NGOs in four categories of risk which determine reporting, M&E, and auditing requirements as well as the level of the first disbursement of funds. While this approach provides good guarantees of administrative and financial accountability, its suitability for a humanitarian context is questionable.

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UNDP to create a UNDP post at the same level as the JPFU manager, called "Team Leader PF" and place it inside the JPFU. *The JPFU Manager was neither consulted on the appropriateness of this decision nor, subsequently, on the ToR, and was not even informed of the publication of the post. He ended up on the interview panel, but for various reasons, the vacancy had to be reopened several times.* UNDP imposed both the ToR and the person, which caused tensions within the Unit.

<sup>150</sup> Source: verbal and written feedback on the first draft of this report.



**Eligible NGO are classified in one of four categories of risk** – high, significant, moderate, or low – which in turn determine the maximum size of the first disbursement, the frequency of financial and narrative reports (e.g. High risk requires quarterly financial and narrative reporting and Low risk a quarterly financial report and a narrative report at the end), and the number or frequency of M&E visits per project. The higher the risk level, the more frequent and demanding the oversight and accompanying measures will be. **Until recently, no systematic review of NGO risk levels was being made**, but in July 2010, the JPFU brought together cluster coordinators, JPFU programme, finance and M&E staff, and the ‘NIM DIM’ unit to review the level of 75 NGOs using an improved (HACT-based) methodology which takes performance into account. Such reviews will take place every six months. Currently, 132 NGOs are eligible<sup>151</sup>.

As the table below indicates, the number of NGOs in the ‘high’ and ‘significant’ risk categories has diminished considerably, which will have a matching impact on transaction costs and efficiency for UNDP, the JPFU, and the NGOs whose risk level has diminished.

*Eligible NGOs and their risk level in 2009 and 2010<sup>152</sup>*

NGOs	High	Significant	Moderate	Low	Total
<b>2009</b>					
<b>National</b>	37	50	9	1	97
<b>International</b>	6	24	22	5	57
<b>Total 2009</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>154</b>
<b>2010</b>					
<b>National</b>	28	10	24	4	66
<b>International</b>	8	16	29	4	57
<b>Total 2010</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>123<sup>153</sup></b>

This process contributes to ensuring that NGO PF partners have the capacities required to implement projects and offer guarantees of accountability.

**Clusters have a general idea about the capacities and comparative advantage of their partners** and in general require that NGOs presenting projects have a track record in the sector concerned<sup>154</sup>. An exception in the framework of the second allocation for 2010 was rapidly spotted and the NGO disqualified for the project concerned.

A fairly robust system for tying poor performance and eligibility seems to be in place and **poor performance by UN agencies and NGOs alike affects their eligibility<sup>155</sup>**. The PF Board and the HC have blocked funding requests of at least two agencies at some points in time. A particular UN agency has not been eligible since 2008 because of implementation delays affecting 18 projects, mostly due to lengthy HQ procedures for authorizing NGO

<sup>151</sup> A total of 40 NGOs approved in 2006 have been removed from the list because they no longer present projects.

<sup>152</sup> Source: PF Annual Report 2009 and JPFU report on the July 2010 workshop to assess NGO risk levels.

<sup>153</sup> The risk level of 9 NGOs (6 international and 3 national) still had to be completed.

<sup>154</sup> The PF guidelines require that NGOs prove that they are recognised by the competent line ministry and demonstrate that it has the capacity

<sup>155</sup> The PF guidelines state that a new grant will only be approved if the UN or NGO partner has demonstrated adequate performance with respect to achieving the objectives and the use of previous funds, and in addition, for NGOs, that the files concerning the finalization of previous projects have been received by the JPFU and it is up to date in the submission of reports.



partners to purchase locally, which are unsuitable for emergency contexts. The agency requested no-cost extensions in September 2008, refrained from requesting funds in 2009 but has started reapplying, but some confusion remaining at the level of expenditure reports may have hampered its access to funds for the second allocation of 2010. A difficulty with UN agencies is that the responsibility for taking measures in the event of poor performance rests on the HC at the risk of "personalising" the issue and putting him/her in a difficult position.

The **national government plays no active role** with respect to the PF, but it has facilitated the management of NGO projects by signing an umbrella agreement with UNDP in 2007, which authorizes UNDP to manage projects and request reports on its behalf. The **Minister of Plan of North Kivu is not aware of what is being funded** and said he learns of PF projects through signboards. He wishes to be more involved, especially since he is sometimes called upon to defend projects facing criticism from local communities. He gave examples of a community angered by the reduction in the size of buildings being constructed, with no prior consultation, and of a lack of understanding on the part of another of the reasons why an INGO was establishing a presence to construct latrines. The community thought the NGO had a hidden agenda.

**New coordination mechanisms are being established by the Ministry of Plan, which will give its provincial counterparts a central coordination role for stabilization and recovery.** Provincial edicts have been recently approved to that effect. The Minister insisted that he fully recognised the humanitarian coordination role of OCHA and merely wanted to be informed. Humanitarian actors need to recognise government demands for greater ownership and the need for increased coordination of humanitarian, stabilization and recovery efforts.

**Government services take part in cluster coordination at provincial level** in the case of some of the clusters, (health, nutrition, food security, education, WASH) and in the case of health and education<sup>156</sup>, are involved in the monitoring of project implementation. The evaluation team met the government counterpart of the education cluster in S. Kivu, who was very supportive of the PF as his department had benefitted from funding through UNICEF for a community-based project to reintegrate children into schools. His only regret was that this project funded in 2008, which was already demonstrating its effectiveness, received no funding in 2009. He rightly pointed out that such projects require a longer term commitment.

**At the local project implementation level**, PF partners inform the local administration of their activities and their visits. The team witnessed an incident in S. Kivu when an inspector for the agriculture and fisheries department complained at a meeting with the local administrator about the lack of respect and cooperation on the part of an NGO project manager when he visited a (non-PF) project site. There seems to be some resistance on the part of some NGOs to coordinate and involve the local authorities in their work, despite the legitimacy of this request and the importance of this participation in a stabilization and

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<sup>156</sup> For example, the education cluster lead recently carried out a monitoring mission of 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> 2010 allocation PF projects in Equateur with the Provincial Education Chief (Proved).

recovery-oriented context. This is certainly partly due to a belief that the local authorities expect something for themselves in return. Examples were given of requests for relief supplies.

### Main Recommendations

- 1) **The UNDP Country Office should start implementing the HACT in the third quarter of 2011 at the latest, in order for UNDP to diminish the costs of audits, and transaction costs for NGOs in general.**
- 2) **As implementing the HACT may not be sufficient to improve UNDP efficiency as MA, OCHA HQ needs to identify and evaluate possible alternatives to UNDP, including itself, in the first half of 2011. This could be done through the commissioning of an independent study to identify potential alternative managers of funds earmarked for NGO projects in emergency contexts. OCHA HQ should share its conclusions and recommendations with PF donors by the end of 2011.**
- 3) **Small projects responding to priority needs should retain a possibility of accessing PF funding, especially after such much effort has been put in building capacities of local partners, who are the ones likely to request small amounts. The OCHA RRF seems like the best mechanism for doing so. This would strengthen the complementarities between the OCHA RRF and the PF.**
- 4) **OCHA/the JPFU should ensure that the provincial authorities are informed of PF allocations and encourage clusters and partners to increasingly work with government counterparts in recognition for government demands for greater ownership.**
- 5) **Projects whose impact clearly require a timeframe longer than one year, as was the case of the education project mentioned above, should be given an opportunity to secure a second grant.**

## Operational Impact

The PF has been a relevant, appropriate and effective tool for improving the ability of the humanitarian community to address critical needs in the DRC. The PF has reinforced the humanitarian system in DRC by supporting the HC, a single humanitarian strategy and planning tool (the HAP), humanitarian coordination at all levels, and partnerships. It has enabled the HC and clusters to improve sector and geographic coverage, reduce funding disparities across sectors, support innovation, streamline gender, and provide a rapid response to new or worsening emergencies as well as predictable support to strategic projects. However, greater clarity about what activities can and cannot be funded in areas where donor policies diverge would provide a more objective basis for decision-making. The wide range of partners involved in the humanitarian response and the ensuing

operational opportunities is a significant comparative advantage of the PF over other humanitarian donors.

Donors would not have been able to channel the same amount of funding and have the same outreach through bilateral funding. However, the funds available have somewhat fallen in 2010, which has put pressure on the allocation process and generated some tension. The fact that the source of humanitarian funding regarded as the most reliable and flexible was becoming less predictable has been of concern to the humanitarian community in the latter half of 2010.

The institutional set up of the PF is appropriate and effective and the fund is managed by an excellent team and supported by strong coordination mechanisms. PF structures, Project Management Cycle, and processes have improved significantly over time, adapting to the capacities and limitations of the humanitarian response system in place and taking advantage of its strengths. The current allocation processes of the PF strike a careful balance between democracy and effectiveness. Balancing accountability and inclusiveness with flexibility and speed has partly been achieved through the establishment of complementary funding windows, and through extensive fine-tuning and constant analysis of the procedures in place by the Joint Pooled Fund Unit (JPFU).

The independent involvement of different forums in the allocation process acts as a system of checks and balances and provides certain guarantees that projects retained are relevant, appropriate and of the required technical quality. The recent re-centralisation in Kinshasa of project pre-selection, after several years of decentralisation that frequently generated unmanageable tension and competition at provincial level, should increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the process. Problems related to conflict of interests will never entirely disappear, but can be further offset through simple measures such as the participation of cluster co-facilitators in project pre-selection. The mobilization of the humanitarian system in support of the PF has generated important transaction costs that are insufficiently recognized.

One of the main requirements at this stage is to reinforce Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E), which is already quite advanced in comparison to the other CHF countries and other humanitarian contexts in general, in order to ascertain the quality of project implementation, identify good practice and learn lessons. This will require strengthening the cooperation between the JPFU and the clusters and their respective capacities. Putting in place a comprehensive M&E system (including UN agency projects) will largely depend on the willingness of UN agencies, which still view M&E of UN projects as an internal prerogative. This may pave the way for evaluating impact. If M&E of the PF projects can generate best practices and lessons learnt, the PF in the DRC could be a groundbreaker in terms of effectiveness.

Information and communication about PF processes and procedures amongst UN agencies and NGOs also requires strengthening, but steps are already being taken by the JPFU.

## ANNEX I – TOR

The 25 page Terms of Reference has been circulated as a separate document.

## ANNEX II – FUNDING FLOWS ANALYSIS

**Table 1 – Pledges to the Pooled Fund per donor from 2006-2010**

Contributor/Partner	Commitments	Deposits	Deposit rate
Belgium, Government of	15.749.741,87	15.749.741,87	100,0%
Canada – Canadian International Development Agency	6.207.131,75	6.207.131,75	100,0%
Denmark, Government of	1.808.449,07	1.808.449,07	100,0%
Ireland - Irish Aid	29.983.917,06	29.912.819,69	99,8%
Luxembourg, Government of	1.766.010,61	1.766.010,61	100,0%
Netherlands, Government of	89.266.117,00	89.266.117,00	100,0%
Norway, Government of	19.254.369,00	19.237.526,00	99,9%
Spain - Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional	25.731.836,00	25.731.836,00	100,0%
Sweden – Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	87.505.828,54	87.505.828,54	100,0%
United Kingdom – Department for International Development	303.715.399,76	303.715.399,76	100,0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>580.988.800,66</b>	<b>580.900.860,29</b>	<b>100,0%</b>

Source: Gateway - UNDG Multi Donor Trust Fund Office/UNDP; Data as of 13 February 2011

**Table 2 – Comparison of donor contributions the year before and the year of their first contribution**

Donor	Year	Total Contribution	Contribution to PF	% of total	Increase
Belgium	2005	13.249.037			
	2006	20.226.149	1.981.191,87	9,80%	52,66
Canada	2005	11.309.082			
	2006	9.711.830	3.127.576,57	32,20%	-14,12
Denmark	2007	5.195.982			
	2008	6.989.069	1.808.449,07	25,88%	34,51
DFID/UK	2005	30.617.487			
	2006	84.308.401	54.562.499,76	64,72%	175,36
Ireland	2006	7.087.466			
	2007	10.075.931	9.416.750,02	93,46%	42,17
Luxembourg	2006	2.218.327			
	2007	2.403.870	292.780,00	12,18%	8,36
Netherlands	2005	11.149.405			
	2006	18.215.658	14.724.000,00	80,83%	63,38
Norway	2005	5.281.869			
	2006	12.466.216	3.324.854,95	26,67%	136,02
Spain	2006	3.996.795			
	2007	10.770.362	5.295.536,00	49,17%	169,47
Sweden	2005	17.173.319			
	2006	19.531.580	14.533.743,49	74,41%	13,73

**Table 3 - Percentage of CAP/HAP requirements covered and of PF contribution**

Year	HAP requirements (US\$)	PF contribution to the HAP (US\$)	Percentage of HAP requirements covered by the PF	Total percentage of HAP requirements covered
2005	219,717,245 (revised)	-	-	65%
2006	696,024,728 (revised)	85,529,143	26%	51%
2007	686,591,107	116,707,760	26%	68%
2008	575,654,173	124,856,675	25%	77%
2009	946,252,242 (revised)	53,453,167	18%	66%
2010	827,616,628			59%

Source: FTS and JPFU PowerPoint Presentation of September 2009

**Table 4 – Geographical distribution of PF funding from 2006-2009**

Province / District	2006	2007	2008	2009
	% of total	% of total	% of total	% of total
National	-	29.3	9.8	28.7
Nord Kivu	5	17.5	30.6	21.1
Sud Kivu	6.6	7.8	12.4	11.6
Haut Uélé	-	-	-	9.4
Katanga	16.3	11.5	13.5	8.4
Ituri	8.0	11.5	8.1	5.4
Province Orientale	3.5	4.7	6.6	2.7
Maniema	3.7	2.6	4.1	2.4
Equateur	5.4	3.9	5.6	2.2
Kasaï Oriental	1.8	2.7	3.1	2.1
Kasaï Occidental	1.1	3.5	1.9	2.1
Bandundu	0.7	4.0	3.5	2.0
Kinshasa	-		0.1	1.2
Bas Congo	1.4	0.9	0.8	0.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>53.5</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Annual reports, OCHA/UNDP Joint Pooled Fund Unit



## ANNEX III – STRATEGIC COMMITTEE

A matrix indicating financial requirements is developed as a basis for the deliberations of the Strategic Committee as follows.

**A first calculation of requirements per cluster per province is based on cluster requirements as stated in the HAP and the funding secured thus far through CERF and PF allocations and as reported by the OCHA Financial Tracking System (FTS).**

Since the FTS is not adapted to tracking contributions down to the level of provinces and clusters, the JPFU contacts donors to verify the breakdown of contributions per cluster and province. When it is not possible to get this disaggregated information, the contribution is artificially disaggregated on the basis of the proportional cluster requirements per province and sector. If the level of funding secured is higher than the requirements for a given province, it is assumed that the cluster needs no funding for that province. This process is as objective as can be, since it is a mathematical exercise based on the financial requirements expressed in the HAP.

However, as there is no common way of calculating HAP financial requirements and those of some sectors are inflated compared to others, there is an intrinsic risk that clusters with greater requirements will get more funding or that clusters or agencies receiving less donor support because the latter are not convinced by their performance will benefit more than others.

In order to offset this risk, **a more subjective process takes place after the initial mathematical exercise, based on the provincial strategies** (which provide the latest available information on priority needs). Cluster requirements for each province are given a coefficient 1, which the Strategic Committee corrects upwards or downwards on the basis of the provincial priorities (e.g. from 1 to 0.5 if not a high priority) and to some extent, cluster capacities and performance. The coefficient approach was developed to avoid overdependence on the HAP and take into account the evolution of the humanitarian situation.

*In other words, a cluster that would have been awarded an envelope on the basis of the mathematical approach may not appear in the provincial strategies, in which case the envelope is cut out, whereas a cluster that would have been excluded from funding on the basis of the mathematical approach but appearing in the provincial strategy has having priority needs may be given an envelope.*

The JPFU consolidates all of the information and recommendations resulting from this exercise, after which they are submitted to the HC to decide upon.

## ANNEX IV – TECHNICAL REVIEW COMMITTEE

### Composition

At the time of its establishment in 2007, the TRC was expected to include volunteer members of the PF Board (donors and NGOs), the cluster coordinators or a technical expert appointed by the cluster coordinator, and the JPFU 2007<sup>157</sup>. Since 2008, PF allocation guidelines also include the OCHA focal points of the clusters as members and state that cluster co-facilitators are encouraged to participate. In reality, the technical reviews are being carried out by the cluster coordinators or their representatives, and JPFU staff.

### Role

The TRC is responsible for verifying that:

1. Projects adhere to allocation criteria;
2. Projects are of an emergency nature;
3. The technical quality of the projects, which includes verifying that expected results are quantified and project indicators are SMART;
4. The feasibility of the projects;
5. The coherence between objectives, activities, and budget;
6. The partner's capacity to implement the project;
7. The absence of duplication with other projects in the same area.

### Timeframe

The aim is to complete the first review of a project within 7-10 days after receipt.

### Management of the Process

Three JPFU (UNDP) programme analysts take the lead for organising the technical review. Each of them is assigned a number of clusters and is responsible for organising review meetings for each cluster and providing a secretariat function. The technical review starts with a meeting for each cluster, which brings all relevant TRC members together.

### Tools

The TRC uses a checklist to verify:

- The coherence between the project and the HAP,
- The experience of the organisation and the area and sector concerned,
- The technical quality of projects,
- The management and implementation capacity of the organisation,
- Implementation performance of previous PF projects,
- A global evaluation of the quality of the project,
- The presentation and the substance of the text,
- The clarity and measurability of objectives (they should be SMART),
- Coherence between the budget, the activities, and the objectives,
- The relevance of results indicators proposed and of the means to collect the data.

Technical guidelines developed by the clusters in 2010 are now also used for the review.

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<sup>157</sup> 2007 DRC PF Annual Report.

Projects are graded on a scale from A (approved) to E (rejected). Grade “A” means that a project is considered ready for financing and processed administratively and “E” that it is rejected.

Observations for projects with B to D grades are sent by email to partners, who have three days to respond. Projects are revised up to three times until grade “A” is achieved. Projects that do not achieve grade “A” are eliminated.

*Project Grading Criteria*<sup>158</sup>

- A:** The project is approved, i.e. it has the required technical quality and can be funded;
- B:** The project is approved but requires minor changes unrelated to the budget; i.e. the project globally responds to the required quality criteria but some clarifications are indispensable and will be taken care of through email correspondence. The payment process can be started.
- C:** The project needs to be revised (minor changes); this requires the incorporation by the partner of minor but necessary changes to the project proposal. This grade suspends any financial commitment by the PF until the TRC validates the changes. The validation process takes place via email.
- D:** The project needs to be revised (major changes); this means that major changes pertaining to the substance, the project description or the budget must be made. In this case, the project will go through a new technical review.
- E:** The project is rejected.

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<sup>158</sup> PF Allocation Guidelines

## ANNEX V - FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS OF PREVIOUS EVALUATIONS

### Common Funds for Humanitarian Action in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo: Monitoring and Evaluation Study - December 2006 : Recommendations

#	Recommendations to donors	Stakeholders to consult in this Evaluation	Eval. Matrix Section	Status
1.	Make the necessary arrangements in home governments, including if necessary, new legislative measures, that will allow special dispensation to commit and disburse to the Common Funds mechanism early. "Early" means commitments by November of the previous year, with first disbursements to made by January 1 and with a majority of funds disbursed against the commitment by the end of the first quarter.	Donors, HC, OCHA, Joint CHF Unit	2	No information regarding measures taken in donor capitals, but several donors disburse late in the year or the following year: this remains an issue: see Synthesis Report
2.	Each year, decide on and reserve a reasonable portion of their total contribution for discretionary bilateral funding, emphasizing multi-year NGO programming, and other priorities within the current needs context that would not normally be funded through the Common Funds.	Donors, HC, OCHA, beneficiary organisations	4	This is being done.
3.	Continue funding UN agencies directly at the Headquarters and regional level as well as through Common funds at the country level.	Donors, UN agencies incl. OCHA	4	This is being done.
4.	Improve their communications regarding aid flows, in particular their reporting to FTS.	Donors, OCHA, Joint CHF Unit	4	This is still a need.
5.	Engage non-participating donors and push for better communication on funding intentions and actions.	Donors, HC, OCHA, Joint CHF Unit	4	The two major humanitarian donors besides the PF, USAID/OFDA and ECHO, are observers on the PF Board.
6.	Establish in-country donor forums where they meet regularly to dialogue with both Common Funds participating and non-participating donors.	Donors, HC, OCHA, Joint CHF Unit	4	A strong GHD donor forum exists, which includes PF donors, but there is no interaction between the two.

				Follow up is required.
7.	Consider using such a forum as a proactive body to identify financing gaps in the country and seek innovative solutions. It was suggested by one respondent that such a body could conceivably evolve into in effect an additional cluster at the national level – a “finance cluster” that interacts in the inter-cluster process and involves donors more proactively with the humanitarian efforts.	Donors, HC, OCHA/Joint Unit	4	Same as above.
8.	Emphasize the importance of efforts to increase the participation of national NGOs in the mechanism.	Donors, HC, OCHA/Joint Pooled Unit, cluster leads, I/NGOs	2	The PF has been extremely effective in terms of increasing national NGO participation.
#	<b>Overall Recommendations to Donors and UN Partners</b>	<b>Stakeholders to consult in this Evaluation</b>	<b>Evaluati on Matrix Section</b>	<b>Status</b>
9.	Actively seek alternatives so that the Fund legal structure may be modified or replaced with a new one that allows for NGOs (approved by the HC based on proven performance and formal indicators of capacity) to receive funds directly from the fund rather than through a Participating UN Organization.	OCHA HQ and field, HC, UNDP, CHF Joint Unit	5	In Synthesis Report
10.	If this proves impossible, or is legally unacceptable by governments of a majority of participating donors: Put out to bid the Participating UN Organization role for NGO funding in both countries. If UNDP wishes to retain this role it must demonstrate how it will modify its PCA to a format more suitable for humanitarian action. Other agencies could propose their own system. The HC and the Advisory group/boards in each country would decide the outcome. The consensus in the two countries holds that UNDP should remain as Administrative Agent for the UN agency funding since in this role it performed reasonably well and the difficulties of a new start up threaten to outweigh any gains.	HC, OCHA, UNDP	5	In Synthesis Report
11.	Give special consideration to OCHA	Same as	5	In Synthesis Report

	for this role, as it has proven it can competently manage such a fund (Angola 199722, the RRM or similar mechanisms in DRC 2000-2006). As the support structure for the HC, OCHA would also provide greater coherence of leadership.	above		
12.	Based on lessons learned in each country, draft new TORs that make it clear to all stakeholders how the procedures work and the responsibilities are of participants and cluster leads.	Joint CHF Unit, all stakeholders	5	ToR for the DRC PF were developed in March 2006 and revised in December 2006. New ones have been approved in early 2011. Standard PF allocation guidelines were developed in 2007, were improved in 2008, and only slightly modified until the end of 2010. New PF guidelines have been approved in the beginning of 2011.
13.	Promote Plan models more akin to the DRC Action Plan – no project sheets, not static but rather able to absorb new projects as they fit into overall objectives.	OCHA	2, 5	N/A
14.	Require each years Plan to be based on a current needs assessment. Consider multi-sectoral national-level team in both countries that would support the cluster system by coordinating a comprehensive countrywide needs assessment, as well as technical review of projects coming up from the regional level sectors/clusters, and M&E.	HC, OCHA, cluster leads	4, 5	A national multi-sectoral needs assessment was carried out in 2006 prior to the CAP, but such exercises are considered too expensive in a country as vast as DRC.
15.	Increase facility to use the Common Funds more rapidly and flexibly. In DRC, for example, this may be achieved by formally expanding the criteria of the RRM to cover all emergent and unforeseen needs, or by allowing for projects to be submitted and considered in between funding tranches (without necessarily triggering a separate, “Special Allocation Process” but within the	HC, Joint CHF Unit, OCHA	2, 5	The Rapid Response Reserve has evolved to provide rapid and flexible funding in response to new emergencies and strategic initiatives at any time during the year. It has continued supporting the RRM/P, as well as



	business of the clusters.) In Sudan, reserve a portion of the fund to be used for rapid response.			some prepositioning, in areas with frequent population displacement, of emergency stocks.
16.	Establish and disseminate clearer “rapid access” procedures governing the allocation of rapid response funds.	HC, Joint CHF Unit, OCHA	2, 5	The need to clarify procedures to apply for RRM funding remains (despite the newly-adopted PF allocation guidelines).
17.	To avoid conflict of interests in both reality and appearance, require cluster leads to agree with participants on methods to ensure transparency and impartiality of all decisions. For instance, to ensure transparency they might keep written records of meetings and decision rationales and fairness could be served by establishing decision procedures such as having the agency whose project is being considered recuse itself from vote/decision input.	HC, Joint CHF Unit, cluster leads	2, 5	A lot of effort, and trial-and-error has taken place in the past years, but no method is considered as really impartial since cluster coordinators are responsible for the pre-selection of projects and still need to review their own agency’s project proposals.
18.	Require cluster leads to actively engage all capable operators in the area, including actively seeking out national NGOs	Joint CHF Unit, cluster leads (both national and sub-national)	2, 5	This has been done In DRC.
19.	Require cluster leads to be operationally present in cluster areas. If they are not, assign leadership to another agency or NGO with the expertise and capacity to fulfill this role.	Joint CHF Unit, cluster leads	2, 5	This has been done in DRC.
20.	Expand the practice, where feasible of naming NGO cluster/sector co-leads at the field level.	HC, Joint CHF Unit, cluster leads	2, 5	This has been done in DRC.
21.	Consider the national multi-sectoral team for impact monitoring on a sectoral level against objectives outlined in the Plan.	HC, Joint CHF Unit, CHF Board Members, cluster leads	4, 5	This is not the model followed in DRC where the clusters have this responsibility, but impact monitoring is still an issue.
22.	For monitoring at the project level, rely on the existing legitimate M&E capacities of the participants for internal evaluations and use the	Joint CHF Unit, OCHA, UNDP, CHF Board	4, 5	M&E is carried out by UN agencies for their projects and by the JPFU for NGO projects

	sector/cluster system that vetted the projects in the first instance– agencies and NGOs to report on progress and justify subsequent proposals for funding on past performance.	members, beneficiary organisations		funded through UNDP as Managing Agent. In addition to the reports provided by NGOs on project implementation, a common UN/NGO reporting format is in place, which provides detailed information on outputs and enables to spot poor performance.
23.	Ensure that organizations receiving funds undergo an annual financial audit by an external independent auditor.	Joint CHF Unit, Managing Agent	4, 5	In DRC, the approach is currently still project-based and is likely to become partner-based in the course of 2011 for the UNDG ExCom agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA and WFP), when they start implementing the HACT.
24.	<i>Strength of HC.</i> Many felt that the system is dependent on highly effective individuals in the role of HC. Presumably however, the lessons learned from the Sudan and DRC cases, and the decision-making models that have been constructed would help provide a basis that need not be entirely HC-dependent.	HC, OCHA, donors, CHF Board Members	2	The HC ultimately decides for both the Standard and the RRR allocation windows.
25.	<i>Government participation/obstruction.</i> Ethiopia has been proposed as a possibility, but many worry that the government, already highly restrictive of humanitarian access, would create problems to the extent that it would not be the next logical testing ground.	HC, OCHA, donors, CHF Board Members, Government officials	1	-
26.	<i>Size of country.</i> Some say the mechanism would be more effective and have a larger impact in smaller countries (e.g., CAR, Guinea), but at the same time there would have to be a critical mass of operational agencies.	HC, OCHA, donors, CHF Board members	1	-
27.	<i>Humanitarian context.</i> Common Funds piloting should not be allowed to drift into development settings, but keep its	HC, OCHA, donors, CHF Board	2, 4	The PF has maintained its focus on humanitarian

	<p>focus on humanitarian response. Its operating structures are uniquely suited for the quick transfer of funds to meet urgent needs, rather than providing the additional oversight more suitable in development contexts. Furthermore, its humanitarian status can be critical for host state acceptance of the model. Development cooperation traditionally requires negotiation and collaboration with government authorities, letting the Common Fund become a back door for these activities would be to embark down a dangerous path. That said, as reflected in the GHD principles, humanitarian action is rightly not limited to life-saving activities only, but should include early-recovery and transitional activities as well.</p>	<p>members, cluster leads, UNDP and Early Recovery cluster</p>	<p>response, but has supported the humanitarian response when emergency thresholds were reached in areas not affected by conflict or disasters. It has not supported development-oriented activities. It has focused on life-saving activities (but without having a clear definition of what was meant), and to a limited extent, recovery-oriented activities through the various clusters.</p>
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#### Evaluation of Common/Pooled Funds in DRC and Sudan - 2007

#	General Recommendations	Stakeholders to consult	Evaluation Matrix Section	Follow up
1	<p>The Funds should continue as a mechanism in both countries. However considerable work is needed for them to realise their potential and overcome outstanding weaknesses.</p>	<p>All</p>	<p>2</p>	<p>The PF has continued and its institutional set up and processes have been refined over the years.</p>
2	<p>In the short term, the existing fund management by UNDP is satisfactory. UNDP has done its best to adapt its contracting requirements for NGOs to a humanitarian context but these are still not entirely appropriate. Therefore, the evaluators believe that the most feasible option is that UNDP retains the Administrative Agent role and OCHA takes on the Managing Agent role once it has the capacity to do so, but that the transition should be gradual. Donors would have to support OCHA in becoming the Managing Agent.</p>	<p>HC, Joint CHF Unit, OCHA, Managing Agent/UNDP, beneficiary organisations</p>	<p>3, 5</p>	<p>UNDP has retained both roles.</p>
3	<p>The Joint Unit model is a sensible</p>	<p>HC, OCHA, UNDP,</p>	<p>5</p>	<p>The JPFU is still in</p>

	compromise solution to incorporate the current role of UNDP, as long as it is backed up by a clearer corporate commitment from UNDP on its specific role so that there are no difficulties with accepting non-UNDP staff as fund managers.	CHF Board members		place and has functioned well, but there are still difficulties with having OCHA staff as fund managers.
4	If the Funds continue at current levels, they can be used strategically to complement other funding. But, if they become small, in both absolute and relative terms, the management process should be made much lighter, with more discretion for the HC to fill gaps strategically and with less consultation.	HC, OCHA, CHF Board Members, cluster leads and co-facilitators	4	The PF is still one of the largest donors in DRC, but this recommendation remains valid.
#	<b>Recommendations to Donors</b>	<b>Stakeholders to consult</b>	<b>Evaluation Matrix Section</b>	<b>Follow up</b>
5	Donor commitments to the Funds should be sought at the end of a calendar year (perhaps in November, when the Appeal is launched) for disbursement to occur the following January. This may require the on-time publication of reports for the previous year. If the timing of donor financial years makes this difficult, at least indicative planning figures should be shared with HCs so that the allocation process can be started.	Donors, HC, OCHA, Joint CHF Unit, CHF Board Members	2, 5	This is still a problem for a few donors.
6	Donors to the Common/Pooled Funds should continue to provide some bilateral funding to retain flexibility and focus on cross cutting or integrated programming.	Donors, HC, OCHA, beneficiary organizations	4, 5	This is the case.
7	Donors should ensure funding for transition activities so that the Funds do not have to stretch to these and can focus on real emergency needs. Continued discussion is needed on how to define what constitutes humanitarian need.	HC, donors, OCHA, CHF Board members	4, 5	Four donors to the PF (Belgium, Netherlands, Norway & Sweden) are funding the Stabilization and Reconstruction Funding Facility (SRFF) in Eastern DRC.
8	Donors should commission an analysis of the 'value chain' of humanitarian funding looking at	Donors, OCHA, UNDP/Administrative Agent/managing	3	Study of Transaction Costs Associated with

	transaction costs and value added.	Agent		Humanitarian Pooled Funds; Praxis group Ltd.; 2010
9	Review systems of UN accountability, based on donor requirements.	HC, UN agencies, OCHA	4, 5	There have been improvements with respect to monitoring and reporting on outputs, but more needs to be done. UN agencies keep their M&E findings to themselves. One of the problems is the lack of mandate of the HC for M&E.
10	Funding of OCHA's management of the funds should be transparent and covered directly by donors instead of reducing the amount of money available for beneficiaries.	OCHA, UNDP	3	The JPFU is still paid through the PF. Whether paid from the PF or from bilateral funds, the funds would come from the humanitarian budget anyway.
#	<b>Recommendations to Cluster/Sector Leads</b>	<b>Stakeholders to consult</b>	<b>Evaluation Matrix Section</b>	<b>Follow up</b>
11	Better training is needed for cluster/sector leads on their role and how to manage processes.	HC, OCHA, UN agencies, cluster leads and co-facilitators	2, 3, 4, 5	-
12	Agency investment is needed in Cluster leads with good technical capacity and coordination skills.	Same as above	2, 3, 4, 5	-
13	Agencies need to take more responsibility for make cluster working a corporate objective and reflect this in the personal objectives and appraisals of staff.	Same as above	2, 3, 4, 5	-
#	<b>Recommendation to OCHA</b>	<b>Stakeholders to consult</b>	<b>Evaluation Matrix Section</b>	<b>Follow up</b>
14	More learning between Sudan and DRC would be valuable, led by a HQ support function. This is particularly important given the likely turnover of staff with considerable	OCHA HQ and field	5	In Synthesis report

	institutional knowledge.			
#	<b>Recommendation to OCHA/UNDP</b>	<b>Stakeholders to consult</b>	<b>Evaluation Matrix Section</b>	<b>Follow up</b>
15	There also needs to be a discussion at senior level to clarify exactly what UNDP's commitment is and what expectations are from OCHA and other agencies.	OCHA HQ and field; UNDP HQ and field, beneficiary organisations	5	In Synthesis report
#	<b>Recommendations to HC and Common/Pooled Fund Units</b>	<b>Stakeholders to consult</b>	<b>Evaluation Matrix Section</b>	<b>Follow up</b>
16	The HCs and Advisory Boards should develop clear Terms of Reference for the scope and role of the Board. This should focus on policy guidance and advice on general funding allocation (e.g. by state/province or priority sectors) rather than discussion of individual projects.	HC, OCHA, CHF Board members	5	DRC has ToR for the Board and PF Allocation guidelines, and both were updated at the beginning of 2011.
17	The Advisory Boards should have at least one general policy meeting a year, involving Fund and non-Fund donors to coordinate and agree broad policy issues. This would enable donors who do not have a presence in-country or manage their involvement from their capitals to send representatives.	HC, OCHA, CHF Board members	5	This does not happen and needs to be followed up.
18	To enable the Advisory Boards to provide strategic guidance in an effective manner, the technical unit in the country should supply them with the necessary information. However, these units are completely over-stretched so they need support. This could be from a Deputy HC or a combination of sources, such as OCHA's FTS section or national sector/Cluster leads or other sections in the Mission (e.g., since MONUC's Civil Affairs Section provides coordination support in some Western DRC provinces, perhaps it could help to compile some of the necessary data).	HC, OCHA, CHF Board members	5	The JPFU has been considerably reinforced in the past couple of years and is in a position to provide such guidance.
19	The extent of national or local government involvement in governance and monitoring	HC, OCHA, CHF Board Members	5	Some of the clusters (e.g. health, nutrition,



	structures should be considered carefully and decided on a case-by-case basis.			food security) have strong partnerships with local authorities, which exercise a limited oversight function and should be systematically associated to M&E.
20	Appoint a DHC with specific responsibilities for the Fund in large countries or highly complex situations.	HC, CHF Board members	5	Not done.
21	Ensure sufficient staffing continues to be available.	HC, Joint CHF Unit	5	Done.
22	Develop stronger management information systems, particularly in DRC.	HC, Joint CHF Unit, cluster leads	5	Still required, but the JPFU has just opened an interactive 'share point' on the web to which it is transferring its database.
23	The Advisory Boards should develop clearer criteria about what can be funded as lifesaving/humanitarian, and what recovery activities can be funded.	HC, donors, OCHA, CHF Board members	2, 4	This is still required.
24	More detailed guidance is still needed from the centre on the process. This should cover details of how to run meetings, voting systems, and how to assess whether activities are lifesaving. Sector/cluster leads should develop sector specific guidance.	HC, OCHA, CHF Board, cluster leads	5	Detailed guidance in the form of PF Standard Allocation Guidelines have been in place since early 2008 but until their review at the beginning of 2011, they contained some confusing wording about the process to follow by the clusters for the pre-selection of projects. There are no guidelines on what activities are

				considered life-saving. Cluster technical guidelines for the selection and technical review of projects were prepared by the clusters in 2010, at the request of the HC.
25	Terms of reference for the Funds and different stakeholders should be reviewed and updated in the light of changing processes.	HC, OCHA, CHF Board members, cluster leads	2, 5	This has been done, as indicated above.
26	HCs should consider having two allocation rounds per year at pre-defined times to coincide with the seasonal calendar/rainy season and allow agencies to plan ahead.	HC, OCHA, CHF Board members	3, 5	There are two Standard allocations rounds per year, but they do not necessarily correspond to the seasonal calendar. However, the PF supports the procurement and pre-positioning of supplies, including seeds and tools.
27	Streamline allocation procedures so as to strike a balance between responsiveness and ensuring that only quality projects are funded.	HC, Joint CHF Unit, cluster leads	3, 4, 5	This is being done through the submission of short 2-3 project sheets as a basis for project identification and pre-selection, and once they are approved 'in principle' but the HC, the technical revision process.
28	In the DRC, instead of establishing a separate Rapid Response window, all rapid response actions should be funded through the OCHA RRF since OCHA has a quick decision-making process, uses simple proposal and reporting formats and can disburse fairly quickly (usually	HC, OCHA	3	This recommendation has not been followed through. The RRR has been expanded, while the RRF has been increasingly

	within 10 working days).			under-used despite its comparative advantage as a rapid funding mechanism for small projects.
29	Strict adherence to a minimum of 1 week's advance notice of meetings to ensure attendance.	Joint CHF Unit, cluster leads, CHF Board, Technical Review Committee	5	This was not brought up as an issue.
30	Greater NGO involvement as co-leads, recognising that they face resource constraints.	HC, OCHA, cluster leads, cluster co-facilitators	2, 5	The involvement of co-facilitators has been encouraged but has had varying success, either because of cluster/JPFU-NGO communication issues or NGO capacities.
31	NGOs should be able to access funding directly from the Funds while funding of UN technical and coordination costs should be made more transparent.	Joint CHF Unit, UN agencies	3	NGOs still do not have direct access to the PF (and funds are channeled through UNDP as MA). UN agencies charge overhead costs that are within the 7% limit.
32	OCHA needs to have more involvement in allocation process as facilitator/arbitrator and OCHA sub-office heads need training to perform this role, plus deployable HQ capacity to support provincial level prioritisation.	HC, OCHA, CHF Board Members	5	OCHA is involved, especially through the JPFU and the Heads of sub-offices, but not only. OCHA staff increasingly attends cluster pre-selection meetings.
33	Centralise more of the allocation process where capacity is weak in the field, provide more support to weaker provinces, but continue to get considerable input from the field	HC, Joint CHF Unit, cluster leads at national and provincial levels	5	This has been the practice in DRC.

	on priorities and projects.			
34	Strengthen the technical review element in Sudan as part of the Workplan process and streamline the process in the DRC.	HC, Joint CHF Unit, cluster leads, members of Technical Review Committee	4	The system is in place.
35	UNDP's NGO capacity assessment procedure should not become a barrier to funding organisations capable of quality delivery so it should be used in conjunction with other judgments about an NGO's capacity.	HC, Joint CHF Unit, CHF Board members	3, 5	The review has been improved along those lines by UNDG ExCom agencies in the run up to HACT implementation in 2011.
36	Consider more informal, brief reporting from UN to allow monitoring while keeping formal reporting in line with global norms.	HC, Joint CHF Unit, UN agencies	4, 5	The common results sheet for NGOs and UN agencies, introduced in 2008, allows monitoring and is considered as a breakthrough. The data collected twice a year feeds into the Annual Report on the use of the PF. Formal reporting continues.
37	All applicants must have spent a certain percentage of the previous allocation or demonstrated implementation before applying for more funding, e.g. a one pager on quantitative use of funds to date (how many schools/wells/etc).	HC, Joint CHF Unit, CHF Board members, cluster leads and co-facilitators	4, 5	NGO applicants must have submitted their end of project reports to apply for more funding. This is taken into account by the PF Board at the time of the review of cluster recommendations.
38	Use more consistent M&E to assess achievements & impact, thereby reducing the need for detailed narrative reports from both UN agencies & NGOs.	HC, Joint CHF Unit, CHF Board members, cluster leads and co-facilitators, beneficiary organisations	4, 5	The JPFU has developed a sound capacity to monitor outputs and to a limited degree, outcomes, but more work is required, in conjunction with

				the clusters, to assess the technical quality of the projects, achievements, and impact.
39	Clarify role of sectors/clusters in M&E. Clusters should be responsible for agreeing the criteria for project as well as strategic M&E and defining TORs for evaluations. This should be done by the cluster lead in consultation with cluster members.	HC, Joint CHF Unit, CHF Board members, cluster leads and co-facilitators	4, 5	This is still a need. Clusters have developed technical standards in 2010 and have some involvement in PF PCM, but are unclear about what their role should be with respect to M&E.
40	Sector/Cluster leads could also ensure that relevant line ministries are involved in coordination and M&E where appropriate. Where sufficient Government capacity exists and this is appropriate, it could act as a more neutral monitor.	HC, Joint CHF Unit, CHF Board members, cluster leads and co-facilitators, Government counterparts	4, 5	Several clusters include representatives of provincial departments, and some of the latter do some M&E of projects, but this aspect of M&E needs to be reinforced as well as cluster ones..
41	A fully staffed M&E unit should report directly to HC/RC's office and provide a full range of M&E from project to more strategic functions.	HC, Joint CHF Unit, CHF Board members, cluster leads and co-facilitators, UNDP/Managing Agent	4, 5	The JPFU has an M&E Section responsible for the M&E of NGO projects receiving the funds through UNDP as MA, but not for UN projects. It does not report directly to the HC.
42	Where UNDP takes on a role in monitoring humanitarian projects, it needs to bring in more technical expertise, either seconded from Cluster/sectors or in the form of consultants.	HC, Joint CHF Unit, CHF Board members, cluster leads and co-facilitators, UNDP/Managing Agent	4, 5	This is still required.

## ANNEX VI – LIST OF PEOPLE MET

Name	Title	Organisation
Abdou Dieng	Representative	WFP
Abdou Mahaman Dango	Programme Officer	UNHCR
Abdourahmane Dia	Finance Specialist	JPFU (UNDP)
Adama Guindo	Country Director	UNDP
Adrien	Co-facilitator Protection Cluster	Oxfam GB
Agnès Katavali	Education Cluster Focal Point	UNICEF, Bukavu
Aminata Kone Séguétio	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	
Andrea De Domenico	Head(OCHA)	JPFU
Anis Parsa	Programme Coordinator	Solidarités, Goma
Anna Furubom Guittet	First Secretary	Embassy of Sweden
Antoine Maleka	Education Cluster Focal Point	UNICEF, Bunia
Ashley Sarangi		ACF, S. Kivu
Aude Rigot	Emergency Coordinator	CARE International
Beatrice Lumwanga	Nutrition Coordination Assistant	ACF, S. Kivu
Benjamin Ambwa	Focal point Food Security Cluster	WFP, Bunia
Benjamin Kikobya	Humanitarian Field Assistant	OCHA
Bernard Mulamba		VAS
Brigitte Pedro	WASH programme M&E Specialist	UNICEF
Caroline Schaefer	Programme Specialist, Poverty Reduction Unit	UNDP
Cécile Quan	Head of Office	NRC, Goma
Célestin Tuyisenge	Development Bureau Coordinator	Caritas, Goma
Céline Schmitt	External Relations Officer	UNHCR
Cheik Ba	Head of Mission	ACF USA
Claude Banywesize Chigangu	Nutrition Cluster Co-Facilitator	ACF, S. Kivu
Claude N'Sindi	Chargé d'Appui aux Programmes	UNFPA
Claude Mululu	Associate Humanitarian Affairs Office	OCHA
Cléophas Bishima Nzengu	Logistics Cluster Co-Facilitator	Caritas
Corinna Kreidler	Head of Office	ECHO
Damien Kwabene	Programme Coordinator	APEC, Bunia
Damien Ndahanwa Bwale	NFI Cluster Focal Point/Emergency Officer	UNICEF, Bukavu
Daniel Ahula	Humanitarian Field Assistant	OCHA
Delphin Mugula		VAS
Delphine Brun	GenCap Gender Advisor for Humanitarian Action	IASC/NRC, hosted by UNICEF



Denis Gravel	Logistics Cluster Coordinator	WFP
Deo Mirindi	Emergency Education Assistant	UNICEF
Dia Oumar	Head of Office	UNDP, Goma
Diane Duffour	Pooled Fund Officer (OCHA)	JPFU
Dieudonné Bamouni	Deputy Head of office	OCHA
Dieudonné Mohindo	WASH Cluster Focal Point	
Dirk-Jan Koch	Second Secretary	Embassy of the Netherlands
Djamal Zamoum	Protection Officer	UNHCR, Bunia
Djuma Baudouin	Assistant Humanitarian Affairs Officer	OCHA, Goma
Dmitri Katelevsky	Resource Management Specialist	UNDP, New York
Dominique Bollier	(Former) Head of Office	IOM, Bunia
Donat Ongolomeza Bagula	Food Security Cluster Focal Point and Head of FAO Sub-Office	FAO
Dr. Bernard Assumani	Inspecteur Provincial de l'Agriculture, Pêche, et Elevage	Inspection Provinciale, S. Kivu
Dr. Letshu		WHO, Bukavu
Dr. Makakala		WHO
Elena Locatelli	Education Specialist	UNICEF, Goma
Ellie Kemp	Protection Cluster Coordinator	Oxfam GB
Elodie Nsamba Kamashy	Community Recovery National Expert	UNDP
Emile Mpanya	Country Representative/Programme Director	LWF, Goma
Emmanuel Barote		IPS
Eric Tida	JPFU Finance Specialist	UNDP
Ernest Balola	M&E Officer (UNDP)	JPFU, Goma
Eustache Roger Lotsove	Head of Office	Caritas Bunia
Fabienne Mially	Head of Sub-Office	Solidarités Bunia
Fidele Sarassoro	Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative	UN DSRSG
Frédéric Sizaret	Chief of Emergencies	UNICEF
Fruzsina Csaszar		PRM
Geneviève LEROY	Country Representative	Solidarités
Georges Mukamba	Nutrition Officer	UNICEF, Goma
Gilbert Hascoet	Country Director	Merlin
Gilbert Sengamali	Assistant Humanitarian Affairs Officer	OCHA

Guindo Mahmadou	Field Coordinator	UNHCR, Bunia
Guy-Rufin Guernas	Senior Protection Officer	UNHCR
Hassane Djibrine Djaranabi	Logistics Manager	NRC
Heather Kerr	Deputy National Director	Oxfam GB
Hébie Sékou	Head of M&E Department	FAO
Isaac Mathe	National Logistics Officer	WFP
Jay Nash	Senior Program Officer USAID/OFDA/Representative	USAID
Jean Bisimwa	NFI/Shelter Cluster Focal Point	UNICEF, Bukavu
Jean Claude	Programme Officer and cluster lead	UNDP
Jean-Charles Dupin	Head of Office	OCHA, Bunia
Jean-Marie Delor	Technical Assistant	ECHO
Jeanne Coreke	Project Coordinator	UNHCR, Bunia
Jeanne Mangani	Project Coordinator	Oxfam Quebec, Bunia
Joanna Heil	Programme Development and CAFOD representative for NGO HR project	CAFOD
John Namegabe	Evaluator, JPFU, Focal Point, Early Recovery Cluster	UNDP, Bunia
José Bonyoma	Assistant Humanitarian Affairs Officer	OCHA, S. Kivu
Joseph De Beus	Cluster Coordinator and Community Development Specialist	UNDP
Juan Peña	AECID Representative	Embassy of Spain
Judicael Elidje	Team Leader, M&E Unit and Humanitarian Focal Point	UNFPA
Judicael Elidje	Humanitarian Focal Point	UNFPA
Juma Balikwisha	Minister of Plan	N. Kivu
Justin Garoula	Health Cluster Focal Point	WHO
Justin Ntamuguma	NFI/Shelter Cluster Focal Point, Emergency Officer	UNICEF, Bunia
Justin Vegenean	Co-Facilitator Health Cluster	Med Air
Kambale Baraka Delphin	Technical Coordinator	CESVI
Karen Perrin	Head of Sub-Office	OCHA, Goma
Kossy Ayigan		WHO
Lacina Barro	Team Leader Pooled Fund (UNDP)	JPFU
Laure Anquez	RRMP Coordinator / NFI/Shelter Cluster provincial Co-facilitator	Solidarités, Goma
Liliane Bitong Ambassa	Humanitarian Reform Officer, NGO and Humanitarian Reform Project	Oxfam GB

Loubna Benhayoune	Head of Sub-Office	OCHA, Bukavu
Lovy Nshombo	M&E Officer (UNDP)	JPFU, Bukavu
Luc Lomp	Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Coordinator	FAO
Magalie Salazar	RRMP Coordinator	UNICEF, Goma
Mamadou N'Daw	Head of M&E Unit (UNDP)	JPFU
Margarida Fawke	Principal Programme Administrator	UNHCR, Goma
Maria Torelli	Programme Coordinator	COOPI, Bunia
Marie Brault	First Secretary (Cooperation)	Embassy of Canada
Marlene Ostrowska	Project development Officer	IOM
Martial Mbilizi	National Expert Poverty Reduction Programme and ER Cluster Focal Point	UNDP
Masinango Chimanuka	Programme Assistant	UNHCR
Matthieu Kamwa	Representative	WHO
Maurizio Crivellaro	Country Director	Care International
Max Hadorn	Head of Office	OCHA
Maxence Delchambre	Provincial Coordinator NK	Oxfam GB
Meissa Dieng Cissé	Project Manager (UNDP)	JPFU
Michael Tschanz	Representative	IOM
Michel Dubois	Head of Field Office	UNDP, Bukavu
Mohamed Boukry	Regional Representative	UNHCR
Moïse Muhindo	Head of Sub-Office	FAO, Bukavu
Moïse Muhindo	Food Security Cluster Focal Point and FAO Head of Sub-Office	FAO, Bukavu
Monika Brulhart	Deputy Representative - Operations	UNHCR
Ndiaga Gueye	FAO Representative	FAO
Nelly Reliat	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	OCHA
Nestor Yombo-Djema	Associate Humanitarian Affairs Officer	OCHA
Nick Rene Hartmann	Deputy Country Director	UNDP
Nicolas Le Guen	Technical Assistant	ECHO
Olembo Otcha		VAS
Olivier Floriant Sieyadji	WASH Cluster Coordinator / WASH Specialist	UNICEF
Olivier Nkidiaka	Pooled Fund Officer (OCHA)	JPFU

Oswald Musoni	Director	Caritas, Goma
Peter McNichol	Head of Mission	Concern
Philippe Barragne Bigot	Chief, WASH Section	UNICEF
Pierre Gusira	Programme Officer	UNDP
Pierre Julien	Coordinator;	UNOPS
Pierre Vauthier	Food Security Cluster Coordinator	FAO
Pierrette Vu Thi	Representative	UNICEF
Reginald Kahwl	Field Supervisor	Oxfam Quebec
Richard Dackam-Ngatchou	Resident Representative	UNFPA
Roger Ndagijé	Provincial Health Coordinator	Caritas, Goma
Roselidah Ondeico	OIC/Coordinatrice Nationale SGBV	UNFPA, Goma
Sadio Kanté	Protection Officer	UNMAC
Salvator Bijojote	Pooled Fund Officer (OCHA)	JPFU
Sebastien Fouquet	DFID Representative	DfID
Sege Kunga	Chargé d'urgences	UNFPA
Siméon Nanama	Head of Nutrition	UNICEF
Sophie Meingast	Protection Project Manager	CESVI, Bunia
Sonja Varga	Humanitarian and Post-Conflict Programme Specialist;	UNOPS
Steven Michel	Chief	UNICEF
Tasha Gill	Emergency and Post-Conflict Child Protection Specialist	UNICEF
Théophile Bansimba	Nutrition Cluster Coordinator and Nutrition Specialist	UNICEF
Thony Kadogo		WFP
Tobias Schuldt	Humanitarian and Post-Conflict Officer, UNOPS	UNOPS
Tracy Sprott	Education Cluster Coordinator / Education Specialist	UNICEF
Typhaine Gendron	WASH Cluster Focal Point/WASH Emergency Officer	UNICEF Goma
Willy Lukemba	Assistant Humanitarian Officer	OCHA Bunia

## ANNEX VII - DETAILED METHODOLOGY

The Democratic Republic of the Congo country case study for the evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF) was carried out by a team of two consultants with a brief accompaniment of the Team Leader for the Kinshasa leg of the field visit. The field visit took place 10-29 October 2010 and covered 3 provinces; North Kivu, South Kivu and Province Orientale, with initial and concluding interviews in Kinshasa.

### In-country visits and interviews

53 meetings were held in Kinshasa and 15-20 meetings were held in each province. The meetings took the form of semi-structured interviews, focus group meetings, project reviews and at least one visit to a project site in each province. The stakeholders that were met included; staff of the Joint Pooled Fund Unit (JPFU); Pooled Fund (PF) donors and other donors (ECHO and USAID); Heads of agencies; international and national NGOs; cluster coordinators, cluster co-leads, cluster co-facilitators and cluster provincial focal points; local authorities in the provinces; and finally a limited number of project beneficiaries.

### Document Review

A continuous document review has been carried out before departing for the field, during and after. Much of the necessary documentation was located at the field level, spread between different actors resulting in documents being collected 'on the go'. An online database was set up by the JPFU for the sole purpose of gathering documentation from all the stakeholders for the evaluation team<sup>159</sup>. The team has gathered and read not only published reports, but also the following type of documentation:

- Official documentation by the HC and the JPFU about the allocation processes, such as guidance notes (*'lignes directrices'*)
- Provincial (CPIA) Pooled Fund strategy documents
- Provincial and national Cluster 'scoring' documents and/or meeting notes (*compte rendu*) of meetings where Pooled Fund allocations were discussed
- Samples of Technical Review Committee feedback to partners
- Minutes from PF Board meetings
- Inter-Cluster and CPIA meeting notes which have discussed Pooled Fund allocations
- Project Proposals and Reporting documentation
- Emails related to the allocation process as well as the implementation of the project

The recurring themes of the timeliness and predictability of funding by donors to the CHF, and by the CHF in-country presented in the previous evaluations carried out of the Pooled Fund in the DRC<sup>160</sup> were given renewed attention. In addition, the concerns raised in these reports about the allocation process in-country, monitoring and evaluation and the extent to which cluster leads are able to offer objective leadership, were also followed up on (at both the strategic and project levels) to see what, if any, actions had been taken to address these concerns.

<sup>159</sup> <http://rdc-humanitaire.net/?CHF-Evaluation-mission>

<sup>160</sup> Evaluation of CHF in DRC and Sudan 2006 & 2007

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### ***Project Review***

In order to address the important issues raised in the TOR around the quality and impact of CHF projects & programmes, a sample of 4 projects was selected for closer investigation in each province visited (12 in total). The team went over all project documentation, interviewed implementation staff and carried out visits to 4 project sites<sup>161</sup> in total.

The sampling criteria for the selection of these projects were as follows:

- **Different agency types:** UN, INGOs, national NGOs
- **Range of intervention types** in the full country sample: rapid response, longer term humanitarian, and Early Recovery where relevant
- **Range of clusters/ sectors:** the project sample in the DRC covered Education, Protection, Health, Early Recovery, Logistics, Food Security, WASH, and NFI/Shelter through the RRMP.

As the total number of projects in the DRC is very high (over 1100) the final selection of projects, based on the above criteria, was done by the JPFU.

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<sup>161</sup> One in Province Orientale, 2 in North Kivu and 1 in South Kivu



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## ANNEX VIII - DETAILS OF ANY QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS UNDERTAKEN

### Quantitative Analysis

A significant amount of funding data has been collected from various sources such as the OCHA Financial Tracking System and MDTF Gateway, as well as from the JPFU database. This allows the analysis of not only annual donor disbursements but also of exactly how the PF has been used in the DRC, the allocation between different agencies and clusters, and the extent to which it has been used in order to meet critical humanitarian needs – the original objective of the PF.

The quantitative data collected has also allowed the team to carry out an analysis of the disbursement processes in order to assess if they has speeded up or slowed down since 2008, as well as comparisons with other donors' and funding mechanisms' disbursement speeds.

## ANNEX IX – EVALUATION TOOLS APPLIED

The team leader developed an overall interview guide from which questions were selected for different types of interviewees

**Table 1: Interview guide**

<p>Stakeholder <i>Local &amp; Provincial Authorities</i> <i>National Governments</i></p> <p><b>CHF Recipient Agencies*</b> <i>(both UN &amp; I/NGOs)</i> <i>Management level &amp; CHF Board Members</i></p>	<p>Key questions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ How, and to what extent has the CHF contributed to improvements in the humanitarian community’s ability to address critical humanitarian needs in a timely and effective manner?</li> <li>➤ In what way, if at all, are you able to advise on, or participate in, the allocation of the CHF?</li> <li>➤ Is CHF more flexible than other donors, esp. in respect of spending periods*?</li> <li>➤ Has the CHF increased recipients’ ability to respond to unforeseen humanitarian needs during the year?</li> <li>➤ Does the CHF require fewer conditionalities than other donors?</li> <li>➤ Can funding be switched to meet unforeseen needs?</li> <li>➤ Has their Response capacity in 2008 &amp; 2009 been strengthened given knowledge that CHF is a reliable source of funding? Examples? *</li> <li>➤ Is there a faster start-up time for projects now that CHF exists?</li> <li>➤ Predictability: Do you feel confident about future funding from CHF compared with other funding sources?</li> <li>➤ Do you believe that the allocation decisions of the CHF in each country are seen as both fair &amp; consistent? (ask for examples)</li> <li>➤ What kinds of projects, or projects in which sectors/areas do you have most difficulty in raising funding for?</li> <li>➤ Has the CHF been able to fund these ‘hard-to-fund’ activities?</li> </ul> <p><b>CHF Funding processes:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ What is their perception of the transparency of the funding processes of the CHF?*</li> <li>➤ Do local &amp; national NGOs have good access to information about application procedures and when funding is available?*</li> <li>➤ Is there NGO training to increase their capacity to access resources from pooled funds to ensure better performance of national NGO participation into CHF*?</li> <li>➤ How much have national NGOs received from the CHF since 2008 in each of the 3 countries? Is this amount increasing or decreasing?***</li> <li>➤ How much time does it take between submitting a proposal to the CHF &amp; receiving a response (on average)?</li> <li>➤ Where there have been delays in decision making have there been any negative impacts on the recipient agency’s operations?</li> <li>➤ Are these delays increasing or decreasing since 2008? (Ask for examples)</li> <li>➤ Does the CHF involve lower or higher transaction costs for recipients than other types of funding (for example, in relation to the time taken to prepare and revise proposals?)</li> <li>➤ Have both NGOs and UN been able to use CHF funding to leverage more funds from other sources?*</li> <li>➤ To what extent has the CHF Emergency Reserve been used in complementarity with the CERF Rapid Response (RR) window to</li> </ul>
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## Stakeholder

**CHF Recipient Agencies\***  
*implementing staff/field staff*

**HC/RC**

**UNDP as Fund Manager in-country**

**CHF Secretariat**

## Key questions

respond to unforeseen emergencies.\*?

- Are there projects in your area which have been funded by the CHF?
- Would these projects have been able to go ahead without CHF support?
- Is CHF funding appropriate to the needs you see on the ground -e.g. adequate in quantity, sufficient duration, flexible enough to meet changing needs? )
- Is CHF funding reaching the most vulnerable?

**Strategic issues:**

- What is the value added of having a CHF as a complement to other funding streams?\*\*\*
- Has the CHF helped correct any imbalances in funding levels for the CAP?
- Has it enabled the HC to direct funds to where they are needed most both within and across clusters as compared to other funding sources?\*
- Has the Emergency Reserve enabled the HC to respond effectively to new humanitarian needs in 2008-10?
- Has the CHF contributed to ensuring duplication of activities is avoided and gaps within the system have been filled (Examples?)\*
- Has the CHF encouraged improved cluster co-ordination both within & between clusters? (Examples?)
- Extent to which the HC can retain clear prioritization in the face of many pressures to 'divide the cake' between different requests. (Ask for examples of both successful & unsuccessful attempts at such prioritization.)
- To what extent has CHF funding been channeled to the highest priority areas (geographical, thematic, sectoral) within the overall response?\*
- Extent to which RC/HC perceive his/her role as strengthened through the ability to oversee distribution of pooled funds such as CHF?\*
- What % of humanitarian actors are engaged in common needs assessments, joint planning and prioritization processes, and is this number increasing or decreasing?\*
- Has the CHF helped to bring in new donors to the country?\*
- How has their role changed, if at all, since 2007? What are the major issues they face?
- As Fund Managers, how do they balance accountability with flexibility?
- Are there clearly documented links between CHF allocations and the CAP/Sudan Work Plan, regional/sectoral priorities, and priorities as set out in the CHF policy papers?\*
- Are these priorities based on needs assessments at field level?\*
- Do these priorities feed through into actual funding allocations?
- Are there increasing numbers of new agencies participating in the CAP/Sudan Work Plan\*?
- What are the trends in CHF funding flowing to NGOs (vs. UN agencies) since 2006 (taking into consideration other factors as well)\*?
- How are gender issues recognized and prioritized in the allocation of the CHF?
- How is M & E divided up between the CHF staff and the recipient agency?
- Do the CHF M & E Units undertake any evaluations? (Ask for examples.) If so, how have the findings of these evaluations been followed up?
- To what extent do either the recipient agencies or M & E Units

## Stakeholder

*UN Country Team**Cluster leads/co-ordinators**Donors (in-country)*

## Key questions

themselves collect gender-disaggregated data?

- Do they feel that the CHF has enhanced the quality of the overall humanitarian response, and if so what specific features of CHF have contributed to these improvements?
- Has the CHF contributed to ensuring duplication of activities is avoided and gaps within the system have been filled\*?
- Is there any evidence that (a) more organizations participate in the joint planning process (CAP/Sudan Work Plan) following the introduction of the CHF & (b) More organizations participate in cluster coordination meetings following the introduction of the CHF\*?
- To what extent has CHF funding been able to correct imbalances in funding levels for the CAP/Work Plan?\*
- To what extent has CHF funding been channeled to the highest priority areas (geographical, thematic, sectoral) within the overall response?\*
- Has the CHF helped to bring in new donors to the country?
- Do more organizations participate in cluster coordination meetings following the introduction of the CHF?
- How do you ensure that agencies receiving the CHF have a real comparative advantage in relation to their past performance?\*\*\*
- Has the CHF (and related enhancement of clusters' mandate to advise on priorities) had a positive or negative impact on the way different clusters work?
- Has the CHF contributed to ensuring duplication of activities is avoided and gaps within the system have been filled\*?
- To what extent has CHF funding been channelled to the highest priority activities within clusters?\*
- To what extent are Cluster leads able to use CHF as a tool to incentivize coordination?\*
- As a result of the CHF have the Cluster identity and role of the cluster lead been strengthened through improved cohesiveness of cluster operations, including planning and allocations?\*
- Are cluster leads operationally present in all cluster areas?\*\*\*
- Has the CHF in any respect encouraged clusters to give a higher priority in their discussions to gender issues?
- Given the growing recognition of the need to address Early Recovery issues at an early stage in a response, have clusters been able to recommend any CHF funding for Early Recovery?

**Overall:**

- How good a 'fit' is there between the donors' country strategy and what the CHF is doing?
- What is the value added of having a CHF as a complement to other funding streams?\*\*\*
- What are their perceptions of the CHF's efficiency & effectiveness, and whether these have improved or declined since 2008?
- Does the CHF involve higher or lower transaction costs for donors than other types of funding?
- Compared to bilateral funding, does the CHF offer a donor 'value for money' in relation what is able to achieve?
- Has the quality of CHF's monitoring, reporting, and evaluation improved or not since 2007? (Ask for examples)
- What more general lessons have emerged regarding the design of CHF's in other countries?

Stakeholder  
***Non-‘donors’***

Key questions

- View of strengths & weaknesses of the CHF?
- How closely are they engaged in the CHF in-country even though not funding it?\*
- What changes would have to be made in the way in which the CHF is managed before they would recommend that their agencies/governments funded it?

The interview guide in Table 1 was a guide only, the actual questions asked depended on responses to earlier questions.

## ANNEX X - TEAM ITINERARY

<b>Kinshasa - Sunday 10 October 2010</b>	
	Arrival of Hugh Goyder, Team Leader, and Marie Spaak, Team Member
<b>Kinshasa - Monday 11 October 2010</b>	
	Meeting with OCHA RDC
	Meeting with the RC/HC and the Head of JPFU
	Meeting with staff of Joint Pooled Fund Unit
	Lunch break
	Meeting with Health Cluster Coordinator
	Meeting with WHO Representative
	Meeting with NGO Consortium/NGO and Humanitarian Reform project
	Meeting with UNDP Management Agent - Programme
<b>Kinshasa - Tuesday 12 October 2010</b>	
	Meeting with DFID Representative
	Security briefing
	Meeting with Merlin Country Director
	Lunch break
	Meeting with Inter-Cluster
	Meeting with NFI cluster Coordinator
	Meeting with Concern
	Meeting on RRMP
<b>Kinshasa - Wednesday 13 October 2010</b>	
	Meeting with SIDA Representative
	Meeting with Representative of The Netherlands
	Meeting with ACF USA
	Meeting with JPFU Head of M&E Unit
	Lunch break
	Meeting with Nutrition cluster Coordinator

	Meeting with Logistics Cluster Coordinator
	Meeting with WFP Representative
	Meeting with Early Recovery Cluster Coordinator
	Dinner with UNDP Deputy Country Director
<b>Kinshasa - Thursday 14 October 2010</b>	
Arrival of Annina Mattsson, Team Member	
	Meeting with DG ECHO
	Meeting with WASH Cluster Coordinator
	Meeting with UNHCR Regional Representative
	Meeting with Protection Cluster Coordinator Assistant
	Lunch break
	Meeting with FAO Representative
	Meeting with Food Security Cluster Coordinator
	Meeting with GenCap Gender Advisor
	Meeting with OCHA Head of Office
<b>Kinshasa - Friday 15 October 2010</b>	
Departure of Hugh Goyder at 17h00	
	Meeting with UNFPA
	Meeting with UNFPA Representative
	Meeting with UNOPS Coordinator
	Meeting with JPFU Programme Officer
	Meeting with Representative of Embassy of Spain
	Lunch break / Check-in
	Meeting with protection Cluster/Mine Action Sub-Cluster
	Meeting with Education Cluster Coordinator
	Meeting with UNDP JPFU TL – Lacina Barro
	Meeting with Head of JPFU
<b>Kinshasa - Saturday 16 October 2010</b>	



	Meeting with CAFOD/Caritas
	Meeting with Head of JPFU
<b>Goma - Monday 17 October 2010</b>	
Arrival Marie Spaak and Annina Mattsson	
	Meeting with UNDP
	Meeting with CPIA/Inter-Cluster
	Meeting with ECHO
	Meeting with JPFU M&E Officer
<b>Goma - Tuesday 18 October 2010</b>	
	Meeting with OCHA Office
	LWF project review
	UNFPA project review
	Lunch break
	Meeting with NRC
	Meeting with Oxfam
	Meeting with Health Cluster Focal Point
	Meeting with Caritas Goma
<b>Goma - Wednesday 19 October 2010</b>	
	Visit to Solidarités WASH project
	Meeting with Early Recovery Focal Point
	Meeting with Provincial Minister of Plan, Budget, Information and Media
	Meeting with Logistics Cluster Focal Point
<b>Goma - Thursday 20 October 2010</b>	
Departure of Annina Mattsson for Bunia	
	Visit to WFP logistics project
	Meeting with Head of JPFU
	Meeting with Food Security Cluster Focal Point
	Meeting with Focal Points of WASH, NFI, Nutrition and Education clusters
	Meeting with USAID/OFDA and BPRM
	Meeting with CARE International

	RRMP project review
	Meeting with Protection Cluster Focal Point
<b>Bukavu - Friday 21 October 2010</b>	
Departure of Marie Spaak for Bukavu	
	Meeting with UNDP Head of Field Office
	Meeting with CPIA, inter-cluster and co-facilitators
	Lunch break
	Meeting with WHO
	Project review VAS
	Dinner with OCHA Head of Sub-Office
<b>Bukavu - Saturday 22 October 2010</b>	
	Visit of ACF WASH project
	Meeting with JPFU M&E staff
	Meeting with Food Security Cluster Focal Point
<b>Bukavu - Monday 24 October 2010</b>	
	Meeting with Education Cluster Focal Point
	Meeting with WASH Cluster Focal Point
	Meeting with ECHO
	Lunch break
	Meeting with state technical services, IPAPEL (agriculture) and EPSP (education)
	Meeting with state technical service IPS (health)
	Meeting with OCHA staff member
<b>Bukavu - Tuesday 25 October 2010</b>	
Departure of Marie Spaak for Kinshasa	
	Point focal Cluster NFI & Abris
	Meeting with OCHA staff
	Meeting with UNDP Head of Field Office
<b>Kinshasa - Wednesday 27 October 2010</b>	
	Meeting with Nutrition and Logistics clusters co-facilitators
	Meeting with INGO Heads of Mission
	Meeting with CARE International
	Lunch Break

	Meeting with JPFU Project Officers
	Meeting with UNDP Management Agent - Finance
	Meeting with Oxfam GB
<b>Kinshasa - Thursday 28 October 2010</b>	
	Meeting with Representative of Canada
	Meeting with Protection Cluster/Child Protection
	Meeting with UNICEF Representative
	Meeting with Representative of Solidarités
	Meeting with IOM Representative
<b>Kinshasa - Friday 29 October 2010</b>	
	Debriefing with Head of JPFU
	Humanitarian Advisory Group
	Meeting with Head of JPFU M&E Section
	Debriefing with UNDP Country Director
	Meeting with UNDP Administrative Agent
<b>Bunia Thursday 20 October</b>	
	Arrival of Annina Mattsson in Bunia
	Meeting with UNHCR, CESVI and Oxfam Quebec
	Meeting with OCHA
	Inter-Cluster meeting (focal points and co-facilitators)
	JPFU M&E Officer
<b>Bunia, Friday 21 October 2010</b>	
	Departure for Field Visit axis Bunia - Masakini
	Field Visit - got stuck in Djugu due to bad roads and tree trunk blocking the way and had to spend the night in Fataki
<b>Bunia Saturday 22 October</b>	
	Project review, Caritas Bunia
<b>Bunia, Sunday 23 October</b>	
	Meeting Oxfam Quebec on Protection
<b>Bunia, Monday 24 October</b>	

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	Partner meeting: COOPI
	Partner meeting: APEC (local ngo)
	NFI + Shelter Cluster Lead, UNICEF
	Project review UNICEF PEAR
	RRMP
	Meeting with OCHA
	CPIA + Meeting to discuss PF project allocation