Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation: report on consultations

Report for the Inter-Agency Working Group on Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation

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Executive summary

1. Background and purpose
Since the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition there have been ongoing discussions concerning mainstreaming joint impact evaluation within the humanitarian system. With pressure to demonstrate that results are being achieved by humanitarian action, the question has arisen as to whether and how evaluations can take place that will assess joint impact. An Inter-Agency Working Group was established in November 2009 to manage and facilitate consultations on the potential of Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation (JHIE). It was agreed to hold a series of consultations between February and November 2010 to define feasible approaches to joint impact evaluation in humanitarian action, which might subsequently be piloted in one to two humanitarian contexts.

Consultations were held with a representative cross section of humanitarian actors: the affected population in 15 communities in Sudan, Bangladesh and Haiti, and local government and local NGOs in the same countries; with national government and international humanitarian actors in Haiti and Bangladesh; and with 67 international humanitarian actors, donors, and evaluators in New York, Rome, Geneva, London and Washington. This is perhaps the most systematic attempt to consult with the affected population during the design phase of a major evaluative exercise. This report details the results from the consultations.

2. Results from the consultations
Overall across all the consultations there was strong support for JHIE, with about 95 per cent of international respondents in favour, and about 75 per cent strongly in favour. While there were differences in opinion as to what JHIE should look like, the main question was the format and process of pilots, rather than whether they should take place. At the national level there was strong support from government in Haiti and Bangladesh. There was also support from municipal leaders and local NGOs, qualified in Haiti in particular by concerns that there had been inadequate consultation during the initial stages of the response, and therefore raising questions as to why they were being consulted about joint activities now. There was also support by a majority of respondents in all of the consultations - 90 per cent and up - for the main focus of a JHIE to be on changes in the quality of life of the affected population.

Across Bangladesh, Sudan and Haiti, the affected population were also supportive and viewed JHIE as a potentially useful way of ensuring accountability of the government and humanitarian actors to them. There was a demand from some of the affected population to be active participants in the evaluation process rather than passive respondents. But there was also scepticism about the quality of interaction between international actors and the affected population, and the likely uses of JHIE findings. As one community noted in South Sudan, they were concerned by the fact that they have participated in several evaluations, but there had been no change in the mistakes that they had identified. In Haiti there was a certain scepticism as to the real purpose and target of a JHIE: were the results going to be used for political reasons in the run-up to elections? A further common theme from the affected population consultations was that they wanted to know the results of the JHIE. They wanted communication and feedback mechanisms so that at the very least they could validate the findings of the evaluation. A focus on gender equality and women’s livelihoods and empowerment were also considered as essential elements in some communities.
There was limited interest in trying to come up with a definition of impact in the context of emergencies. One respondent expressed this general feeling as follows: “Impact means different things to different people, it’s difficult to come up with a common definition. The OECD-DAC definition is fine. It’s not useful to have an endless discussion as to what impact means.” In terms of JHIE subject matter, international respondents and the affected population had an interest in both shorter and longer-term results, that is in both life saving and livelihood related results. In Bangladesh the most common suggested focus was: “Sustainable or long lasting changes in the lives of affected people”; while in Haiti definitions centred around short-term response. The preferred focus has implications for evaluation methods, design and timing, and demonstrates that JHIE needs to be context specific.

In terms of methods to be selected, it was noted in the international consultations that advantages of joint evaluation were that it could be comprehensive, and be able to promote more sustained engagement with the affected population. There was agreement that JHIEs should take a mixed methods approach, with representative samples, but with a greater emphasis on qualitative methods which could foster participation. However, it cannot be assumed that affected people will want to participate, in particular if they have seen a lot of international actors coming to their communities and acting in an inappropriate fashion, or if they have experienced prior evaluations but seen little change. There was no support for quasi-experimental design in the relief phase, because of ethical and practical challenges, and very limited support for this in the recovery stage.

3 Implications of the consultations for JHIE
That findings are relatively consistent across all the consultations suggests that there is a firm basis on which to proceed with pilot JHIEs, but there are a number of issues to be worked out.

Defining the JHIE purpose
There were differences in consultations at international and national levels concerning preferences for the purpose of JHIE. At the affected population and municipal levels, there was clear support for JHIE to focus on accountability, both to the affected population and donors. For international respondents there was a mixed preference but with more of a focus on lesson learning between and within operations. For international respondents there was a mixed preference but with more of a focus on lesson learning between and within operations.

The implications of this for JHIE, as expressed by several consultation participants, is that there needs to be clarity at the outset as to the purpose of the JHIE. Respondents expressed this in different ways, with several at the national level noting the need for clear and agreed terms of reference, and others at the international level commenting on the need for an agreed conceptual framework. At an early stage in a JHIE the evaluation manager and team need to define with key users the main purpose of the evaluation, so that a conceptual framework can be developed in the evaluation Inception Report. The purpose will vary from context to context, but the main message is: don’t try and have two primary purposes of accountability and lesson learning, focus mainly on one or the other.

A number of respondents commented that JHIE focus will differ between complex emergencies and slow onset emergencies such as drought, and sudden onset emergencies such as cyclones, floods or earthquakes. For complex emergencies, in particular cases where there is long-term provision of emergency support and government is party to the conflict, the JHIE focus is more likely to be on life-saving
responses by the international humanitarian actors, protection issues, and the extent to which the ground is being laid for recovery. For sudden onset emergencies, the focus is more likely to be on recovery processes in which the government will be involved to a larger extent. In this context the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment, usually conducted after a major disaster by the government, UN, World Bank and the relevant regional development bank, and the subsequent recovery plan which sets the framework for the recovery process, can be taken as one central area of JHIE focus

Focus on the affected population
While the clearest message coming from the consultations is the need for a sustained focus on the results on the response on the affected population, not all respondents agreed on what this focus meant. For a majority of respondents at the international level, this meant using evaluation techniques to ensure that the affected population gets to tell their side of the story. For a minority of respondents, this meant engaging with the affected population through more formal quantitative surveys such as population surveys. For the affected population themselves across the three countries, this meant having more of a voice throughout the evaluation process and more active participation, as well as in defining specific areas for evaluation focus. Pilot JHIEs will need to determine early on what kind of engagement with the affected population is feasible.

Impact evaluation as part of the overall response
Some respondents, for example at the national level in Bangladesh, and in the international consultations, noted the need for development of a set of context-specific impact indicators which can be tracked from a baseline on. JHIE can build on regular needs assessment, monitoring and RTEs if a framework is in place at or prior to the beginning of an emergency concerning data to be collected and analysed at different stages of the emergency.

3. Recommendations for the JHIE Working Group
a. Undertake two pilot JHIEs, one in a natural disaster and one in a complex emergency setting. Undertake these pilots in 2011 and 2012, to test and provide guidance on different approaches to JHIE.

b. If a JHIE in Haiti goes ahead, use the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti as a basis for part of the evaluation, and explore the potential of using local municipal and a representative sample of camp committee members as part of the evaluation team. For the complex emergency JHIE, consider taking a case where engagement with government will be challenging, to test the potential for JHIE in this kind of setting.

c. Focus one pilot JHIE on lesson learning, and the other on accountability, to test and provide guidance on these different approaches. Where the JHIE is mainly for lesson learning purposes, explain the rationale for this carefully to the affected population.

d. Ensure that the evaluation methodology is participatory and involves ongoing engagement with the affected population. See the methodology in the proposed Haiti JHIE Terms of Reference in Annex 1.

e. Ensure that mechanisms are included for sustained involvement of the affected population in evaluation design and implementation. Build feedback sessions on evaluation results with the affected population into the evaluation methodology.
f. Develop the pilot JHIE methodology to focus on both short and longer-term results. See the methodology in the proposed Haiti JHIE Terms of Reference in Annex 1.

g. Develop the JHIE methodology by measuring against a baseline of impact indicators developed with key stakeholders, with representative sentinel samples, and informal control groups. See the methodology in the proposed Haiti JHIE Terms of Reference in Annex 1 for details.

h. Review the idea of an automatic trigger during the JHIE pilots.
1. Background and purpose

Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation (JHIE) has its origins in the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (1), with the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) being the second major system-wide joint evaluation (2). Since the TEC there have been ongoing discussions concerning mainstreaming joint impact evaluation within the humanitarian system. There have also been a number of joint evaluations (e.g. on IDPs) and individual agency led impact evaluations. With pressure to demonstrate that results are being achieved by humanitarian action, the question has arisen as to whether and how evaluations can take place that will assess joint impact. Questions have also arisen as to how impact evaluations can be useful at the country level to governments and humanitarian agencies – and hence to the affected population. Joint evaluation is viewed as having considerable benefits to the humanitarian system because of its potential scope in assessing areas of humanitarian response which are rarely captured by single agency evaluations (3); impact evaluation could provide the system with an intensive over-view of results which is not usually captured in evaluation of humanitarian action.

In June 2009 an OCHA commissioned paper on Evaluability Assessment for Impact Evaluation of the Humanitarian System at the Country Level was presented at a workshop looking at the future of interagency evaluations. Participants indicated support for further discussion, and requested OCHA to commission an options paper on joint humanitarian impact evaluation, which was presented at the 25th ALNAP meeting in London in November 2009 (4). Subsequently a Working Group on JHIE was established with membership from OCHA, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, DFID, ALNAP, ECB, DARA, HAP-I and Groupe URD in order to manage and facilitate consultations on the potential of JHIE. It was agreed to hold a series of consultations between February and November 2010 to explore the interest in and potential for one or two pilot JHIEs. This report presents the findings of these consultations and makes recommendations for next steps on JHIE.

The rationale behind the consultations was that before undertaking a major JHIE exercise there should be agreement on both proceeding with pilot JHIEs, and the scope, focus and methodology for these potential pilots. A second rationale was the need to consult with the affected population; while there are good intentions about consultation in evaluation stated in various agency policies, these rarely come to fruition, but considering some sections of the impact evaluation literature note that impact evaluation should focus on changes in the quality of life of the affected population, this consultation was deemed essential before a pilot JHIE could begin. The purpose of the consultations was therefore to collectively define feasible approaches to joint impact evaluation in humanitarian action, which might subsequently be piloted in one to two humanitarian contexts.

1 http://www.reliefweb.int/library/nordic/index.html
2 http://www.alnap.org/initiatives/tec.aspx
During the consultations a major international humanitarian response was taking place in Haiti, and because of the extent of the emergency there and interest in joint evaluation, this report was written in association with terms of reference for a pilot JHIE in Haiti, which form Annex 1 to this report.

JHIE can be defined as a joint evaluation involving two or more partners which analyses impact with a focus on changes in the quality of life of the affected population. Although there is no agreement on definition of impact in relation to relief and recovery, there is agreement that impact evaluation in these sectors should focus on:

- the end of the results chain – this could be several years, or it could be a few months, dependent on the kind of intervention.
- if possible, attribution and establishing a counterfactual, that is determining the causes that led to specific results, or at least establishing plausible assumption that the results are due to the intervention.
- changes in the lives of the affected population.
- unintended as well as intended results.
- negative as well as positive results.

JHIE has the potential to look at areas that cannot easily be evaluated in single agency evaluations, for example the overall results of multiple interventions vis-à-vis the affected population, and the ways in which coordination and management processes have led to these results. JHIE is likely to be particularly challenging in humanitarian contexts because of issues of lack of data, access, and security. JHIE, like all evaluation in the humanitarian sector, needs to proceed using the principle of do no harm, and ensure that the affected population is not subject to any risks because of the evaluation process.

This report is organized as follows. First it presents the methodology used for the consultations; then it provides a synthesis and overview of the results of consultations, followed by conclusions and implications of the consultations for JHIE; followed by recommendations for pilot JHIEs. Annex 1 provides a proposed Terms of Reference for a JHIE in Haiti including purpose, focus, methodology, timing, staffing and budget. This report has been informed by, but does not include discussion of, the humanitarian and academic literature on impact evaluation, which was reviewed in the two earlier OCHA commissioned papers referenced above.
2. Methodology

Overall coordination of the consultations was managed by OCHA’s Evaluation and Studies Section. Background papers based on the JHIE Options paper (footnote 4) were developed for three sets of consultations: with the affected population and local government and local NGOs; with national government and international humanitarian actors in country; and with international humanitarian actors and evaluators in New York, Rome, Geneva and London. Attempts were made to consult with a representative cross-section of the humanitarian sector. The main humanitarian actors in government and international organizations were canvassed. Government staff were highlighted as a key source of information, given that they are often bypassed in evaluation of humanitarian action. For the affected population consultations, sites were chosen that are prone to natural disasters or have been subject to conflict. Further methodological details can be found in the consultation background papers in Annex 3. The synthesis of consultations below is organized according to the topics in these background papers, with main trends noted.

Consultations were organized in three countries, Sudan, Bangladesh and Haiti. Sudan and Bangladesh were selected because they are sites of a complex emergency and natural disaster, and Haiti was selected as a country with an ongoing humanitarian and recovery response. In Bangladesh consultations were held with the affected population, local NGOs and government, facilitated by Muslim Aid, as well as the national level government and international humanitarian actors in Dhaka facilitated by the Emergency Capacity Building project and Oxfam. In South Sudan consultations were held with the affected population, local NGOs and government facilitated by Norwegian Church Aid. In Haiti consultations were held with the affected population, local NGOs and government as well as the national level government and international humanitarian actors in Port-au-Prince, facilitated by Groupe URD. HAP-I, one of the members of the JHIE Working Group, facilitated contact with their local partners in Bangladesh and Sudan. In total 15 communities were consulted in the three countries in group meetings – probably the most systematic consultation with the affected population in the planning stage of an evaluation exercise. Learning from this exercise is included as Annex 4.

Consultations were held at the international level as follows:

- In New York, with humanitarian evaluation offices, facilitated by OCHA; and with evaluators and academics, facilitated by UNICEF.
- In Rome, with WFP and FAO staff, facilitated by WFP.
- In Geneva, with cluster leads, and international NGOs, evaluators and academics, both facilitated by ECB and CARE.
- In London, with donors, and evaluators, facilitated by DFID and ALNAP.
- In Washington, with USAID.

Consultations were held with staff with similar functions, e.g. evaluators or cluster leads, in group meetings. In total 67 people were consulted at the international level. Participants are listed in Annex 5. As can be seen, there was extensive support for the consultation process from JHIE Working Group members and other stakeholders.
Limitations
Because of time and budgetary restrictions, it was not possible to consult at the central government level in Sudan. The cholera outbreak in Haiti in October-November 2010 meant restricted movement during the consultations with the affected population there, some of which were carried out by cell phone.
3. Results of consultations

3.1 Consultations with international humanitarian agencies, independent evaluators and academics

a. The purpose of JHIE

Respondents were asked what they thought should be the main purpose of JHIE, either lesson learning for an ongoing programme, and/or accountability to donors and the affected population, and/or generating knowledge for the system as a whole. If they thought it should be a mix of these three purposes, they were asked which they thought should be most prominent. They were also asked what the overarching question was that they would like to see answered by JHIE.

A number of respondents thought that the purpose of JHIE should both for lesson and accountability. In terms of prioritizing the main purpose, of the 22 respondents who answered this directly, eight were in favour of JHIE being mainly for generalizable knowledge generation, six for lessons learning within an operation, and eight for accountability to the affected population and donors. Some donors saw ALNAP’s role as central in transfer of knowledge between operations, for example as one respondent noted: "Knowledge generation for future interventions is a key purpose of JHIE; this is best done through ALNAP." Respondents noted that it would be difficult for JHIE to have an accountability purpose because of the issue of attribution – that is, because the whole of the response was being evaluated, specific results would not be attributable to specific agencies. Others saw this as a potential advantage of JHIE, as it would mean not getting bogged down in the debate about attribution and control groups.

Of those who responded as to the overarching question for JHIE, 90 per cent thought that this should relate to changes in the quality of life of the affected population. For example, all cluster leads that responded noted that this should be central focus. Whatever the purpose of JHIE, there was overwhelming support for this focus. The main reasons for this were:

- that impact could only be assessed at this level, that is changes in people’s lives;
- that JHIE would have the resources to consult systematically with the affected population;
- that JHIE could give a voice to the affected population; and
- that changes in people’s lives was the area that humanitarians knew least about.

Several respondents noted that one advantage of joint evaluations is their comprehensiveness: “They can look at targeting and overall efficiency of response throughout the whole system. Comprehensiveness is the unique selling point.” Another agreed as follows in relation to a focus on the affected:

JHIE has to be something other evaluations are not – we can take the perspective of the affected population and ask them if we meet their needs – no single actor can ask this question by itself. You can get more objectivity if affected population consultation is done by multiple agencies. The Sphere standards could be used to look at the perspective of the affected population.
One respondent raised the issue as to whether JHIE is the best way of getting at the affected population perspective. He asked whether consultation with the affected population could rather be done through a beneficiary survey, and if it would be possible to put together a research coalition for this purpose, without using “evaluation” in the title?

b. Understanding of impact
Respondents were asked their understanding of impact, whether this differed from emergency to emergency, and about the key indicators for measuring impact. In general respondents did not think that it was worthwhile to attempt to come up with a new definition of impact for JHIE. One respondent expressed this general feeling as follows: “Impact means different things to different people, it’s difficult to come up with a common definition. The OECD-DAC definition is fine. It’s not useful to have an endless discussion as to what impact means.” However, another noted that the OECD-DAC definition is too restrictive. Several respondents noted that understanding of impact is likely to differ depending on the type of emergency.

One respondent noted that developing a common set of indicators could be one result of the pilots. Respondents thought that JHIE needed to take into account both the relief and recovery phases of the response, and to work with a classification such as humanitarian, transition, and recovery. A significant number of respondents commented on the need to take changes in livelihoods into account in JHIE. Explicit or implicit in a number of comments was the need to look at longer-term results - as one person said, “Impact is long term. Monitoring can focus on saving lives, that is not an impact.”

c. Use and users
Respondents were asked how they expected JHIE findings and recommendations would be used in emergency contexts with which they were familiar (giving Sudan, Bangladesh and Haiti as examples), who the main users are likely to be, and how users should be involved in the evaluation process.

There was some discussion as to how single agencies would use the findings and recommendations of JHIE, and whether there was sufficient incentive for single agencies to be involved. One rationale given for single agencies to be involved was that they would understand more fully how the overall humanitarian system works and how they can influence this. However one respondent noted that there is limited use of these large evaluations by NGOs working on the ground.

Several respondents noted that governments and other national actors should be the main users of JHIE results, even though governments are often bypassed or not engaged in evaluation of humanitarian action. Government involvement would need to be limited in some cases, for example where they were considered to be perpetrators of conflict. Others noted the IASC as an important audience.

The consultation group of evaluators and academics in Geneva carried out an exercise where they could rank up to three main users. The four highest categories were: donors, to know who is most effective and efficient in a given context (9 votes); the affected population, to hold agencies accountable (6 votes); international organizations and the Humanitarian Country Team, for redirecting programming, measuring the effectiveness of partnerships, and analysing cross-cutting issues (6 votes); and national authorities, for
transparency and accountability, but also potentially negatively as a way to expel organisations (5 votes).

**d. Scale of the JHIE**

Respondents were asked what the scale of a joint impact evaluation should be, whether it should cover the whole humanitarian intervention by the international system, or part of this, and for example include government interventions, the role of remittances and local initiatives. There were also asked if it would be appropriate to evaluate the CAP, or if JHIE should focus beyond this. There was a detailed discussion of this area in most of the consultations.

There was agreement that JHIE should extend beyond the CAP to the wider response, but there were differences in opinion at to how far beyond the CAP JHIE should extend. Several respondents thought all key humanitarian and recovery actors should be covered, including government and civil society. Others argued for including contextual factors such as remittances and the economy, e.g. markets and the private sector. Most people responding to this area thought that it is important to put the humanitarian response in perspective, and acknowledge the importance of the affected population’s own initiatives, as well as the wider context, as in many cases the international response is quite modest.

However, there were differing views as to scale. A number of respondents noted that a multi-sector JHIE may be too large in many cases, and that there should be a sectoral approach, with a focus perhaps on food aid. The idea was raised of carrying out a number of individual sector JHIEs, and synthesizing these, which could lead to greater lesson learning.

**e. Methodology to be employed**

Questions related to methods were framed in the ongoing debate concerning the potential of mixing qualitative and quantitative approaches, and the relevance of quasi-experimental design to JHIE. Discussants were asked to focus on the feasibility of a mixed-method approach, and what the level of affected population participation through the evaluation process should be. This topic was introduced in the context of some organizations working on impact evaluation arguing that experimental design is its “gold standard”.

Participants thought that purpose and an overarching framework need to be decided upon before there could be agreement concerning methods. Of the nine respondents who voiced strong opinions, two thought there should be a mixed methods approach, five thought there should more of a focus on qualitative approaches, and two were in favour of quantitative methods; as one person noted: “Quantitative methods are essential if the evaluation is to be used by policy makers.” However, overall there was no support for formal experimental design in the relief phase; and limited support for using this approach in the recovery phase, because quasi-experimental design appeared counter-intuitive to the kinds of participatory approaches upon which humanitarian action should be founded.

Academics and independent evaluators expressed the opinion that JHIE should be closer to a research initiative (which is how the Joint Evaluation on Emergency Assistance to Rwanda has been retrospectively described) than a traditional evaluation,
using cross-sectional and panel design or sentinel groups. There were a number of other comments as to specific methodologies:

- Use proportional piling to determine which interventions have been most important to the affected population;
- Some assessment tools in Haiti took over 3 hours – it is important to be careful that the population does not feel over-assessed;
- Use community observatories, where communities are given phones and cameras to create a time series; and
- Individual interviews are important; it is important to use not only focus groups, but to combine these with observations, and case studies of communities and households.

f. Timing and links between needs assessment, monitoring and JHIE
Respondents were asked about the appropriate timing for a JHIE, and the potential for connecting JHIE with needs assessment and ongoing monitoring. There was limited discussion of either of these topics, but the few people who commented noted that early recovery is now quite well defined and can’t be left out of JHIE, which has implications for timing. Other respondents noted that there is a level of impatience in the international community with long evaluation processes, as the feeling is that if evaluations take too long then their value can be lost. Respondents discussed feeding results of a JHIE back into operations on an ongoing basis, and conducting small and medium sized JHIEs that could be carried out fairly quickly. There was also agreement that finalizing needs assessment indicators is a foundation for using indicators for JHIE.

g. Coordination
There was also limited discussion of the area of optimal coordination arrangements for JHIE, partly because the main features of JHIE’s would need to be established before coordination mechanisms could be determined. One respondent noted that there should be both an open group for agreement on the scope of work, and a smaller working/management group (as is the case in most large joint evaluations). Another commented that there needs to be different kinds of jointness which agencies can pick up on if they want to – i.e. develop different models rather than one model.

h. Trigger mechanism
Respondents were asked whether there should be an automatic trigger for JHIE, for example when funding reaches a certain level. Seven out of eight participants were against the idea of a trigger mechanism, with one noting that a trigger would be important as it could help with a focus on forgotten emergencies. One participant suggested that it would be useful to have the JHIE pilots first, and then determine if a trigger mechanism is needed.

i. Whether JHIE pilots should go ahead
The vast majority of respondents thought that JHIE should proceed, with only one person having serious doubts. There were a number of enabling contextual factors that respondents thought should be in place for a pilot JHIE to proceed. These included:
The right locations. There was some discussion as to whether Darfur would be an appropriate location for a pilot, given that, according to some respondents, it is something of an “outlier”. Pakistan and Bangladesh came up as possible locations, and there was substantial discussion of holding a pilot in Haiti (as reflected in the ToR include as Annex 1).

The need for leadership. Respondents noted OCHA and ALNAP as two agencies that could potentially take the lead.

The need for clear objectives and agreement on the purpose of the JHIE.

Given the wide range of initiatives already underway, the need to ensure that a pilot JHIE does not duplicate any other activities. This would require a careful scanning of evaluation work in potential JHIE pilot locations.

3.2 Consultations at the national level
Different sets of questions were asked to different participants in the consultations at the national level. At the national capital level, government staff and international actors were asked a set of questions similar to those asked to those at international HQ, with added questions related to national capacity and involvement. At the regional/local level, government staff and local NGOs were asked about their experience with evaluation, their views on the feasibility of JHIE, and local capacity. The affected population consultations focused on three areas:

The key topics for the evaluation. What are the most important topics that the affected population would like to see as a focus – e.g. immediate live saving initiatives, protection, gender equality, and/or livelihoods? Does this differ between different groups?

Participation. How would the affected population like to participate in JHIE, if at all? Would they be willing to organize community meetings and/or focus groups? Who would participate (men, women etc)?

Methodology. What kinds of methods are most appropriate, and how would the affected population like to be involved in gathering and analyzing data? Are there any informal indigenous or local methods of gathering impact type information (e.g. community councils)?

Findings below are differentiated by type of respondent and country as relevant.

3.2.1 National capital level in Bangladesh and Haiti
a. The purpose of JHIE
In Haiti respondents thought that they could not prioritize the purpose of JHIE, but that it should be for four inter-connected purposes:

- Lesson learning and taking stock of lessons learnt;
- Accountability to the donors (institutional and private donors);
- Accountability to the affected population.
- Demonstrating the ability of different actors to work together.
In Bangladesh there was clear support for the purpose being either ensuring accountability to the affected population and/or generating knowledge for the system as a whole, with RTE, in the view of one respondent, being more relevant for ongoing learning.

b. Understanding of impact
In Bangladesh the most common definition was: “Sustainable or long lasting changes in the lives of affected people” Most respondents said that the impact will differ from emergency to emergency, and impact is dependent on the time, context and nature of the interventions in any particular geographical location.

In Haiti, representatives of donors, UN agencies, some large NGOs and the Red Cross identified the following meta-level impacts:
- no major malnutrition crisis;
- no major epidemic;
- no large-scale social unrest.

At a micro level, the following impacts were identified:
- lives saved (during the emergency and stabilization phases);
- low malnutrition rates;
- Access to livelihoods e.g. through Cash for Work programmes;
- Impact on the local economy due to the injection of cash and relief supplies;
- Access to water;
- Access to sanitation facilities;
- Access to health services;
- Access to shelter;
- Social structures are strengthened;
- Reduction of risks.

In other words, in Haiti, the definitions centred around short-term response rather than the longer-term definition in Bangladesh, perhaps because Haiti is in the middle of a major response.

c. Main use and users
In Bangladesh, most respondents suggested that the findings and recommendations should contribute to the Disaster Management Act of the Government. The findings and recommendations could also be used to scale up future humanitarian/ emergency programmes by different actors. Respondents also emphasized the importance of follow up to findings and recommendations, as this is one of the weakest areas for most of the organizations consulted. Some of the respondents also thought that the affected community should know about the findings and recommendations of JHIE, which would help them think about follow up mechanisms at their level.

From both Haiti and Bangladesh a number of points came across concerning the format and accessibility of JHIE reports, in particular that the reports need to be:
- short and easy to read;
- credible, so they do not only talk about positive points, but also underline challenges;
- visual – both reports suggested using video;
- available in the local language.
d. Methodology to be employed
In the Haiti consultations, methodological issues were raised several times:

- TORs have to be very clear. If they are not, problems of understanding are common.
- The sample on which a JHIE is based is “mission critical”. There is a serious risk that limited time or resources will make it too small or agency-biased.
- It is essential to find the right mix of quantitative and qualitative indicators to assess impact.
- It is important to clarify how impact evaluations differ from classical evaluations which focus on results and compliance with the project’s objectives.
- In Haiti, local committees and the disaster-affected population have rarely been involved in evaluations which have been carried out, or, for that matter, in needs assessments and monitoring. Some effort is now being made in this area.

In Bangladesh there were three main responses, that there should be a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches (a unanimous position), that there should be a set of agreed impact level indicators prior to development of the methodology, and that participation of the affected population should be fostered at every stage of the JHIE process.

e. In-country capacity to carry out the evaluation
In Bangladesh most respondents emphasized the need for mixed national and international expertise in the evaluation team, as international expertise brings a wider humanitarian perspective and national expertise provides in-depth analysis of the national context. This composition was also thought to help ensure bias free analysis. Government ownership was thought to be key to success of JHIE, with a Government representative included in the evaluation team to ensure accountability and follow up.

In Haiti, respondents thought that the capacity to carry out joint evaluation exists but is confronted by several difficulties:

- There has been a huge loss of key competencies and human resources due to the earthquake. Many competent and qualified people died. In addition, staff have left the administration to work for NGOs or have left the country;
- There is regular training on M&E in the main training centre of the Ministry of Planning, in Haiti State University and in Quisqueya private university. NGOs also train on M&E techniques;
- The planning and evaluation units in the different line ministries are weak and require proper support;
- The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission is setting up its own structure, the Performance and Accountability Office. It is in the process of recruiting staff but does not have capacity as yet.

Respondents noted that despite the disaster, data collection capacity is strong, but there is weakness in terms of analysis.

f. Timing and links between needs assessment, ongoing monitoring and JHIE
In Bangladesh most of the participants through that JHIE should be conducted at least six months after the completion of the humanitarian/emergency intervention. This gap
would facilitate the measurement of long-term changes in the lives of affected community and how sustainable these are. Most respondents thought the process of JHIE should not take more than three months, because if it took longer than this it might lose focus. However, some respondents felt that it would take at least six months to complete the whole process. In Haiti the general opinion was that the end of the first year would have been a good time to start a JHIE, but this was not feasible because of the upcoming elections.

In Bangladesh most respondents noted that having a baseline in place is one of the weakest areas for many organizations. Other respondents mentioned that there is no need of a baseline for JHIE, as the team could get an idea of the pre-disaster situation using different participatory exercises at the community level, supported by secondary sources.

In Haiti, one of the most complicated issues raised was that of identifying impact indicators for unexpected, indirect or negative impacts. This type of impact is sometimes as, if not more, important than the expected positive impacts which evaluations try to capture.

g. JHIE trigger
In Haiti the view expressed was that an automatic trigger for JHIE is attractive because it offers predictability and facilitates early funding, early identification of data sources and early mobilization of human resources. In Bangladesh most respondents felt that there should a government policy of conducting an impact evaluation for any large-scale emergency intervention.

In both countries it was thought that funding should not be the only trigger. Unconventional crises and responses, difficult operations and non-traditional responses could also trigger an impact evaluation, and, if necessary, in view of the complex institutional setting, a JHIE.

h. Whether JHIE pilots should go ahead
There was strong endorsement from both countries as to the idea of pilot JHIEs. The Bangladesh country report notes that most respondents welcomed the idea, thinking the work will add value to the humanitarian sector in Bangladesh. Only two respondents thought that Bangladesh is not ready for JHIE. Firstly, this is due to the attitude of different agencies. According to the respondent, there is a tendency, in some agencies, of not sharing information and not working closely with each other. Secondly, the process of JHIE should convince that it will add an extra value to the future humanitarian programme and is different from other impact assessments/evaluations.

In Haiti the country report concludes: “There is now wide recognition that a joint impact assessment is needed. The debate now is more about how this should be done, when and with whom.”

3.2.2 Community level and local NGOs and government in Haiti, Bangladesh and South Sudan
In South Sudan, consultations revealed that most people would like a JHIE to be conducted to establish the kind of results that have been achieved by humanitarian action for the past six years. The most important areas of intervention that the affected population would like a focus on are mainly life saving initiatives, including food aid and
food security; health and sanitation. Also development programs were mentioned, including promotion of gender equality, women's and youth empowerment, especially income generating activities.

The main purpose for a JHIE to be conducted was for accountability to donors and more particularly to the affected population. There was strong emphasis on the need to include the perspectives of the affected population as a central feature in a JHIE, but also including the affected population in the planning and implementation of JHIE. As one respondent noted:

Carrying out evaluations by looking at results of interventions would not be feasible without going to the ground and assessing what has been done, and whether it has created positive or negative impact. For example, food aid sometimes creates conflict in the communities, and therefore creates a negative impact. This cannot be detected unless one consults the affected population.

Most respondents believed that a JHIE would give opportunity for the stakeholders in humanitarian aid to take stock, know where they have succeeded, and where efforts need to be made for improvement. Most respondents wanted to participate in JHIE in groups, either as focus group discussions or community meetings. They would be willing to organize community meetings if needed. Some communities also mentioned the possibility of being represented by existing community committees. In once instance the community was not in favor of individual interviews as they were concerned about victimization.

In Bangladesh all of those consulted strongly supported the concept of Joint Evaluation. Participants thought that lesson learning for the ongoing programme, and generating knowledge for the system as a whole were useful, but that accountability to the affected population was the most important purpose. One female respondent noted: “You shouldn't wait to know what was good and what was bad after the disaster is over. You should come to us even during disaster to know how we are doing with your aid.” Respondents strongly recommended that affected communities should be in a facilitating role together with other stakeholders. The respondents felt that they don't have much technical knowledge related to methodology, but wanted a methodology that would allow them to participate, and designed in such a way that all voices are heard. Methodology should be a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches. Innovative ways should be identified to report back to the affected people and local government. Female respondents noted that there were many constraints to their participation in social activities, so that an evaluation would need to be proactive to ensure their inclusion; and also that children’s views would need to be represented.

In Haiti while municipal representatives welcomed the idea of impact evaluation and were enthusiastic about the idea of taking part, a recurring theme was the bitterness that they felt about not having been involved and consulted in the earlier phases of the response. As one respondent noted: “How can we be involved in evaluating their work if we do not know what they do and why and with what objectives?” Another issue which came up particularly in Petion Ville is the economic impact of the presence of the aid community. Though employment has been created, rents and other prices have gone up, making life difficult for the average Haitian. “Are you ready to include this issue in a global JHIE?” was a frequently raised question
For camp committee members the idea of a JHIE inspired both interest and suspicion. The initial reaction was “c’est affaire de blancs” (it is white man’s business), because many of these committees were still frustrated by the way they were treated during the early phases of the relief operation. They wondered why they were being interviewed about a JHIE at this late stage when they were not consulted before about people’s needs. One critical issue was what activities and which period of the response should be evaluated. The committee members interviewed explained that so many things went wrong that the whole operation deserves to be the object of a very thorough lesson learning exercise. They also said that most of the changes could not be attributed to the aid response alone and that improvements in living conditions were more the result of efforts by the population than the work of aid agencies. They thus very clearly raised the question of “attribution”. According to several committee members, one of the most complex issues will be to analyse the psychosocial impact of the long months spent in sites. This type of impact assessment was considered more important than assessing the health or economic impact.

Interviewees also had doubts about how the “joint” part of JHIE would actually function. They had witnessed so much competition between aid actors in their sites and camps that it was not obvious to them that these different actors could really work together for a joint evaluation. The site committee members were interested in taking part in the JHIE exercise and helping in terms of interaction with people in sites. However, they pointed out that they did not have the competencies or the financial means to do so.

For the affected population, women interviewed welcomed the idea of an impact evaluation, but pointed out that the impact of activities carried out during the first few months was no longer apparent as the situation had evolved. How, for instance, could the impact of the early food distributions be evaluated? How could the impact of the delivery of tarpaulins be assessed when people had constructed their own zinc and wood shelters? Some mentioned that the impact of receiving a T-shelter from an aid agency could be analyzed by comparing the situation of those who had received one with that of the hundreds who had received nothing. Women noted that if they are to take part in focus groups or other types of interviews for the JHIE, this will have to be organized in a way that allows them to organize proper childcare. The women also expressed the hope that JHIE would not only focus on impact, but would also be a chance for them to express their views about the aid system and the behaviour of certain aid agencies. For men interviewed, impact evaluation is very much linked to livelihoods and cash for work programmes and shelter/human settlement issues, and they thought that cash for work programmes should be a top priority for impact evaluation. One of the men interviewed mentioned that the fact that many services were free was good at the beginning, but not in the long run. He explained that free water distribution in camps had compromised the management of the old water kiosks. How can the longer-term possible negative impact of aid be measured in this respect?

The main recommendations from the affected population were:

- JHIE is very important, and should be done from time to time to ensure that interventions are achieving their objectives.

- The findings of evaluations and what is going to be done as a result should be communicated to the population.
4. Conclusions and implications of the consultations

4.1 Conclusions from the consultations

Overall across all the consultations there was general support for JHIE, with strong support in particular at the international level where about 95 per cent of the 67 people consulted were in favour of JHIE, with about 75 per cent strongly in favour. While there were differences in opinion as to what JHIE should look like, the main question was how the pilots should function rather than whether they should take place. At the national level there was also strong support from national authorities in Haiti and Bangladesh. There was also support from municipal leaders and local NGOs, qualified in Haiti in particular by concerns that there had been inadequate consultation during the initial stages of the responses, and raising questions as to why they were being consulted about joint activities now. There was support by a majority of respondents - 90 per cent and up - for the main focus of a JHIE to be on changes in the quality of life of the affected population.

Across Bangladesh, Sudan and Haiti, the affected population were also supportive and viewed JHIE as a potentially useful way of ensuring accountability. There was also a demand to be active participants in the evaluation process rather than passive respondents. But there was also scepticism about aid in general, the quality of interaction between international actors and the affected population, and the likely uses of JHIE findings. As one community noted in South Sudan, they were concerned by the fact that they have participated in several evaluations, but there had been no change in the mistakes that they had identified. In Haiti there was a certain scepticism as to the real purpose and target of a JHIE; were the results going to be used for political reasons in the lead up to the general and municipal elections? The affected population have seen many visitors and little done after these visits, and wondered if JHIE will have the same lack of impact on them. A further common theme of the affected population consultations was that they wanted to know the results of the JHIE. There needed to be communication and feedback mechanisms so that at the very least they could validate the findings of the evaluation.

There was limited interest in trying to come up with a definition of impact in the context of emergencies. A working definition of a JHIE could be: a joint evaluation involving two or more partners which analyses impact with a focus on changes in the quality of life of the affected population. In terms of subject matter of a JHIE, international respondents and the affected population had an interest in both shorter and longer-term results. This has implications for evaluation methods, design and timing.

It should be recalled that this is one of the first times that local authorities and NGOs and the affected population have been systematically consulted in the design phase of a major evaluation exercise. That findings are relatively consistent across three countries and quite different contexts suggests there are systemic issues with which JHIE pilots will need to deal. Firstly, while there were calls for greater participation in the evaluation process, it cannot be assumed that affected people will want to participate, in particular if they have seen a lot of international actors coming to their communities and acting in an inappropriate fashion, or if they have experienced prior evaluations but seen little change. The message is clear that JHIE can’t operate in the fashion of much evaluation of humanitarian action, where affected people are often consulted as an afterthought and there is almost no participation other than as, at best, respondents. As noted in the international consultations, one of the advantages of joint evaluation is that it should be able to promote more sustained engagement with the affected population. If the main
purpose of JHIE is to be lesson learning either within the operation or between operations, it needs to be explained carefully to the affected population that the purpose of the JHIE is for the benefit of the system as a whole.

Secondly, there needs to be much improved communication processes with municipal authorities and affected people, in particular of the results of JHIE and how they are going to be used. In many inter-agency processes information flows tend to be “upwards” towards national and international capitals, rather than “downwards” towards evaluation participants at the local level. The implications for JHIE are clear in terms of the need to adjust the evaluation methodology to ensure appropriate interaction with affected people.

4.2 Implications of the consultations for JHIE
This section reviews the implications of the consultations for pilot JHIEs, taking into account as well learning from past joint evaluations.

4.2.1 Defining the JHIE purpose
There were differences in findings at international and national levels concerning preferences for the purpose of JHIE. At the affected population and municipal levels, there was clear support for JHIE to focus on accountability, both to the affected population and donors. For international respondents there was a mixed preference but with more of a focus on lesson learning between and within operations. This may stem from the different location of respondents, with the affected population particularly concerned with accountability as the emergency response affects them more directly.

The implications of this for JHIE, as expressed by several consultation participants, is that there needs to be clarity at the outset as to the purpose of the evaluation. Respondents expressed this in different ways, with several at the national level noting the need for clear and agreed terms of reference, and others at the international level commenting on the need for a clear conceptual framework. Evaluation managers usually include both lesson learning and accountability in evaluation Terms of Reference, often not thinking through the implications of this for the evaluation team and methodology. One lesson from the TEC is that without an agreed conceptual framework it becomes more challenging to ensure a common understanding of the evaluation purpose, define key evaluation questions and users, and enable consistency between different evaluation products (5). The TEC had three main aims: to improve the quality of humanitarian action, including linkages to longer term recovery and development; to provide accountability to the donor and affected-country populations on the overall tsunami response; and to test the TEC approach as a possible model for future joint evaluation. Each of these is a major undertaking and attempting three objectives in one evaluation may have been over-ambitious.

Patton comments on those who think that judgment and learning can be combined equally in one impact evaluation (6):

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5 TEC (2006a) "Notes from an ‘After Action Review’ held at the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) Core Management Group (CMG) meeting, Copenhagen." Mimeo.
one purpose is likely to become the dominant motif and prevail as the primary purpose informing design decisions and priority uses; or else, different aspects of an evaluation are designed, compartmentalized, and sequenced to address these contrasting purposes. I also find that confusion among these quite different purposes, or failure to prioritize them, is often the source of problems and misunderstandings along the way, and can become disastrous at the end when it turns out that different intended users had different expectations and priorities.

At an early stage in a JHIE the evaluation manager and team need to define with key users the main purpose of the evaluation, so that a conceptual framework can be developed in the evaluation Inception Report. The purpose will vary from context to context, but the main message is: don’t try and have two primary purposes of accountability and lesson learning, focus on one or the other.

A number of respondents commented that JHIE focus will differ between complex emergencies and slow onset emergencies such as drought, and sudden onset emergencies such as cyclones, floods or earthquakes. For complex emergencies, in particular cases where there is long-term provision of emergency support and government is party to the conflict, as in Darfur, the JHIE focus is more likely to be on life-saving responses by international humanitarian actors, protection issues, and the extent to which the ground is being laid for recovery. For sudden onset emergencies, the focus is more likely to be on recovery processes in which the government will be involved to a larger extent. As the ALNAP lessons learned paper on response to earthquakes notes: “Agencies need to focus on the recovery phase even from the start of the operation as there is no gap between relief and recovery, and recovery is the biggest challenge in sudden-onset natural disasters. The distinction between relief and recovery is an artificial one. For a household after an earthquake, relief actions to save the lives or reduce the suffering of household members or neighbours may be accompanied by efforts to protect livelihoods by rescuing assets such as livestock and tools. The distinction between relief and recovery at the donor level is clear in terms of how funding applications are dealt with, but making the distinction in the field is far more difficult – and irrelevant to affected households.” (7)

For this reason in sudden onset emergencies, JHIE is more likely to focus on longer-term recovery, usually defined as between 3 and 18 months after the disaster. In this context the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment, usually conducted after a major disaster by the government, UN, World Bank and the relevant regional development bank, and the subsequent recovery plan which sets the framework for the recovery process, can be taken as one central mechanism for JHIE focus (8) – see Annex 1 for further details on this in the Haiti context. There is a link here to ensuring linkages with the national government, as for example one criticism of the TEC process, despite various attempts

made, concerned lack of affected-country involvement. (9). If one area of focus of the JHIE is the national recovery plan, there is greater likelihood that there will be government engagement and participation.

It is clear from earlier research and the consultations that there is no agreement on what impact means in humanitarian action, but there is agreement that an overarching definition may not be needed because impact will mean different things in different contexts. However, there is consensus that JHIE needs to cover both life-saving interventions as well as interventions aimed at supporting longer-term recovery, such as support to livelihoods.

4.2.2 Focus on the affected population and appropriate methodologies
The clearest message coming from the consultations is the need for a sustained focus on the results of the response on the affected population. There was unanimous agreement concerning this from all levels. Not all respondents agreed however on what this focus meant. For a majority of respondents at the international level, this meant using participatory and/or qualitative evaluation techniques to ensure that the affected population gets to tell their side of the story. For a minority of respondents, this meant engaging with the affected population through more formal quantitative surveys such as population surveys. For some of the affected population themselves across the three countries, this meant having more of a voice throughout the evaluation process and more active participation, as well as specific areas for evaluation focus, including both short term relief and longer-term issues such as livelihoods.

This has implications for the methods to be selected. There was no support for quasi-experimental design in the relief phase, because of ethical and practical challenges, and very limited support in the recovery stage, where quasi-experimental design has been used with some technical success. (10) While a number of specialists in development evaluation argue that quasi-experimental design is the best approach for determining attribution, particularly when combined with an assessment of programme theory (11), the trade-offs between appropriateness and rigour need to be taken into consideration. Quasi-experimental design, usually involving large-scale surveys where enumerators have limited interaction with affected people but rather fill out pre-set questionnaires, is not conducive to participation. If quasi-experimental approaches could be combined with qualitative interviews there might be more of an argument for their incorporation into an overall evaluation design, but to date there have been no examples of this in evaluation of the relief or recovery phases of a response. Participatory impact assessment tools are likely to be preferable (12). The clear message from the consultations is that participatory approaches and systematic participation of the affected population should be paramount in the JHIE process.

Goal-free evaluation, which offers an alternative to programme theory approaches, may offer a useful methodology for JHIE. Much work on impact evaluation has focused on

9 http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/tecsurvey(2).pdf
programme theory/theory of change and logic models. White for example refers to the need to test the programme theory in combination with experimental design (13). Programme theory may be useful in some cases, but, as some consultation participants commented, the idea of constructing or assessing programme theory is counter-intuitive in the case of the relief phase and complex emergencies in particular, because responses take place in an environment which is constantly changing. Logframes and result chains in this context, although often required by funders, are at best partly relevant. Goal-free evaluation studies all aspects of the programme and notes all positive and negative aspects, without focusing on information that supports the goals. The evaluator remains purposely ignorant of a program's goals, searching for all effects of a program regardless of its developer's objectives, for example as expressed in log frames. If the program is doing what it is supposed to do, the evaluation should confirm this, but the evaluator will also be more likely to uncover unanticipated effects that the goal-based evaluations would miss because of the preoccupation with stated goals. (14) Given the OECD-DAC definition of impact: “Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended”, goal-free evaluation would appear to be useful in determining negative, indirect and unintended results which programme theory might have difficult in capturing, and which are particularly important on the context of “doing no harm”. In addition, focusing directly on the results of interventions requires engagement with the affected population, who are a key source of information. And in joint humanitarian responses there is no single programme theory which covers all interventions, making a focus on programme theory less useful.

4.2.3 Impact evaluation as part of the overall response

Some respondents, for example at the national level in Bangladesh, and in the international consultations, noted the need for development of a set of impact indicators which can be tracked from a baseline on. JHIE can build on regular needs assessment, monitoring and RTEs if a framework is in place at or prior to the beginning of an emergency concerning data to be collected and analysed at different stages of the emergency. Impact evaluation is one piece of a larger monitoring and evaluation framework which needs to be in place to assess results and improve programming. As Bamberger notes (15): “A successful IE [impact evaluation] program can only be achieved when it is part of a broader M&E system. It would not make sense, or even be possible, to focus exclusively on IE without building up the monitoring and other data-collection systems on which IE relies. Although IEs are often the highest profile (and most expensive) evaluations, they only provide answers to certain kinds of questions; for many purposes, other kinds of evaluation will be more appropriate.” One consultation respondent called this “evaluation preparedness”, that is trying to integrate evaluation design from an early stage of the response.

Several respondents noted the need for the development of impact indicators, specific to each context, that can be tracked from a baseline through to measurement of impact. There has been considerable work carried out on indicators, including in relation to inter-agency needs assessment, Sphere and SMART. Indicators are also developed in country by clusters. JHIE should build on this work in each context and construct a small set of quantitative and qualitative indicators (e.g. 10-12) in key areas such as protection, health, education, shelter, water and sanitation, and livelihoods, that can be tracked throughout the JHIE process.

4.2.4 Coordination and management arrangements

A useful typology for management arrangements is given in the OECD-DAC guidance on joint evaluation (16):

- **Classic joint evaluation**: Participation is open to all stakeholder agencies. All partners participate and contribute actively and on equal terms (e.g. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, General Budget Support)

- **Qualified joint evaluation**: Participation is open only to those who qualify, through membership of a certain grouping (e.g. EU) or through participation in the activity that is being evaluated

- **Hybrid joint evaluation**: Includes a wide range of alternative ways of joint working:
  a. responsibilities are delegated to one or more agencies while others take a ‘silent partnership’ role.
  b. some components of the evaluation are undertaken jointly while others are delivered separately.
  c. various levels of linkage are established between separate but parallel and interrelated evaluations.
  d. the joint activity is agreeing a common evaluation framework, and responsibility for implementation of individual evaluations is devolved to different partners.
  e. research, interviews and team visits are undertaken jointly but each partner prepares a separate report.

Some respondents noted that the “hybrid joint evaluation”, option d., might be the most appropriate to test for a joint humanitarian impact evaluation. This was because the system would be best able to manage this level of “jointness”. This option was used in the IDP and Basic Education evaluations among others. The key point is that JHIE should not reinvent the wheel when deciding which coordination model to use – there is experience with a variety of models which will be appropriate to different circumstances.

In relation to management arrangements, while this was not discussed in depth in the consultations, the preferred management set-up seems to have a two tier arrangement – a steering committee made up of key stakeholders such as the government, UN, donors and civil society, and a smaller management group that will oversee the day-to-day running of the JHIE.

## 5. Recommendations for the JHIE Inter-Agency Working Group

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<tr>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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<tr>
<td>There is a clear mandate from the consultations from across the system - including national governments, international actors at the HQ and national level, national actors at the local level, and the affected population – for going ahead with pilot JHIEs.</td>
<td>Undertake two pilot JHIEs, one in a natural disaster, and one in a complex emergency setting, in 2011 and 2012, to test and provide guidance on different approaches to JHIE. Ensure that the pilots are organised to facilitate future JHIEs in different contexts.</td>
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<td>There is a need to engage in the JHIE process as feasible with government at the national and municipal levels.</td>
<td>If a JHIE in Haiti goes ahead, use the <em>Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti</em> as a basis for part of the evaluation, and explore the potential of using local municipal and a representative sample of camp committee members as part of the evaluation team. For the complex emergency JHIE, consider taking a case where engagement with government will be challenging, to test the potential for JHIE in this kind of setting.</td>
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<td>Respondents had differing perspectives as to the main purpose of a JHIE. International respondents were mainly in favour of lesson learning, while the affected population and municipal staff were overwhelmingly in favour of accountability to the affected population and donors.</td>
<td>Focus one pilot JHIE on lesson learning, and the other on accountability, to test and provide guidance on these different approaches. Where the JHIE is mainly for lesson learning purposes, explain this carefully to the affected population.</td>
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<td>There was consensus that the main focus of JHIE should be on changes in the quality of life of the affected population.</td>
<td>Ensure that the evaluation methodology is participatory and involves ongoing contact with the affected population. See the methodology in the proposed Haiti JHIE Terms of Reference in Annex 1.</td>
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<td>Some affected population respondents expressed strong preference for being active participants in the evaluation process.</td>
<td>Ensure that mechanisms are included for sustained involvement of the affected population in the evaluation design and implementation, as well as for adequate discussion of feedback and results.</td>
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<td>Consultation respondents thought that JHIE focus is dependent on context, but most considered that JHIE focus should be on both short-term results such as saving</td>
<td>Develop the pilot JHIE methodology to focus on both short and longer-term results. See the methodology in the proposed Haiti JHIE Terms of Reference in</td>
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lives, and longer-term results such as livelihoods, with emphasis on the latter.

Consultation respondents supported a mixed method approach, but with greater emphasis on qualitative techniques. There was little or no support for formal quasi-experimental design.

Develop the JHIE methodology by measuring against a baseline of quantitative and qualitative impact indicators developed with key stakeholders, with representative sentinel samples, and informal control groups. See the methodology in the proposed Haiti JHIE Terms of Reference in Annex 1 for details.

The affected population requested feedback on the findings and use of evaluation results.

Build feedback sessions with the affected population into the evaluation methodology.

There was limited support for an automatic trigger for JHIE at the international level, but support in Haiti and Bangladesh.

Review the idea of an automatic trigger during the JHIE pilots.
Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation: report on consultations

Report to the Inter-Agency Working Group on Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation

Annexes

Tony Beck
January 2011
Annex 1: Terms of reference for a pilot Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation in Haiti

1. Background
This Section sets out the key contextual areas for consideration for a Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation (JHIE) in Haiti. The JHIE will build on other work, in particular the Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluations (IA-RTEs), the Haiti context analysis, the Haiti synthesis of evaluation findings, and the inter-agency affected population survey, all of which are referenced below.

1.1 The relief phase
On 12 January 2010, shortly before 5:00 pm, an earthquake measuring 7.3 on the Richter scale struck Haiti for 35 seconds. It was the most powerful earthquake to hit the country in 200 years. The hypocentre of the earthquake was near the earth’s surface (at a depth of 10 km) and its epicentre was near the town of Léogâne, about 17 km south west of the capital. The effects were felt in the Ouest, Sud- Est and Nippes departments. The Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (including the towns of Port-au-Prince, Carrefour, Pétionville, Delmas, Tabarre, Cité-Soleil and Kenscoff) suffered a substantial amount of damage. Eighty percent of the town of Léogâne was destroyed. Over 220,000 people were killed, 300,000 injured, and a million left homeless. There was large-scale destruction of infrastructure, vital services were seriously disrupted, and government resources seriously depleted. The earthquake stands as one of the worst disasters of the modern era. In response, a massive relief and recovery effort has been undertaken by a complex array of national and international actors, one of the largest since the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004. The scale of the disaster and response warrants a JHIE which can analyse areas that single agencies cannot cover in their evaluations, in particular an overview of the results of the whole response, and a systematic focus on the perspective of the affected population. Further details of the disaster and of the early response can be found in the IA-RTE. (17)

By May 2010, over 1000 international organizations had provided humanitarian assistance to Haiti. Fifty seven per cent of the 1.5 billion US dollar Revised Humanitarian Appeal had been funded, the Food Cluster had provided 3.5 million Haitians with food aid, 17,500 people had been employed in Cash for Work programs, the Shelter Cluster had distributed over half a million tarpaulins, and the Protection Cluster reported that it had organized social activities for 45,000 children.

The UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti provides the following pledges and disbursement for humanitarian assistance from the top 30 donors in US$ millions as of 30th September 2010 (18):

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<th>Pledged</th>
<th>Committed/disbursed</th>
<th>Unallocated/undisbursed</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,652.2</td>
<td>1,876.6</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 Data source is http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/relief_and_recovery/international_assistance
Funding modalities in US$ million are as follows (same source as above):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cash</th>
<th>In kind</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Govt of Haiti</td>
<td>State aid or other internal agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>811.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The IA-RTE in Haiti found that several factors delayed the response and left a large series of uncovered geographic and sector based gaps: in particular: lack of humanitarian leadership; limited local ownership; difficulties of the humanitarian sector in preparing for and responding to an urban disaster; and a weak assessment of the humanitarian situation and needs. These are all constraints that have come up in numerous other operations, raising a central question as to why lessons from past operations are not being implemented. The IA-RTE also found that most key humanitarian actors both at headquarters and in Haiti recognized these shortcomings and worked hard to continuously improve the response, by strengthening humanitarian leadership and local ownership, and pushing for improved coverage and preparation for the upcoming hurricane season. (19)

Haiti has a complex political and social history which is key to understanding the reasons why the earthquake had such an effect, as well as the context for the response. The scale of the disaster was due to an excessively dense population, a lack of adequate building standards, the disastrous state of the environment, disorganised land use, and an unbalanced division of economic activity. This context is further detailed in the “Haiti Earthquake Response: Context Analysis” at http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/haiti-context-analysis-final.pdf Details of context are therefore not repeated here but the context analysis is drawn on in these Terms of Reference (ToR) as relevant. The JHIE will need to pay careful attention to context throughout in terms of strengths and weaknesses of the response, results achieved, and potential lessons.

1.2 The recovery phase
As the ALNAP post-earthquake lesson learning paper notes: “Agencies need to focus on the recovery phase even from the start of the operation as there is no gap between relief and recovery, and recovery is the biggest challenge in sudden-onset natural disasters. The distinction between relief and recovery is an artificial one. For a household after an earthquake, relief actions to save the lives or reduce the suffering of household members or neighbours may be accompanied by efforts to protect livelihoods by rescuing assets such as livestock and tools. The distinction between relief and recovery at the donor level is clear in terms of how funding applications are dealt with, but making the distinction in the field is far more difficult – and irrelevant to affected households.” (20) Given this close connection, this pilot JHIE will focus on the impact of both the relief and recovery response.

A Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) was carried out between February 18 and March 24 2010, at the request of and under the direction of the Government of the Republic of Haiti, with the technical support of the UN, the IDB, the ECLAC, the World

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19 Add findings from ALNAP-UNEG-OECD-DAC review of individual evaluations.
Bank and the European Commission. (21) PDNA’s are usually taken as the main source of disaster losses, and have an important influence of the recovery programme, which tends to take place up to 18 months after the disaster. (22) Although recovery can take up to five years to occur, 3-18 months is often the funding window for recovery programming.

The PDNA estimates overall damage and losses at USD 7.9 billion, just over 120 percent of the country’s GDP in 2009 - the first time that the cost of a major disaster is so high in relation to the country’s economy. Seventy per cent of damage and losses were related to the private sector. The value of destroyed physical assets, including housing units, schools, hospitals, buildings, roads, bridges, ports and airports, is estimated to be USD 4.3 billion. The effect on economic flows (production losses, reduction of turnover, loss of employment and wages, increase in production costs, etc.) was USD 3.6 billion.

Subsequent to the PDNA the Government produced in March 2010 an Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti (23) which set out recovery plans for the next 18 months. This Action Plan will be used as part of the framework for this JHIE, along with an assessment of the relief phase. (24) Although specific targets are not included in the plan and it focuses on processes rather than results, it will form one framework of the JHIE as it is a nationally developed plan against which impact can be measured. Using the Action Plan as a basis for the JHIE will help promote government and other local engagement and ownership, and is in line with Good Humanitarian Donorship, the Paris Declaration, and Accra Agenda for Action. The Inter-Agency RTE (footnote 1) noted that the international response failed to engage adequately with national capacity. A finding from the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) was that limited government engagement in the evaluation process, despite efforts made during the TEC to get government on board, led to a situation of the international humanitarian community mainly “talking to itself”.

The Action Plan sets out an ambitious agenda for recovery (p. 5):

Rebuilding Haiti does not mean returning to the situation that prevailed before the earthquake. It means addressing all these areas of vulnerability, so that the vagaries of nature or natural disasters never again inflict such suffering or cause so much damage and loss. The plan that has been put forward is inspired by a vision that goes beyond a response to the losses and damage caused by the earthquake, even though it proposes action to be taken over the next 18 months and estimates
costs over this period. It aims to launch a number of key initiatives to act now while creating the conditions to tackle the structural causes of Haiti’s under-development.

The recovery plan is divided into three phases (p. 10):

The emergency period, which must be used to improve accommodation for the homeless; to return pupils to school and students to university and vocational training centres; to prepare for the next hurricane season in the summer; to pursue efforts to restore a sense of normality to economic life, especially by creating large numbers of jobs through high-intensity work, by guaranteeing stability in the financial sector and access to credit for SMEs; and to continue to reorganise state structures. During this period, it will be necessary to work on development strategies and plans for selected new economic centres; to pursue action in favour of equipping reception zones for those who have been displaced by the earthquake; and to set up an electoral process to avoid constitutional gaps.

The implementation period (18 months), for projects to kick-start the future of Haiti and establish a framework of incentives and supervision for private investment on which Haiti’s economic growth will be founded. As foreseen by various analyses and assessments, private investment in the economy as well as in the social sector will form the backbone of the country’s reconstruction. Among the commitments of donors, support will be given to the private sector to provide it with the capacity required to fulfil this role.

The period (10 years) during which the reconstruction and recovery of Haiti will become a reality, in order to put the country back on the road to development, followed by another ten years to make it a real emerging country.

The plan sets out four areas of response which will each be tracked in the JHIE (p. 11):

- Territorial rebuilding: Reconstruction of the devastated zones and urban renovation, the road network, regional development hubs and urban renovation, preparation for the hurricane season and regional planning and local development.
- Economic rebuilding: Relaunch of national production, restoration of economic and financial circuits, access to electricity.
- Social rebuilding: Health, food safety, nutrition, water, sanitation, highly labour-intensive activities.
- Institutional rebuilding: Democratic institutions, restart of public administration, justice and security.

The recovery plan does not include any details on monitoring and evaluation, a gap that can be filled by this JHIE. In general similar recovery plans in the past have not been well served by evaluation, partly because they are multi-donor and each donor carries out its own evaluation, so that there is no overview of impact. And because recovery funding is not under the same spotlight as relief funding, evaluations that are carried out are often inadequate (See footnote 5).

Figures for disbursement and commitments to recovery from the top 30 donors as of 30th September 2010, in US$ are:
While relief funding is from regular sources, the top five recovery funders are the US, Venezuela, the Inter-American Development Bank, the IMF and the EC, i.e. including two non-traditional “donors”. The Haiti context analysis comments that Haiti’s response capacity and risk reduction efforts are undermined by its history of weak governance institutions. Humanitarian aid to Haiti reached a total of US$175 million in 2008—just over 20 per cent of total ODA. So the JHIE needs to analyse the absorption capacity of the government and other local counterparts given the large influx of relief and recovery funds.

1.3 Purpose and users of the evaluation
Consultations on JHIE, led by OCHA and supported by an inter-agency working group, were held between January and November 2010 to consider the potential for JHIE pilots which would assess the response to emergencies as a whole. Seven consultations were held at the international level, and consultations were held as well as in three countries with the affected population, government, the UN, civil society and other stakeholders, including in Haiti. (25) These consultations strongly supported the idea of undertaking one or two pilot JHIEs, and the findings from the consultations have been factored in to these ToR.

A JHIE is a joint evaluation involving two or more partners which analyses impact with a focus on changes in the quality of life of the affected population. Although there is no agreement on definition of impact in relation to relief and recovery, there is agreement that impact evaluation in these sectors should focus on:

- the end of the results chain – this could be several years, or it could be a few months, dependent on the kind of intervention.
- if possible, attribution and establishing a counterfactual, that is determining the causes that led to specific results, or at least establishing plausible assumption that the results are due to the intervention.
- changes in the lives of the affected population.
- unintended as well as intended results.
- negative as well as positive results.

In the Haiti context there is a need to analyse both the relief and recovery phases and look over a longer time period at results, because the longer-term results of humanitarian interventions will only become clear after at least a year has passed.

One lesson from the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition and other humanitarian evaluations is that it is difficult to combine learning and accountability purposes in one evaluation. The primary purpose of the Haiti JHIE will therefore be lesson learning – that is what were the main results, what worked and why, and how could the response achieve better results next time either in Haiti or elsewhere. Lack of learning has been identified as one of the key constraints to humanitarian action.

A secondary purpose of the JHIE will be accountability to the affected population and donors, but any questions concerning accountability will not interfere with the primary purpose of lesson learning.

Reduction of the number of evaluations will not be a purpose of the JHIE. Experience has shown that joint evaluations do little to reduce the number of single agency evaluations, but do allow for detailed analysis of areas which single agency evaluations cannot cover, such as overall results of the response, capacity development, LRRD, and the perspective of the affected population.

The primary users of the JHIE will be the Government of Haiti, in relation to its national recovery strategy, and key donors; and humanitarian actors in relation to the relief phase who will be interested in how humanitarian action has affected longer term results.
2. Methods
The JHIE methodology will be developed iteratively with key stakeholders and users, and will be flexible to allow for changes during the JHIE process. Key users will be engaged from the start of the evaluation process, and have already been engaged in the JHIE consultations. The details in this Section can be taken as guidance to be adapted in relation to local context.

The evaluation will be guided by the UNEG (26) and OECD-DAC (27) standards and will demonstrate how these standards have been integrated into the evaluation design and methodology. The evaluation will also be guided by the ALNAP guidance on using the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria for evaluation of humanitarian action (28), the ALNAP Proforma (29), and questions in the Haiti context analysis (see above for weblink). Adequate gender analysis should be carried out throughout, and the evaluation method, questions, and report should reflect this analysis. All data will be disaggregated by sex, age, ethnicity and disability wherever possible.

The evaluation will take a utilization focused approach, engaging users early on in the evaluation process, in particular the government – see Figure 1. (30)

**Figure 1: Standard processes in utilization focused evaluation**

| Determine primary intended users and uses | Establish a working group of users and/or a quality control mechanism | Determine focus, methodology, and design with users | Review findings and recommendations with users on an ongoing basis, and include a tracking matrix in the report |

The evaluation will build on the inter-agency affected population survey, which is being carried out independently of this JHIE, as a baseline. This survey is being developed to integrate key questions related to impact and should be a central reference for the JHIE.

2.1 Background research and development of indicators
Research will be ongoing throughout the JHIE. The following will be carried out:

- Gather and analyse all reliable demographic, health and nutritional and other relevant data. Review needs assessments for data and other findings, building on ongoing work in-country by OCHA. This data will be used to develop a baseline of indicators, disaggregated by sex, age, ethnicity and disability if possible, on demographics, nutrition, health, housing, protection, education, and livelihoods (about two indicators each, e.g. mortality, incidence of disease, gender based violence, school enrolment, employment). Inter-agency work led

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29 http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/QualityProforma05.pdf
by OCHA internationally on needs assessment should be reviewed in relation to development of these indicators. These indicators need to be agreed at an early stage with key evaluation users. Feed this into the sentinel group questionnaire (see below). (31) The TRIAMS experience after the tsunami should be reviewed to determine its relevance for Haiti. (32)

- Use the context analysis (see weblink on page 1) and inter-agency synthesis of evaluations (forthcoming) to feed into the overall evaluation design.

- If appropriate, construct the programme theory from the relief to the recovery phases, using the government Recovery Plan as one basis of this.

- Input new research and evaluation findings on an ongoing basis.

2.2 Relief and recovery phases from the perspective of the affected population

One part of the assessment of impact in the relief and recovery phases will be based on affected population surveys. This will include a “before-after” analysis using the indicators generated in the research phase of the JHIE, and “with-without” analysis by using informal control groups.

The inter-agency affected population survey plans to cover 4500 respondents. From this population, sub-samples will be selected for focus groups and key informant interviews using a similar geographical sampling frame to the larger survey. Sample size will be about 400 respondents, with purposive sampling if possible to ensure participation of men, women, girls, boys, older people, PLHIV, ethnic groups and the disabled. This sub-sample will form a sentinel group that will be tracked through the JHIE by three repeat visits, in months two, four, and six of the JHIE. The main methodologies to be used with this sentinel group are participatory, e.g. focus groups and participatory mapping. Using proportional piling techniques, the evaluation team will assess the affected population’s perspective as to which interventions caused impact.

Data gathered from the sentinel groups will be triangulated against the total sample of the affected population survey to ensure data is rigorous. Particular attention will be paid to accessing marginalized groups through established techniques, in particular “snowball sampling”, where existing participants in the survey direct enumerators towards other

31 The IA-RTE notes: In fact, a great deal of data exists, but this is not widely known. Over the years, huge quantities of data and information have been produced by various sources: the World Bank, the Inter-American Bank, UNDP, NGOs, academics and evaluators. Some data was lost in the earthquake, including the very rich UNDP library which was completely destroyed. On the other hand, the very large databank of the Haitian Institute of Statistics was saved by heroic statisticians who risked their lives to get the hard disks from the ruins. Not many agencies know about the wealth of information stored on these in terms of demography, socio-economics, etc.

Since the earthquake, the IOM data system (the Displacement Tracking Matrix) has been the most comprehensive system. It not only has a site by site data bank, but also has everything georeferenced on Google Earth and Opencitystreet.com. The issue is not the availability of data but how it can be used effectively.


participants, e.g. enumerators might ask to speak to the poorest five people in the community. (33) This method should help to ensure participation of those usually excluded in evaluations of humanitarian action.

Formal experimental design, because of its complex set up requirements, will not be used in the evaluation; however, 400 affected people who have not received external assistance should be canvassed using a similar questionnaire and indicators to that for the sentinel group. Validity and reliability cannot be ensured as there is no formal experimental design, however the evaluation team should assess whether there is a significant difference in impact between those who have and have not received external assistance. The evaluation team can then make plausible assumptions as to the causes of impact.

The evaluation team for this component will be made up of a mix of international and national evaluators. As well as carrying out components of the survey, international evaluators will support the national team in terms of survey design and data analysis. The evaluation team should explore the potential of using local committees/relief organisations (as mentioned in the IA-RTE) to support the sentinel survey; local committees may also be a key source of information on impact.

The evaluation team should prepare appropriate questions related to relief and recovery for the sentinel group based on the inter-agency affected population survey, and the indicators developed in the research phase, examining key questions in greater detail than will be possible in the larger inter-agency survey. Relief questions, which should be asked in the first set of interviews in month 2, should focus on:

- Did the intervention save lives (reduce mortality, morbidity or the risk of disease)? What are the longer-term demographics?
- Did the intervention directly relieve suffering by addressing acute human needs in the aftermath of the earthquake?
- Was targeting of assistance been accurate, transparent and fair?
- Were relief activities carried out in a way to support recovery and development?
- What were the main causes of success and/or failure of relief?
- Were gender considerations taken into account during the relief phase, and was the groundwork laid for promoting gender equality?

For the recovery phase questions will again be adapted from the inter-agency affected population survey and the indicators developed in the research phase. The focus should be on the following questions in the second set of interviews, with a focus on gender issues included as relevant:

- Has security improved? Has gender based violence decreased?

➢ To what extent have local people (broken down by sex, age, ethnicity and disability) been consulted and involved in the rebuilding of livelihoods?

➢ Beyond the immediate rescue phase, how appropriate have interventions been in rebuilding and strengthening sustainable livelihoods in the longer term?

➢ Has targeting of assistance been accurate, transparent and fair?

➢ To what extent have livelihoods actually improved? How far is this a result of the earthquake response, and how far is this due to other factors (proportional piling methods can be used here)?

➢ How sustainable are livelihoods likely to be?

➢ How far has disaster risk reduction been factored into the response? Is there greater security in terms of future disasters?

➢ In relation to impact, what is your assessment of your overall situation? Have you returned to the pre-earthquake situation, or have things got worse or better?

➢ What were the main unintended effects of the response?

➢ Were there any negative effects of the response?

➢ What were the main causes of success and/or failure of relief?

The indicators developed as a baseline in the research component will be compared to the situation 18 months after the earthquake. A final visit will be made to the sentinel group in month 6 to solicit feedback on draft evaluation findings.

The evaluation will have four components outlined below. These will analyse different stages and elements of the response. No evaluation can include all areas of enquiry, but the components below have been prioritised as of probable most interest to evaluation users. For these components, respondents will include the affected population, government, international actors, civil society and sector specialists, all in country. Separate reports, which will form Annexes to the main report, will be produced for the components. The evaluation Inception Report will develop a matrix setting out methods and related evaluation questions and data sources, by component.

2.3 Component 1: infrastructure, including housing and shelter

This component will take the government led Recovery Plan, and the programme theory developed for this in the research phase, as its focus for assessment of impact. The Recovery Plan includes a significant focus on infrastructure, which in turn should produce positive impacts for the affected population. Infrastructure development after major natural disasters is rarely subject to socio-economic analysis (see footnote 8 for exceptions). The following are key questions:

➢ Who are the main users of the infrastructure being developed? Does this differ by gender, age, ethnicity and disability?
What are the differential benefits of infrastructure in terms of supporting livelihoods and employment? Who is benefiting most (e.g. from road reconstruction)?

Are the benefits of economic growth that is a product of infrastructure development accruing to particular sections of the population?

Is infrastructure adequately incorporating disaster risk reduction practice?

How sustainable are benefits from infrastructure likely to be?

Housing will be a particular focus of the JHIE because of widespread destruction of housing, because this is to a large extent an urban disaster, and also because housing has been a controversial area in humanitarian action and recovery. Key questions to be covered related to housing and impact are:

- Was temporary housing developed appropriate to the short and longer-term needs of the affected population?
- Is coverage fair and transparent? To answer this question it will be important to have an adequate sample of affected people who have not received housing support.
- Have land titles been issued in the names of men and women, or just men?
- Are new housing sites being developed in connection to supporting services such as proximity to markets, roads, and sanitation?
- Is housing design appropriate? Was there participation of the homeless in design? Does it incorporate disaster risk reduction principles?

Infrastructure and housing specialists will make up part of the JHIE team in order to analyse technical quality.

2.4 Component 2: Markets and remittances

One challenging area in terms of determining attribution for impact is to assess how far impact is due to specific interventions, and how far it is due to contextual features. Remittances and markets are among the most important factors leading to improvement in the quality of life of disaster affected people. Some three million overseas Haitians send remittances, so this could be a substantial source of support (34). Key questions related to remittances and impact are:

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34 Fagen’s review of the role of remittances in after the Cyclone Jean in 2004 notes: “Remittances are obviously not addressing the larger problems confronting Haiti. Nor can the remittance flows to Gonaives after the hurricane be credited with having stimulated recovery. Individual families received vital help from relatives, but the all too limited recovery that occurred is due primarily to international humanitarian assistance.”

What role have remittances played in supporting livelihoods of the affected population?

How important are remittances in relation to other forms of assistance?

Do particular segments of the affected population receive a disproportionate amount of remittances? What is the breakdown by gender, age, ethnicity, and disability?

Stabilization of trade and markets is likely to have a significant impact on recovery. This area is rarely reviewed post-disaster. Key questions are related to impact are:

- Has government input and international assistance led to stabilization of internal trade and resumption of market trading?
- Have prices of key commodities that are of importance to the affected population been stabilized at affordable prices?
- Have new markets developed in camps for the displaced? What has been the result of these in terms of the quality of life of the affected population?
- What has the effect of the earthquake response been on wage levels, particularly for workers in the informal economy?
- What has been the impact of the aid system on the local economy, e.g. has this led to increased rents and salaries?

2.5 Component 3: Capacity development

The IA-RTE and various other evaluations (35) have found that international assistance tends to bypass local capacity as it seeks to support the affected population. In the relief phase this is partly related to the need for independence, and partly to the normal mode of operation of humanitarian agencies which are often insensitive to local context, and partly to national “flag flying”.

The key question to answer related to impact is the extent to which capacity at national, sub-national, and local levels has been strengthened so that there is now adequate capacity to plan, implement, and monitor recovery and development programming for the earthquake affected population. This question is important for assessing impact because without adequate national capacity there can be no sustainable impact.

A retrospective review of capacity pre-earthquake will be carried out in month 1 of the JHIE, with follow up in month 6 to determine how capacity has changed during the 18 month of the recovery period, and how far this capacity will likely be sustained. The TEC capacity assessment evaluation will be a useful reference study. Key areas of enquiry for this JHIE are:

- The extent to which the international response has built capacity at national, sub-national and local levels;

35 E.g. the TEC capacity development evaluation
http://www.alnap.org/initiatives/tec/thematic/capacities.aspx
The extent to which capacity has been built to develop pro-poor policy;

The types of capacity which are being developed and how useful these are likely to be over the longer-term;

The means by which capacity has been successfully built;

The results of capacity development in terms of implementation of the Recovery Plan and changes in the situation of the affected population;

The likely sustainability of capacity developed.

This component will require a capacity development specialist as part of the evaluation team.

2.6 Component 4: Lesson learning
This component will focus on humanitarian actors and examine why lessons of previous responses were not employed, despite summaries of these being readily available (e.g. ALNAP 36, World Bank 37). The JHIE will take the findings of the IA-RTEs (38) concerning lessons not learned (see above for a summary of the first RTE) and explore in each case why humanitarian actors did not or were unable to pick up on previous lessons.

Similar kinds of conclusions have been drawn on emergency and recovery operations in the last 20 years; for example the ALNAP State of the Humanitarian System (39) draws similar conclusions to ALNAP syntheses carried out 10 years earlier, and evaluations from the early 1990s make similar recommendations to those carried out today. Clearly there are systemic issues at play, for example around coordination, needs assessments, participation, attention to gender equality, shelter and housing, and LRRD. The JHIE will analyse constraints to learning lessons, and make recommendations of how these can be overcome, taking into account developments in the sector such as the ALNAP Learning Support Office experience, increased training and capacity development and improved knowledge management.

38 The first IA-RTE notes (p. 55): “The emphasis on post-disaster “safer” reconstruction is one of the interesting developments which have been learnt from earlier disasters. Deployment of early recovery teams and environment specialists is another example, as is the strong mobilization of resources for CFW programs and debris removal. But there are a lot of hindrances in the learning process. Many lessons have been learnt and some of them have been implemented. But the system has rarely identified the need to match lessons learnt and recommendations with their specific area of application. Therefore, the implementation of certain recommendations has not always been successful. But often, lessons learnt are simply either ignored or not acted upon.”
3. Evaluation products and management
3.1 Required capacities for carrying out the evaluation

The evaluation team will require the following:

- Background experience in Haiti; working ability in French and English; for international evaluators, links to Haitian research/evaluation groups.

- Experience with utilization focused evaluation; knowledge of goal free evaluation, theory based evaluation, appreciative enquiry will be an asset.

- Ability to use a mixed methods approach, including participatory interview techniques

- Expertise in disasters in urban settings

- Ability to assess capacity development

- Infrastructure, housing and markets specialists

- Learning specialist (for lesson learning component)

- Representatives from camp coordination committees can be included as part of the evaluation team as relevant.

3.2 Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month 1</td>
<td>Evaluation design including sample size and location, discussions with government, UNCT/IASC country team/clusters, hiring national evaluators and researchers. Definition of key users Development of evaluation findings and recommendations dissemination plan Preparation of inception report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month 2</td>
<td>Initial round of data gathering with the affected population and other key stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month 3</td>
<td>Initial feedback to evaluation users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Research component Individual components: infrastructure, markets, housing, capacity assessment, learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month 4</td>
<td>Second round of interviews with the affected population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month 6</td>
<td>Evaluation findings discussed in country with users, including the affected population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month 8</td>
<td>Final evaluation report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3 Evaluation products

- Inception report within one month
- Interim report after 3 months (up to 20 pages)
- Draft report after 7 months (to be jointly written by the national and international team leaders, up to 50 pages, excluding annexes)
- Individual reports on components 3-6, which will form annexes to the main report
- Final report after 8 months
- Note on JHIE methodology and reflections on the process of the pilot
- Ongoing evaluation briefings in country and internationally

3.4 Budget (40)
All figures are estimates.

<table>
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<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost (US$)</th>
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<tr>
<td>National team leader (120 days)</td>
<td>@400 per day = 48,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity development specialist (30 days)</td>
<td>@550 per day = 16,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market specialist (30 days)</td>
<td>@550 per day = 16,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure specialist (30 days)</td>
<td>@550 per day = 16,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing specialist (30 days)</td>
<td>@550 per day = 16,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge management/lesson learning specialist (20 days)</td>
<td>@550 per day = 11,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research Assistant (100 days)</td>
<td>@300 per day = 30,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>National researchers (6 people, 50 days each)</td>
<td>@200 per day = 60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel and per diems</td>
<td>60,000 (this figure will need to be reviewed on an ongoing basis)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>335,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contingencies (10 per cent)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>379,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5 Management
The JHIE will be managed by a Steering Committee co-chaired by the government and the Office of the UN Special Envoy. The Steering Committee will provide overall guidance to the JHIE and be a key mechanism for use of evaluation results. The Steering Committee will meet three times during the evaluation, at the start (to review the methodology), after three months (to review initial findings), and towards the end of the JHIE (to consider the draft report). The Steering Committee will consist of relevant experts.

40 Based on a review of previous joint evaluations.
government ministries, donors and civil society representatives, and external specialists. It will have a maximum of 12 members. Decision-making will be by consensus.

The Steering Committee will be supported by a management group, including a full time evaluation coordinator), and one full-time administrative support staff. These two staff members should be based in the Evaluation Support Office in Haiti if this idea comes to fruition, and in another relevant office in country if it does not. These positions have not been included in the budget in Section 3.4.

3.6 Communication and dissemination strategy
The evaluation Inception Report will include a communication and dissemination strategy for different users, at HQ, country, local and community levels. Particular attention should be paid to feeding back results to and validating results and recommendations with representative groups from the affected population. The evaluation team should ensure that adequate time is devoted to this activity, and demonstrate in the evaluation methodology and report the process of engagement with the affected population, and their perspective on the evaluation findings and recommendations.

3.7 Taking forward the pilot JHIE
An Inter-Agency JHIE Working Group was set up to manage and guide the JHIE consultations, and will take lessons from this pilot JHIE forward. The evaluation team leaders will be asked to write a short note (up to 5 pages) on strengths and weaknesses of the pilot process, methodology, management, and interest of key stakeholders, including the extent to which the government was engaged.
1a. What has your experience been of evaluations to date, including joint evaluations? What has worked well and where have the problems been? What lessons can be drawn from current and previous evaluation practice?

Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation (JHIE) is relatively a new concept in the context of Bangladesh as shared by most of the respondents in the consultation process. However, impact evaluation has been conducted by individual organizations. Bangladesh is prone to natural disasters and the country faces different types of disaster every year. Hence, the response to natural disaster becomes the priority for most of the aid agencies and for the government. Most of the respondents felt the necessity and importance of conducting joint humanitarian impact evaluation to capture the changes in the lives of affected communities through the interventions of government and aid agencies.

Interviewees shared their experiences based on the impact assessment or evaluation conducted at individual organization level.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>What worked well</th>
<th>Challenges faced</th>
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<tr>
<td>▪ A combination of internal and external experts in the impact assessment or evaluation team that provided with bias free findings.</td>
<td>▪ Follow up of recommendations is one of the weakest areas for most of the organizations.</td>
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<td>▪ A clearly defined ToR helped smooth completion of impact assessment or evaluation.</td>
<td>▪ Weakness in regular monitoring system. More focus on output level than on outcome level.</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Participation of community people during the data collection phase of impact assessment or evaluation.</td>
<td>▪ Inadequate participation of community people in the monitoring process of project or programme.</td>
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<td>▪ Building community people and donor confidence.</td>
<td>▪ Inadequate linkages between different stages of programme or project cycle.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>▪ Reports mostly read by managers than by other staff. Long report discourages most of the staff and stakeholders to read the whole report.</td>
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The interviewees also shared the lessons and recommendations to be considered for joint impact evaluation.

▪ Government commitment is a must to do a joint impact evaluation at Bangladesh. Government should be included from the very beginning of joint impact assessment process.

▪ It will be a challenge to create a consensus among the stakeholders involved in the joint impact evaluation. A clear ToR will help in creating the consensus among them.

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41 Prepared by Gaziul Hassan Mahmood, Oxfam GB and Md. Harun-or-Rashid, Save the Children USA
There are many evaluations conducted each year by individual agencies. The joint impact evaluation will fail to draw the attention of all the stakeholders if it does not show that this is something different from other evaluations. Stakeholders should have the feeling that the joint impact evaluation will add an extra value to their work.

- It is important to agree on a set of impact indicators before conducting a joint impact evaluation.
- Joint impact evaluation will create opportunities of mainstreaming of learning in the future programme. This will help in building the confidence of donors and community people confidence. The learning from this process can be used in future advocacy.

1b. What would you see as the main purpose of a joint humanitarian impact evaluation in Bangladesh or other similar contexts, e.g. lesson learning for your ongoing programme and/or accountability to donors and the affected population, and/or generating knowledge for the system as a whole? If a mix of these three purposes, which do you think should be most prominent? What is the overarching question that you would like to see answered by JHIE?

Before conducting this JHIE, we need to prepare a matrix of the past impact evaluations to see where are the gaps and how this joint impact evaluation will fill those gaps. We also need to assess what will be the added value of this joint impact evaluation. Most of the respondents shared that the purpose should be a mix of the three mentioned above. However, it has come out clearly that the prominent one should be to ensure accountability to the affected population and generating knowledge for the system as a whole. Respondents from UNICEF Bangladesh said that they prefer real time evaluation (RTE) rather than impact evaluation. However, rest of the respondents from other agencies supported the idea of JHIE.

The respondents also shared that the donors will also learn from this process and the JHIE will help them avoiding duplication of interventions. In this process, we should find out top ten priorities that will benefit the emergency/humanitarian sector in Bangladesh. Also there should be a clear follow up mechanisms to take the learning and recommendations forward.

Through this JHIE process we should be able to find out whether people are safer and better than before. We should also find out the speed and timeliness of the response to reduce the suffering of the affected population. We should be able to find out the degree of relevance and effectiveness of the intervention to mitigate the sufferings of the affected communities. We should also look at level of integration, sustainability and mainstreaming aspect as well.

1c. What is your understanding of “impact”? Does this differ from emergency to emergency? What are the key indicators for measuring impact?

‘Sustainable or long lasting changes in the lives of affected people’ – was the common way of expressing the understanding of impact. Most of the respondents shared that the impact will differ from emergency to emergency. As they said the impact is completely dependent on the time & context and the nature of the interventions in any particular geographical location. SO DON’T NEED ONE DEFINITION

Indicator is dependent on the scale and nature of the intervention. The respondents also stressed on the importance of monitoring the indicators mentioned in the ‘sphere code of conduct’. However, some of the respondents shared some broad indicators that might be useful in the context of JHIE.

- How fast and coherent was the response
● Breadth of the response
● Increased coping capacity of community people
● Community people are safer than before
● Affected communities are self reliant
● Improved food security situation and nutrition status
● Increased access to alternative livelihoods
● Reduced rate of child labour
● Improved household condition to protect them from next disaster
● Strengthen local economy
● Community people are aware about their entitlements
● Local institutions are better organized/equipped to handle further disaster (e.g. reconstruction of roads, embankments, shelter, school etc.)
● Reduced number of death, injuries and affected population

1d. Related to 1b, how would you expect JHIE findings and recommendations would be used in Bangladesh? Who are the main users? What is the most useful reporting format for them to receive the evaluation findings and recommendations?

Most of the respondents shared that the findings and recommendations should contribute to the Disaster Management Act of the Government of Bangladesh. The findings and recommendations can also be used to scale up future humanitarian/emergency programmes by different actors. The respondents also emphasized on the follow up of the findings and recommendations, as this is one of the weakest areas for most of the organizations.

All the stakeholders involved in JHIE will be the user of the report. However, to be precise, the respondents shared that the aid agencies (national and international), civil society organization, community based organizations, journalists and the government (local and national) should be the key users of JHIE report. Some of the respondents also thought that the affected community should know about the findings and recommendations of JHIE. This sharing will help community to think of some follow up mechanisms at their level.

All the respondents prefer a short report with the findings and recommendations at the beginning of the report. One or two page executive summary should be there before the main findings. Considering all these, the main report should be between 25 and 35 pages. The report should be both in Bangla and English. Some of the respondents mentioned about two reports, one focusing on the findings & recommendations and can be used by developments workers. The other one for academic purpose and can used for further research work. The report should be uploaded in the website for fast and easy access by the audience worldwide. Some of the respondents also thought that the whole process of JHIE should be video documented that can be used further for different purposes.

1e. What do you think should be the scale of a joint impact evaluation? Should it cover the whole humanitarian intervention by the international system, or part of this? Should it include government interventions/role of remittances? Should regular government programme be taken into account when evaluating impact/local efforts? At what intervention level would impact best be measured – e.g. cluster, objective or programme?

Most of the respondents shared that the JHIE should focus on the humanitarian intervention at national level. However, international system/context can be considered where appropriate. It is also important to assess the coherence aspect.
The respondent felt that it would be useful to see how effective the government’s emergency interventions are in reducing the vulnerability of different community to any emergency situations.

Some of the respondents mentioned that it would be useful to see how regular government programme are contributing to the emergency programme by government and other agencies.

Most of the respondents thought that impact would be best measured at programme level. A few of the respondents supported the idea of impact assessment at cluster level.

1f. What are the best methods to use in joint impact evaluation? Do you think that an experimental design using control or comparison groups would be feasible in a humanitarian setting/ post-disaster setting? Do you think qualitative methods using focus groups and key informant interviews (eg using proportional piling to explore attribution) are more appropriate? Do you think it would be feasible to combine quantitative and qualitative methods in one evaluation? What should be the level of affected population participation through the evaluation process?

There was a unanimous response about the mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods. They also felt that the qualitative aspect should be more prominent than the quantitative aspect. However, the specific tools should be developed after the finalization of the methodology. Proper sampling techniques should be applied while developing the methodology of JHIE. Some of the respondents shared that it would add value if community and local level government authority is consulted while developing the methodology. There should be a set of agreed impact level indicators prior to methodology development.

Some of the respondents thought that control or comparison group is not necessary to consider doing the JHIE, as most of the community in a particular geographical location will be affected by the disaster or emergency situation. Some of the respondents felt the necessity of control or comparison group to assess the level of impact of the intervention in the affected population. However, this is specific to any particular context and situation.

Bottom up approach should be followed at every stage of JHIE. Participation of affected population should be mandatory at every stage.

1g. Is there capacity in country to support/carry out effective joint impact evaluation? Would you see a mixed national/international team as appropriate?

In country capacity exists to support/ carry out effective JHIE. Most of the respondents’ emphasized on the mixture of national and international expertise to form a team for JHIE. International expertise will bring in international humanitarian perspective while national expertise will provide in-depth analysis from the national context. This composition will also ensure bias free/ neutral findings/ analysis of the whole work. One of the key roles of international experts is to develop the capacity of national staff on technical aspects of impact evaluation.

Government ownership is key to the success of JHIE. Government representative must be in the team to ensure accountability and future follow up. INTERESTING POSSIBLE WHERE THERE IS AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT EVALUATION UNIT, AS IN INDIA
1h. What would be appropriate timing for a joint impact evaluation? How long do you think a system-wide joint impact assessment should take to carry out from the development of the Terms of Reference to final report?

Most of the participants opined that JHIE should be conducted at least after six months of the completion of all the humanitarian/ emergency intervention. This gap will allow us to measure the long-term sustainable changes in the lives of affected community.

Most of the respondents shared that the whole process of JHIE should not take more than three months. It might loose the focus and the context if it takes more than three months. However, some respondents felt that it would take at least six months to complete the whole process.

1i. How will it be possible to make adequate links between needs assessment, ongoing monitoring and a joint humanitarian impact evaluation? Is there adequate baseline data against which to measure progress? If not, what is the next best solution?

All these are interlinked. All the respondents shared that need assessment should have been done at the beginning of the intervention and ongoing monitoring process should have been completed prior to JHIE. They also mentioned that presence of a strong on going monitoring system would ease the process of JHIE.

Most of the respondents shared that baseline is one of the weakest areas for many organization. Some of the organization does have a baseline and some did it late even if they have one. If there is no baseline then need assessment can be the best alternative solution. Some of the respondents mentioned that there is no need of a baseline to do JHIE. The team can get an idea of pre-disaster situation using different participatory exercises at the community level. Also the information from secondary sources will help understand the situation before the disaster.

1j. Are there any agreed impact level indicators in place?

Cluster wise indicators are available. Indicators are also available at individual organization level. Impact level indicators agreed by all stakeholders are not available in the country.

1k. Which departments, agencies or other actors would be likely to get involved in a joint humanitarian impact evaluation?

Government, UN agencies, INGO, NNGO, Civil Society members, CBOs, Community people should be involved in a JHIE. Most of the responded said that government and UN agencies should take the lead in JHIE. A working group/ steering committee can be established, comprising of INGO, NNGO, Civil Society members, CBOs, Community people, that can work closely with leading agencies. Government and UN leadership will generate ownership and wider acceptance of JHIE.

1l. What is the optimal coordination arrangement for JHIE, e.g. participation is open to all stakeholders; participation is open to a smaller self-selected group; the joint activity is agreeing a common evaluation framework, and responsibility for implementation of individual evaluations is devolved to different partners.
Participation should be open to all the relevant stakeholders. It is important to agree on a ToR and common evaluation framework. It will be difficult to successfully complete this work without a clear ToR and work plan.

1m. Should there be an automatic trigger for JHIE, for example when funding (Is funding the only parameter? Is there any other criteria?)

Funding is very important but should not be the only trigger for JHIE. Most of the respondents felt that there should a government policy of conducting an impact evaluation for any emergency intervention. It is also necessary to determine and agree on a percentage of money at proposal development and approval stage.

1n. Would it be appropriate to carry out a joint impact assessment in Bangladesh?

Most of the respondents welcomed the idea of JHIE. They think the work will add value to the humanitarian sector in Bangladesh. Only two respondents thought that Bangladesh is not ready for JHIE. Firstly, this is due to the attitude of different agencies. According to the respondent, there is a tendency, in some agencies, of not sharing information and not working closely with each other. Secondly, the process of JHIE should convince that it will add an extra value to the future humanitarian programme and it is different from other impact assessment/evaluations. It is a must to create a consensus among the stakeholders about this work. Ownership of all the involved stakeholders is key to success of this work.

ANNEX: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS:
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BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

This consultation took place from 22 to 28 October 2010, at a time when Haiti was affected by a number of events:

- the country was preparing for presidential and general elections;
- the first anniversary of the terrible earthquake that devastated part of the country was approaching;
- the aid community and national institutions were focused on an outbreak of cholera which could have terrible consequences if it gets out of control.

Consultation of the affected population was therefore urgent but also complex and politically sensitive.

The present report of the stakeholder consultations on Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation compiles the views of a wide range of actors and stakeholders on impact evaluation in general and on its feasibility in Haiti after the earthquake in particular.

UN staff, officials from the Haitian government and personnel from NGOs were interviewed in a semi-structured manner which left a lot of room for interviewees to express themselves freely.

SEMANTIC CLARIFICATION

During several consultations, it became clear that semantic clarification was required

- **Joint:** “inter-agency or multi-donor”
- **Humanitarian:** “action which takes place during the crisis and the immediate post-crisis phase”. The idea of humanitarian action is difficult in Haiti as the level of vulnerability and poverty is often above the crisis threshold.
- **Impact:** Impact of aid can be either positive or negative. It often depends on the initial assumptions. It also depends on who is impacted by what? The issue of free health care came up several times in the discussions as having both a positive impact on the population – especially those who could not afford healthcare prior to the earthquake - and a very negative impact on private health structures and their personnel (some have had to close and personnel have migrated overseas).
- **Evaluation** is understood here to be an ex-post process or a real-time external process which aims to assess completed or on-going actions.

RESULTS OF THE STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION

Experience to date

*What has your experience been of evaluations to date, including joint evaluations? What has worked well and where have the problems been? What lessons can be drawn from current and previous evaluation practice?*

There is very little experience of Impact Evaluation in general in Haiti (even in the development field) and almost none of Humanitarian Impact Evaluation (JHIE). A lot of evaluations have taken place since the earthquake, and more are in the pipeline. However, these rarely focus on impact, but are more “compliance and control” exercises carried out by agencies and donors to prepare for the questions which will be raised one year after the earthquake.
Several interesting exercises were mentioned during the interviews:

- The OXFAM opinion survey carried out in March 2010 was an interesting approach to establish a benchmark of people’s perceptions, but it was not a “joint exercise”.
- The IASC RTE in April tried to include people’s perspectives on the ongoing action as much as possible. While inter-agency by nature (under the IASC), it did not assess impact quantitatively.
- The work done by the Haiti Aid Watch group/Observatoire de la Société Civile, which produced its first “population-centred” survey as early as February, is very interesting.
- The CARE/SCF joint evaluation in connection with the ECB project. While the report is not yet available, the opportunities provided by joint evaluations and peer review-like exercises seem to have an interesting potential.

Several issues have been identified during the mission:

- How can we identify the impact of a given operation when we know that changes are often the result of multiple factors (the issue of “attribution”)?
- Is the “joint process” method the right method to deal with the multi-disciplinary components of impact?
- Should these JHIE look at the changes which have taken place in people’s lives or how these changes are perceived?
- How can the government’s involvement be assured? How In Haiti, the question is who should be brought on board from the government: technical ministries, the Ministry of Planning, the newly established Interim Commission for Reconstruction in Haiti? And at what level should they be involved? The decentralisation process in Haiti is slow but steady; how should the CASEC and ASCEC be involved during an impact evaluation?

How evaluations are used:

- Feedback activities are often underdeveloped. They should be considered a priority and sufficient time and resources should be allocated to them.
- Ex-post and even RTE evaluations are often not built into the overall project cycle very well. In particular, they are not linked to initial and rolling data collections. There is rarely a baseline to compare with.
- Communication of the JHIE to the whole aid community is essential: questions remain in Haiti about how synthetic and how specific it should be. Another issue frequently discussed is on whether the communication on JHEI will honestly present the challenges or if it will only going to be a PR exercise. Some people are worried that with the first anniversary of the disaster approaching, it will mostly be a PR exercise, and there will not be enough evaluation and lesson learning.
- The process whereby recommendations and lessons learnt feed into planning. Several stakeholders mentioned that learning is not developed enough. People do sometimes learn, but it is less common for institutions to learn. This can create a lot of frustration.
- The Government’s involvement is seen as critical by most stakeholders. As it only has limited means to carry out evaluations, it would be of great benefit to it to receive evaluation reports (or at least a digest of them) and to be invited, when feasible, not only for the final feedback sessions, but also to participate in the earlier phases of the JHIE, especially the preparation phase.
Purpose of the JHIE

What would you see as the main purpose of a joint humanitarian impact evaluation in Haiti or other similar contexts, e.g. lesson learning for your ongoing programme and/or accountability to donors and the affected population, and/or generating knowledge for the system as a whole? If a mix of these three purposes, which do you think should be most prominent? What is the overarching question that you would like to see answered by JHIE?

While respondents could not rate between the three, they all stated that the objectives of a JHIE should be fourfold:

- Lesson learning and taking stock of lessons learnt;
- Accountability to the donors (institutional and private donors);
- Accountability to the affected population.
- Demonstrating the ability of different actors to work together.

One interviewee also felt it was important to underline what a JHIE should not be:

- A mechanism for "blaming and shaming"
- An audit
- A tool for PR (although intelligent PR can be built around it)

What is impact?

What is your understanding of "impact"? Does this differ from emergency to emergency? What are the key indicators for measuring impact?

An interesting discussion took place concerning meta and micro impacts:

Representatives of donors, UN agencies, some large NGOs and the Red Cross identified the following meta impacts

- no major malnutrition crisis;
- no major epidemic: this is currently compromised by the outbreak of a serious cholera epidemic
- no large-scale social unrest despite the very difficult conditions in which people have been living for months in more than 1000 sites and camps of all sizes.

At a micro level, the following impacts were identified:

- lives saved (during the emergency and stabilization phases),
- low malnutrition rate;
- Access to livelihoods through possible savings thanks to the free services and Cash for Work programmes,
- Impact on local economy due to the injection of cash and goodies;
- Impact on fertility in the camps due to the congested living conditions;
- Access to water
- Access to sanitation facilities
- Access to health services
- Access to shelter
- Social structures are strengthened
- Reduction of risks (This is explained by the large-scale displacement of people to Corail and Tabare Issa camps, but also by the large Cash for Work programmes in the steepest and most unstable areas of Port-au-Prince).

However, evaluations have rarely identified negative impacts:
- The impact of the aid system on the local economy (mentioned in one report by OXFAM Quebec and in various other reports but often in an anecdotal manner);
- Some stakeholders are wondering on the relations between the aid system and local actors. The aid system’s lack of cooperation with local structures created a certain amount of resentment. In addition, many newly-arrived agencies wanted to have their own “community-based committees and thus created a lot of parallel structures. How do we identify the potentially lasting impact of the disempowerment of local actors?
- How does the aid system look at its own economic impact? Job creation is good, but brain drain can have terrible consequences on national capacities. Similarly, the rapid increase in rental prices and salaries can create a very negative global impact, but impact evaluations often fail to report on these.

There is even less strategic thinking about how to appraise and measure indirect and unintended impacts. Also, social and structural impacts are not fully included in most “impact evaluation grids” as they do not correspond to clusters’ and donors’ narrow technical views.

**Usefulness of JHIE**

How would you expect JHIE findings and recommendations to be used in Haiti? Who are the main users? What is the most useful reporting format for them to receive the evaluation findings and recommendations?

The results of the JHIE should be shared with:

**Government institutions:**
- National institutions in charge of disaster management (Secretariat d’Etat à la Gestion des Désastres, Directorate of Civil Protection)
- National institutions with an evaluation function (within line ministries and the Ministry of Planning);
- The Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission

**Inter-agency and inter-institution mechanisms:**
- UNCT, HCT
- Multi donor coordination (GACI, G20)
- National coordination and planning mechanisms (Tables de Concertation sectorielle)

**Individual agencies**
- International NGOs
- National NGOs

**Civil society groups, media and public opinion**
In the post-earthquake and pre-electoral context, it is clear that there has been a great deal of demand amongst “opinion makers” for information about achievements and impacts. This has had both positive and negative aspects.
- For civil society groups and advocacy groups, it is important to have this kind of information to defend people’s rights.
- There is a danger of mismanagement of the information in the pre-electoral context: communication in connection with the JHIE needs to be done with great political sensitivity.
- There is growing demand from taxpayers and individual private donors to know what has been done with their money. Typical agency PR work is often seen as biased.

In these days of too much rather than too little information, reporting formats are very important. They need to be:
- short and easy to read;
- credible, so they do not only talk about positive points, but also underline challenges;
- visual: the RTE video was praised on a number of occasions.
- available in the local language (or at least in French for Haiti).

The scale of a JHIE

What do you think should be the scale of a joint impact evaluation? Should it cover the whole humanitarian intervention by the international system, or part of this? Should it include government interventions/role of remittances? Should regular government programmes be taken into account when evaluating impact/local efforts? At what intervention level would impact best be measured – e.g. cluster, objective or programme?

There is no “one size fits all” approach. Different types of evaluation could build on each other. In addition, observing and measuring the impact of a crisis response is complex:
- The result of pre-existing vulnerabilities and the impact of pre-crisis resilience-building programmes. The humanitarian aid system tends to claim responsibility for changes in a situation (impact) but the Haitian context underlines how the pre-crisis situation affects whether or not the aid will have any effect.
- A joint evaluation of a system response needs to disaggregate the different components of the system and needs to take into account how they interact:
  o Projects,
  o Programmes,
  o Clusters,
  o Inter-clusters,
  o Area-based multi-sector intervention.

Focus should be based each time on an analysis of the timeline and mapping of the response:
- What happened when and where?
- What were the impacts?

Methodology

What are the best methods to use in joint impact evaluation? Do you think that an experimental design using control or comparison groups would be feasible in a humanitarian setting/post-disaster setting? Do you think qualitative methods using focus groups and key informant interviews (e.g. using proportional piling to explore attribution) are more appropriate? Do you think it would be feasible to combine quantitative and qualitative methods in one evaluation? What should be the level of affected population participation through the evaluation process?

Methodological issues were raised several times:
- TORs have to be very clear. If they are not, problems are very common.
The sample on which a JHIE is based is “mission critical”. There is a serious risk that limited time or resources will make it too small or agency-biased. In the meantime, in a highly diversified context, the debate between random and purpose sampling processes is likely to be interesting.

It is essential to find the right mix of quantitative and qualitative indicators to assess impact.

It is important to clarify how impact evaluations differ from classical evaluations which focus on results and compliance to the project’s objectives.

In Haiti, local committees and the disaster-affected population have rarely been involved in the evaluations which have been carried out, or, for that matter, in needs assessments and monitoring. Some effort is now being made in this area (CDAC, SMS-based, people-based data generation systems).

One of the issues which came up a couple of times is central to impact evaluation: are we comparing “before and after” the intervention, or ‘with and without” it. The fist case requires proper baseline data for the situation prior to the intervention, while the other means having control groups in place. The evaluation sector has not yet resolved this issue properly.

- Conducting a baseline assessment is often not feasible (access, security, time, means, priority on action, etc.) and is rapidly hampered by the pace with which situations change;
- Establishing a control group might be feasible in evidence-based medical research. It is not ethical in a humanitarian response. Often the only option is to compare different programmes or to compare an area where a programme has taken place with another where there were needs but which was not included in the response.

Finally, the key issue will be finding a way to link the analysis of the impact with the different aid processes:
- initial assessment,
- intervention design;
- resource mobilisation (financial and human);
- implementation strategy (direct, delegated or partnership)
- monitoring and capacity to adjust and reorient programmes etc.

It is in this final multi-causal analysis that explanations of positive and negative impacts and their scale and magnitude can identified. Then, a very complex analysis of the different external and internal factors which have affected the intervention and its impacts can be carried out.

**Capacity to carry out JHIE**

Is there capacity in country to support/carry out effective joint impact evaluation? Would you see a mixed national/international team as appropriate?

In Haiti, the capacity to carry out proper evaluations does exist but it is confronted with several difficulties:

- There has been a huge loss of key competencies and human resources due to the earthquake. Many competent and qualified people died. In addition, staff have left the administration to work for NGOs or have left the country to seek greener pastures.
- There is regular training on M&E in the main training centre of the Ministry of Planning, in Haiti State University and in Quisqueya private university. NGOs also train people on M&E techniques;
- The planning and evaluation units in the different line ministries are weak and require proper support;
- The ICRH is setting up its own structure (the Performance and Accountability Office or PAO). It is in the process of recruiting staff but does not have any capacity as yet;
- Civil society groups such as the Haiti Aid Watchdog have also developed their evaluation capacity.

Despite the disaster, data collection capacity is strong. A lot of progress has been made in this area in Haiti and there have been a number of innovations:
- SMS-based information sharing (used by CDAC and IOM);
- Web-based systems (Ushahidi, Savanna)
- PDA-based information recording and transmission (used for the Rapid Needs Assessment in Haiti – RINAH) and developed by the UNFPA Demography and Development team with the Haitian Institute of Statistics.

However, there is weakness in terms of analysis. Proper technical and methodological support is needed with regard to the analysis of qualitative data, the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data, etc.

**Timing**

What would be appropriate timing for a joint impact evaluation? How long do you think a system-wide joint impact assessment should take to carry out from the development of the Terms of Reference to the final report?

Ideally, the end of the first year could have been a good time. With the election campaign starting and all the lights shifting to orange in UNDSS, it is clear that this is not feasible. In addition, due to the history of the politicization of aid in Haiti, some people expressed serious doubts about whether it was feasible in the weeks ahead because of the approaching elections.

However, there may be opportunities for small, narrowly-focused JHIEs. For example, a JHIE of the first phase of Search and Rescue and emergency medical help would probably would useful in view of the critical issues raised by the only evaluation carried out on this subject three weeks into the response phase.

Timeliness is critical in the learning process. The experience of the RTE report, which took months to be issued, shows that if JHIEs are to have an impact on the aid process, they must not drag on too long.

**JHIE and the project cycle**

*How will it be possible to make adequate links between needs assessment, ongoing monitoring and a joint humanitarian impact evaluation? Is there adequate baseline data against which to measure progress? If not, what is the next best solution?*

In fact, a great deal of data exists, but this is not widely known. Over the years, huge quantities of data and information have been produced by various sources: the World Bank, the Inter-American Bank, UNDP, NGOs, academics and evaluators.
Some data was lost in the earthquake, including the very rich UNDP library which was completely destroyed. On the other hand, the very large databank of the Haitian Institute of Statistics was saved by heroic statisticians who risked their lives to get the hard disks from the ruins. Not many agencies know about the wealth of information stored on these in terms of demography, socio-economics, etc.

Since the earthquake, the IOM data system (the Displacement Tracking Matrix) has been the most comprehensive system. It not only has a site by site data bank, but also has everything geo-referenced on Google Earth and Opencitystreet.com.

The issue is not the availability of data but how it can be used effectively.
Indicators and JHIE

Are there any agreed impact level indicators in place?

Most of the clusters have developed their own sets of indicators. The need is not for more indicators but rather for fewer indicators which are easy to measure and reproduce and which can fit into a qualitative framework. While some organisations use the SPHERE standards as their benchmarks, others find them inappropriate or not necessarily linked to impact.

The *Tables Sectorielles* managed by the line ministries and their specific modus operandi during a crisis (under the Secretariat Général de la Gestion des Désastres and the Civil Protection Directorate) should be the place where indicators are identified. These were mainly sidelined during the first months of the response.

One of the most complicated issues raised is that of identifying impact indicators for unexpected, indirect or negative impacts. This type of impact is sometimes as, if not more, important than the expected measurable positive impacts which evaluations try to measure.

**Who should be involved in a JHIE?**

Which departments, agencies or other actors would be likely to get involved in a joint humanitarian impact evaluation?

The same actors that were identified as targets for the lesson learning exercises:

**Coordination arrangement and JHIE**

*What is the optimal coordination arrangement for JHIE, e.g. participation is open to all stakeholders; participation is open to a smaller self-selected group; the joint activity is agreeing a common evaluation framework, and responsibility for implementation of individual evaluations is devolved to different partners.*

Here again, there is no “one size fits all” approach. If the process is to be very open, agreement on the profile of agencies who can take part in a given exercise should be on a case by case basis. The relevance and cohesiveness of the group behind the JHIE is an essential ingredient of its success. The recent joint evaluation (CARE and SCF) under the umbrella of the ECB project appears to have been a relatively successful exercise, but it was more of a process evaluation than an impact evaluation.

**Trigger mechanisms for JHIE**

Should there be an automatic trigger for JHIE, for example when funding *reaches* a certain level (Is funding the only parameter? Is there any other criteria?)

An automatic trigger for JHIE is attractive because it offers predictability and facilitates early funding, early identification of data sources and early mobilization of human resources. However, it should not be the only trigger. Unconventional crises and responses,
difficult operations and non traditional responses could also trigger an impact evaluation, and, if necessary, in view of the complex institutional setting, a JHIE.

Mechanisms such as ECB conduct joint evaluations in a relatively systematic manner, but these are not necessarily impact evaluations.

**JHIE in Haiti: Opportunities and needs**

Would it be appropriate to carry out a joint impact assessment in Haiti?

There is now wide recognition that a joint impact assessment is needed. The debate now is more about how this should be done, when and with whom.

However, a large number of initiatives are currently in the pipeline:

- The population consultation which is part of the IASC supported RTE;
- The US administration’s proposed global impact assessment;
- The monitoring and evaluation of impact slowly being put in place by the Haiti Aid Watch group /Observatoire Citoyen;
- The epidemiological survey on aid impact being funded by France through the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD);
- Several evaluations by individual agencies.

There appears to be a more pressing need to establish complementarity and synergy between all these initiatives rather than to launch an additional one without having mapped them and identified any gaps that exist. Careful situation analysis should also guide the decision to launch a JHIE. The current electoral period is not necessarily prone to serene objective data collection. Data analysis can also be a source of manipulation. In addition, the current outbreak of cholera has created a context where it is critical to restrict movements in order to contain the spread of the disease. In this type of situation, moving from site to site in such contexts is not recommended.

**CONCLUSION**

There is a consensus about the importance of carrying out Humanitarian Impact Assessments. There is also awareness of methodological challenges and the difficulties involved in the “joint” part of the JHIE.

In addition, most of the stakeholders are aware of the political sensitivity of HIE in the current political context in Haiti.

There is also some skepticism about what can be learned from this type of exercise: two frequently expressed opinions were that beneficiaries would either say what they thought the evaluators wanted to hear or that they would try to manipulate them.

To conclude, if there is an overall agreement on the need and potential of a JHIE to help shaping the humanitarian agenda in Haiti, the issues at stake are more “when” and “how”.
ANNEX N°1: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION AND CONTACT DETAILS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriel Verret</td>
<td>IRCH, Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garry Mathieu</td>
<td>National Secretariat on Food Security, M&amp;E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernice Kavanah Clement</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning, UCAONG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alta Jeanbaptise</td>
<td>Director Haitian Civil Protection Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerald Jeanbaptiste</td>
<td>Head of DINEPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Paleme Mathurin</td>
<td>Advisor to the Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN agencies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicola Dahrendorf</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, DSRSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazimiro Rudolf-Jocondo</td>
<td>OCHA coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaticia Rougeron</td>
<td>OCHA ERRF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claudine Joseph</td>
<td>OCHA ERRF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jessica Faieta</td>
<td>UNDP Senior Country Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imogene Wall</td>
<td>UN Humanitarian spokesperson, Head of Communications OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Hanson</td>
<td>UNDSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincent Grammont</td>
<td>UN Habitat Social work coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asako Saegusa</td>
<td>UNICEF M&amp;E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donatien Temeko</td>
<td>UNICEF M&amp;E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc Levesque</td>
<td>OIM CCM Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriel Mathieu</td>
<td>OIM, Displacement Tracking Matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igor Bosk</td>
<td>UNFPA Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claude Henry Voltaire</td>
<td>UNFPA special Advisor, Ancien Ministre de la Santé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriel Bidegain</td>
<td>UNFPA Senior demographer</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NGO and civil society</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippe Becoulet</td>
<td>CLIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicole St Pierre Martinez</td>
<td>Haitian NGO Papillons légers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Jean-Louis</td>
<td>Haiti aid Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venes Luna</td>
<td>Haiti aid Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippe Mathieu</td>
<td>OXFAM Quebec</td>
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<tr>
<td>Antoine Fureau</td>
<td>CHF International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassandra Mehu</td>
<td>Haitian architect: Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandra Carrie</td>
<td>Head of office, Handicap International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerôme Canicave</td>
<td>HI, Health Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Calvot</td>
<td>Technical coordinator, HI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yves Laurent Regis</td>
<td>CARE International, M&amp;E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Febelon</td>
<td>CARE International, M&amp;E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myra De Bruijn</td>
<td>Action aid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX N°2 : DOCUMENTATION CONSULTED

IOM : Differentiation of the types of IDP settlements in relation to the Haiti earthquake

HAP : Guide destiné au personnel HAP en intervention à Haïti

Alnap context analysis: Haiti Earthquake Response Context Analysis

ALNAP Lessons Paper 'Responding to earthquakes 2008: Learning from earthquake relief and recovery operations'

Joint Paper of NGO Platforms: Principles and Recommendations for International NGO Participation in Haiti

Oxfam US: Survey- Haitians talk about rebuilding the country

Haiti aid watchdog: Six months later

World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group 'Haiti Earthquake: Evaluative Lessons'

Foundation for Development Cooperation 'Post-Earthquake Recovery in Haiti: The Challenges Ahead' Also available in French

CDA 'Lessons for Haiti paper'

CDA 'Haiti background paper'

Groupe URD 'Haïti, leçons tirées des précédentes catastrophes'

DEC 'Lessons from Aceh: Key considerations in post-disaster reconstruction'

Government of Pakistan Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority 'Lessons learned from the experience of ERRA'

INTOSAI 'The added value of geospatial data for the transparency and accountability of disaster-related aid'

World Vision Int. 'Situational Analysis of HIV in Haiti Post Emergency'

ALNAP 'Evaluating Humanitarian Action Guide'

ALNAP 'Real Time Evaluation Guide'
Affected population and local NGO and government staff consultations in Haiti, Bangladesh and Sudan

REPORT ON
October 2010, Bangladesh

Photo: Focus Group Discussion with Religious Minority at Kurigram district

Report Prepared by:
Mohammad Obaidur Rahman
Md. Harun or Rashid
Executive Summary:

This report has been produced as a part of the consultation process for Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation (JHIE) coordinated by UN OCHA. This is the output of the findings from Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and Key Informant Interviews (KII) with affected communities, local government representatives and local Non Government Organizations (NGOs). The consultation was carried out in six communities in two districts of Bangladesh: Kurigram and Satkhira. These districts have been selected based on the country hazard profile, previous disaster history and socio-economic vulnerability. A total of 12 Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were conducted with affected communities. In each community, one Focus Group Discussions (FGD) was conducted with a male group and one with a female group. Total 36 Key Informant Interviews (KII) was conducted representing six from each community. 10 UP (Union Parishad - the lowest administrative tier in Bangladesh) representatives from 2 Unions were interviewed separately. In each district two local NGOs were consulted.

The study revealed that affected communities and local government don’t have any experience of evaluation. They have never been part of an evaluation team. However, many of the NGO workers have experience of either organizing or responding to evaluation in development projects. Very few of them have experience of evaluation for humanitarian programmes. None of them has ever heard of the concept of joint evaluation. As responded by most of the participants, the key purpose of the evaluation should be a mix of three purposes:

- lesson learning for ongoing programmes
- accountability to donors and the affected population
- generating knowledge for the system as a whole.
Accountability to the affected population has been viewed as most prominent among these three. All of the consulted stakeholders strongly supported the concept of Joint Evaluation. They feel that joint evaluation could ensure optimum usages of time and resources. Joint evaluation can reduce duplication and enhance coordination. They have identified a number of positive and negative factors contributing to joint evaluation. According to the respondents, JHIE would not only ensure their participation but also allow them to be part of the evaluation team. They strongly recommend that affected communities should be also in facilitating role together with other stakeholders. The respondents of this study feel they don't have technical knowledge on methodology. Simply, they want such methodology that would allow them to participate in the process. It should be designed in such a way that all voices are heard. JHIE should mix qualitative and quantitative approaches. There is no such local capacity to conduct JHIE. Some NGO workers have training and experience of evaluation but not joint evaluation. Evaluation shouldn’t only be held after the programme is completed. Most of respondents said that there should be ongoing (real time) evaluation also. The participants of this consultation agreed that the evaluation should produce a report at the end. There should be two versions of report: detailed and brief. Main points/highlights should also be available in local languages. Innovative ways should be identified to report back to the affected people and local government.

Finally, we can say that all the respondents agreed that a joint evaluation would be very useful for them. They should not only be respondents during the evaluation but should be involved throughout the process of evaluation from methodology selection to reporting. Capacity building initiatives should be undertaken to build the capacity for joint evaluation.
1. Introduction

This report has been produced as part of the consultation process for Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation (JHIE) coordinated by UN OCHA. This is the output of the findings from Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and Key Informant Interviews (KII) with affected communities, local government representatives and local NGOs. Their views and suggestions about JHIE has been recorded and presented here very carefully.

2. Background to the consultation area

The consultation was carried out in six communities from four Unions (lowest administrative unit) of two Upazillas (sub-districts) in two districts of Bangladesh namely Kurigram and Satkhira. These districts have been selected based on the country hazard profile, previous disaster history, socio-economic vulnerability etc. Kurigram is highly vulnerable to riverine flooding while Satkhira is exposed to tropical cyclones.

Kurigram- a northern district of Bangladesh is prone to recurrent flooding. The district is in what is called the area subject to "monga" (seasonal food insecurity) as people here live under abject poverty and without adequate livelihood options and have no income or crops for several months a year. This is home to poverty stricken marginal rural people who mainly live agriculture. Most of them are agricultural labourers and share croppers. Flood and River Erosions are the main hazards. The communities of this district experienced moderate or severe floods in 1988, 1996, 1998, 2004, 2006 and 2008. In one sense they are living with floods.
### Basic Information of the Unions Surveyed in Kurigram:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District: Kurigram</th>
<th>Upazilla (Sub-district): Nageswari</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Union: Bamon Danga</strong></td>
<td><strong>Union: Jatrapur</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area:</strong> 21.17 sq. k.m.</td>
<td><strong>Area:</strong> 71.36 sq. k.m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population:</strong> 14232</td>
<td><strong>Population:</strong> 23503 (Male: 11102, Female 11401)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Literacy Rate:</strong> 21%</td>
<td><strong>Literacy Rate:</strong> Male 65%, Female 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Occupation:</strong> Agriculture, Day labourer</td>
<td><strong>Main Occupation:</strong> Agriculture, Day labourer, Fishermen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Hazards:</strong> Flood, River Erosion</td>
<td><strong>Major Hazards:</strong> Flood, River Erosion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Vulnerabilities:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Major Vulnerabilities:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Poor and agri-dependent economy</td>
<td>➢ 45% people live under poverty level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Low literacy rate</td>
<td>➢ Lack of awareness and education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Lack of government services</td>
<td>➢ Lack of GO-NGO services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Lack of economic opportunities</td>
<td>➢ Lack of employment opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Weak infrastructure and poor communication system.</td>
<td>➢ Weak rural infrastructure and bad road networks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Union Parishad Office

Satkhira- is one of the southwestern districts in Bangladesh which has experienced two devastating cyclones in recent times, Cyclone SIDR in 2007 and Cyclone AILA in 2009. This district is close to the Sundarban, the world’s largest mangrove forest and the
livelihood of the people is mainly dependent on forest, fishing and day labour. Most of the people live under abject poverty without having access to resources to fulfil their basic needs. The situation has been aggravated by Cyclone AILA and they are in fact living a very miserable life.

Basic Information of the Unions Surveyed in Satkhira:

| District: Satkhira | 
| Union: Assasuni (Sub-district): Assasuni |
| --- | --- |
| **Union: Protap Nagar** | **Union: Burigoalini** |
| **Area:** 36.4217 sq. k.m. | **Area:** 17 sq. k.m. |
| **Population:** 31720 | **Population:** 34445 |
| (Male: 16473, Female 15247) | (Male: 17450, Female 16995) |
| **Literacy Rate:** 55% | **Literacy Rate:** 74% |
| **Main Occupation:** Agriculture, Day labour, fishing | **Main Occupation:** Agriculture, Day labour, fishing |
| **Major Hazards:** Cyclone, Tidal Surge, Salinity | **Major Hazards:** Cyclone, Tidal Surge, Salinity |
| **Major Disasters:** Cyclone SIDR 2007, Cyclone AILA 2009 | **Major Disasters:** Cyclone SIDR 2007, Cyclone AILA 2009 |
| **Major Vulnerabilities:** | **Major Vulnerabilities:** |
| ➢ Nature (Sundarban) dependent economy/livelihood | ➢ Nature (Sundarban) dependent economy/livelihood |
| ➢ Lack of government services | ➢ 40% families are extreme poor |
| ➢ Weak infrastructure and poor communication system. | ➢ Lack of GO-NGO services |
| ➢ Vulnerable to climate change. | ➢ Weak rural infrastructure and bad road networks/communication |
| ➢ Lack of fresh water for domestic use and agriculture due to salinity | ➢ Vulnerable to climate change. |

Source: Union Parishad Office

3. Methodology
A total 6 communities from 4 Unions (lowest administrative tier) in two Upazillas (sub-districts) from two districts were selected for the consultation. As mentioned earlier, the area was selected considering the hazard profile, socio-economic conditions and disaster history.

3.1 FGD with affected communities:
A total of 12 Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were conducted with affected communities. In each community, one Focus Group Discussion (FGD) was conducted with a male group and one with a female group. Special attention was given to religious/ethnic minorities, vulnerable women, occupational groups and adolescent girls. Approximately 8-10 participants attended each FGD.

3.2 KII with affected communities:
In consultation with the communities, a total of 36 Key Informant Interviews (KII) were conducted representing six from each community. Half of them were female and half were male. Respondents for KII include housewives, vulnerable/women headed households, religious leaders, village leaders, primary school teachers, students (both male and female), day labourers, fishermen and marginal farmers. The respondents have been selected on random basis. They represent different occupations and groups exist in the communities. Male and female ratio was maintained. Marginal and vulnerable groups as well as local leaders were also considered to get views from different cluster of people.

3.3 KII with local government representatives:
The Union Parishad (UP) is the lowest administrative tier in Bangladesh 10 UP representatives from 2 Unions were interviewed separately. This includes 2 UP Chairmen, 2 UP secretaries and 6 UP members (3 male & 3 female).

3.4 FGD & Interviews with local NGOs:
In each district two local NGOs were consulted. In Kurigram, FGDs were conducted with two local NGOs ZIBIKA and SOLIDARITY where the Executive Directors, senior managers and humanitarian staff attended. In Satkhira, 6 staff from two NGOs i.e. Christian Commission for Development in Bangladesh (CCDB) and Sudipti Shomaj Unnyan Sangstha were interviewed.

4. Major Findings

The major findings from the consultation have been clustered below:

4.1 Experience of Evaluation

The study revealed that affected communities and local government don't have any experience of evaluation. They have never been part of an evaluation team. Very few respondents had been interviewed during post distribution monitoring. Almost everyone complained that humanitarian and government agencies hardly come back and discuss with them after the distribution or completion of project interventions. There is very limited scope to feedback on what went well and what not. However, many of the NGO workers have experience of either organizing or responding to evaluation in development projects. Very few of them have experience of evaluation for humanitarian programme. None of them has ever heard of the concept of joint evaluation.

After any disaster, Govt. or NGOs come, distribute some relief and go back. They never come back to know whether the relief was useful or adequate.

- Mr. Hazrat
  Marginal Farmer,
  Village: Char Jatrapur,
  Union: Jatrapur,
  Upazilla:Nageswari,
  District: Kurigram.

Photo: Mr. Hazrat, a marginal Farmer from Kurigram
4.2 Key purpose & topics for evaluation

As responded by most of the participants, the key purpose of the evaluation should be a mix of three purposes:

(a) lesson learning for ongoing programmes
(b) accountability to donors and the affected population, and
(c) generating knowledge for the system as a whole

Accountability to the affected population has been viewed as most prominent among these three. Particularly the vulnerable people opined that their views should be heard and they should be reported back by aid agencies.

Evaluation should cover a wide range of topics including immediate life saving initiatives, protection, gender equality, livelihood, water & sanitation etc. The vulnerability and needs of different groups of people are different in different communities and contexts which means the subject of evaluation could differ based on differing socio-economic contexts and disasters.

4.3 Usefulness of JHIE

All of the consulted stakeholders strongly supported the concept of Joint Evaluation as they feel that it could ensure optimum usages of time and resources. They do not feel positive about different people asking them the same questions time and again. Joint evaluation can reduce duplication and enhance coordination and seems to be a more effective and useful approach of evaluating humanitarian work and they welcomed the idea.

4.4 Facilitating factors and constraints of JHIE

A number of positive and negative factors contributing to joint evaluation were identified by the stakeholders consulted.

The facilitating factors are:
• It would capture learning together.
• The whole sector could benefit from the evaluation.
• Communities would be consulted and be an active part of the process.
• Optimum usage of time, money and resources.
• Owned by all stakeholders.
• Methodology and reporting are identified jointly.

Some of the constraints could be:
• Lack of Common understanding among stakeholders.
• Some agencies/staff could play a dominant role.
• Specific issues could be lost among the common issues.
• People/agencies may not be interested to hear bad things about themselves in the evaluation.

4.5 Participation
Participation is the most important element of JHIE. Current evaluation practices allow less opportunity for the affected community to participate. According to the respondents, JHIE would not only ensure their participation but also allow them to be part of the evaluation team. They strongly recommend that affected communities should be also in facilitating role together with other stakeholders. The evaluation team should consist of mutli-stakeholders (Govt, NGO, Communities) and would also consider gender, disability and ethnicity issues. Vulnerable women felt that they were not enough consulted before and they got very limited scope to participate. They put extra emphasis on making arrangements for ensuring their participation. Children participation has also been given due importance by the student respondent, but innovative ways should be found to ensure their participation.

4.6 Methodology
The respondents of this study felt that they did not have the technical knowledge on methodology of JHIE which would allow them to participate. The JHIE should include a
mixture of qualitative and quantitative data where quality issues should be given due importance and should be designed in such a way that all voices are heard.

4.7 Local Capacity for JHIE (source of information)

There is no local capacity to conduct JHIE. Some NGO workers have training and experience of evaluation but not joint evaluation. Local human resources should be developed through training and capacity building. The JHIE should be led by local experts with the technical support from international staff/team. The sources of information could be affected communities, local government offices, NGO offices, media etc.

4.8 Timing

Evaluation shouldn’t only be held after the programme is completed. Most of respondents said that there should be ongoing (real time) evaluation also. Based on the report, the project should be improved and implemented. If the mistakes are identified only at the end of the projects, no corrective actions could be taken. So, there should be both real time and end evaluation.
4.9 Report format

The participants of this consultation agreed that the evaluation should produce a report at the end. There should be two versions of report: detailed and brief. Many points/highlights should also be available in local languages. It could be circulated through web for larger audience. But for affected people and local government, innovative ways should be identified. One of the suggestions is to provide a bill board in the village highlighting the key findings of the report. Other options could be disseminating the key findings through folk songs, leaflets and flip charts. Pictorial illustrations would be more effective than long text.

You shouldn’t wait to know what was good and what was bad after the disaster is over. You should come to us even during disaster to know how we are doing with your aid.

- Ms. Rabeya
  Housewife
  Village: Char Jatrapur,
  Union: Jatrapur,
  Upazilla: Nageswari,
  District: Kurigram.

Photo: Ms. Rabeya (right), Vulnerable woman from Kurigram
5. Major Recommendations

The major recommendations from different groups have been presented below:

5.1 Affected population

- Representatives from the affected community should be members of the evaluation team.
- They should be involved in every stage of evaluation from methodology, selection to reporting.
- Evaluation should be done during and after the programme.
- Reports should be available in local language and in easily understandable format to the local people.

5.2 Local government

- Local government should be in the driving seat for conducting the evaluation at local level.
- LG’s capacity for JHIE should be strengthened by GOs and NGOs.
- NGOs should be involved with local government and give them periodic update on their response activities.

The major findings of the report should be displayed on a display board in pictorial format in front of the Union Parishad (UP) office.

-Ms. Fatema Begum
Union: Jatrapur,
Upazilla: Nageswari,
District: Kurigram.
• Reports should be available in the local language and in easily understandable format.

5.3 Local NGOs
• More and more advocacy initiatives needed to sensitize both National and Local Government about joint evaluations.
• Staff capacity should be improved for conducting such evaluations.
• A national body of GO-NGO should be formed to coordinate JHIE at national level and similar GO-NGO forum should also be facilitated at District and Sub-District levels.

6. Conclusion
JHIE has been viewed as very important by all the respondents of this study. Though the affected communities and local government don't have any experience of evaluation, they feel this approach would be very useful to ensure optimum usage of time and resources, to reduce duplication and to enhance coordination. Accountability to the affected population has been viewed as the most prominent purpose of JHIE. According to the respondents, JHIE would not only ensure their participation but also allow them to be part of the evaluation team. They strongly recommend that affected communities should be also in facilitating role together with other stakeholders in the assessment stages. They should not only be respondents during the evaluation but should be involved throughout the process of evaluation. As for methodology of JHIE, it should be as simple as possible and ensure multi-stakeholder participation including the community. National and local government should take the lead or coordinating role. However as there is no such local capacity to conduct JHIE and as although some NGO workers have training and experience of evaluation, but not in joint evaluation. Initiatives should also be taken to build local capacity on JHIE. Evaluation shouldn’t only be held after the programme is completed. Most of respondents said that there should be ongoing (real time) evaluation also. The participants of this consultation agreed that
the evaluation should produce a report at the end. There should be two versions of report: detailed and brief. Main points/highlights should also be available in local languages. Innovative ways should be identified to report back to the affected people and local government.

7. Annexure

Annexure 1: Questionnaire for affected community
Annexure 2: Questionnaire for local government and local NGOs
Annexure 3: List of respondents

Annexure 1
Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation

Questionnaire for affected community

(For KII)
Name:
Occupation/Designation:
Age:
Union:
Upazilla: District:
(For FGD)
Please attach participants' Name, Age, Occupation and address.

1. - Do you think joint impact evaluation would be useful?
   - Do you think affected population should be involved/participate in the joint evaluation?

2. What are the most important topics that you would like to see as a focus of joint evaluation?
   - immediate live saving initiatives,
   - protection,
   - gender equality,
   - and/or livelihoods?
Does this differ between different groups?

3. - How would the affected population like to participate in JHIE, if at all?
   - Would they be willing to organize community meetings and/or focus groups?
   - Who would participate (men, women etc)?

4. - What kinds of methods are most appropriate, and how would the affected population like to be involved in gathering and analyzing data?
   - Are there any informal indigenous or local methods of gathering impact type information (e.g. community councils)?

5. What is the most useful reporting format for the affected people to receive the evaluation findings and recommendations?

Annexure 2

Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation

Questionnaire for local government and local NGOs

(For KII with local govt.)
Name:
Occupation/Designation:
Age:
Union:
Upazilla: District:
(For FGD with NGOs)

Please attach participants' Name, Designation and Organization address

1a. What has your experience been of evaluations to date, including joint evaluations?
   ▪ What has worked well and where have the problems been?
   ▪ What lessons can be drawn from current and previous evaluation practice?

1b. What would be the most useful questions that an evaluation (impact or otherwise) could answer for you right now?

1c. What do you see as the facilitating factors and constraints to joint evaluation?
   How would different actors (e.g. clusters) be involved?

1d. What would you see as the main purpose of a joint humanitarian impact evaluation in Bangladesh or other similar contexts, e.g.
   ▪ lesson learning for your ongoing programme and/or
   ▪ accountability to donors and the affected population, and/or
   ▪ generating knowledge for the system as a whole?
   If a mix of these three purposes, which do you think should be most prominent?

1e. What local capacities are there to carry out evaluation – e.g. research institutes, monitoring and evaluation units?

1f. Would it be feasible to carry out an evaluation looking at the results of different kinds of intervention (e.g. food aid, vouchers, cash)?

1g. What are some key local sources of information, e.g. administrative records, knowledgeable local stakeholders?

1h. What would be appropriate timing for a joint impact evaluation?

Annexure 3

List of Respondents

Local NGOs:

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<tr>
<th>SI #</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Mr. Manik Chowdhury</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Zibika</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Mr. Akhter Hossain  Coordinator- Admin  Zibika
3. Mr. S. M. Jasimuddin  Programme Manager  Zibika
4. Mr. Ferdous Ali  Coordinator  Zibika
5. Mr. Harun or Rashid Lal  Director  Solidarity
6. Mr. Bimal Chandra Sarkar  Project Coordinator  Solidarity
7. Mr. Jahangir Alam  Project Coordinator  Solidarity
8. Mr. Humayun Kabir Surjo  Principal Investigator  Solidarity
9. Ms. Shamchiara Begum  PO  Solidarity
10. Mr. Rabindra Nath Sarker  PO  Solidarity
11. Mr. Rafiquzzaman  PO  Solidarity
12. Ms. Zannati Akter  Field Facilitator  Solidarity
13. Ms. Morshed Badrun Nessa Bithe  Project Coordinator  Solidarity
14. Mr. Danesh Ali Mondal  Programme Manager  CCDB
15. Md. Fazlur Rahman  Project Coordinator  Sudipti Shomaj Unnayan Sangstha
16. Mr. Sameer Ranjan Gayen  Executive Director  Sudipti Shomaj Unnayan Sangstha

Local Government (Union Parishad Representatives):

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<tr>
<th>Sl #</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Mr. Kahililur Rahman</td>
<td>Union Parishad Member</td>
<td>Union: Jatrapur, Upazilla: Nageswari District: Kurigram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Mr. Md. Nasor Uddin Sarker</td>
<td>Union Parishad Member</td>
<td>Union: Jatrapur, Upazilla: Nageswari District: Kurigram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Ms. Fatema Begum</td>
<td>Union Parishad Member</td>
<td>Union: Jatrapur, Upazilla: Nageswari District: Kurigram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Mr. Abul Kashem</td>
<td>Union Parishad Secretary</td>
<td>Union: Jatrapur, Upazilla: Nageswari District: Kurigram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mr. Ayub Ali Sarkar</td>
<td>UP Chairman</td>
<td>Union: Jatrapur, Upazilla: Nageswari District: Kurigram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Mr. Khalilur Rahman</td>
<td>UP Member</td>
<td>Union: Protap Nagar Upazilla: Assasuni</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Ms. Noor Jahan</td>
<td>UP Member</td>
<td>Satkhira</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Ms. Renuka Rani Mondol</td>
<td>UP Member</td>
<td>Satkhira</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Mr. Md. Firoz Hossain</td>
<td>UP Secretary</td>
<td>Satkhira</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Mr. Mawlana Abdul Mannan</td>
<td>UP Chairman</td>
<td>Satkhira</td>
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Communities:
Approximately 120 participants attended in the Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and 36 participated for Key Informant Interview (KII). Their names have not been annexed here. We would like to thank them for their valuable contributions.
REPORT ON THE CONSULTATIONS WITH AFFECTED POPULATION, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL NGOS ON JOINT HUMANITARIAN IMPACT EVALUATION

PRESENTED TO NORWEGIAN CHURCH AID (NCA)
SUDAN

BY JUSTA LUGALA
P.O. BOX 4392 – 00100
NAIROBI
EMAIL: jlugala@yahoo.co.uk
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Following the ongoing pressure to demonstrate results that are being archived by humanitarian action, questions are being asked as to whether and how evaluations that will assess joint impact can be carried out.

An Inter – Agency Working Group on Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation (JHIE) was formed at a meeting in London in November 2009 to facilitate a consultation to receive inputs on the advantages and disadvantages of carrying out joint humanitarian impact evaluations at the country/regional level. This was a result of several joint evaluations e.g. in Rwanda (1996), Tsunami (2006) and other individual agency efforts, in order to establish how impact evaluations can be useful at the country level to governments, humanitarian agencies and affected population. UN OCHA was mandated to coordinate these activities.

South Sudan being one of the major recipients of humanitarian aid was chosen for consultations on Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation (JHIE).

OCHA mandated The Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), one of the humanitarian agencies working in Southern Sudan to lead the discussions in Eastern Equatoria. The purpose of the consultations is to define feasible approaches to joint impact evaluation in humanitarian action in Sudan.

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 was followed by the formation of a semi autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), led by the former rebel movement, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). This brought to an end to a bloody war which had pitted Southern and Northern Sudan for more than two decades, resulting into massive loss of life and displacement of the people of Southern Sudan within Sudan, in the neighboring countries, and around the world. It also led to the destruction of infrastructure as well as socio-economic development.

The CPA facilitated the entry of many international donors working together with International agencies into Southern Sudan to bring the much needed aid in terms of humanitarian assistance as well as development. This has been necessitated by the enormous needs for (re)-construction in a country where infrastructure was nonexistent, inadequate health care facilities and schools. Massive drought and floods, landmines, and an influx of returning displaced people from neighboring counties and within also heightened the need for food aid.

Consultations with the affected population, the Local Authorities and the Local NGOs revealed that most people would like a JHIE to be conducted in South Sudan to establish the kind of results that have been achieved by humanitarian action for the past six years of peace.

The most important areas of intervention that the affected population would like to be focused on are mainly life saving initiatives, including food aid and food security; health and sanitation. Also development programs were mentioned, including women’s and youth empowerment, especially income generating activities initiatives.

Most respondents believed that a JHIE would give opportunity for the stakeholders in humanitarian aid to take stock, and know where they have succeeded, and where efforts need to be made for improvement.

After the consultations, it was concluded that most respondents would like to participate in JHIE in groups, either as focus group discussions or community meetings. Some
communities also mentioned the possibility of being represented by existing community committees.
This report sets out to present findings, constraints to the consultations (which could be potential constraints for JHIE as well) and the general recommendations from the consulted stakeholders. This draft has been shared and discussed with three communities in Torit county (i.e. Hiyala, Tirrang’ore and Odikye) and their comments have been included at the end of this report.

1. **BACKGROUND TO THE CONSULTATION AREA**

Eastern Equatoria is one of the ten states in Southern Sudan. The state borders two neighboring countries, Kenya and Uganda, and has received massive number of returnees from these countries following the return to peace. Eastern Equatoria state had also been affected by insecurity mainly resulting from the Lords Resistant Army (LRA) raids from neighboring Uganda, as well as cattle raiding among the neighboring communities. Torit is the state headquarters as well as Torit county headquarters.
The State is divided into eight (8) counties, namely Torit, Magwi, Kajo Polat, Kajo Kaji North, Kajo Kaji South, Ikotos, Budi and Lopa/Lafon; which are further divided in payams and bomas. A boma is the smallest level of administration in Sudan. There are about 30 international agencies registered with the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), of the GOSS to work in Eastern Equatoria State. These NGOs work in different counties and payams delivering humanitarian aid as well as development activities. A number of Local NGOs also work in different areas of this state.
For the purpose of these consultations, two counties in Eastern Equatoria, Torit and Magwi, were selected in which six communities were visited, and discussion were held with the local authorities, local NGOs, stakeholders as well as the affected population. Consultations were held with three (3) communities (at boma level) in both Torit and Magwi counties, and the draft report was afterwards shared among three of these communities. Their views have been incorporated in this report. Please explain why Eastern Equatoria was chosen as the site for the consultations.

2. **CONSTRAINTS**

There was conducive environment for the consultation process, especially due to the support from NCA staff, both in Juba and Torit offices, as well as Local Authority officials. However several challenges were experienced and it is worthwhile mentioning due to the possibility of recurring during JHIE.

- Poor road network. This is a general problem in Southern Sudan due to the prolonged war which destroyed infrastructure. This caused delays as well as difficulty in reaching some intervention areas.

- Inadequate understanding from the affected population. Due to massive illiteracy, the consultant had to spend much time explaining in order to get the right responses from
respondents. Most of the time the respondents did not understand the purpose of visit and were eager to explain their needs.

✓ Unavailability of government officials. Due to the pressure of work encountered by officials it was difficult to arrange interviews with them, and sometimes had to wait for hours or several days before getting the opportunity to meet them.

✓ Local NGOs capacity. Very few Local NGOs had a monitoring and evaluation unit/officer, and therefore the consultations had to rely on other officials.

✓ Women views were not largely represented. This was due to the fact that most of the time they were in the farm, and very few of them attended the discussions. Even those who attended rarely participated in the discussions, unless asked specifically. There was a feeling that they did not feel comfortable or confident enough to engage in discussions. Efforts were however made to meet them separately including at the market where they sell their wares, and there was a fruitful discussion what about other marginalized groups (e.g. the disabled) –were they included?

3. **MAIN FINDINGS FROM EACH CONSULTATION AREA**

**Eastern Equatoria State – South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC)**

SSRRC works with all agencies in the state in the areas of humanitarian aid as well as development. The commission appreciates the work of the agencies in the state, but also notes that there are some gaps that need to be filled. Also acknowledges the importance of joint evaluations as a way of assessing the work and measuring impact in service delivery.

Most useful questions that an evaluation should answer should be what have been the strengths of interventions in the areas, and where gaps still exist. What still needs to be done, and how.

Facilitating factors for joint evaluation in Eastern Equatoria is the willingness of authorities as well as communities to participate. The availability of resources for International agencies was pointed out as another facilitating factor for carrying out joint evaluations.

The commission agrees that the purpose for joint humanitarian impact evaluation should be lesson learning for on going program, generating knowledge for the system as a whole, but most importantly should be for accountability purpose, both as a donor requirement as well as accountability to the affected population.

There are no local institutions with capacities to carry out evaluations in the state at the moment, and therefore individual organizations e.g. NGOs, ministries carry out their own monitoring and evaluation activities.

For evaluation to be feasible there is need to go to the affected population to ensure that aid has reached the beneficiaries to avoid misinformation, and see the real impact of the intervention.
Local sources of information include ministries, SRRC, County offices among others depending on the kind of information one is looking for. Evaluations should be done at the end of the implementation period, which will basically depend on the duration of the intervention.

**Torit County Executive Director**

Impact evaluation is very important especially in Southern Sudan at this time when the country is approaching referendum. It is time to take stock, and see how the partners have contributed to the recovery of the country. As a new chapter starts, what are the things that need to be done differently, and what should be emphasized on. Evaluation should answer how resources meant for the people of south Sudan have been used, and what has been their impact on the ground. How have people’s lives changed as a result of massive donor aid?

Have local capacities been strengthened in terms of employment, or is it mostly foreigners who have enjoyed employment opportunities as a result of donor aid?

Facilitating factors for joint evaluations in Eastern Equatoria include the willingness of the affected population, the local and state authorities to participate in the joint evaluations. Also the fact that International agencies have resources, including financial and human resources (i.e. trained personnel in evaluation) to be able to cover the expansive area of Eastern Equatoria.

The main purpose for a joint evaluation should be to learn lessons for ongoing programs in order to identify strengths and weakness. Currently there are no local capacities to conduct evaluations as there are neither research institutions nor monitoring and evaluation units, but humanitarian sand State Ministries do carry out their own evaluations from time to time.

Carrying out evaluations by looking at results of interventions would not be feasible without going to the ground and assessing what has been done, and whether it has created positive or negative impact. For example, food aid sometimes creates conflict in the communities, and therefore creating a negative impact. This can not be detected unless one consults the affected population.

Local sources of information in Torit County include beneficiaries of interventions, NGOs, County Councils, among others.

JHIE should be conducted in Southern Sudan in November, 2010, before the referendum to assess the impact of humanitarian work so far.

**LOCAL NGOs CONSULTATIONS**

1. **AFRICA INLAND CHURCH – AIC**

Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation in South Sudan will give opportunity for critical thinking in order to ensure effectiveness and will give a chance to correct past mistakes in order to forge forward.

Evaluations work well when feedback is taken positively and changes are made to ensure success of the programs, as affected populations also get time to appreciate the assistance they get. They do not work well when mistakes are repeated even after getting feedback, which makes respondents adamant of giving their views knowing that they will not be taken into consideration.

Lessons learnt from previous evaluations include the fact that consistency is important to improve past mistakes before it is too late.
The questions that a joint evaluation should answer right now is how did the intervention change life not clear what this means, and whether it is necessary to continue with the intervention in the way that it has been implemented or whether there is need to change strategy.

The enormous resources that International agencies have are a facilitating factor for joint evaluations as they are able to pull resources together, including human resources.

Different actors should be clustered together. This will work well as it will create forum for discussions. It will also avoid bias, giving more accurate information.

The most important purpose for joint interventions should be to generate knowledge for the system, ensuring that it works well.

There are no local capacities to carry out monitoring and evaluation but agencies, CBOs and state ministries do carry out their own evaluations.

Evaluations can be done by looking at intervention results, but efforts should be made to go to the ground and see the impact that it has created.

Information sources include local people, chiefs, implementing staff on the ground as well as county governments.

Timing for evaluations should be at the end of the intervention so that you can plan for the next intervention.

2. **CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF TORIT (CDOT)**

Evaluation is very important because it gives the affected population the opportunity to interact with donors, appreciate them and identify gaps. CDOT has carried out several joint evaluations with various international partners, and this has helped them to appreciate each others strengths. This shows that others are interested in what you are doing.

Joint evaluations have worked well when mutual timing has been agreed upon and there are clear terms of reference among the partners. They do not work well when the timing is wrong especially in terms of seasons. There are times when roads are impassable, and if evaluations are planned to take place during this time it becomes very difficult to even reach the project areas. The lesson is that evaluations should be planned together with the implementing partner.

A successful evaluation should answer how affected population have benefited from the intervention, how it has changed their lives. What could have been done better?

Facilitating factors in joint evaluations should be team work and understanding.

Constraints include bias, prejudice, pre-conceived ideas and not appreciating some partners’ inputs as valuable. This can be de-motivating, and therefore negatively affect the accuracy of the results.

In widely extended interventions actors should be put in clusters depending on their lifestyle.

Lesson learning for ongoing programs, generating knowledge for the system should be the purpose of evaluation, but the most prominent purpose should be accountability to donors and the population.

Generally there are no institutions carrying out monitoring and evaluation activities in Eastern Equatoria, but individual organization carry evaluations on their interventions. Agrees that carrying out evaluations by looking at the results of different kinds on intervention could be feasible in evaluation.
Some state ministries, NGOs, parishes and payams have database where information on various matters can be accessed.
The timing for evaluation should be immediately after intervention, midterm, and lastly final evaluation. Final evaluation should be a few months after end of the program to give time for impact to be felt.

3. **SOUTHERN SUDAN ASSOCIATION RECOVERY FOR RETURNEES AND DISPLACEMENT (SARRA)**

SARRA was established in 2006 to cater for the returnees and provide them with basic non food items. The organization has implemented several projects in collaboration with various International NGOs, and hence has had opportunity to conduct joint evaluations. This has enabled them to change some things from being negative to positives, and therefore making their beneficiaries appreciate them more.

Joint evaluations worked well when they were able to forge a way forward on how to correct past mistakes, but it does not work well when there is no follow up as the respondents get demoralized feeling their feedback is not appreciated.

Evaluations should answer whether the program is acceptable to the community, and whether the beneficiaries are satisfied with the outcome of the intervention.

Facilitating factors for joint evaluation include the presence of forums to give update on intervention progress, availability of capacity (to do evaluations) and means for transport to cover a large area. However, JHIE could be hindered by insecurity in some parts of Eastern Equatoria, poor roads, which are impassable during rainy seasons, political implications (competitions), inadequate understanding of the affected population among others.

Evaluations should be done from down to top i.e. from boma – payam- county up to state level. Also same sectors should be clustered together.

The main purpose for joint evaluations should be for accountability to donors and the affected population.

Local capacities for evaluation are not available in Eastern Equatoria state, but coordination meetings help in monitoring what the agencies are doing.

Carrying out evaluation by looking at the results of different kinds of intervention is not feasible not sure what this means. There is need to go to the ground and see the impact.

Key local sources of information include chiefs, community leaders, coordination meetings (minutes), SRRC as well as communities themselves.

4. **ST. MONICA WOMEN ASSOCIATION**

The most useful questions for evaluation should be what the impact of the intervention has been to the affected population.

Facilitating factors for joint evaluation include the availability of records, progress reports, and willingness of different stakeholders to participate in evaluations. Constraints include poor road network, especially Pajok, poor communication (there are no working telephone networks in Pajok). Enough funds should also be set out for this process especially because it is a vast, rough area.

The most prominent purpose for joint evaluation should be to generate knowledge for the system.
Local sources of information include chiefs, payam administrators, youth and women leaders and elders. There are no local capacities to undertake evaluations as there are no research institutions or monitoring and evaluation units. It would not be feasible to carry out an evaluation looking at the results of different interventions, there is need to follow up on the ground because you cannot tell whether the intervention has worked or not.

CONSULTATIONS WITH AFFECTED POPULATION IN TORIT COUNTY

i.  Hiyala Boma

There are several agencies working in Hiyala Boma providing basic services e.g. water, food distribution, drugs, and agriculture tools among others. The area is mainly affected by insecurity from cattle raiders and therefore they are unable to go out to the fields due to fear of attacks. The community is well organized with committees that represent the needs of the community to different authorities. The community would like to focus mainly on life saving activities, especially provision of water and food distribution. Another concern for the community is women’s empowerment. This focus does not differ among the different groups as all were in favor of the above issues. However it was noted that women did not participate freely as they had to be encouraged to speak out. The population would be willing to participate in Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation either through their representatives (committee) or through organizing community meetings. Focus group discussions could also be organized. There was concern on their ideas not being taken into account, and therefore no change in their lives.

ii.  Tirrang’ore Boma

Several NGOs are present in this boma with activities ranging from water and sanitation, food distribution, provision of seed for agriculture, among others. The community is also affected by insecurity due to cattle raiders. The main activities here are cattle keeping, small business, and very limited cultivation activities. The community would like the main focus of intervention to be life saving initiatives (e.g. food aid), protection (due to insecurity) as well as development. These were agreed upon by the youth and elders, as women were notably absent. They were said to be out in the fields. The respondents would be willing to participate in JHIE through community meetings as well as focus group meetings. All groups would be represented i.e. men, women and the youth, but the timing should be right to ensure that women are present. The communities were not in favor of individual interviews as they were afraid of victimization.

iii.  Odikye Boma

Odikye Boma is located in Nyong Payam, within the outskirts of Torit town. Community members are engaged in various activities including farming, small business and formal employment. The boma has received several interventions from International organizations, including water and sanitation, provision of school materials, seeds for agriculture, etc.
Although there are several challenges in this community pertaining to development, participants in this community recommend that the main focus should be immediate life saving initiatives, especially food distribution for returnees who were not able to produce their own food during the last season. The community would like to participate in JHIE in order to identify gaps as well as appreciate strengths of various agencies. They would be willing to organize community meetings if need be, but would prefer to be represented by their boma committee which they have given mandate to represent them. They were however concerned by the fact that they have participated in several evaluations, but there had been no change in the mistakes that they had identified. Participants in joint evaluation would be youth, women, and elders.

**CONSULTATIONS IN MAGWI COUNTY**

Magwi County is one of the counties in Eastern Equatoria, and indeed in Southern Sudan that have received the largest number of returnees from neighboring countries. The population in Magwi is mainly returnees. The area is generally peaceful with no cases of insecurity. The availability of fertile land has created an environment for the people of Magwi County to engage in subsistence farming, making it one among the few communities in Eastern Equatoria and indeed in Southern Sudan which are almost self sufficient in food security. Several agencies have been working in this area, mainly in the areas of repatriation, rehabilitation and reintegration. Challenges include inadequate basic services i.e. water, health facilities, schools; poor road network, among others.

**MAGWI COUNTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR**

The Executive Director has personally been involved in several evaluations done by various departments of the county, but have not participated in joint evaluations by NGOs. His experience has shown that for better outcome, one needs to go to the ground, where implementation is done to have a proper evaluation. The main focus at the moment according to the executive director of the county is on development, but focus on emergence e.g. food aid should be looked upon. The main questions that an evaluation should answer should be how the intervention has lifted peoples’ lives, what difference has it made for them. What should be done differently?

Willingness of the affected population and the local authorities to participate combined with availability of human resource by agencies to carry out monitoring and evaluation are the contributing factors for joint evaluations. Joint evaluations could be constrained by poor roads, especially in Magwi County. Different actors should be involved in groups where possible, but also individually depending on the level of understanding of issues.

The main purpose of joint evaluations should be to generate knowledge for the system to understand whether the system works or not, but it should go hand in hand with accountability to donors and affected population, as well as lesson learning for the program.
Local NGOs carry out evaluations from time to time, but there are no other institutions that are involved in research or monitoring and evaluation in Magwi. Those who do evaluations always come from outside the county. Evaluation by looking at the results of intervention is not feasible not clear what this means. One must go to the ground and see for themselves and also engage with the affected communities. Everything must be looked at together i.e. results and visiting affected areas.

Some of the key local sources of information include County SSRRC office, boma chiefs, and various departments at the county level e.g. health, education etc.

The proposed timing for evaluation is six months for long term intervention, but for short time interventions, evaluation should be done along the way. This will create opportunity for corrections along the way.

**MAGWI COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT**

There are several agencies that are working in Magwi County in the health sector, providing services ranging from curative, preventive, HIV awareness, among others. Evaluation for health NGOs is mainly done during coordination meetings which are held quarterly. The experience has been the ability to identify gaps and challenges as well as strengths, and it has been good experience. Joint evaluations have worked well in these coordination meetings, and has reduced duplication of activities by various organization and therefore resulting in well distributed services.

An evaluation should answer how beneficial the intervention has been to the community, how have the budgets been used?

Facilitating factors for joint evaluation include the presence of coordination meetings where organizations are able to evaluate what everyone is doing, and where, and see where the gaps are. They are also able to learn from each other.

The main purpose for evaluation must be accountability to the people as well as donors. A JHIE would be feasible in South Sudan at the moment, before referendum to assess the impact of humanitarian activities since 2005

**AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT**

There are several NGOs supporting agriculture in the area, in terms of farmer group support, provision of seeds, forestry, among others.

Evaluations should find out whether the intervention is useful, and how can it be improved.

Facilitating factors for joint evaluations include farmers’ willingness to give feedback in order to ensure improvement for improved livelihoods. The constraints will however be the fact that there is little understanding of issues among the people, and therefore the possibility of getting wrong information.

The main purpose for joint evaluation should be accountability to donors and the affected population.

There are no institutions that carry out evaluations, but they are normally done during workshops.

Main source of information is from different departments at the county office, depending on the sector that one is interested in. information can also be found at the Local Authority office.
Evaluation by looking at intervention results are not feasible, one must go to the project area for proper results. Any evaluation about agriculture should be done at the end of the season in order to know the challenges and prepare for the next season.

EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
There have been several evaluations done in education sector, however there was concern that the department has not been involved, and the results of evaluations are not shared with the department, except during coordination meetings. Acknowledges the importance of evaluations, and recommends that the main purpose for evaluations should be accountability to the donor as well as to the beneficiaries. Joint evaluations are hampered by poor road network, which lead to inaccessibility of most of program areas during the better part of the year. Timing for evaluations should be at the end of the year, or end of the project life.

MAGWI PAYAM ADMINISTRATOR
Has previously been involved in evaluation with some agencies, and they were able to identify achievements and challenges. The experience was good as people appreciated the intervention, and gave feedback on the issues that they would have wanted to be done differently. The evaluation worked well because they were able to correct mistakes. The purpose of joint evaluation should be project assessment, but more prominent should be accountability to donors and the community involved. This will lead to sustainability of the projects. Local NGO carry out evaluations, but their capacities are inadequate, and therefore there is need for more experienced institutions to do proper evaluations in the area. Evaluations done by looking at intervention results are not feasible, efforts must be made to reach program areas. Information can be found at NGO offices, Payam Administrator’s office and chiefs. Joint impact evaluation should be done at the end of this year (2010).

CONSULTATIONS WITH AFFECTED POPULATION IN MAGWI COUNTY

i. Kirio Boma
Participants in Kirio community would like to focus more on livelihood, gender equality and protection initiatives. This somehow differs from different groups. While the youth focus was mainly on livelihoods interventions, women preferred to focus more on gender equality and protection, as well as life saving initiatives, e.g. child and maternal health. A livelihood was also mentioned among women. The community would be willing to participate in JHIE. This would be done through organizing community meetings as well focus group discussions. The different groups including men, women, youth and the elders would be represented. There are informal indigenous methods of gathering information including the Boma Development Committee and the Boma chief.

Amiga Boma any further information from this community?
Several NGOs work in this area providing various services. This community would also be willing to participate in joint evaluation as they feel it is important to take stock and
appreciate strengths as they also find where the gaps exist and how to turn them into strengths.
The community would like to participate through community meetings and focus group discussions, although would not rule out individual interviews especially with opinion leaders.

ii. **Palwong’a Boma**

The most important topics for this area as recommended by the affected population are livelihoods and life saving initiatives, e.g food aid for returnees, health facilities, especially drugs supply, education and literacy and water, gender equality among others. Joint evaluation will be appreciated in this community, and the locals are willing to participate either through community meetings, focus group discussions or as individuals. A functioning Boma committee also exists, and the community is willing to give them mandate to represent them.
Depending on the timing of the evaluations, all groups would like to participate, including men, women, youth and elders.

4. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

a) **Recommendations From Affected Population**

- Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation is very important, and should be done from time to time to ensure that interventions are achieving their objectives

- Affected populations should be involved in planning, implementation of evaluations of any humanitarian interventions

- Feed back during consultations must be taken positively, and put into action in order for the people to know that their ideas are important

- After evaluations, the population should also receive a report of what the findings are, and what is going to be done about it

b) **Recommendations From Local NGOs**

- Supports the idea of JHIE, and that it should be done from time to time

- Local NGOs and CBOs working in intervention areas should take part in joint evaluations
✓ Once carrying out joint evaluations, partners, especially Local NGOs should not be undermined, but their contribution should be appreciated.

✓ Timing for JHIE should be taken into consideration. This is due to poor roads that are impassable during rainy season, which makes some parts of the country unreachable.

✓ A consortium, that will also include members of National NGOs, should be formed to oversee JHIE.

c) **Recommendations From Local Authorities**

✓ Supports JHIE.

✓ JHIE should be done before referendum in order to know the impact of humanitarian intervention in South Sudan since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, and where to make changes after referendum.

✓ Local Authorities should be involved in joint evaluations.

✓ Feedback should be given to authorities for them to know to know what is going on in their areas.

✓ Evaluations must be carried out at grassroots level, i.e. where the intervention is being carried out to find out the feedback from beneficiaries.

5. **CONCLUSION**

Although majority of the respondents in these consultations appreciate the work and assistance that International agencies have been doing in Southern Sudan for many years, there is a general feeling that there is need for these agencies to come together and evaluate the impact of their interventions in order to establish the results of humanitarian action. Most respondents would like to know the humanitarian action has impacted on the lives of the beneficiaries, and what need to be done differently.

Facilitating factors that were pointed out include the general willingness of stakeholders including authorities, affected population and local NGOs; availability of records and various sources of information, and the fact that there is a possibility of pulling resources together (human and financial).

The main constraint that was pointed out was the state of the roads, which are almost impassable during the most part of the year. This could hinder movements for JHIE. Local capacities for monitoring and evaluation are non-existent and therefore efforts should be made to source for external sources.
Appropriate methodology for affected population should be qualitative mixed with quantitative methodology. In gathering and analyzing of data, beneficiaries would like to be involved through participatory methodology. A JHIE will be feasible in Southern Sudan because most stakeholders, including the authorities, Local NGOs and the affected population would be willing to participate in this process. However, there would be a number of challenges to this process, given the enormous size of the country, the poor road network, inadequate understanding of issues among the population among others.
A random selection methodology was employed. Villages were randomly selected after discussions with the SSRRC County Representative (in Torit County) and the Payam chief (in Magwi County) and consultations with the local NGOs. This was a deliberate effort to avoid bias in the selection of affected population by relying on information from implementing agencies. Once in the bomas, the boma chief was requested to randomly summon the people, after which groups were formed for focus group discussions. Two groups were formed in every boma.

Individual interviews were held with key stakeholders who included chiefs, opinion leaders, and boma committee members. Could you include the approximate number of affected people in the consultations in each community?

Discussions were also held with Local Authority representatives including Payam Administrators, County Executive Directors, SSRRC personnel, Local Authority Departments’ Staff among others.

Also interviewed were the Local NGO representatives in the two counties. In the selection of Local NGOs, experience in monitoring and evaluation, especially existence of monitoring and evaluation unit was taken into consideration.

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ANNEX 2: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of Participant</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization Represented</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Jonathan Odongi</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
<td>SSRRC Eastern Equatoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Victor Otiong’o</td>
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<td>SSRRC Torit County</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Tito Agaho Oturo</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>AIC</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Fr. Peter Amayo</td>
<td>In Charge - Education</td>
<td>CDOT</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>David Origa</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Torit County</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Jimmy Killanga</td>
<td></td>
<td>SARRA (Local NGO)</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Mike Nucta</td>
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<td>SARRA (Local NGO)</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Santa Auma</td>
<td></td>
<td>St. Monica Women Organization</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Affected population</td>
<td>Boma Chief</td>
<td>Opinion Leader</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Odikye Boma</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Louis Oburo</td>
<td>Odikye</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Victor</td>
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<td>John Oromo</td>
<td>Hiyala Boma</td>
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<td>Hilaya Boma</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Obwana James</td>
<td>Tirrang’ore</td>
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<td>Tirrang’ore Boma</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Emmanuel Mono Duku</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Ersilia Lakulu Omek</td>
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<td>Jino Oku Mark</td>
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<td>Alexander Kenyi</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Jonson Okela Anthony</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Walter Achan Tabor</td>
<td>Kirio Boma</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Dominic Edema</td>
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<td>Amiga Boma</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Palwang’a Boma</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Hellen Ída</td>
<td>Magwi Payam</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Olga Eunice Odera</td>
<td>Magwi Payam</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Joseph Wani</td>
<td>Magwi Payam</td>
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JOINT HUMANITARIAN IMPACT EVALUATION

CONSULTATION WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES, CAMP AND SITE COMMITTEES AND THE AFFECTED POPULATION IN HAITI

November 2010

François Grunewald
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Nearly ten months have passed since the devastating earthquake in Haiti, which created one of the worst urban disasters of recent times. What has happened in those ten months? With 1.3 million people still living in very precarious conditions, there is growing demand for an impact evaluation in many circles within and outside Haiti.

The Inter – Agency Working Group on Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation (JHIE) launched a series of consultations to gather views and opinions from different contexts about the potential of Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation (JHIE). This report presents findings from consultation of the Haitian population on this issue. It complements a second report which presents the views of humanitarian stakeholders in Haiti.

Groupe URD was entrusted with the task of carrying out these two consultations which took place at a time when Haiti was affected by a number of important events:

- The country was preparing for presidential, senatorial and parliamentary elections. Electoral campaigns began on 18 October and are slowly growing in intensity;
- The first anniversary of the earthquake was approaching and emotion was growing as a consequence;
- An outbreak of cholera suddenly changed the situation and put everyone back into emergency mode.

In the context of a potentially explosive epidemic, movements had to be restricted, reducing the possibility of carrying out a fully-fledged study and forcing the consultation facilitator to be more innovative in his approach.

Consultations took place with three municipal teams (Petion Ville, Carrefour and Leogane). Focus groups were organized in three sites. Site coordination committees were interviewed by telephone thanks to the comprehensive list of camps managed by IOM, which includes the telephone numbers of site committee members.

Several key points emerged from these consultations: COULD SAY THAT OVERALL THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR CARRYING OUT A jhie, AS NOTED IN SECTION 3?

- People want to know why they are being consulted by the aid sector for the impact evaluation when they were not consulted on issues of importance for survival and basic well-being;
- How will the JHIE findings be made public and available for open discussion?
- Many people find that the aid is so fragmented (in some places there are as many as 6 agencies working on the same site) that the “joint” part should start much earlier than the evaluation stage. They feel that joint planning, joint distributions, etc. are more meaningful than joint evaluations.
The local people interviewed (local authorities, population and NGOs) were surprised to learn that evaluations also exist which do not assess impact and had difficulty understanding the objective of such evaluations. There was also a certain amount of scepticism about the real purpose of the JHIE. People have already seen many visitors passing through, with so little done after their departure... They wonder if the JHIE will have the same impact on them as all the other visits.

PLEASE INCLUDE THE LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE END OF THE REPORT, INCLUDING THE NUMBER OF AFFECTED PEOPLE INTERVIEWED IN EACH CATEGORY.
1. METHODOLOGY AND CONSTRAINTS

Due to the particular events taking place at the time of the research, an ad-hoc methodology was designed in order to cope with the challenges of the context and to ensure that the findings remained of a reasonable quality. It became clear that semantic clarification was needed early on in the process, based on the earlier experience of the stakeholder consultation. Whenever necessary, the terminology used was explained:

- **Joint**: “inter-agency or multi-donor”
- **Humanitarian**: “action which takes place during the crisis and the immediate post-crisis phase”. The idea of humanitarian action is difficult in Haiti as the level of vulnerability and poverty is often above the crisis threshold.
- **Impact**: the impact of aid can be either positive or negative. It often depends on initial assumptions. It also depends on who is impacted by what. The issue of free health care came up several times in the discussions as having both a positive impact on the population – especially those who could not afford healthcare prior to the earthquake - and a very negative impact on private health structures and their personnel (some have had to close and personnel have migrated overseas).
- **Evaluation** is understood here to be an ex-post process or a real-time external process which aims to assess completed or on-going actions.
- In order to select the areas where surveys were to be carried out and the people to interview, a typology of the areas to visit was established. First of all, a number of zones were established. These were:
- Within metropolitan Port-au-Prince:
  - Wealthy areas that were not too affected: Petion Ville
  - Poor areas that were very affected: Carrefour
- Outside Port-au-Prince: Léogane

On the basis of earlier work done by the International Organisation for Migration which runs the Camp Coordination and Management Cluster (CCCM), sites for interviews were chosen on the following basis:

- Large camp: Champs de Mars
- Small camps: sites in Bristou Bobin and in Martisan
- Areas with tents but no site: the area known as “Quartier Militaire” and Carrefour Feuille

With cholera cases being confirmed in certain parts of Port-au-Prince and the risk of an epidemic, it was decided that the survey team would limit its movements, in accordance with advice from the WHO and discussions with the OCHA office in Haiti. It was possible to conduct several meetings in the form of face to face semi-structured interviews. Two Haitian consultants, Timoté Darroville and Searjeanne Jean-Julien (a man and a woman) were recruited to carry out a series of telephone
interviews, limiting the amount of direct interaction and to help with language in
discussions with the affected population. How many people were consulted?
With the large data bank of camp committee members’ names and telephone numbers, it was possible to carry out most interviews by phone. To ensure that certain special cases, such as disabled people, could be interviewed, Digicel telephone air time units were transferred to the camp committee telephones. This meant that phone calls could be carried out more privately. As the camp committee data bank included the names and telephone numbers of women members, a certain number of them were contacted directly.

The drawback of this approach was that it limited the possibility of conducting proper focus groups.

2. BACKGROUND TO THE CONSULTATION AREA

It is important to qualify the context in order to define the field of application of the conclusions and recommendations: it would be good if this background information could be tied to the consultation responses

Culture: The Haitian context is characterized by cultural and political complexity. The country’s vivid cultural life is strongly rooted in traditional Voodoo, which has been enriched by different layers of religious and cultural influence and continues to be affected by the memory of slavery.

Poverty and inequality: Haiti is the poorest country in the Caribbean. 72 per cent of the population lives on less than two US dollars a day and the mortality rate due to complications during childbirth is the highest in the region. There is a high level of social inequality, with a few families owning a large portion of the nation’s wealth. As a result, most Haitians do not have access to quality services.

High vulnerability, high resilience: Over the past decades, natural disasters of all kinds have regularly struck Haiti. Poverty, ecological degradation and limited development have made the country extremely vulnerable to the effects of these disasters. Landslides frequently disturb the flow of people and goods. Hurricanes and tropical storms are regular occurrences, taking their toll on the population and the economy. Migration has been a key survival strategy, and remittances from the Diaspora are an essential source of financial resources for many Haitians. This has been further amplified since the earthquake.

A troubled recent history but gradual consolidation of the State: Haiti has had a troubled recent past. Political violence in the years 2000-2005 was the consequence of internal political problems, international military interventions and difficulties in establishing the rule of law. In 2004, the Integrated UN Stabilization Mission for Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established to strengthen security, governance and the rule of law. Most international and Haitian actors recognize the persistent weakness of the Haitian State, although progress has been made in recent years.

Mainly private basic services and a relatively weak public system: Most of the health, education and water services in Haiti are managed by private structures of different sizes.
Government ministries try to define policies and run a few public services with the assistance of international actors.
The Haiti earthquake of 12 January 2010: an exceptional event and a constrained response: With an estimated death toll of about 230,000 people, about 300,000 injured, many seriously, 1.2 million homeless in Port-au-Prince alone and about two million people displaced, many to rural areas, the disaster was as deadly as the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, but concentrated in a single area. Again, can this information be linked to the consultations? What is the effect of local context on people’s responses?

Several factors contributed to the scale of the disaster:

- Though only of magnitude 7 on the Richter scale, the location of the earthquake’s epicentre only ten kilometres under the surface and close to the southern peninsula coast meant that it hit the country’s urban settlements, from the centre of the bay of Gonaïves (Gressier, Léogâne, Carrefour) to Jacmel, with great force.

- The earthquake hit the national capital. Port-au-Prince, the nerve centre of the country, was badly affected by the earthquake. Government buildings and the UN’s main offices were close to large fault lines and thus largely destroyed.

- Modern housing construction and the absence of earthquake-resistant construction norms. Modern housing construction did not incorporate earthquake-resistant norms and focused on hurricane resistance which transformed many houses made of concrete blocks into deadly traps. By contrast, traditional wooden houses and light constructions in slums resisted better.

- Institutions were both victims of the disaster and actors in the response. After the earthquake, the already weak Haitian State found itself with an even further reduced capacity to take charge of the disaster response. In addition to the huge loss of life and damage to infrastructure, state capacity was limited by the fact that, understandably, the priority for many civil servants was to look for their loved ones and to meet their basic needs in terms of shelter, water, food and safety. The United Nations and international NGOs alike had not only to respond to the emergency but to deal with wounded, traumatized and homeless staff.

- Communication problems. As happens frequently in natural disasters, telecommunication networks within the country and with the outside world broke down. Skype and internet continued to work, albeit intermittently. Very rapidly, various mechanisms were established, including web-based and SMS-based communication systems which allowed the Diaspora and the Haitian population to communicate about the whereabouts of friends and relatives.

- The US Army took control of the airspace, regulated air traffic and also patrolled the streets with the MINUSTAH. This gave many Haitians the impression that the aid community did not trust and were afraid of the Haitian population.

- Security. Already before the earthquake, the UN had classified Haiti as a security Phase 3 (out of 5) environment and a “non-family duty station.” This stood in contrast with development actors who considered Haiti to be a relatively calm posting in recent years. This situation further limited the access that the aid community had to the Haitian
population and increased the gap between the aid community in the Log Base and the affected population.

3. FINDINGS

3.1. Findings from the consultation with local authorities

The views of the different municipalities interviewed were similar on many points, with a few notable exceptions. Though municipal representatives welcomed the idea of impact evaluation and were enthusiastic about the idea of taking part, a recurring theme was the bitterness that they felt about not having been involved and consulted in the earlier phases of the response.

Petion Ville: “Petion Ville used to be and still is the residential area of Greater Port-au-Prince. Many agencies are once again living in Petion Ville, but they have not made the effort to come to us for advice. Even in front of our Town Hall in Petion Ville, there is a big displaced persons’ site and agencies working there have not even crossed the street to discuss with us. The only exception is in the field of water and sanitation because the DINEPA is strong and has the weight needed to coordinate NGOs at the national, departmental and communal levels.”

Carrefour: “The only agencies which made an effort to engage with us early on were those who were already in the areas before the earthquake. We knew them and we collaborated immediately. But we do not know about the others. How can we then be involved in evaluating their work if we do not know what they have done and why and with what objectives?” In the upper part of Carrefour, there was quite a lot of insecurity because it was used as a hiding place by gang members and other convicts who escaped from the central prison when it collapsed on 12 January. Field work in these areas has not been easy and staff from the local administration simply do not venture into certain areas like Fontamara. Great care will need to be taken to carry out field work for an impact evaluation in these areas. UN staff are not welcome because of the role of MINUSTAH. Particular care needs to be taken in establishing the JHIE team IN WHAT SORT OF WAYS? as there are “image issues” which could affect the evaluators’ security.

Leogane: The centre of the city and a large part of the surrounding peri-urban settlements suffered heavy losses. For a long time, the local authorities have had two faces: the Crisis Committee, largely made up of civil society representatives and local entrepreneurs, and the Municipal Council and the Civil Protection Municipal Department. At one stage, the Municipal Council felt as if they were strangers in their own municipality: “We had to call the NGOs to organize a meeting to find out what they were doing. We often don’t receive reports of what has been achieved. How can we be involved in a JHIE in these conditions?”

The municipal authorities all felt that before they could be involved constructively in a JHIE, they would need:
- Information about what has been achieved, what the objectives were and why;
- Information about the type of needs assessments which were conducted and their conclusions and recommendations;
- Capacity building and logistical support, as they have only limited human resources and means of transportation.

It should be mentioned that the municipal authorities have limited experience of evaluation and are not familiar with the differences between regular evaluations, impact evaluations, joint impact evaluations, etc. Though all the interviewees recognized the importance of evaluations to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the work done, they did not really know how to adopt evaluation results in their daily work. Low impact and poor results are often linked to issues which are far-removed from their field of action such as delayed funding from the donor or high staff turnover within NGOs or UN agencies, etc. It is another matter to know what to do with these lessons.

Another issue which came up particularly in Petion Ville is the economic impact of the presence of the aid community. Though employment has been created, rents and other prices have gone up, making life difficult for the average Haitian. "Are you ready to include this issue in a global JHIE?" was a frequently raised question.

There is also a certain amount of fear that the results of the JHIE could be used as a political weapon against the authorities with presidential, senatorial and parliamentary elections due to take place in the near future (November for the first round and January for the second round) and municipal elections due next year.

### 3.2. **Findings from the consultation with local committees**

Local committees are vital components of neighbourhood life in Port-au-Prince. The idea of a JHIE of post-earthquake operations inspired both interest and suspicion amongst almost all the Camp committee members who were interviewed. The initial reaction of the committee leaders was “c’est affaire de blancs” (it is white man’s business), because many of these committees are still very frustrated by the way they were treated during the early phases of the relief operation. They wonder why they are being interviewed about a JHIE at this late stage when they were not consulted before about people’s needs.

One of the critical issues which came up was the question of what activities and what period of the response should be evaluated. The context is constantly changing. How can the impact of operations done 6 months ago when people were under tarpaulins be evaluated when they are now in self-built, makeshift T shelters? The idea that evaluations involve the critical analysis of operations is well understood. The committee members interviewed explained that so many things went wrong that the whole operation deserves to be the object of a very thorough lesson learning exercise.

They also said that most of the changes could not be attributed to the aid response alone and that improvements in living conditions were more the result of efforts by the population than the work of aid agencies. They thus very clearly raised the question of “attribution”.
According to several committee members, one of the most complex issues will be to analyse the psychosocial impact of the long months spent in sites: what impact have these months of promiscuity in the camps had on people's lives, social relations, and on perceptions of their culture, of people's appearance, of age, of existing disabilities, etc. What methodology can be used for this type of impact assessment which is considered by social workers and community members to be more important than assessing the health or economic impact (cash for work)? Interviewees also had doubts about how the “joint” part of JHIE would actually function. They had witnessed so much competition between aid actors in their sites and camps that it was not obvious to them that these different actors could really work together for a joint evaluation.

The site committee members were interested in taking part in the JHIE exercise and helping in terms of interaction with people in sites. However, they pointed out that they did not have the competencies or the financial means to do so. Most of the work that they do is voluntary and is often done at the expense of their own livelihoods. This should be taken into account if the JHIE process wants to engage operationally with this key group within the population of Port-au-Prince.

### 3.3. Findings from the consultation with the population

The findings have been disaggregated into four categories:
- Women,
- Disabled people
- Men
- Children.

#### 3.3.1. Women

Women have always played a critical role in the daily survival of the Haitian family. Though many of the programmes were implemented through them (food distribution until March, etc.), they were only marginally consulted. The women interviewed welcomed the idea of an impact evaluation, but pointed out that the impact of activities carried out during the first few months was no longer apparent as the situation had evolved. How, for instance, could the impact of the early food distributions be evaluated? How could the impact of the delivery of tarpaulins be assessed when people had constructed their own zinc and wood shelters? Some of them mentioned that in the current context, the impact of receiving a T-shelter from an aid agency could be analyzed by comparing the situation of those who had received one with that of the hundreds who had received nothing.

The women also mentioned that it was very difficult for them to ensure that their children were properly taken care of while they were carrying out their normal economic activities. Before the earthquake, there had been hundreds of small kindergartens where they had been able to leave their children for the day. If they are to take part in focus groups or other types of interviews for the JHIE, this will have to be organized in a way that allows them to organize proper childcare. The
women also expressed the hope that JHIE would not only focus on impact, but would also be a chance for them to express their views about the aid system and the behaviour of certain aid agencies.

3.3.2. Disabled people

Disabled people in Haiti have always been discriminated against and are very much looked down upon. They are referred to as “kokobé”, which means “useless”. Therefore it was important to include them in the consultation.

Programmes which do not take disabled people into account will either have very little or no impact on them, and may even be detrimental to them. On the other hand, programmes which acknowledge their existence and understand their specific problems often have an immediate and very significant impact. For them, the critical issue is whether JHIE can be used to advocate in their favour.

The work done by Handicap International and local NGOs with the National Secretary of Disability (himself a blind person) was regularly praised as an example of how relief programmes can be made disability sensitive during operations. JHIE could be a way of identifying good practice and success stories of this kind and disseminating them more effectively. Whether or not joint evaluation is better at doing this than single agency evaluation is not clear.

3.3.3. Men

For the men interviewed, the issue of humanitarian impact evaluation is very much linked to livelihoods and cash for work programmes and shelter/human settlement issues.

Cash for work and livelihoods programmes: The men were very critical of these programmes because they considered that the number of days it was possible to enrol was too short to have a real impact. They felt that these programmes should be a top priority for impact evaluation. Some mentioned that there are regular reports about CFW programmes in the local press and on the MINUSTAH radio, but that what is reported does not match with their own experience. The men were very keen that their views should be taken into account in an impact evaluation of this type of programme.

Shelter and human settlement: Many of the men mentioned that this sector is very complicated with an extremely complex system of different types of land tenure, housing rights and renting habits. They expressed concern that the aid strategy may end up making life even more difficult for informal tenants.

One of the men interviewed mentioned that the fact that many services were free was good at the beginning, but not in the long run. He explained that free water distribution in camps had compromised the management of the old water kiosks. How can the longer-term possible negative impact of aid be measured in this respect?
3.3.4. Children

Children are rarely involved in evaluations and “JHIE” is a complicated concept for them. However, they wanted to be able to explain the pride they had felt when they had been able to go back to school in their clean uniforms.

The children interviewed also mentioned how sad they were when they thought about their friends who had lost their lives: “Sometimes, we don’t know what to do when we think of them”. The impact of psychosocial programmes therefore needs to be evaluated properly.
4. RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1. Recommendations from the municipal authorities

✓ The JHIE should be carried out after the next set of elections so it does not interfere with these complex and very sensitive events.

✓ Municipal authorities need to be involved in the JHIE process at all stages. Not only will they be responsible for security around the process, together with the Haitian National Police, they also played a part in the humanitarian response. They therefore want to be involved in any kind of evaluation, including JHIE. One of the impacts to consider is the way NGOs’ behaviour jeopardized the position of the municipalities in some instances.

✓ Municipalities are also responsible for ensuring that different services are properly delivered. There should be special sessions with them during the whole JHIE process and especially at the end when recommendations are formulated.

4.2. Recommendations from the camp committees

a. In view of their knowledge of the situation and the fact that they have been able to follow its progress since the earthquake makes the involvement of camp committees in the JHIE essential. Staff turnover has been so high in most NGOs that they no longer have any institutional memory of the beginning of the operations. It would be impossible to assess the impact of aid without the help of committee members.

b. In order to be able to take part in the JHIE, camp committee leaders will need some training and some support, especially in the form of telephones, etc. to ensure the proper and smooth running of the evaluation.

c. There is a need to ensure that a selection of local camp committees are part of the JHIE steering committee, to ensure that the voice of the population is heard. HOW REPRESENTATIVE ARE THESE LOCAL CAMP COMMITTEES – CAN YOU SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT THIS? DO WE KNOW HOW SUCCESSFUL THEY HAVE BEEN IN SUPPORTING EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF AID?

4.3. Recommendations from the affected population

Two types of recommendations were made:

For Haiti itself

d. Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation is very important, and should be done from time to time to ensure that interventions are achieving their objectives.

e. The findings of evaluations and what is going to be done as a result should be communicated to the population.
For similar situations:
f. It is not good enough to try to involve the affected populations in JHIE if they have not been involved earlier in the aid delivery process: “Nobody asked us what we needed, so why do you want to ask us about the impacts of what you did?”
g. If the population is involved in a JHIE, it is imperative that it receives feedback at the end. The national media should be the primary means of communicating findings and recommendations. New means of communication, such as the film made by Groupe URD as part of the IASC evaluation, which was then shown in Bristou Bobin, should be developed.

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5. CONCLUSION

A JHIE in Haiti will be complex because of the difficulty of establishing what the impact of humanitarian action has been. Many of the problems in post-earthquake Haiti are just magnified forms of problems which existed before.

In addition, there is a widely shared perception that consultation of the population was minimal and that the response itself was very fragmented and not at all coordinated. There is therefore a great deal of scepticism about the aid community’s reasons for undertaking a JHIE and its chances of success.

A JHIE will also be confronted with several technical challenges:

- Evaluating programmes that ended months ago and are no longer relevant due to drastic changes in the situation.
- Ensuring that negative impacts are also properly appraised and their roots investigated.

Other issues which came up at different stages of the consultation and which will need to be taken into account are:

- the presence or absence of psychosocial programmes
- the impact of the large aid presence on the local economy (rent prices, fresh food prices, etc.)
Annex 3 Consultation background papers

Note for participants in country level consultations

Background
Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation (JHIE) has been on the agenda of humanitarian agencies and donors for some time. There have been two joint evaluations analysing system-wide results - the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda completed in 1996, and the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, completed in 2006. There have also been a number of joint evaluations (e.g. on IDPs) and individual agency led impact evaluations. With ongoing pressure to demonstrate that results are being achieved by humanitarian action, the question has arisen as to whether and how evaluations can take place that will assess joint impact. Questions have also arisen as to how impact evaluations can be useful at the country level to governments and humanitarian agencies – and hence to the affected population.

In this context, discussions were held with a number of agencies, and past experience in joint evaluation was reviewed. This led to the idea to engage in consultations with key stakeholders in the first half of 2010, to receive input into advantages and disadvantages of carrying out joint humanitarian impact evaluation at the country/regional level. Consultations are planned in two countries with humanitarian actors and the affected population, as well as at HQ level. An Inter-Agency Working Group on JHIE was formed at a meeting in London in November 2009, made up of OCHA, UNICEF, WFP, ECB, ALNAP, Groupe URD, FAO, and DARA. The purpose of the Working Group is to facilitate the consultation process. A background paper for the consultation process can be found on the OCHA website (Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation: Options Paper): http://ochaonline.un.org/ToolsServices/EvaluationandStudies/ESSReports/tabid/1325/language/en-US/Default.aspx Further resources can be found on the ALNAP website at: http://www.alnap.org/initiatives/current/impactassessments.aspx

The purpose of the consultations is to collectively define feasible approaches to impact evaluation in humanitarian action, which might subsequently be piloted in one to two humanitarian contexts. The challenge for joint impact evaluations is the same for much evaluation work: how to provide useful information to key stakeholders while at the same time providing independent and critical analysis.

Currently there is no agreed definition of impact evaluation in humanitarian settings (although there have been a few attempts to come up with such a definition), or agreement on methodologies which should be used for impact evaluation. This is partly why consultations are being held – to help determine agreement on purpose and methodology. So we propose in the meantime using the OECD-DAC definition of impact: “Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.” Generally when evaluators talk about impact they are referring to longer-term changes in the lives of the affected population.

The proposed method for consultation is either individual meetings, or focus group discussions for 1.5 - 2 hours, with 6-8 people in each group.

The following pages set out questions for discussion with government and humanitarian agencies. A separate note is available for consultation with the affected population.
Discussion questions for Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator, UNCT and clusters, government and civil society

1a. What has your experience been of evaluations to date, including joint evaluations? What has worked well and where have the problems been? What lessons can be drawn from current and previous evaluation practice?

1b. What would be the most useful questions that an evaluation (impact or otherwise) could answer for you right now?

1c. What do you see as the facilitating factors and constraints to joint evaluation? How would different actors (e.g. clusters) be involved?

1d. What would you see as the main purpose of a joint humanitarian impact evaluation, e.g. lesson learning for your ongoing programme and/or accountability to donors and the affected population, and/or generating knowledge for the system as a whole? If a mix of these three purposes, which do you think should be most prominent?

1e. Related to 1d, who would be the main users of joint humanitarian impact evaluation, and how would they use the information? What is the most useful format for them to receive the evaluation findings and recommendations? How should they be involved?

1f. What do you think should be the scale of a joint impact evaluation? Should it cover the whole humanitarian intervention by the international system, or part of this? Should it include government interventions/role of remittances/local efforts? Would it be appropriate to evaluate the CAP, or should a joint impact evaluation go beyond this? At what intervention level would impact best be measured – e.g. cluster, objective or programme?

1g. What are the best methods to use in joint impact evaluation? Do you think that an experimental design using control or comparison groups would be feasible in a humanitarian setting/post-disaster setting? Or do you think qualitative methods using focus groups and key informant interviews (e.g. using proportional piling to explore attribution) are more appropriate? Do you think it would be feasible to combine quantitative and qualitative methods in one evaluation? What should be the level of affected population participation through the evaluation process?

1h. Is there capacity in country to support/carry out effective joint impact evaluation? Would you see a mixed national/international team as appropriate?

1i. What would be appropriate timing for a joint impact evaluation? How long do you think a system-wide joint impact assessment should take from the development of the Terms of Reference to final report?

1j. How will it be possible to make adequate links between needs assessment, ongoing monitoring and a joint humanitarian impact evaluation? Is there adequate baseline data against which to measure progress? If not, what is the next best solution?

1k. Are there any agreed impact level indicators in place?
1l. Which departments, agencies or other actors would be likely to get involved in a joint humanitarian impact evaluation?

1m. What is the optimal coordination arrangement for JHIE, e.g. participation is open to all stakeholders; participation is open to a smaller self-selected group; the joint activity is agreeing a common evaluation framework, and responsibility for implementation of individual evaluations is devolved to different partners?

1n. Should there be an automatic trigger for JHIE, for example when funding reaches a certain level?

1o. Would it be appropriate to carry out a joint impact assessment for this crisis/setting?
Note for participants involved in affected population and local government and national NGO consultation

1. Background

Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation (JHIE) has been on the agenda of humanitarian agencies and donors for some time. There have been two joint evaluations analysing system-wide results - the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda completed in 1996, and the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, completed in 2006. There have also been a number of joint evaluations (e.g. on IDPs), and individual agency led impact evaluations. With ongoing pressure to demonstrate results are being achieved by humanitarian action, the question has arisen as to whether and how evaluations can take place that will assess joint impact. Questions have also arisen as to how impact evaluations can be useful at the country level to governments, humanitarian agencies, and the affected population.

In this context, discussions were held with a number of agencies, and past experience in joint evaluation was reviewed. This led to the idea to engage in consultations with key stakeholders in the first half of 2010, to receive input into advantages and disadvantages of carrying out joint humanitarian impact evaluation at the country/regional level. Consultations are planned in two countries with humanitarian actors and the affected population, as well as at HQ level. An Inter-Agency Working Group on JHIE was formed at a meeting in London in November 2009, made up of OCHA, UNICEF, WFP, ECB, ALNAP, Groupe URD, and DARA. The purpose of the Working Group is to facilitate the consultation process. A background paper for the consultation process can be found on the OCHA website (Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation: Options Paper): http://ochaonline.un.org/ToolsServices/EvaluationandStudies/ESSReports/tabid/1325/language/en-US/Default.aspx Further resources can be found on the ALNAP website at: http://www.alnap.org/initiatives/current/impactassessments.aspx

The purpose of the consultations is to collectively define feasible approaches to impact evaluation in humanitarian action, which might subsequently be piloted in one to two humanitarian contexts. This note sets out some guidelines for consultation with the affected population and local government and NGO staff, recognizing that the focus and methodology of the consultations may need to vary depending on context.

Currently there is no agreed definition of impact evaluation in humanitarian settings (although there have been a few attempts to come up with such a definition), or agreement on methodologies which should be used for impact evaluation. This is partly why consultations are being held – to help determine agreement on purpose and methodology. So we propose in the meantime using the OECD-DAC definition of impact: “Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.” Generally when evaluators talk about impact they are referring to longer-term changes in the lives of the affected population.

2. Consulting with the affected population

The Inter-Agency Working Group is proposing consultations with the affected population, local government and NGO staff. There is a clear mandate for consultation. The
Listening Project found that: “With remarkable consistency across many locations, including areas that have experienced disasters such as the 2004 tsunami, people say that aid agencies should “take more time,” “invest the necessary time,” “go more slowly,” and “listen to people” in order to “learn about the real circumstances,” “get to know people,” and “show respect for people’s ideas and opinions.” The ALNAP State of the System Report concluded that: “People’s desire for greater meaningful participation in planning and implementation is a common theme in consultations with beneficiaries.” A Good Humanitarian Donorship principle is: “Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response.” Similarly the UN Evaluation Group Standards include: “Stakeholders must be identified and consulted when planning the evaluation (key issues, method, timing, responsibilities) and should be kept informed throughout the evaluation process.”

The importance of consultation with the affected population during the planning stage of JHIE should not be underestimated. Time and time again it has been found that international and national aid workers’ priorities are not always the same as those of the affected population, to the serious detriment of humanitarian action. The same is true for evaluation; the priorities and interests of evaluation stakeholders in national capitals may be quite different from those who are planned to be the main focus of impact evaluation. This is not to suggest that affected population views are always correct or consistent, only that they are one set of key stakeholders who should be consulted through the evaluation cycle.

Consultation with the affected population during humanitarian evaluations is generally inadequate, and almost never occurs at the planning stages. There is therefore no widely used methodology developed for consultation with the affected population through the evaluation process, although general participatory methods can be drawn upon. Because this is perhaps a first systematic attempt to consult with the affected population over international evaluation practice before the evaluation has begun, the consultation process needs to be carefully designed and organized.

42 “Listening to Improve the Quality of International Aid”. http://compasquality.org/blog/IMG/pdf/Listening_to_Improve_the_Quality_of_International_Aid.pdf
44 http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/background.asp
45 http://www.uneval.org/normsandstandards/index.jsp?doc_cat_source_id=4. See also e.g. the UNHCR evaluation policy: “UNHCR stakeholders, including refugees whenever possible, participate in the identification, planning, implementation and utilization of evaluation projects; evaluation findings and recommendations are never placed in the public domain without such consultation.”
and OXFAM evaluation policy
46 See among other the numerous studies from the Listening Project
http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project_profile.php?pid=LISTEN&pname=Listening%20Project
3. Consultation with local government staff and local NGOs
These are two other groups whose views are systematically under-represented in evaluations, although local NGOs are often the main implementer of humanitarian action. While they may not be knowledgeable about evaluation practice, their views can still be canvassed as to the worth and focus of JHIE, and their potential participation in it.

4. Focus of the consultation process
It's suggested consultations with the affected population focus on three areas:

The key topics for the evaluation. What are the most important topics that the affected population would like to see as a focus – e.g. immediate life saving initiatives, protection, gender equality, and/or livelihoods? Does this differ between different groups (see below on selecting a representative sample)?

Participation. How would the affected population like to participate in JHIE, if at all? Would they be willing to organize community meetings and/or focus groups? Who would participate (men, women etc)?

Methodology. What kinds of methods are most appropriate, and how would the affected population like to be involved in gathering and analyzing data? Are there any informal indigenous or local methods of gathering impact type information (e.g. community councils)?

5. Methodology for the consultation process with the affected population
Note: a more detailed methodology and key questions for discussion with the affected population will be worked out with consultation facilitators once the consultation locations are established.

Consultation is planned in six communities each in two countries. Consultation would require about 25 days input from one staff member in each country – see the budget breakdown below. Ongoing external support will likely be needed, in particular in setting up the consultations, supporting the development of locally appropriate methodologies, analyzing the data, and writing up the results. The most useful methods are likely to be focus groups and key stakeholder interviews. Local NGOs with experience in participatory methods of working, and which have an M&E unit or officer, would probably be most appropriate for carrying out the consultation, in association with international partners. Following are the steps for consultation:

a. Local facilitators will receive a phone or in-person briefing on the consultation process. Breakdown of timing is as follows:

- Three days will be allocated for briefing, document review, and planning.
- Ten days for initial consultations in six communities, including travel.
- Four days for consultations with local government and local NGOs.
- Three days for writing a first draft report (under 15 pages) and responding to comments. The draft report should include: background to the consultation areas; methodology employed; constraints; main findings in each of the consultation focus areas; main recommendations from the affected population, local government and local NGOs.
- Five days for discussing the results at the community level with three of the communities, and completing the report. The draft and final reports should be in
English. The report should include a one page Executive Summary which should be translated into local languages.

Total input required is 25 days.

b. Select the consultation areas. These should be broadly representative of emergency hit areas, e.g. where representative groups of the affected population are likely to be found. Avoid bias towards particular ethnic groups or geographical locations which have received disproportionate amounts of international aid. Select areas where the CSO is known and trusted.

c. Select the six consultation communities - again these should be broadly representative. Ensure that not all communities are direct recipients of support from the CSO, to promote independent responses.

d. About a day should be spent in each community, holding two focus groups and 6-8 key stakeholder interviews.

e. About half a day should be spent in each location in consultations with local government and local NGOs.

6. Methodology for consultations with local government and local NGOs
Consultations can be held with NGOs either at their HQ and/or at their offices where affected population consultation has taken place. Local government staff should be consulted in their offices. One focus group meeting can be held with each group, or individual interviews can be carried out; consultations can use the questions at the end of this note.

7. Budget
Facilitator fees: US$150 per day x 25 = $3,750
Travel, communication and miscellaneous costs = $1,250

Total per country = $5000
Discussion questions for local government and local NGOs – to be adapted depending on the background of the interviewee

1a. What has your experience been of evaluations to date, including joint evaluations? What has worked well and where have the problems been? What lessons can be drawn from current and previous evaluation practice?

1b. What would be the most useful questions that an evaluation (impact or otherwise) could answer for you right now?

1c. What do you see as the facilitating factors and constraints to joint evaluation? How would different actors (e.g. clusters) be involved?

1d. What would you see as the main purpose of a joint humanitarian impact evaluation, e.g. lesson learning for your ongoing programme and/or accountability to donors and the affected population, and/or generating knowledge for the system as a whole? If a mix of these three purposes, which do you think should be most prominent?

1e. What local capacities are there to carry out evaluation – e.g. research institutes, monitoring and evaluation units?

1f. Would it be feasible to carry out an evaluation looking at the results of different kinds of intervention (e.g. food aid, vouchers, cash)?

1g. What are some key local sources of information, e.g. administrative records, knowledgeable local stakeholders?

1h. What would be appropriate timing for a joint impact evaluation?
Note for participants in HQ agency consultations

Background
Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation (JHIE) has been on the agenda of humanitarian agencies and donors for some time. There have been two joint evaluations analysing system-wide results - the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda completed in 1996, and the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, completed in 2006. There have also been a number of joint evaluations (e.g. on IDPs) and individual agency led impact evaluations. With ongoing pressure to demonstrate that results are being achieved by humanitarian action, the question has arisen as to whether and how evaluations can take place that will assess joint impact. Questions have also arisen as to how impact evaluations can be useful at the country level to governments and humanitarian agencies – and hence to the affected population.

In this context, discussions were held with a number of agencies, and past experience in joint evaluation was reviewed. This led to the idea to engage in consultations with key stakeholders in the first half of 2010, to receive input into advantages and disadvantages of carrying out joint humanitarian impact evaluation at the country/regional level. Consultations are planned in two countries with humanitarian actors and the affected population, as well as at HQ level. An Inter-Agency Working Group on JHIE was formed at a meeting in London in November 2009, made up of OCHA, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, ECB, ALNAP, Groupe URD, HAP-I, and DARA. The purpose of the Working Group is to facilitate the consultation process. A background paper for the consultation process can be found on the OCHA website (Joint Humanitarian Impact Evaluation: Options Paper): http://ochaonline.un.org/ToolsServices/EvaluationandStudies/ESSReports/tabid/1325/la nguage/en-US/Default.aspx Further resources can be found on the ALNAP website at: http://www.alnap.org/initiatives/current/impactassessments.aspx

The Working Group has tentatively selected three countries for consultations with humanitarian actors and the affected population – Sudan, Haiti, and Bangladesh.

The purpose of the consultations is to define collectively feasible approaches to impact evaluation in humanitarian action, which might subsequently be piloted in one to two humanitarian contexts. The challenge for joint impact evaluations is the same for much evaluation work: how to provide useful information to key stakeholders while at the same time providing independent and critical analysis.

Currently there is no agreed definition of impact evaluation in humanitarian settings (although there have been a few attempts to come up with such a definition), or agreement on methodologies which should be used for impact evaluation. This is partly why consultations are being held – to help determine agreement on purpose and methodology.

The proposed method for consultation is group discussions for about 2 hours.

The following page sets out questions for discussion with agency HQ staff. Separate notes are available for consultation with government and humanitarian agencies, and for consultation with the affected population.
Discussion questions agency HQ staff

1a. What would you see as the main purpose of a joint humanitarian impact evaluation in Bangladesh, Haiti, Sudan, or other similar contexts, e.g. lesson learning for your ongoing programme and/or accountability to donors and the affected population, and/or generating knowledge for the system as a whole? If a mix of these three purposes, which do you think should be most prominent? What is the overarching question that you would like to see answered by JHIE?

1b. What is your understanding of “impact”? Does this differ from emergency to emergency? What are the key indicators for measuring impact?

1c. Related to 1a, how would you expect JHIE findings and recommendations would be used in these contexts (Bangladesh, Haiti, Sudan or others similar contexts)? Who are the main users? What is the most useful format for them to receive the evaluation findings and recommendations? How should they be involved?

1d. What do you think should be the scale of a joint impact evaluation in these contexts? Should it cover the whole humanitarian intervention by the international system, or part of this? Should it include government interventions/role of remittances/ local efforts? Would it be appropriate to evaluate the CAP, or should a joint impact evaluation go beyond this? At what intervention level would impact best be measured – e.g. cluster, objective or programme?

1e. What are the best methods to use in joint impact evaluation in these or similar contexts? Do you think that an experimental design using control or comparison groups would be feasible in a humanitarian setting/ post-disaster setting? Or do you think qualitative methods using focus groups and key informant interviews (eg using proportional piling to explore attribution) are more appropriate? Do you think it would be feasible to combine quantitative and qualitative methods in one evaluation? What should be the level of affected population participation through the evaluation process?

1f. Which organizations in country would be best placed to participate in JHIE? What level of government involvement would be appropriate?

1g. What would be the appropriate timing for a joint impact evaluation? How long do you think a system-wide joint impact assessment should take to carry out from the development of the Terms of Reference to final report?

1h. How will it be possible to make adequate links between needs assessment, ongoing monitoring and a joint humanitarian impact evaluation? What is the next best solution if baseline data is not in place?

1i. What is the optimal coordination arrangement for JHIE, e.g. participation is open to all stakeholders; participation is open to a smaller self-selected group; the joint activity is agreeing a common evaluation framework, and responsibility for implementation of individual evaluations is devolved to different partners?

1j. Should there be an automatic trigger for JHIE, for example when funding reaches a certain level?
Annex 4 Methodological learning from the consultations

Consultation with the affected population during humanitarian evaluations is generally inadequate\(^48\), and almost never occurs at the planning stages. There is therefore no widely used methodology developed for consultation with the affected population through the evaluation process, although general participatory methods can be drawn upon. The JHIE consultations were perhaps a first systematic attempt to consult with the affected population over international evaluation practice on a systematic basis before the evaluation has begun.

There is a clear mandate for consultation. The Listening Project (49) found that: “With remarkable consistency across many locations, including areas that have experienced disasters such as the 2004 tsunami, people say that aid agencies should “take more time,” “invest the necessary time,” “go more slowly,” and “listen to people” in order to “learn about the real circumstances,” “get to know people,” and “show respect for people’s ideas and opinions.” The ALNAP State of the System Report (50) concluded that: “People’s desire for greater meaningful participation in planning and implementation is a common theme in consultations with beneficiaries.” A Good Humanitarian Donorship (51) principle is: “Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response.” Similarly the UN Evaluation Group Standards include: “Stakeholders must be identified and consulted when planning the evaluation (key issues, method, timing, responsibilities) and should be kept informed throughout the evaluation process.” (52)

The methodological learnings from the JHIE consultations are as follows:

- Consultation in evaluation design is feasible at relatively low cost. The budget for the affected population consultation in six communities was about US$5,000. In a major joint evaluation this would make up a relatively small part of the overall budget. Those consulted at the evaluation design phase could also be part of an ongoing dialogue with the evaluation team through the evaluation process.

- Working through local organizations is feasible, as long as clear guidelines are provided. However, the contracting process can be slow and adequate time should be allowed for contracting, consultation, and report writing.

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49 “Listening to Improve the Quality of International Aid”. http://compasqualite.org/blog/IMG/pdf/listening_to_improve_the_quality_of_international_aid.pdf
51 http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/background.asp
52 http://www.uneval.org/normsandstandards/index.jsp?doc_cat_source_id=4. See also e.g. the UNHCR evaluation policy: “UNHCR stakeholders, including refugees whenever possible, participate in the identification, planning, implementation and utilization of evaluation projects; evaluation findings and recommendations are never placed in the public domain without such consultation.”
and OXFAM evaluation policy
Affected populations are willing to participate in discussions concerning the planning of evaluations, but want to see results from their participation in terms of change in agency practice. It cannot be assumed that affected people will want to participate in evaluations, in particular if they have seen a lot of international actors coming to their communities and acting in an inappropriate fashion, or if they have experienced prior evaluations but seen little change.

Consultations need to take into account learning from general participatory processes, e.g. the need to organize consultations around the timetables of affected populations, the need to be proactive in ensuring that women participate, and the need to ensure that marginalized groups such as the disabled participate.

Consultations need to take place in areas which are representative of the areas which will be covered by the evaluation.
## Annex 5 International Consultation participants

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Alice Willard, International Relief and Development, was interviewed by phone as she was unable to make the Washington consultation.